Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6177 OF 2004

Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. … Appellant

Versus

Dilbahar Singh … Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2162 OF 2004

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2901 OF 2006

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2005

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7520 OF 2005

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5212 OF 2006

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2859 OF 2006

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3313 OF 2007

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1224 OF 2006

SLP (C) NO.34303 of 2009

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7491 OF 2004

1

Page 2 SLP (C) No.11931 of 2011

SLP (C) No.22248 OF 2007

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7066 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

R.M. LODHA, CJI.

This group of eleven appeals and three special leave petitions

has been referred to the 5-Judge Bench to resolve the conflict into the two

3-Judge Bench decisions one, Rukmini

1

and the other, Ram Dass

2

. Ram

Dass

2

has followed Moti Ram

3

. At the time of hearing of Civil Appeal

No.6177 of 2004, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh,

the 2-Judge Bench, while dealing with the meaning, ambit and scope of

the words “legality and propriety” under Section 15(6) of the Haryana

Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short, ‘the Haryana Rent

Control Act’), was confronted with the question whether the High Court (as

revisional authority) under Section 15(6) could interfere with the findings of

fact of the first appellate Court/first appellate authority. The appellant

relied upon the decision of this Court in Rukmini

1

in support of its

contention that the revisional Court is not entitled to re-appreciate

1

Rukmini Amma Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana and others; [(1993) 1 SCC 499]

2

Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander and others; [AIR 1988 SC 1422]

3

Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan and others; [AIR 1960 SC 655]

2

Page 3 evidence. On the other hand, the respondent pressed into service the

decision of this Court in Ram Dass

2

wherein it has been held that the

expression “legality and propriety” enables the revisional Court to

reappraise the evidence while considering the findings of the first appellate

Court. The 2-Judge Bench felt that there was conflict in the two decisions

and for its resolution referred the matter to the larger Bench. In the

Reference Order (dated August 27, 2009), the 2-Judge Bench observed,

thus:

“Learned counsel for the appellant has placed

reliance on a three Judge Bench decision of this Court in the

case of Rukmini Amma Saradamma Vs. Kallyani Sulochana

And Others (1993) 1 SCC 499 wherein Section 20 of

the Kerala Rent Control Act was in question. It

was held in the said decision that though Section 20 of the

said Act provided that the revisional court can go into the

'propriety' of the order but it does not entitle

the revisional court to re-appreciate evidence. A similar view

was taken by a two Judge bench of this Court in the case of

Ubaiba Vs. Damodaran (1999) 5 SCC, 645.

On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent

has relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Ram

Dass Vs. Ishwar Chander and Others AIR 1988 SC 1422

which was also a three Judge Bench decision. It has been

held in that case that the expression "legality and propriety"

enables the High Court in revisional jurisdiction to re-

appraise the evidence while considering the findings

of the first appellate Court. A similar view was taken by

another three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Moti

Ram Vs. Suraj Bhan and others AIR 1960 SC 655.

From the above it is clear that there are conflicting

views of coordinate three Judge Benches of this Court as to

the meaning, ambit and scope of the expression

'legality and propriety' and whether in revisional jurisdiction

the High Court can re-appreciate the evidence. Hence, we

are of the view that the matter needs to be considered by a

3

Page 4 larger bench since this question arises in a large number of

cases as similar provisions conferring power of revision

exists in various rent control and other legislations, e.g.

Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Accordingly, we direct that the papers be placed before

Hon'ble The Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench.”

2. There are other appeals/SLPs in this group of matters, some

of which arise from the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act,

1965 (for short, ‘the Kerala Rent Control Act’) and the few appeals/SLPs

arise from the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960

(for short, ‘the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act’). These appeals/SLPs

following the Reference Order in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation have

also been referred to the 5-Judge Bench. This is how these matters have

come up before us.

3. It is appropriate to first notice the statutory provisions

pertaining to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the above three

Rent Control Acts. These provisions are not similar to Section 115 of the

Code of Civil Procedure which confers revisional jurisdiction upon the High

Court in the matters arising from the Courts governed by the Code.

4. Section 15 of the Haryana Rent Control Act provides for

appellate and revisional authorities. This provision in the Haryana Rent

Control Act reads as under:

“15. Appellate and revisional authorities.—(1) The State

Government may, by a general or special order, by notification,

confer on such officers and authorities as it may think fit, the

powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such

4

Page 5 area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.

(2) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller

may, within thirty days from the date of such order or such longer

period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be

recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate

authority having jurisdiction. In computing the period of thirty days

the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed

against shall be excluded.

(3) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may

order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on

the appeal.

(4) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending

for the records of the case from the Controller and after giving the

parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after

making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or

through the Controller.

(5) The decisions of the appellate authority and subject to such

decision, the order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be

liable to be called in question in any court of law except as provided

in sub-section (6) of this section.

(6) The High Court as revisional authority, may at any time, on

its own motion or on the application of any aggrieved party, made

within a period of ninety days, call for and examine the record

relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under this Act for

the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such

order or proceedings and may pass such order in relation thereto

as it may deem fit. In computing the period of ninety days the time

taken to obtain a certified copy of the order shall be excluded.”

5. In the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, Section 23 and Section

25 provide for appeal and revision, respectively. Since we are concerned

with the scope of revisional power, it is not necessary to reproduce the

appellate provision. Section 25, which deals with revisional power, reads

as under:

5

Page 6 “25. Revision.—(1) The High Court may, on the

application of any person aggrieved by an order of the

Appellate Authority, call for and examine the record of

the Appellate Authority, to satisfy itself as to the

regularity of such proceeding or the correctness, legality

or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and

if, in any case, it appears to the High Court that any

such decision or order should be modified, annulled,

reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass

orders accordingly.

(2)Every application to the High Court for the

exercise of its power under sub-section (1) shall be

preferred within one month from the date on which the

order or proceeding to which the application relates is

communicated to the applicant:

Provided that the High Court may, in its

discretion, allow further time not exceeding one month

for the filing of any such application, if it is satisfied that

the applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the

application within the time specified in this sub-section.”

6. The provision for appeal is contained in the Kerala Rent

Control Act in Section 18 while Section 20 of that Act deals with the

revisional jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act reads as

under:

“20. (1) In cases where the appellate authority empowered

under section 18 is a Subordinate judge, the District Court,

and in other cases the High Court, may, at any time, on the

application of any aggrieved party, call for and examine the

records relating to any order passed or proceedings taken

under this Act by such authority for the purpose of satisfying

itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such order or

proceedings, and may pass such order in reference thereto

as it thinks fit.

(2)The costs of and incident to all proceedings before

the High Court or District Court under sub-section (1) shall

6

Page 7 be in its discretion.“

7. A careful reading of the text of the above three provisions will

show that under Section 15(6) of the Haryana Rent Control Act, the High

Court as revisional authority, may suo motu or on the application of an

aggrieved party, call for and examine the record relating to any order

passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the purpose of satisfying

itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may

pass such order as it may deem fit. The Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act

provides that the High Court on the application of an aggrieved person

may call for and examine the record of the appellate authority to satisfy

itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or

propriety of any decision or order passed therein. The High Court in

exercise of its revisional power may modify, annul or reverse the order or

decision impugned before it or remit the matter for re-consideration. In the

Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the High Court has no power to act suo

motu. The Kerala Rent Control Act provides that the High Court on the

application of an aggrieved party may call for and examine the record

relating to any order passed or proceedings taken under the Act for the

purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality, regularity or propriety of such

order or proceedings and pass any order that it deems fit. Like the Tamil

Nadu Rent Control Act, the Kerala Rent Control Act also does not

empower the High Court to act suo motu. Though, there is some difference

7

Page 8 in the language of the revisional provision in the above three statutes but,

in our opinion, the revisional power of the High Court under the above Rent

Control Acts is substantially similar and not significantly different.

8. Before we embark upon an inquiry to find out the ambit and

scope of the revisional power of the High Court under these Rent Control

Acts, we may quickly observe that in this reference, we have to really

determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or

propriety”, “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and “legality,

regularity or propriety”. Obviously, this will determine the extent of the

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the respective Rent Control

statutes and will also include the consideration of the question whether the

High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction can re-appreciate the

evidence in order to find out the correctness, legality or propriety of the

impugned order or decision.

9. The scope of revisional jurisdiction under various Rent Control

Acts has fallen for consideration in many cases before this Court. One of

the earlier decisions in the long line of such cases is Moti Ram

3

. The 3-

Judge Bench of this Court in Moti Ram

3

had an occasion to consider the

extent of revisional power of the High Court under Section 15(5) of the

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (3 of 1949) which reads: “…

The High Court may, at any time, on the application of any aggrieved party

or on its own motion, call for and examine the records relating to any order

8

Page 9 passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the purpose of satisfying

itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or proceedings and may

pass such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.” Having regard to

this provision, the Court noted the revisional power of the High Court in the

following words:

“…the revisional power conferred upon the High Court under

Section 15(5) is wider than that conferred by Section 115 of

the Code of Civil Procedure. Under Section 15(5) the High

Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of

the order under revision and that would clearly justify the

examination of the propriety or the legality of the finding made

by the authorities...”

10. Before we refer to the other cases of this Court, we feel that

the weighty observations made by the 2-Judge Bench in Dattonpant

4

may

be noted. The Court while dealing with findings of fact recorded by the

appellate court under the Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961 referred to

Section 50 of that Act which conferred upon the High Court revisional

power. The Court observed:

“It is true that the power conferred on the High

Court under Section 50 is not as narrow as the revisional

power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code

of Civil Procedure. But at the same time it is not wide

enough to make the High Court a second court of first

appeal.”

(emphasis supplied by us)

11. In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works

5

, the 2-Judge Bench of this

4

Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagaval; [(1975) 2 SCC 246]

5

M/s. Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works and others v. Rangaswamy Chettiar; [(1980) 4 SCC 259]

9

Page 10 Court while considering the scope of Section 25 of Tamil Nadu Rent

Control Act followed Dattonpant

4

and while doing so, the Court also

articulated the distinction between “appellate jurisdiction” and “revisional

jurisdiction”. In paragraph 2 (page 261 of the Report), the Court stated as

follows:

“2. ‘Appeal’ and ‘revision’ are expressions of common

usage in Indian statute and the distinction between

‘appellate jurisdiction’ and ‘revisional jurisdiction’ is well

known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate

jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as

fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction

may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has

been done in the case of second appeal under the Code of

Civil Procedure, and under some Rent Acts in some States.

Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a

power of superintendence and may sometimes be exercised

even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of

revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring

such jurisdiction. The conferment of revisional jurisdiction is

generally for the purpose of keeping tribunals subordinate to

the revising Tribunal within the bounds of their authority to

make them act according to law, according to the procedure

established by law and according to well defined principles

of justice. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood

with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate

jurisdiction but not vice versa. These are general

observations. The question of the extent of appellate or

revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with

reference to the language employed by the statute.”

While dealing with revisional power under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu

Rent Control Act, the Court said in paragraph 3 (page 262 of the Report)

as under:

“The language of Section 25 is indeed very wide. But

we must attach some significance to the circumstance that

both the expressions ‘appeal’ and ‘revision’ are employed in

10

Page 11 the statute. Quite obviously, the expression ‘revision’ is

meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction

than that conveyed by the expression ‘appeal’. In fact it has

to be noticed that under Section 25 the High Court calls for

and examines the record of the appellate authority in order

to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the

incorporation of the words ‘to satisfy itself’ under Section 25

appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court

under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence.

Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section

25, the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with

findings of fact merely because it does not agree with the

finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on

the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings

(Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the

revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the

Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untwalia, J., in

Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Maruthirao

Janagaval; “it is not wide enough to make the High Court a

second Court of first appeal”.

Pertinently, in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works

5

, the Court said in

unequivocal words that concurrent findings, based on evidence, cannot be

touched upon by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of

the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act.

12. In Krishnamachari

6

, the Court followed Sri Raja Lakshmi

Dyeing Works

5

while considering the scope of revisional power under

Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act.

13. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Dass

2

was concerned

with the revisional power of the High Court under Section 15(5) of the East

Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. Inter alia, the Court noted the

earlier judgments of this Court in Dattonpant

4

and Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing

6

P.R Krishnamachari v. Lalitha Ammal; [1987 (Supp) SCC 250]

11

Page 12 Works

5

and observed as under:

“On the first contention that the revisional powers do

not extend to interference with and upsetting of findings of

fact, it needs to be observed that, subject to the well known

limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions, the matter

essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the

jurisdiction. The decisions relied upon by Shri Harbans Lal,

deal, in the first case, with the limitations on the scope of

interference with findings of fact in second appeals and in

the second, with the limitation on the revisional powers

where the words in the statute limit it to the examination

whether or not the order under revision is “according to law”.

The scope of the revisional powers of the High Court, where

the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is

“according to law” is considered by Beaumont, C.J. in Bell &

Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj (AIR 1938 Bom 223) a case

referred to with approval by this Court in Hari Shankar v.

Girdhari Lal Chowdhury (AIR 1963 SC 698)

But here, Section 15(5) of the Act enables the High

Court to satisfy itself as to the “legality and propriety” of the

order under revision, which is, quite obviously, a much wider

jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in

appropriate cases, to examine the correctness of the

findings of facts also, though the revisional court is not “a

second court of first appeal”

(emphasis supplied by us)

14. In Rukmini

1

, the scope of revisional power under Section 20 of

the Kerala Rent Control Act fell for consideration before a 3-Judge Bench.

The Bench considered the provision of Section 20 of that Act, vis-à-vis,

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held as under:

“As far as the present Act is concerned Section 20

contains the word “propriety” also. As to the meaning of the

word “propriety” in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of

Madras (1956 SCR 256) at page 264 it was held thus:

12

Page 13 “The word ‘propriety’ has nowhere been

defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of

meanings. In the Oxford English Dictionary (Vol. VIII),

it has been stated to mean ‘fitness; appropriateness;

aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the

circumstances or conditions; conformity with

requirements, rule or principle; rightness, correctness,

justness, accuracy’.”

Therefore, the question would be whether in the

context of this provision the High Court was right in re-

appreciating the evidence and coming to a different

conclusion? In the impugned judgment in paragraph 7 the

High Court observed:

“Under Section 20 of the Act though re-appreciation of

the evidence as such is not called for, the pleadings

and evidence have to be examined to satisfy the

legality, regularity of the order of the lower

authorities.”

We are afraid this approach of the High Court is

wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act

cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second

court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate

and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the

High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire

evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the

Commissioner’s report (Exts. C-1 and C-2 mahazar). In our

considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the

revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word

“propriety” it cannot mean that there could be a re-

appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can

come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of

evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality,

regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it.

Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the

High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction.”

While holding as above, the 3-Judge Bench also referred to the decisions

of this Court in H.V. Mathai

7

and Rai Chand Jain

8

. In H.V. Mathai

7

, this

7

H.V. Mathai v. Subordinate Judge, Kottayam; [(1969) 2 SCC 194]

8

Rai Chand Jain v. Miss Chandra Kanta Khosla; [(1991) 1 SCC 422]

13

Page 14 Court observed that the words of Section 20 are much wider than those in

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also observed that on

the words of Section 20, it could not be held that the revision was limited to

a mere question of jurisdiction. In Rai Chand Jain

8

, relying upon Ram

Dass

2

, the Court observed:

“… The High Court in exercising its power under Section

15(5) of the said Act is within its jurisdiction to reverse the

findings of fact as the same were improper and also illegal. It

is appropriate to refer in this connection to the decision in the

case of Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander where it has been held

that Section 15(5) of the Act enables the High Court to

satisfy itself as to the “legality or propriety” of the order under

revision, which is, quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction.

That jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate

cases, to examine the correctness of the findings of facts

also, though the revisional court is not ‘a second court of first

appeal...”

15. In Sankaranarayanan

9

, the Court had an occasion to consider

the scope of powers of revisional Court under Section 25 of the Tamil

Nadu Rent Control Act. The 2-Judge Bench which heard the matter

observed that it was improper for the High Court to consider the revision

petition under Section 25 as if it were a second appeal. The Court firmly

stated that the findings of the first appellate Court could not be reversed

upon a reassessment of the evidence.

16. In Shiv Sarup Gupta

10

, this Court with reference to the

9

Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank; [1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675]

10

Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta; [(1999) 6 SCC 222]

14

Page 15 revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25-B (8) of the Delhi

Rent Control Act, 1958, though reiterated that the High Court cannot enter

into appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is

inclined to take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts, but

also held that the High Court is obliged to test the order of the Rent

Controller on the touchstone of “whether it is according to law” and, for that

limited purpose, may enter into reappraisal of evidence, i.e., for the

purpose of ascertaining whether the conclusion arrived at by the Rent

Controller is wholly unreasonable or is one that no reasonable person

acting with objectivity could have reached on the material available. The

Court observed that ignoring the weight of evidence, proceeding on a

wrong premise of law or deriving such conclusion from the established

facts as betray a lack of reason and/or objectivity would render the finding

of the Controller “not according to law” calling for an interference under the

proviso to sub-section (8) of Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

17. Again in Ram Narain Arora

11

, a 2-Judge Bench with reference

to revisional power under Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958

observed as follows:

“It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition

under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act

is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or

propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the

High Court could examine the facts available in order to find

11

Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani and Ors.; [(1999) 1 SCC 141]

15

Page 16 out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis

approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure

findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but

(sic if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong

premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional

court to interfere with such a matter. In this case, the Rent

Controller proceeded to analyse the matter that non-

disclosure of a particular information was fatal and,

therefore, dismissed the claim made by the landlord. It is in

these circumstances that it became necessary for the High

Court to re-examine the matter and then decide the entire

question. We do not think that any of the decisions referred

to by the learned counsel decides the question of the same

nature with which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed

reference to them is not required.”

18. The scope of the High Court’s revisional power under Section

50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 came to be considered by a

2-Judge Bench of this Court in M.S. Zahed

12

. The provision (Section 50)

under consideration reads, “The High Court may, at any time call for and

examine any order passed or proceeding taken by (the Court of Small

Causes or the Court of the Civil Judge) under this Act or any order passed

by the Controller under Sections 14, 15, 16 or 17 for the purpose of

satisfying itself as to the legality or correctness of such order or proceeding

and may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit.” The Court,

while observing that revisional power cannot be equated with the power of

reconsideration of all questions of fact as a Court of first appeal, held that

still the nature of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section

50 of the Act will have to be considered in the light of the express

provisions of the statute concerning such power. On the express language

12

M.S. Zahed v. K. Raghavan; [(1999) 1 SCC 439]

16

Page 17 of Section 50(1) of the Act, the Court observed that it cannot be said that

the High Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of correctness of

findings of fact reached by the Court of Small Causes on relevant

evidence. The Court considered a couple of decisions of this Court, (1)

Central Tobacco Company

13

and (2) Bhoolchand

14

and ultimately

concluded that the High Court in revision under Section 50 of the Act was

entitled to re-appreciate the evidence with a view to finding out whether the

order of the Court of Small Causes was legal or correct.

19. In Ubaiba

15

, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court, while dealing with

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 20 of the Kerala

Rent Control Act, considered the meaning of the expression ‘propriety’.

The Court held that in re-appreciating the evidence, the High Court had

exceeded its revisional jurisdiction. This is what the 2-Judge Bench said:

“Mr. K. Sukumaran, the learned Senior Counsel

appearing for the appellant contended that however wide the

jurisdiction of the revisional court under the Act in question

may be, but it cannot have jurisdiction to reappreciate the

evidence and substitute its own finding upsetting the finding

arrived at by the appellate authority and therefore the

impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable in law. In

support of this contention reliance has been placed on a

decision of this Court in the case of Rukmini Amma

Saradamma v. Kallyani Sulochana (1993) 1 SCC 499

whereunder the selfsame provision of the Kerala Act was

under consideration. This Court after noticing the word

“propriety” used in Section 20 came to the conclusion that

the approach of the High Court was totally wrong and even

13

Central Tobacco Company v. Chandra Prakash; [1969 UJ 432]

14

Bhoolchand and Anr. v. Kay Pee Cee Investments and Anr.; [(1991) 1 SCC 343]

15

Ubaiba v. Damodaran; [(1999) 5 SCC 645]

17

Page 18 the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable

the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal.

Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional

jurisdiction will get obliterated. The Court also further

observed “even by the presence of the word ‘propriety’ it

cannot mean that there could be any reappreciation of

evidence”. The learned counsel for the respondent on the

other hand contended that the aforesaid decision will have

no application to the case in hand where the dispute

involved relates to a jurisdictional fact and according to the

learned counsel where the dispute is in relation to a

jurisdictional fact there should not be any fetter on the power

of the revisional court even to reappreciate the evidence and

come to its own conclusion. On being asked to support the

aforesaid proposition no authority could be placed though on

first principle learned counsel for the respondent argued as

aforesaid. Having examined the rival submission and having

gone through the decision of this Court referred to earlier we

are of the considered opinion that though the revisional

power under the Rent Act may be wider than Section 115 of

the Code of Civil Procedure it cannot be equated even with

the second appellate power conferred on the civil court

under the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the use

of the expression “propriety” in Section 20, the revisional

court therefore will not be entitled to reappreciate the

evidence and substitute its own conclusion in place of the

conclusion of the appellate authority. On examining the

impugned judgment of the High Court in the light of the

aforesaid ratio of this Court it is crystal clear that the High

Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reappreciating the

evidence and in coming to the conclusion that the

relationship of landlord-tenant did not exist. In the

circumstances, the impugned revisional order of the High

Court is wholly unsustainable and we set aside the same

and the order of the appellate authority is affirmed.”

20. The scope of power of revision under Section 25 of the Tamil

Nadu Rent Control Act also fell for consideration before a 2-Judge Bench

of this Court in T. Sivasubramaniam

16

. The Court in paragraph 5 (page 279

of the Report) held as follows:

16

T. Sivasubramaniam and Ors. v. Kasinath Pujari and Ors.; [(1999) 7 SCC 275]

18

Page 19 “5. So far as the second submission is concerned, the

language employed in Section 25 of the Act, which confers

revisional jurisdiction on the High Court, is very wide. Under

Section 25 of the Act, the High Court can call for and

examine the record of the appellate authority in order to

satisfy itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the

correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or orders

passed therein. The words “to satisfy itself” employed in

Section 25 of the Act no doubt is a power of

superintendence, and the High Court is not required to

interfere with the finding of fact merely because the High

Court is not in agreement with the findings of the courts

below. It is also true that the power exercisable by the High

Court under Section 25 of the Act is not an appellate power

to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a

different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts

below. But where a finding arrived at by the courts below is

based on no evidence, the High Court would be justified in

interfering with such a finding recorded by the courts below.

In the present case what we find is that neither has the

landlord set out his need or requirement for the premises for

his occupation in his petition nor has he led any evidence to

show that his need is bona fide. In the absence of such

evidence, the Rent Controller and the first appellate authority

acted contrary to law in allowing the petition of the landlord

by directing the eviction of the tenants. In such

circumstances, the High Court was fully justified in interfering

with the findings of the courts below. We, therefore, reject

the second submission of learned counsel.”

21. In Ramdoss

17

, this Court again had an occasion to consider

the scope of Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act. Relying upon

Sankaranarayanan

9

, the Court held that the revisional power of the High

Court under Section 25 of the Act not being an appellate power, it is

impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision

petition filed under Section 25 of the Act. The Court did not accept the

argument that in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can

17

Ramdoss v. K. Thangavelu; [(2000) 2 SCC 135]

19

Page 20 interfere with incorrect finding of fact recorded by the Courts below.

22. In Shaw Wallace

18

, a 2-Judge Bench of this Court relied upon

M.S. Zahed

12

decision of this Court and held in paragraph 13 of the Report

as follows:

“13. On a plain reading of Section 25 of the Act, it is clear

that the revisional jurisdiction vested in the High Court under

that section is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil

Procedure. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to

the regularity of the proceeding, of the correctness, legality

or propriety of any decision or order passed therein and if,

on examination, it appears to the High Court that any such

decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or

remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such orders

accordingly.”

23. The scope of revisional power under Section 20 of the Kerala

Rent Control Act fell for consideration in V.M. Mohan

19

. The Court while

allowing the appeal set aside the order of the High Court as it found that

the High Court had re-appreciated the evidence to come to the conclusion

different from the trial Court as well as the appellate Court. The Court

observed that as the revision application was concluded by concurrent

finding of fact recorded by the original authority as well as the appellate

authority, no interference by the High Court was called for.

24. In Olympic Industries

20

, this Court, while dealing with

revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu

Rent Control Act, observed that the High Court could interfere with

18

Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Govindas Purushothamdas and Anr.; [(2001) 3 SCC 445]

19

V.M. Mohan v. Prabha Rajan Dwarka and Ors.; [(2006) 9 SCC 606]

20

Olympic Industries v. Mulla Hussainy Bhai Mulla Akberally and Ors.; [(2009) 15 SCC 528]

20

Page 21 concurrent orders of the tribunals in revisional jurisdiction only if their

findings are perverse or arbitrary and irregular or improper.

25. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope

and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control

Acts, a quick observation about the ‘appellate jurisdiction’ and ‘revisional

jurisdiction’ is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of

appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice-versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction

and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the

proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is

continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power

of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily,

appellate jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such

jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate

jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of

appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-

fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of

original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the

revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided

in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against

an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the

revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the

extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend

21

Page 22 on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction

and revisional jurisdiction.

26. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour

to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms “legality or

propriety”, “regularity, correctness, legality or propriety” and “legality,

regularity or propriety” which are used in three Rent Control Acts under

consideration.

27. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘legality’ is lawfulness. It

refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of

being legal.

28. The term ‘propriety’ means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude;

suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity

with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness,

accuracy.

29. The terms ‘correctness’ and ‘propriety’ ordinarily convey the

same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary

meaning and substance, ‘correctness’ is compounded of ‘legality’ and

‘propriety’ and that which is legal and proper is ‘correct’.

30. The expression “regularity” with reference to an order

ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the

principles of natural justice and fair play.

22

Page 23 31. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that

although there is some difference in the language employed by the three

Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional

jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under

these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same

scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu

unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confers on revisional

authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority

despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the

Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not

permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an

appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring

the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate

Authority for re-hearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings.

32. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja

Lakshmi Dyeing Works

5

that where both expressions “appeal” and

“revision” are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression “revision” is

meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that

conveyed by the expression “appeal”. The use of two expressions

“appeal” and “revision” when used in one statute conferring appellate

power and revisional power, we think, is not without purpose and

significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a re-hearing while it

23

Page 24 is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute

provides the remedy by way of an ‘appeal’ and so also of a ‘revision’. If

that were so, the revisional power would become co-extensive with that of

the trial Court or the subordinate Tribunal which is never the case. The

classic statement in Dattonpant

4

that revisional power under the Rent

Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section

115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the

High Court a second Court of first appeal, commends to us and we

approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional

jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Statutes, the High Court is

not conferred a status of second Court of first appeal and the High Court

should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.

33. Insofar as the 3-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Ram

Dass

2

is concerned, it rightly observes that revisional power is subject to

well-known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions and the matter

essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the jurisdiction.

We do not think that there can ever be objection to the above statement.

The controversy centers round the following observation in Ram Dass

2

,

“...that jurisdiction enables the Court of revision, in appropriate cases, to

examine the correctness of the findings of facts also...”. It is suggested

that by observing so, the 3-Judge Bench in Ram Dass

2

has enabled the

High Court to interfere with the findings of fact by re-appreciating the

24

Page 25 evidence. We do not think that the 3-Judge Bench has gone to that extent

in Ram Dass

2

. The observation in Ram Dass

2

that as the expression used

conferring revisional jurisdiction is “legality and propriety”, the High Court

has wider jurisdiction obviously means that the power of revision vested in

the High Court in the statute is wider than the power conferred on it under

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it is not confined to the

jurisdictional error alone. However, in dealing with the findings of fact, the

examination of findings of fact by the High Court is limited to satisfy itself

that the decision is “according to law”. This is expressly stated in Ram

Dass

2

. Whether or not a finding of fact recorded by the subordinate

court/tribunal is according to law, is required to be seen on the touchstone

whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers

from any illegality like misreading of the evidence or overlooking and

ignoring the material evidence altogether or suffers from perversity or any

such illegality or such finding has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice.

Ram Dass

2

does not lay down as a proposition of law that the revisional

power of the High Court under the Rent Control Act is as wide as that of

the Appellate Court or the Appellate Authority or such power is co-

extensive with that of the Appellate Authority or that the concluded finding

of fact recorded by the original Authority or the Appellate Authority can be

interfered with by the High Court by re-appreciating evidence because

revisional court/authority is not in agreement with the finding of fact

25

Page 26 recorded by the Court/Authority below. Ram Dass

2

does not exposit that

the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an

appellate power to re-appraise or re-assess the evidence for coming to a

different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the Court/Authority

below. Rather, it emphasises that while examining the correctness of

findings of fact, the revisional Court is not the second Court of first appeal.

Ram Dass

2

does not cross the limits of revisional court as explained in

Dattonpant

4

.

34. Rai Chand Jain

8

that follows Ram Dass

2

also does not lay

down that the High Court in exercise of its power under the Rent Control

Act may reverse the findings of fact merely because on re-appreciation of

the evidence it has a different view on the findings of fact. The

observations made by this Court in Rai Chand Jain

8

must also be read in

the context we have explained Ram Dass

2

.

35. In Shiv Sarup Gupta

10

, the observations of this Court with

reference to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under the Delhi Rent

Control Act that the High Court, on the touchstone of “whether it is

according to law” and for that limited purpose, may enter into reappraisal of

evidence must be understood in the context of its observations made

preceding such observation that the High Court cannot enter into

appreciation or re-appreciation of evidence merely because it is inclined to

26

Page 27 take a different view of the facts as if it were a Court of facts and the

observations following such observation that the evidence is examined by

the High Court to find out whether Court/Authority below has ignored the

evidence or proceeded on a wrong premise of law or derived such

conclusion from the established facts which betray lack of reasons and/or

objectivity which renders the finding not according to law. Shiv Sarup

Gupta

10

also does not lay down the proposition of law that in its revisional

jurisdiction under the Rent Control Act, the High Court can rehear on facts

or re-appreciate the evidence to come to the conclusion different from that

of the trial Court or the appellate Court because it has a different view on

appreciation of evidence. Shiv Sarup Gupta

10

must also be understood in

the context we have explained Ram Dass

2

.

36. The observations in Ram Narain Arora

11

that in examining the

‘legality’ or ‘propriety’ of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the

High Court could examine the facts available must be understood for the

purpose stated therein, namely, in order to find out that the finding of facts

are based on firm legal basis and are not given on a wrong premise of law.

Ram Narain Arora

11

also lays down that pure findings of fact are not for

interference in revisional jurisdiction.

37. The statement in M.S. Zahed

12

that under Section 50 of the

Karnataka Rent Control Act, the High Court is entitled to re-appreciate the

27

Page 28 evidence with a view to find out whether the order of Small Causes Court

is legal and correct must be understood in light of the observations made

therein, namely, that revisional power cannot be equated with the power of

re-consideration of all questions of fact as a Court of first appeal.

38. Shaw Wallace

18

has relied upon

M.S. Zahed

12

and observed

that the High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the regularity of the

proceeding, of the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order

passed therein and if, on examination, it appears to the High Court that

any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or

remitted for reconsideration, it may pass such order accordingly. In Shaw

Wallace

18

, this Court does not lay down that the High Court can re-

appreciate the evidence to come to conclusion different from the

court/authority below as the appellate Court.

39. Rukmini

1

holds, and in our view, rightly that even the wider

language of Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act does not enable the

High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. We are in full

agreement with the view of the 3-Judge Bench in Rukmini

1

that the word

“propriety” does not confer power upon the High Court to re-appreciate

evidence to come to a different conclusion but its consideration of

evidence is confined to find out legality, regularity and propriety of the

order impugned before it. We approve the view of this Court in Rukmini

1

.

28

Page 29 40. The observation in Sankaranarayanan

9

that the revisional

Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act cannot reverse

the findings of the first appellate Court upon a reassessment of evidence is

in line with Rukmini

1

and we approve the same.

41. Similarly, the view in Ubaiba

15

, which has followed Rukmini

1

that, under Section 20 of the Kerala Rent Control Act, the revisional court

will not be entitled to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own

conclusion in place of the conclusion of the Appellate Authority is the

correct view and gets our nod.

42. In T. Sivasubramaniam

16

this Court has held that under

Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Rent Control Act, the High Court does not

enjoy an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for

coming to a different finding contrary to the finding recorded by the courts

below. This view is the correct view and we approve the same.

43. The observation in Ramdoss

17

that the High Court in exercise

of its revisional jurisdiction cannot act as an appellate court/authority and it

is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision

petition filed under Section 25 of the Act is in accord with Rukmini

1

and

Sankaranarayanan

9

. Its observation that the High Court can interfere with

incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context where such

finding is perverse, based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or

29

Page 30 such finding has been arrived at by ignoring or overlooking the material

evidence or such finding is so grossly erroneous that if allowed to stand,

will occasion in miscarriage of justice. Ramdoss

17

does not hold that the

High Court may interfere with the findings of fact because on re-

appreciation of the evidence its view is different from that of the first

Appellate Court or Authority.

44. The decision of this Court in V.M. Mohan

19

is again in line with

the judgment of this Court in Rukmini

1

.

45. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control

Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by

the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-

appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority

below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High

Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that

finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law

and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by

Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without

consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no

evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if

allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to

correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that

30

Page 31 event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the

above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order

as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the

correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned

before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity,

correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the

High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-

appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on

facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of

reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the

High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law,

it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from

procedural illegality or irregularity.

46. We, thus, approve the view of this Court in Rukmini

1

as noted

by us. The decision of this Court in Ram Dass

2

must be read as explained

above. The reference is answered accordingly.

47. Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petitions shall now be posted

before the regular Benches for decision in light of the above.

….………..……………………CJI.

(R.M. Lodha)

31

Page 32 …….………..……………………J.

(Dipak Misra)

…….………..……………………J.

(Madan B. Lokur)

…….………..……………………J.

(Kurian Joseph)

NEW DELHI; …….………..……………………J.

AUGUST 27, 2014. (S.A. Bobde)

32