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PETITIONER:

IN THE MATTER OF MADHU LIMAYE & ORS.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

18/12/1968

BENCH:

GROVER, A.N.

BENCH:

GROVER, A.N.

SHAH, J.C.

RAMASWAMI, V.

CITATION:

1969 AIR 1014 1969 SCR (3) 154

ACT:

Constitution of India, Art. 22,(1)-Necessity of informing

person arrested grounds for his arrest-Arrest illegal if

Article not complied with-Order of remand by magistrate

cannot cure constitutional infirmity.

HEADNOTE:

The petitioners were arrested on November 6, 1968 at a

railway station in Bihar. According to the Sub-Inspector's

report recorded in the general diary they had taken out a

procession in defiance of a prohibitory order under s. 144

Cr. P.C. and had been arrested under s. 151 Cr. P.C. It

was stated that report was being submitted "under sections

107 and 117 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under s. 188

of the Indian Penal Code." On November 6 itself the first

petitioner sent a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution

in the form of a letter mentioning that he and his

companions had been arrested but no grounds of 'arrest had

been communicated to them and they had been merely told that

the arrests had been made "under sections which were

bailable". It was prayed that a writ of Habeas Corpus be

issued. On November 7, 1968 a similar petition was sent by

the petitioners from Jail. The additional fact given was

that the arrested persons had been produced before the sub-

Divisional Magistrate who bad on their refusal to furnish

bail remanded them to custody upto November 20, 1968. Rule

nisi was issued by this Court to the State authorities to

produce the petitioners before the Court on November 25,

1968. On November 19, 1968 a first information report was

recorded in which it was alleged that the petitioners had on

November 6, 1968 committed offences under ss. 188 and 143 of

the Penal Code. In the return, before this Court it was

explained on behalf of the State that the officer-in-charge

while forwarding the arrested persons on November 6, 1968,

had by mistake omitted to mention s. 143 I.P.C. which was a

cognizable offence. It was urged that the order of remand

passed by the Magistrate could not be said to be illegal

merely because of the omission of s. 143 I.P.C. in the order

sheet when the police report clearly made out a case under

that section. It was not claimed that the grounds of arrest

had been supplied to the petitioners.

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HELD : (i) When the arrests were effected by the Sub-

Inspector on November 6, 1968, the offences for which the

arrests were made were not stated to be cognizable. In the

various reports etc. the only offence alleged was one under

s. 188 I.P.C. which is non-cognizable. There was force in

the suggestion of the petitioners that the first information

report came to be recorded formally on November 19, 1968

only because the matter had been brought to this Court by

way of a petition under Art. 32 and a further petition had

been moved in the :High Court under Art. 226. It was not

proved that the arrest had been made at the direction of a

Magistrate who was present. It was somewhat surprising that

no affidavit of the said Magistrate had been filed. It

would be legitimate to conclude that the arrest of the

petitioners was effected by the police officers concerned

without any specific orders or directions of a Magistrate on

November 6, 1968 for the offences and proceedings mentioned

before in the various reports made prior to November 19,

1968. 1159 D-E; 160 B-161 B]

155

(ii) The two requirements of cl. (1) of Art. 22 are meant to

afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to

remove any mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in

the minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know

exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can

exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal

practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him.

Whenever the Article is not complied with the petitioner

would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corp s directing his

release. [162 E-163 C]

In the present case the return filed by the State did not

contain any information as to when and by whom the

petitioners were informed of the grounds of their -arrest.

It had not been contended on behalf of the State that the

circumstances were such that the arrested persons trust have

known the, general nature of the alleged offences for which

they had been arrested. The petitioners were therefore

entitled to be released on this ground alone. [ 163 F]

(iii) Once it was shown that the arrests made by the

police officers were illegal it was necessary for the State

to establish that at the stage of remand the Magistrate

directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind

to all relevant matters. This the State had failed to do.

The remand orders were patently routine and appeared to have

been made mechanically. if the detention of the petitioners

in, custody could not continue after their arrest because

of the violation of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution', they

were entitled to be released forthwith. The

orders of remand were not such as would cure the

constitutional infirmities. [1163 G-164 B]

Christie & Anr. v. Leachinsky, [1947] 1 All, E.R. 567, Ram

Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi & Ors., A.I.R. 1953 S.C.

277, applied.

JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 355 of 1968.

Petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for writ

in the nature of habeas corpus.

The petitioners Nos. 1 and 2 appeared in person.

M. C. Chagla and D. Goburdhun, for the State of Bihar.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Grover, J. Madhu Limaye, Member of Lok Sabha, and several

other persons were arrested on November 6, 1968 at

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Lakhisarai Railway Station near Monghyr. On the same date

Madhu Limaye addressed a petition in the form of a letter to

this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution mentioning that

he along with his companions had been arrested but had not

been communicated the reasons or the grounds for arrest. It

was stated that the arrested persons had been merely told

that the arrests had been made "under sections which were

bailable". It was prayed that a writ of Habeas Corpus be

issued for restoring liberty as the arrest and detention

were illegal. On November 7, 1968, a similar petition was

sent from Monghyr jail. The additional fact given was that

the arrested persons had been produced before the Sub-

Divisional Magistrate who had offered to

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release them on bail but they had refused to furnish bail.

The Magistrate had, thereupon, remanded them to custody up

to November 20, 1968. This Court issued a rule nisi to the,

GOVernment of Bihar and Supdt. District Jail, Moghyr to

produce Madhu Limaye and others whose names were given in

the order dated November 12, 1968 on November 25, 1968.

The State of Bihar filed a return but on November 25, 1968

the Court directed the Advocate General of Bihar to produce

the relevant documents in connection with the recording of

the first information report, the investigation made, the

report to the Magistrate and order sheet, etc. The hearing

was adjourned to December 2, 1968.

It is apparent from the documents and papers placed before

us that on November 2, 1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate

Monghyr issued an order under s. 144, Cr.P.C. prohibiting

assemblage of five or more persons within the limits of 100

yards of Kiul and Lakhisarai Railway Stations for a period

of one week from November 5, 1968 to November 12, 1968.

According to the report submitted by the Sub-Inspector in-

charge of the Government Railway Police Station Kiul to the

Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, Madhu Limaye and others

had defied the prohibitory orders issued under s. 144

Cr.P.C., by holding and addressing a public meeting at the

railway ground at Lakhisarai Railway Station between 4.30

p.m. and 6.30 p.m. on November 5, 1968 and some out of them

had exhorted the public in provocative language to offer

satyagraha at the Railway Station and to disrupt the railway

communications as also to obstruct the normal functioning of

the railway offices at Lakhisarai. It was prayed that their

prosecution be ordered under s. 188. Indian Penal Code.

Dharamraj Singh Sub-Inspector entered a report (Sanha) No.

109 on November 6, 1968, in the general diary. It was

stated inter alia that Madhu Limaye and others took out a

procession at 3 O'Clock with a flag in violation of the

order made under s. 144, Cr.P.C. They had entered the Rail-

way Station for launching a strike shunting slogans. This

group had been followed by several other groups of persons

the last being the 8th group (the names in each group were

mentioned). All these persons had been arrested under s.

151, Cr.P.C. and had been sent to the Sub-Divisional

Magistrate, Sadar, Monghyr. These incidents happened in the

presence of Shri Mathur, Magistrate 1st Class, Monghyr, Shri

B. N. Singh, Railway Magistrate Kiul etc. It was stated

that the report was being submitted " under sections 107 and

117 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under S. 188 of the

Indian Penal Code". Admittedly no first information report

was formally registered on that date which was done on

November 19, 1968 at 23.30 hrs. In this report

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in which the date of occurrence is mentioned 'as November 6,

1968 it was stated that the accused persons had entered the

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Railway Station by illegally forming a mob disobeying the

order under s. 144, Cr.P.C. to disturb the normal

functioning of the railways and had committed offences under

s. 143, I.P.C. and s. 122 of the Railways Act.

The State of Bihar has filed a return according to which the

circumstances in which the prohibitory order was promulgated

under s. 144, Cr.P.C., are set out. It was stated that from

the leaflets circulated by the Lakhisarai unit of the

Samyukta Socialist Party on November 4, 1968, it appeared

that the party had decided to hold a public meeting on

November 5, 1968 and to launch satyagraha at Lakhisarai on

November 6, under the leadership of Madhu Limaye. On

November 5, Madhu Limaye and others held a public meeting of

about 400 persons at the railway ground in defiance of the

order under s. 144 Cr.P.C. and exhorted the public to hold

satyagraha at Lakhisarai Railway Station on November 6 etc.

A report was submitted by the officer-in-charge of the Kiul

Government Railway Police Station on November 6, on which

the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sadar, made an order on

November 11, 1968 directing show cause notices to be issued

to Madhu Limaye and others as to why action under s. 188,

Indian Penal Code, should not be taken against them. On

November 6, 1968, a procession of about 200 persons of

Samyukta Socialist Party led by Madhu Limaye and others came

to the main gate of the platform of Lakhisarai Railway

Station where a Magistrate, Inspector of Railway Police and

Officer-in-charge of Kiul Government Railway Police Station

were present. When these persons, in spite of the warning,

forcibly entered the platform and violated the order under

s. 144, Cr.P.C., the Magistrate on duty, Shri K. B. Mathur,

directed the police officers present to arrest them. Madhu

Limaye and others were arrested and a case was instituted

against them. They were produced before the Sub-Divisional

Magistrate who, on November 6, remanded them to jail custody

till November 20, as they refused to furnish bail bonds. On

November 6, another report was submitted by 'the officer-in-

charge, Kiul Government Railway Police Station for the inci-

dents which happened on November 6, 1968. A case had been

started on that report and show cause notices had been

issued for November 20, 1968 as to why action should not be

taken under s. 188, I.P.C. It was claimed that Madhu Limaye

and others had committed offences under s. 188 and under s.

143 Penal Code (which is cognizable) by violating the orders

made under s. 144 Cr.P.C., and by forming unlawful assembly.

It was explained that while forwarding the arrested persons

the Officer-in-charge, my mistake, omitted to mention s.

143. It

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was asserted that the order of remand passed by the Sub-

Divisional Magistrate could not be said to be illegal merely

because of omission of s. 143, Indian Penal Code, in the

order sheet when the police report clearly made out a case

under that section. It was affirmed that Madhu Limaye and

others had not been arrested on November 6, while they were

participating in a peaceful satyagraha or that the officer-

in-charge Kiul purported to arrest all these persons only

under ss. 151, 107 and 117 of the Cr.P.C.

The annexures attached to the return filed by the State and

the documents contained in the original records which were

sent for have revealed the following state of affairs. On

November 6, the officer-in-charge, Government Railway Police

Station Kiul made what is called report (annexure-D) under

s. 107(3), Cr.P.C. This contained a prayer that Madhu Limaye

and 115 others, vide list attached, should be bound over

under s. 107 with an order to furnish ad-interim bonds. It

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was stated under column No. 5 (brief history of the case)

that as their acts on November 6, 1968 between 09.15 hrs.

and 16.30 hrs. on the Lakhisarai Railway Station were likely

to lead to breach of peace 1.51, Cr.P.C. The same police

officer addressed a letter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate,

Sadar, to the following effect :

"I am forwarding herewith the following

accused persons (list attached herewith) in

custody as they have been arrested u/s

151/107/117(3), Cr.P.C. They may kindly be

remanded in jail Hazat for a fortnight by

which time report u/s 107/117(3) Cr.P.C. and

188 T.P.C. be routed through proper channel."

As stated in the return two show cause notices were issued

by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Shri P. P. N. Sahi on

November 11, 1968 relating to the incidents on November 5,

1968 and the following day. Madhu Limaye and others were

asked to show cause why action should not be taken against

them under s. 188. On November 19, 1968 another order was

made by a different Sub-Divisional Magistrate Shri K. K.

Pathak saying that a petition had been filed on behalf of

the State in which it was alleged that the accused persons

had committed offences tinder ss. 143/448 I.P.C., by forming

unlawful assembly with the common object of committing

criminal trespass in violation of the duly promulgated order

under s. 144 Cr.P.C. It was prayed that these persons be

summoned for being tried for offences under the aforesaid

sections. A show cause notice appears to have been issued

on or about November 20, 1968. The remand orders which were

passed on November 6 and 20, 1968

159

were made on the basis that the accused persons had been

"arrested and forwarded under custody under ss. 151/107/117

Cr-P.C. by Sub-Inspector, Government Railway Police Station

Kiul".

Madhu Limaye, who has addressed arguments in person', has

raised, inter alia, the following main contentions :

1. The arrests on November 6, 1968 were

illegal inasmuch as they had been effected by

Police Officers for offences which were non-

cognizable.

2. There, was a violation of the mandatory

provisions of Art. 22(1) of the Constitution.

3. The orders for remand were bad and

vitiated.

4. The arrests were effected for extraneous

considerations and were actuated by mala

fides.

The entire sequence of events from November 5, 1968 onwards

is somewhat unusual and has certain features which have not

been explained on behalf of the State. In the first place

when the arrests were effected by the Sub-Inspector In-

charge of Government Railway Police Station on November 6,

1968 the offences for which the arrests were made were not

stated to be cognizable. In the various reports etc., to

which reference has been made the only offence alleged was

one under s. 188 I.P.C. which is non-cognizable. On

November 6, 1968 apart from the allegation of commission of

offences under s. 188 the police reports disclose a variety

of proceedings which were sought to be taken. Section 151

in all likelihood was invoked for effecting the arrests but

proceedings were initiated under s. 107 which appears in

Chapter VIII of the Cr.P.C. Under that section the

Magistrate can require a person about whom information has

been received that he is likely to commit a breach of peace,

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to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond

for a period not exceeding one year, for keeping peace.

Under s. 117, which was also invoked, the Magistrate makes

an enquiry as to the truth of an information. But

proceedings under S. 107 have to follow the procedure laid

down in Chapter VIII and arrest cannot be effected unless a

Magistrate issues a warrant for that purpose under s. 114.

Section 151 which has been repeatedly referred to in various

documents is meant for arresting without a warrant and

without orders from a Magistrate if a police officer knows

of a design to commit any cognizable offence and if it

appears to him that the commission of such offence cannot be

otherwise prevented.

There can be no manner of doubt, and this position has

hardly been controverted by Mr. Chagla for the State, that

in all the documents which were prepared before November 19,

16 0

1968 there was no mention of an offence under S. 143 I.P.C.

having been committed by Madhu Limaye and other persons who-

were arrested on November 6, 1968. It is obviously for that

reason that no formal first information report was recorded

on November 6, 1968 which would have necessarily been done

if the police officers effecting arrests had thought of S.

143, Indian Penal Code which is a cognizable offence. No

explanation has been furnished on behalf of the State as to

why the information which was recorded in the general diary

on November 6, was not recorded as an information in

cognizable cases under s. 154 of the Cr.P. Code. There

is,force in the suggestion of Madhu Limaye that the first

information report came to be recorded formally on November

19, 1968 only because the matter had been brought to this

Court by way of a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution

and after a rule nisi had been issued and a petition under

Art. 226 had been filed in the Patna High Court. The

authorities then realised that they had been completely

oblivious of the true position that arrests could not have

been effected for a non-cognizable offence made punishable

under s. 188, Indian Penal Code or for taking proceedings

under s. 107, Cr.P.C. Under S. 151 Cr.P.Code the police

officer could have arrested without a warrant but Mr. Chagla

has not sought justification for the arrests under that

provision. He has pointed out that a prohibitory order had

been issued under s. 144 which had been defied by Madhu

Limaye and the other persons and therefore an offence had

been committed under S. 143 I.P.C. The mere omission, he

says, to mention a section cannot affect the legality or

validity of the proceedings. Mr. Chagla has also laid a

great deal of emphasis on the statement in the return that

when Madhu Limaye and others were arrested they had violated

the orders under S. 144, Cr.P.C. and the Magistrate on duty

Shri K. B. Mathur directed the police officers present to

arrest them. The return is supported by an affidavit of

Shri S. C. Prasad, Magistrate 1st Class, Monghyr according

to whom the contents of para 6 in which this statement

occurs were true to his knowledge. It is somewhat

surprising that the affidavit of Shri K. B. Mathur has not

been filed who would have deposed to all that happened in

his presence and the reasons for ordering the arrests. It

is most unusual and extraordinary that in spite of arrests

having been ordered by the Magistrate there is not one word

in any of the papers or documents which have been produced

relating to this fact. The least that was expected was that

there would have been some mention of the order in the

detailed statement entered in General Diary by the Sub-Ins-

pector in-charge Kiul Police Station on November 6, on the

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basis of which a formal first information report was

registered on November 19, 1968. There, however, only the

pre-

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sence of certain officers and other persons including Shri

Mathur is noted. It would be legitimate to conclude that

the arrest of Madhu Limaye and his companions was effected

by the police officers concerned without any specific orders

or directions of a Magistrate on November 6, 1968 for the

offences and the proceedings mentioned 'before in the

various reports made prior to November 19, 1968.

The submission of Madhu Limaye on the second point has

hardly been effectively met on behalf of the State. Art.

22(1) provides that no person who is arrested shall be

detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may

be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied

the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner

of his choice. Madhu Limaye had, in his petitions addressed

to this Court, made a positive assertion that he and his

companions had not been informed of the grounds for their

arrest. In the return filed by the State this assertion has

neither been controverted nor has anything been stated with

reference to it, It appears that the authorities wanted to

invoke all kinds of provisions like ss. 151, 107/117 of the

Cr.P.C. apart from s. 188 of the Indian Penal Code. Since

no arrest could be effected for an offence under s. 188 by

the police officers without proper order these officers may

have been naturally reluctant to comply with the mandatory

requirements of Art. 22(1) by giving the necessary

information. At any rate, whatever the reasons, it has not

been explained even during the course of arguments before us

why the arrested persons were not told the reasons for their

arrest or of the offences for which they had been taken into

custody.

Art. 22(1) embodies a rule which has always been regarded as

vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal liberty in

all legal systems where the Rule of Law prevails. For

example, the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States of America contains similar provisions and so does

Art. XXXIV of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. In

England whenever an arrest is made without a warrant, the

arrested person has a right to be informed not only that he

is being arrested but also of the reasons or grounds for the

arrest. The House of Lords in Christie & Another v.

Leachinsky(1) went into the origin and development of this

rule. In the words of Viscount Simon if a policeman who

entertained a reasonable suspicion that X had committed a

felony were at liberty to arrest him and march him off to a

police station without giving any explanation of why he was

doing this, the prima facie right of personal liberty would

be gravely infringed. Viscount Simon laid down several

proposi-

(1) [1947] 1 AII E.L.R.567.

162

tions which were not meant to be exhaustive. For our

purposes we may refer to the first and the third :

"1. If a policeman arrests without warrant

upon reasonable suspicion of felony, or of

other crime of a sort which does not require a

warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances

inform the person arrested of the true ground

of arrest. He is not entitled to keep the

reason to himself or to give a reason which is

not the true reason. in other words, a

'citizen is entitled to know on what charge or

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on suspicion of what crime he is seized.

2.............................

3. The requirement that the person arrested

should be informed of the reason why he is

seized naturally does not exist if the

circumstances are such that he must know the

general nature of the alleged offence for

which he is detained."

Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the

circumstances where the accused must know why

he is being arrested:

"There is no need to explain the reasons of

arrest if the arrested man is caught red-

handed and the crime is patent to high

Heaven."

The two requirements of clause (1) of Art. 22 are meant to

afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to

remove any mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in

the minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know

exactly what the accusation against him is so that he can-

exercise the second right, namely, of consulting a legal

practitioner of his choice and to be defended by him.

Clause (2) of Art. 22 provides 'the next and most material

safeguard that the arrested person must be produced before a

Magistrate within 24 hours of such arrest so that an

independent authority exercising judicial powers may without

delay apply its mind to his case. The Criminal Procedure

Code contains analogous provisions in ss. 60 and 340 but our

Constitution makers were anxious to make these safeguards an

integral part of fundamental rights. That is what Dr. B.

-R. Ambedkar said while moving, for insertion of Art. 15A

(as numbered in the draft Bill of the Constitution) which

corresponded to present Art. 22 :

"Article 15A merely lifts from the provisions

of the Criminal Procedure Code two of the most

fundamental principles which every civilised

country follows as principles of international

justice. It is quite true that these two

provisions contained in clause 1) and clause

163

(2)are already to be found in the Criminal

Procedure Code and thereby probably it might

be said that we are really not making any very

fundamental change. But we are, as I contend,

making a fundamental change because what we

are doing by the introduction of Article 15A

is to put a limitation upon the authority both

of Parliament as well as of the Provincial

Legislature not to abrogate these two

provisions, because they are now introduced in

our Constitution itself."

As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi & Ors. this

Court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon

to deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what

they conceive to be their duty must, strictly and

scrupulously, observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever

that is not done the petitioner would be entitled to a writ

of Habeas Corpus directing his release.

It remains to be seen whether any proper cause has been

shown in the return for declining the prayer of Madhu Limaye

and other arrested persons for releasing them on the ground

that there was non-compliance-with the provisions of Art.

22(1) of the Constitution. In Ram Narayan Singh's case(1)

it was laid down that the Court must have regard to the

legality or otherwise of the detention at the time of the

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return. In the present case the return dated November 20,

1968 was filed before the date of the first hearing after

the rule nisi had been issued. The return, as already

observed, does not contain any information as to when and by

whom Madhu Limaye and other arrested persons were informed

of the grounds for their arrest. It has not been contended

on behalf of the State that the circumstances were such that

the arrested persons must have known the general nature of

the alleged offences for which they had been arrested', vide

proposition No. 3 in Christie & Another v. Leachinsky (2).

Nor has it been suggested that the show cause notices which

were issued on November 11, 1968 satisfied the

constitutional requirement. Madhu Limaye and others are,

therefore, entitled to be released on this ground alone.

Once it is shown that the arrests made by the police

officers were illegal, it was necessary for the State to

establish that at the stage -of remand the Magistrate

directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind

to all relevant matters. This the State has failed to do.

The remand orders are patently routine and appear to have

been made mechanically. All that Mr. Chagla has said is

that if the arrested person wanted to challenge their

legality the High Court should have been moved

(1) A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 277.

(2) [1947] All F.I.R. 567,

164

under appropriate, provisions of the Criminal Procedure

Code. But it must be remembered that Madhu Limaye and

others have, by moving this Court under Art. 32 of the

Constitution, complained of detention or confinement in jail

without compliance with the constitutional and legal

provisions. If their detention in custody could not

continue after their arrest because of the violation of Art.

22(1) of the Constitution they were entitled to be released

forthwith. The orders of remand are not such as would cure

the constitutional infirmities. This disposes of the third

contention of Madhu Limaye.

We have been pressed to decide the question of mala fides

which is the fourth contention of Madhu Limayes Normally

such matters are not gone into by this Court in these

proceedings and can be more appropriately agitated in such

other legal action as he may be advised to institute or

take.

We would like to make it clear that we have ordered the

release of Madhu Limaye and the other arrested persons with

regard to whom rule nisi was issued on the sole ground of

violation of the provisions of Art. 22(1) of the

Constitution. We desire to express no opinion on the

legality or illegality of the arrests made on November 6,

1968 of these persons with reference to the first point,

namely, that the police officer purported to have effected

the arrests for the offences under s. 188. Indian Penal

Code, and under S. 151 as also in respect of proceedings

under s. 107 of the Cr.P.C., as these matters are subjudice.

We may also proceed to add that any expression of opinion or

observation in these proceedings shall not affect the course

of the enquiry or trial of the arrested persons concerning

the occurrences on November 5 and 6, 1960 which may be

pending in the courts in the State of Bihar and such

proceedings shall be disposed of in accordance with law.

Madhu Limaye and other arrested persons have already been

ordered to be released by this Court and no further

directions are necessary in the matter of their being set at

liberty.

G.C. Petitions allowed.

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