1

2026:CGHC:8684-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA No.48 of 2024

The date when

the judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is

pronounced

The date when the judgment

is uploaded on the website

Operative Full

21.11.2025 18.02.2026 -- 18.02.2026

1 - Jagdish Prasad Bansal S/o Shri Ramphal Bansal Aged About 61

Years R/o Ward No.11, Sakti, Tah. Sakti, Distt. Janjgir-Champa, Now

Distt. Sakti, Chhattisgarh

Appellant (s)

versus

1 - Indrajeet Burman, the then Sub Divisional Officer (R) and Sub

Divisional Magistrate, Sakti, Tahsil Sakti, Present Posting

Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Durg, Distt. Durg, C.G., Presently

Posted As Upper Collector, Distt. Balrampur Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh

2 - Smt. B. Ekka, Tahsildar And Executive Magistrate Sakti, Distt.

Janjgir Champa, Now Distt. Sakti, Chhattisgarh, Presently Posted As

Deputy Collector, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh

3 - MP Tandon, the then Station Incharge Police Station Sakti, Now

Retired, Village Faraswani, Tehsil Bhatapara, District : Balodabazar-

Bhatapara, Chhattisgarh

Respondent(s)

For Appellant (s) :Mr. B. P. Sharma, Adv with Mr. Pushp Kumar

Gupta and Ms. Sameeksha Gupta, Advs

For Respondent No.1 :Mr. Dhiraj Kumar Wankhede, Adv with Ms.

Aishley Shrivastava and Mr. Sanchit Bhatt,

Advs

2

For Respondent No.2:Mr. Anurag Verma, Adv

For Respondent No.3:Mr. Basant Dewangan, Adv

Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

CAV Judgment

Per Rajani Dubey J.

1.The present appeal has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff

against the judgment and decree dated 05.02.2024 passed by

the learned 2

nd

Additional District Judge, Sakti, District Janjgir-

Champa (C.G.), whereby the suit of the appellant/plaintiff for loss

of damages has been dismissed. (The parties herein shall be

referred as per their nomenclature before the learned Trial

Court).

2.Brief facts of the case, as projected by the plaintiff, are that the

plaintiff is a registered person who since approximately 1985

(about 34 years), has been engaged in stamp vending and

property dealing work. He was involved in several social and

business positions. He enjoys considerable respect in his field,

society, and the business community. The plaintiff’s growing

reputation, honor, prestige, and peaceful life was not appreciated

by defendant No.1, who, with the intention of obtaining

illegal/unconstitutional benefits from the plaintiff, misused his

position and authority beyond legal limits. He issued various

illegal notices, threatened him, did not provide sufficient time to

reply to the notices, and filed false prosecutions with special

3

interest and ulterior motives. By adopting other methods as well,

he harassed the plaintiff physically, financially, and mentally, and

demanded five lakh rupees from him, due to which he sent a

legal notice dated 29.01.2018 through his advocate to Defendant

No.1 and its copies were also forwarded to his superior

authorities, requesting that he should be refrained from

unnecessary harassment and humiliation. Upon receiving the

said notice on 30.01.2018, Defendant No.1 became agitated,

enraged, and angered,and within a week, in the stamp deficiency

case, through Letter No.1783/Anu./Ashi./Stamp–02/2018, Sakti

dated 07.02.2018, and through Letter No. 2424 dated 07.02.2018

issued by Defendant No. 2, an F.I.R. No.0065/2018 was

registered against the plaintiff at Police Station Sakti. Thereafter,

Defendant No. 3, without conducting any preliminary inquiry and

under pressure from Defendant No.1, registered Crime No.65/18

against the plaintiff under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 34 of

the IPC. As a result, the plaintiff had to remain in jail for 26 days

from 22.02.2018 to 20.03.2018 and was deprived of family

comforts and basic conveniences. Defendant No.1, through

Letter No.1765 dated 07.02.2018, wrote to the Sub-Registrar,

Sakti, in this regard. On the same day, upon receipt of Letter

No.10 from the Sub-Registrar, Sakti, Defendant No.2 was

directed through his Letter No.1783, and on that very day,

Defendant No. 2 wrote Letter No. 2424 to Defendant No. 3 for

registration of the F.I.R. Defendant No.1, in his court, without

4

taking interest in other pending matters of similar nature with the

sole intention of sending the plaintiff to jail and with personal

interest and undue haste, within a week the plaintiff was

unlawfully and maliciously sent to jail, which proves malicious

prosecution against the plaintiff and his humiliation and

harassment. In relation to the said unconstitutional F.I.R., the

plaintiff filed a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before the

Hon’ble High Court at Bilaspur and thereafter filed a criminal

before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and by order dated

03.01.2019, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quashed the said illegal

F.I.R, thus the same has caused severe mental and physical pain

to the petitioner, which resulted into filing of a suit before the

learned Trial Court for loss of damages, which has been

dismissed vide impugned judgment and decree. Hence the

present appeal has been filed by the appellant.

3.Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the

appellant is a reputed person of the society and by the acts of the

respondents/defendants, he has suffered physical, financial, and

mental harm and his social reputation, honour, and prestige were

damaged. The defendant No.1 has neither refuted the earlier

notice sent by the appellant till date nor given any reply, which

implies that the contents of the notice are true and deemed to

have been admitted by him. In the matter of stamp duty

deficiency, under Section 27 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, if

found guilty, punishment is provided under Section 64, wherein a

5

maximum fine of ₹5,000 is prescribed. Under the Indian Stamp

Act, the Registration Act, and the Land Revenue Code, there is

no provision for registration of an F.I.R. in cases of stamp duty

deficiency. Further, under Section 70, no prosecution for a

punishable offence shall be instituted without the sanction of the

State Government or the Collector. However, Defendant No.1,

with the help of his subordinate Defendants No.2 and 3, acted

beyond the rules and caused the said F.I.R. to be registered.

Defendant No.1 has no authority to pass orders regarding stamp

duty deficiency. In this regard, the plaintiff obtained information

from the Collector of Stamps / Public Information Officer / Sub-

Registrar through Letter No.465 dated 16.05.2018 and Letter

No.32 dated 13.02.2018, wherein it has been clearly stated that

“In cases of stamp duty deficiency, only the Collector of Stamps

has the authority to hear the matter, and there is no provision for

registration of an F.I.R. in this regard.” Without giving information

about the said order or issuing any notice to deposit the amount,

an F.I.R. was directly registered. Thereafter, Defendant No.3,

under the influence of Defendant No. 1 and acting as per his

directions, conducted the investigation and all proceedings and

only after the plaintiff was sent to jail. As a result of the said

F.I.R., the plaintiff had to remain in jail, and the matter was

prominently published in newspapers. Consequently, the plaintiff

suffered physical, financial, and mental harm, and his social

reputation, honour, and prestige were damaged. Upon hearing

6

the news of the plaintiff’s imprisonment, his elder brother died

due to brain hemorrhage within fifteen days on 10.03.2018, which

caused irreparable loss to the plaintiff, for which Defendant No.1

is responsible. During the plaintiff’s period of imprisonment, the

marriages of his two daughters were scheduled. For this reason,

the defendants conspired against the plaintiff and caused him to

be harassed and humiliated. Even the proceedings of the FIR

have been quashed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which itself

shows the ill intention of the respondents against the appellant,

but the learned Trial court has not considered the above said

aspect of the matter and has wrongly dismissed the suit of

plaintiff for the loss of damages amounting to Rs.1 Crore and the

documents related to the same were filed by the appellant but the

same has not been considered by the learned Trial Court in its

true and correct perspective. Therefore, the appeal deserves to

be allowed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Bachhaj Nahar

vs Nilima Mandal and another, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 491,

Naman Singh @ Naman Pratap Singh and another vs State

of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2019) 2 SCC 344, A.

Shanmugam vs Ariya Kshatriya Rajakula Vamsathu

Madalaya Nandhavana Paripalanai Sangam , reported in

(2012) 6 SCC 430, S. Nambi Narayanan vs Siby Mathews and

others, reported in (2018) 10 SCC 804, Mehmood Nayyar

Azam vs State of Chhattisgarh and others, reported in (2012)

7

8 SCC 1, Joginder Kumar vs State of U.P. and others,

reported in (1994) 4 SCC 260 and in the matter of Gian Chand

and brothers and another vs Rattan Lal @ Rattan Singh ,

reported in (2013) 2 SCC 606 and this Court’s judgment in the

matter of Israr Ahmed Khan Suri vs State of Chhattisgarh,

reported in (2024) SCC Online Chh 2761.

4.Learned counsels for the respondents support the impugned

judgment and decree and jointly submit that the learned Trial

Court has minutely appreciated the oral and documentary

evidence and rightly dismissed the suit of the appellant/plaintiff.

The appellant was remanded to jail as per law. The legal notices

were issued on the basis of complaint received by the

respondent No.1 from the villagers and not on his own. The

respondent No.1 followed the due process of law by calling

reports from Tahsildar and Sub Registrar before directing the

Tahsildar to register FIR against the appellant showing the action

of respondent No.1 being bonafide. The respondent No.1 was

the competent authority to take cognizance and issue direction

on the basis of complaints from villagers and documentary

evidence and other authorities were only performing their duties.

The prompt action taken by the authorities cannot be said to be

malicious, as such the learned Trial Court rightly dismissed the

suit of the petitioner. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be

dismissed. Reliance has been placed on the judgment rendered

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matters of Tarwinder

8

Kumar Bedi vs Jit Parkash, reported in 2014 SCC Online P&H

20259, West Bengal State Electricity Board vs Dilip Ray,

reported in (2007) 14 SCC 568, Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs Daya

Sapra (Smt.), reported in (2009) 13 SCC 729, Ishar Amhed

Khan vs State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2024) SCC Online

Chh 2761, Kiran Madan vs Dishant Manchanda, reported in

2021 SCC Online Del 4344, M/s Bharat Commerce and

Industries Limited vs Surendra Nath Shuka and others,

reported in (1965) SCC Online Cal 79 and the judgment

rendered by the High Court of Madras in the matter of M.

Abubacker and others vs Abdul Kareem, reported in (2021) 1

High Court Cases (Mad) 280, the judgment rendered by the

High Court of Delhi in the matters of SH. Deepak Rathaur and

another vs SH. Shashi Bhushan Lal Das, passed in RSA

No.1/2016, decided on 30.09.2016 and Trilok Chand Bansal

vs Bharat Bhushan Bansal, passed in CS (OS) No.470/2016,

decided on 23.03.2017 and the judgment rendered by the

Guwahati High Court in the matter of Capt. L. Z. Sailo vs State

of Mizoram, reported in 2006 (2) Crimes (SC) 1.

5.Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

available on record.

6.The learned Trial Court on the basis of pleadings of the parties

framed following 2 issues which are as under:-

dz- okn iz’u fu"d"kZ

9

1 D;k oknh] izfroknhx.k dz- 1]2]3] ls

la;qDr :i ls ;k i`Fkd&i`Fkd

ekugkfu ,oa fo}s"kiw.kZ vfHk;kstu

{kfriwfrZ jkf’k :- 1]00]00]000@& ¼,d

djksM+ :i;s½ e; C;kt izkIr djus dk

vf/kdkjh gS \

Þ izekf.kr ughß

2 lgk;rk ,oa okn O;; \ ÞdaafMdk 60 ds vuqlkjß

7.The plaintiff examined himself and two witnesses Jaiprakash

Agrawal (PW-2) and Shyam Sundar (PW-4). He also filed

affidavit of Shrikant Sharma and Sahil Meghani under Order 18

Rule 4 of CPC but these witnesses did not appear before the

learned Trial Court for cross-examination. The defendants

examined M. P. Tandon, Indrajeet Barman and Poonamchand

Agrawl.

8.The plaintiff filed various documents from Ex-P/1 to Ex-P/143, in

which he filed certified copies of order sheets of Revenue Court

and Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class. As per plaintiff,

defendant No.1 Indrajeet Burman who was posted as Sub

Divisional Officer demanded some illegal gratification and when

he refused to fulfill his demand, he falsely implicated him in

various criminal and revenue proceedings. As per plaintiff he sent

notice to respondent No.1 on 29.01.2018 through his advocate

and after that defendant No.1 got lodged FIR against him on

07.02.2018 through his subordinate officer.

10

9.It is not disputed that the defendant No.1 issued memo against

the plaintiff on 07.12.2018 (Ex-P/9) and defendant No.2 Tahsildar

issued notice (Ex-P/10) on 07.02.2018 to him. Ex-P/11 is memo

dated 07.02.2018 issued by the defendant No.1 to Sub Registrar,

Sakti and Sub Registrar, Sakti issued reply on 07.02.2018 itself

(Ex-P/12), the FIR dated 08.02.2018 is Ex-P/13 and certified

copies of order sheets dated 20.02.2018 to 08.03.2018 are Ex-

P/14. The order sheet of Additional Session Court dated

26.02.2018 is Ex-P/15 and order dated 20.03.2018 passed by the

High Court is Ex-P/16. The plaintiff also filed copy of notice dated

29.01.2018 (Ex-P/78) and as per plaintiff, defendant No.1

initiated all proceedings against him with ill intention to harass

and humiliate him. In his affidavit, the plaintiff alleged in para 5 as

under:-

“5.

यहकिउक्तनोटिस प्रतिवादीक्र०कोदिनाँक

30/01/2018

कोप्राप्त

हुई।नोटिसप्राप्तिसेतिलमिलाकर आग बबूला

,

क्रोधितहोकर प्रतिवादी

क्र०1

नेएकहफ्‌तेकेअन्दर स्टाम्पकर अपवंचनकेप्रकरणमेंअपनेपत्र

क्र0/1783/अ

नु

.अ

धि

/स्

टेनो

-02/2018

सक्तीदिनाँक

07/02/2018

केद्वारा

अपनेअधीनस्थ प्रतिवादीक्र

02

केपत्र क्र

0 2424

दिनाँक

07/02/2018 के

माध्यमसेमेरेविरूद्ध सक्तीथानामेंविधिविरूद्ध बदलेकीभावनासेएफ

.

आई.आर. 0065/2018

दर्जकरवादी

,

प्रतिवादीक्र

02

तहसीलदारने

ए

फ

.आई.आर.

मेंउक्त पत्रकाहवालाभीदियाहै। प्रतिवादीक्र०३द्वारा

बिनाप्रारंभिकजांचकेप्रतिवादीक्र

01

केदवाबमेंआकरमेरेविरूद्ध

अवैधानिकअपराधक्र०

65/18

में

.द.वि.

कीधारा

420, 467, 468, 471, 34

दर्जकियागया

,

मुझकोबिनासुने

,

बिनासफाईकामौकादियेबिना

दस्तावेजोकाअवलोकनकिये

,

प्रतिवादीक्र०

1

केदबावमेंमुझकोजेलजाना

पड़ाऔर अनावश्यकरूपसे

22/02/2018

से

20/03/2018

तकछब्बीस

दिनजेलमेंअवैधरूपसेसदोष परिरोधमेंरहाहै। अकारण परिवादी

26

दिनअपनेपरिवार

,

घरेलुसुखसुविधाओं

,

ऐशोआरामसेवंचितहोकरजेल

मेंरहाऔरजिल्लत एवंअपमानकीजिन्दगीजीनीपड़ी।

"

10.In his cross-examination, the plaintiff admitted in paras 37 & 38

as under:-

11

“37-

यहकहनासहीहैकिप्रदर्शडी

. 1

एवंप्रदर्शडी

, 2

मेंक्रेता

,

विक्रेताके

घोषणापत्रमेंमुख्यमार्गसे

500

मीटरकीदूरीलिखाहै।साक्षीकास्वतः

कथनहैकिटंकणत्रुटिहै

,

मैंउसे

50

मीटर दूरलिखनाचाहाथा। यहकहना

सहीहैकिप्रदर्शडी

. 1

एवंप्रदर्शडी

. 2

केससेसभाग पर यह उलेखितहै

किक्रयविक्रयकीगईकृषिभूमि

, भू-दा

न

/

शासकीय पट्टेअथवाशासकीय

पट्टेपर प्रदत्तभूमिस्वामित्वकीजमीननहींहै। यहकहनासहीहैकिजमीन

कीमुख्यमार्गसेदूरीकेआधार परजमीनकेमूल्यमेंजमीनआसमानका

अंतरहोजाताहै। यहकहनासहीहैकिउक्तजमीनकीखरीदीकेपश्चातसे

ग्रामवासियोंद्वाराशिकायतकीजारहीथी।साक्षीकास्वतःकथनहैकि

संजयरामचंद्र

,

पुरुषोत्तमअग्रवालकेद्वाराग्रामवासियोंकेमाध्यमसे

शिकायतकरायीजारहीथी।

38-

यहकहनासहीहैकिनामांतरणमेंभीग्रामवासियोंनेआपत्तिकीथी।

यहकहनासहीहैकिग्रामवासियोंद्वाराइस आशयकीसाक्षीकास्वतः

आपत्तिकीगईथी

,

किउक्तजमीनशासकीयमदकीभूमिहै।कथनहैकि

नामांतरणकीकार्यवाहीमेंतहसीलदारद्वाराविधिवतजांचकरनेकेबादकी

गईशिकायतकोविधिविरूद्धपातेहुयेनिरस्तकरदिया। यहकहनागलतहै

किपांचसेछःलाख रूपयेतककीमूल्यकीविक्रय पत्रकाउपपंजीयकके

द्वारास्थलनिरीक्षणनहींकियाजाताहै। यहकहनागलतहैकिप्रदर्शडी

, 1

एवंप्रदर्शडी

, 2

मेंमैंनेजमीनको

50

मीटर दूरहोनाइसलिएलिखाथा

,

ताकिकीमतकमहोएवंस्टाम्पशुल्कबचाजासके।

"

He also admitted in para 40 that enquiry with regard to complaint

is still pending before the Collector Court of Sakti. The plaintiff

also admitted in paras 44 & 45 as under:-

“44.

यहकहनागलतहैकिप्रदर्शपी

, 4

सेलेकर प्रदर्शपी

, 7

केनोटिसमें

मुझेजबाब प्रस्तुतकरनेकासमयदियागयाहै।साक्षीकास्वतःकथनहैकि

प्रदर्शपी

, 4

सेलेकर प्रदर्शपी

, 7

केतकनोटिसमेंमुझेदो

-

दोदिनकासमय

दियागयाहै। यहकहनागलतहैकिजबाब प्रस्तुतकरनेकेलिए अतिरिक्त

समयकीमांगकरनेपरमुझेअतिरिक्त समयभीदियागयाहै। यहकहना

सहीहैकिप्रदर्शपी

. 4

सेलेकर प्रदर्शपी

. 7

कीनोटिसमेरेद्वारारत्नेश

अग्रवाल अधिवक्ताकेमाध्यमसेप्रतिवादीक्र

.1

कोनोटिसभेजनेकेपूर्वके

है। यहकहनासहीहैकिमेरेद्वाराप्रतिवादीक्र

. 1

कोप्रेषितकियेमयेनोटिस

प्रदर्शपी

. 78

मेंयह उल्लेखितनहींहैकिमुझेउसकेद्वाराप्रेषितनोटिसका

जवाब प्रस्तुतकरनेहेतुसमयनहींदियागयाहै।

45.

प्रदर्शपी

. 78

कानोटिस प्रतिवादीक्रं

1

कोदेनेकेपूर्वतकमैंउसकेद्वारा

प्रेषितनोटिसकाजयाबदेसकताथा।साक्षीकास्वतःकथनहैकिउक्त

नोटिस प्रदर्शपी

, 4

सेलेकर प्रदर्शपी

.7

मेंजवाबदेनेकाजोसमयदियागया

था,

वह समाप्तहोचुकाथा।मैंनेउक्त प्रदर्शपी

. 4

सेलेकर प्रदर्शपी

. 7 की

नोटिसकोरजिस्ट्रीसेनहींभेजा

,

क्योकिसमय समाप्तहोचुकाथा। यह

कहनासहीहैकिमेरेद्वाराप्रदर्शपी

. 78

कानोटिस प्रतिवादीक्रं

1

कोदिये

जानेकेपूर्वमेरेविरूद्धकोईनिर्णय प्रतिवादीक्रे

1

द्वारानहींलियागयाथा।

यहकहनासहीहैकिमैंनेप्रदर्शपी

. 78

कीनोटिसमेंप्रतिवादीक्रं

. 1 द्वा

रा

पांचलाख रूपयेमांगेजानेकाआरोप लगायाथा।

"

11.The plaintiff filed copies of notice dated 30.12.2017 (Ex-P/4),

notice dated 30.12.2017 (Ex-P/5), notice dated 01.01.2018 is Ex-

12

P/6. The notice dated 31.01.2018 is Ex-P/8. It is clear from all

notices that the plaintiff was asked to give reply of the said

notices, but plaintiff admitted that he did not file reply of any

notice instead he sent legal notice (Ex-P/78) through his

advocate to defendant No.1 that he demanded 5 Lakh rupees

from him. It is clear from order sheet dated 22.02.2018 (Ex-P/14)

that Judicial Magistrate First Class after taking cognizance of

judicial remand of plaintiff sent him to judicial custody and also

after considering his bail application dismissed the bail

application. The learned Session Court after hearing arguments

of the counsel for plaintiff as well as State dismissed the bail

application vide order dated 26.02.2018 (Ex-P/15) and this High

Court granted bail by order dated 20.03.2018 (Ex-P/16) so it is

clear from all documents that the defendant No.1 after receiving

complaints from some villagers issued notice to plaintiff but

plaintiff did not reply to any of the notice and issued notices to

defendant No.1. It is also clear that Sub Registrar Office sent

information about loss of government money by letter dated

07.02.2018 (Ex-P/12) and after that defendant No.1 directed his

subordinates to file FIR against the plaintiff and the learned

Judicial Magistrate First Class and the learned Session Judge

after considering the bail application of the plaintiff dismissed the

bail application of the plaintiff and sent him to judicial custody.

The plaintiff filed this suit for damages for malicious prosecution.

13

12.The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 01.03.2019 passed

in CRA No.11/2019 quashed the proceedings against the

appellant in criminal case pursuant to the FIR lodged by the

respondents. The said order is quoted hereinabove:-

“1. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

2. Leave Granted.

3. The allegation against the appellant on the basis of

which proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471

and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 have been

initiated is that in the affidavit enclosed to the sale

deed the appellant had shown the location of the land

50 mtrs. inside from the National Highway whereas the

land is adjacent to the National Highway. In this

manner, it is alleged, inadequate amount of stamp duty

had been paid.

4. The appellant had approached the High Court for

quashing the FIR dated 8th February, 2018 bearing

No.65/18 lodged by the Tahsildar and the said

quashing petition having been dismissed this appeal

has been filed.

5. Having read and considered the allegations against

the accused appellant we are of the view that even if

the said allegations are of accepted to be correct no

case under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 is made out. Learned

counsel for the appellant has the said submitted that

on the basis allegations, at best, the provisions of

Sections 27, 64 and 70 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899

may be attracted.

6 As we not are concerned with the aforesaid we

refrain from going into the same and on our finding that

the present prosecution against the accused appellant

under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860 is ex facie not maintainable

we set aside the order of the High Court and quash the

proceedings in FIR dated 8th February, 2018 bearing

No. 65/18 lodged by the Tahsildar.

7. Consequently and in the light of the above, the

present appeal is allowed.

8. The present order will, naturally, be without

prejudice to the rights of the complainant available in

law.”

14

13.The Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Tarwinder

Kumar Bedi (supra) held in para 8 as under:-

“8. There is a difference between lodging of FIR and

finding the case to be unsustainable during the course

of investigation. On the other hand, lodging of case

resulted in filing of report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and

ultimately entailed in acquittal. In second situation claim

of damages can be sustained. In the present case even

FIR has not been registered against the plaintiff. Only

lodging of complaint with the authorities cannot

tantamount to any prosecution.”

14.The Hon’ble Apex Court in West Bengal State Electricity Board

(supra) after discussing various malicious prosecutions held in

paras 16 to 22 as under:-

“16. Malice means and implies spite or ill-will.

Incidentally, be it noted that the expression "mala fide" is

not meaningless jargon and it has its proper

connotation. Malice or mala fides can only be

appreciated from the records of the case in the facts of

each case. There cannot possibly be any set guidelines

in regard to the proof of mala fides. Mala fides, where it

is alleged, depends upon its own facts and

circumstances. (See Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab State

Electricity Board and others. (2000) 5 SCC 630.

17. The legal meaning of 'malice' is "ill will or spite

towards a party and any indirect or improper motive in

taking an action". This is sometimes described as

"malice in fact". "Legal malice" or "malice in law" means

"something done without lawful excuse". In other words,

"it is an act done wrongfully and willfully without

reasonable or probable cause, and not necessarily an

act done from ill feeling and spite. It is deliberate act in

disregard of the rights of others". (See State of A.P. v.

Govardhanlal Pitti (2003) 4 SCC 739).

18. The word "malice" in common acceptation means

and implies "spite" or "ill will". One redeeming feature in

the matter of attributing bias or malice is now well settled

that mere general statements will not be sufficient for the

purposes of indication of ill will. There must be cogent

evidence available on record. In the case of Jones Bros.

15

(Hunstanton) Ltd. v. Stevens (1955) 1 QB 275: (1954) 3

All ER 677 (CA), the Court of Appeal has stated reliance

on the decision of Lumley v. Gye (1853) 2 E&B 216: 22

L.JQB 463 as below:

"For this purpose maliciously means no more than

knowingly. This was distinctly laid down in Lumley v. Gye

(1853) 2 E&B 216: 22 LJQB 463 where Crompton, J. said

that it was clear law that a person who wrongfully and

maliciously, or, which is the same thing, with notice,

interrupts the relation of master and servant by

harbouring and keeping the servant after he has quitted

his master during his period of service, commits a

wrongful act for which he is responsible in law. Malice in

law means the doing of a wrongful act intentionally

without just cause or excuse: Bromage v. Prosser (1825)

1 C&P 673: 4 B&C. 'Intentionally' refers to the doing of the

act; it doe not mean that the defendant meant to be

spiteful, though sometimes, as for instance to rebut a plea

of privilage in defamation, malice in fact has to be

proved". (See State of Punjab v. U.K. Khann and others

(2001) 2 SCC 330).

19. Malice in law. "Malice in law" is however, quite

different. Viscount Haldane described it in Shearer

Shields, (1914) AC 808 as:

"A person who inflicts an injury upon another person in

contravention of the law is not allowed to say that he did

so with the innocent mind: he is taken to know the law,

and he must act within the law. He may, therefore, be

guilty of malice in law, although, so far the state of mind is

concerned, he acts ignorantly, and in that sense

innocently". Malice in its legal sense means malice such

as may be assumed from the doing of a wrongful act

intentionally but without just cause or excuse, or fro want

of reasonable or probable cause. (See S.R.

Venkatarcunan v. Union of India (1979) 2 SCC 491).

20. Malice" in common law or acceptance means ill will

against a person, but in legal sense means a wrongful act

done intentionally without just cause or excuse. (See

Chairman and M.D., B.P.L. Ltd v. S.P. Gururaja and others

JT 2003 (Suppl. 2) SC 515 and Chairman and MD, BPL

Ltd. v. S.F. Gururaja and others (2003) 8 SCC 567).

21. While it is true that legitimate indignation does not fall

within the ambit of malicious act, in almost all legal

inquiries, intention, as distinguished from motive is the all

important factor. In common parlance, a malicious act has

been equated with intentional act without just cause or

excuse. (See Jones Bros. (Hunstanton) v. Stevans (1955)

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1 QB 275: (1954) 3 All ER 677 (CA)). Kumaon Mandal

Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and others. (2001)

1 SCC 182).

22. A bare perusal of the averments made in the plaint

show that they are extremely vague, lacking in details and

after the learned trial judge held that the Board alone was

responsible because it was not established that any

individual officer was responsible for it and dispute only

have been revealed by the high-power enquiry which the

court was incompetent to direct, the award for damages is

clearly indefensible. The High Court's judgment suffers

from various infirmities. Firstly, it has taken a confused

view of the matter. It failed to notice that the trial court

itself had held "it was highly probable" that the plaintiff was

suspended for extraneous reasons. This conclusion is

based on surmises and conjectures. This had not been

established. As noted above, the High Court noted that the

Trial Court itself held that the plaintiff was not entitled to

damages for defamation. But while affirming the judgment

and decree, it held that the damages granted for

harassment must be read as damages for malicious

prosecution causing harassment. To say the least, all the

conclusions are confusing, contradictory and do not

convey any sense. Looked at from any angle the

impugned judgment of the High Court is indefensible and

is set aside.”

15.The Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Trilok Chand Bansal (supra)

after observing various decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court

and various High Courts held in paras 20, 22 & 23 as under:-

“20. Resultantly this suit for compensation for malicious

prosecution filed during the pendency of the appeal

against the order of acquittal is held to be premature

and the plaint liable to be rejected on this ground alone.

22. In my view all prosecutions ending in an acquittal

cannot be said to be malicious. I have in Sannam Bharti

Vs. D.T.C. 2013 SCC Online Del 3104 and in Akbar Ali

Vs. State 2014 SCC Online Del 1547 held so. There is

no presumption in law of a prosecution ending in an

acquittal being malicious. Thus a plaint in a suit for

compensation for malicious prosecution merely stating

that the plaintiff was prosecuted by or at the instance of

the defendant and was acquitted, would not disclose a

cause of action.

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23. There can be manifold reasons for acquittal. Every

acquittal is not a consequence of the prosecution being

malicious. It cannot be lost sight of that the remedy of

compensation has been provided for "malicious

prosecution" and not for "wrongful or uncalled for or

failed prosecution".

16.This Court in Ishar Ahmad Khan (supra) after observing

guidelines of Hon’ble Apex Court in various cases held in para 24

as under:-

“24. Reading of the aforesaid decision with the

evidence would show that the distinction between an

action for malicious prosecution and an action for abuse

of process is that a malicious prosecution consists in

maliciously causing process to be issued, whereas an

abuse of process is the employment of legal process for

some purpose other than that which it was intended by

the law to effect. The improper use of a regularly issued

process.”

17.In light of the above in the present case it is clear that defendant

No.1 was posted as Sub Divisional Magistrate and he issued

notice to plaintiff on receiving complaints against him and after

that he directed his subordinate officer to lodge FIR against the

plaintiff and the Criminal Court took action according to law and

procedure.

18.The Hon’ble Apex Court quashed the proceeding against the

plaintiff. As per plaintiff he was in custody so he could not attend

engagement of his daughter and last rites of his brother but it is

clear from order sheets of Criminal Courts that the Criminal

Courts were performing their duties. It is also clear from notices

issued by the defendant No.1 that proper opportunity of reply was

18

given to plaintiff but he did not avail that opportunity and he also

did not bother to reply any of the notices and sent legal notice

through his advocate.

19.The learned Trial Court minutely appreciated all oral and

documentary evidence and found that the plaintiff has failed to

prove any malice of defendants and dismissed the suit of the

plaintiff. He himself admitted that some enquiry is still pending

against him before the Collector Court as such he has failed to

prove any malicious spirit or improper motive. Thus the finding

recorded by the learned Trial Court is based on the proper

appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on

record.

20.The appeal is without any merit. It deserves to be and is hereby

dismissed accordingly.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge Judge

Nirala