REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1584 of 2021

(@SLP (CRL.) NO. 11816 OF 2019)

JASDEEP SINGH @ JASSU …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1585 OF 2021

(@SLP(CRL.) NO.11486/2019)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1586 OF 2021

(@SLP(CRL.) NO.3301/2020)

J U D G M E N T

M.M. SUNDRESH, J.

1.Heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

2.Crl. A. No.1584 of 2021 and Crl. A. No.1585 of 2021 are filed by convicted

Appellants/Accused 3 and 4 respectively against conviction under Section

304 Part I of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) with life sentence, while Crl. A.

No.1586 of 2021 is filed by the de facto complainant seeking modification of

the conviction to the sentence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Thus, we

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shall deal with all the appeals by our common order, particularly, when they

emanate and emerge from a common impugned order.

BRIEF FACTS

3.Four accused persons were charged, convicted, and sentenced in the following

manner:

Name of convict Offence under

Section

Sentence

Ramsimran Singh

Makkar

U/s 304 Part I IPCTo undergo

imprisonment for life

and to pay fine of

Rs.10,000/- and in

default of payment of

fine to undergo further

RI for one year.

U/s 25 Arms ActTo undergo rigorous

imprisonment for two

years and to pay fine of

Rs.2000/- and in default

of payment of fine to

undergo further RI for

three months.

U/s 27 Arms ActTo undergo rigorous

imprisonment for five

years and to pay fine of

Rs.5000/- and in default

of payment of fine to

undergo further RI for

six months.

Amardeep Singh

Sachdeva

U/s 304 Part I, read

with Section 34 IPC

To undergo

imprisonment for life

and to pay fine of

Rs.10,000/- and in

default of payment of

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fine to undergo further

RI for one year.

U/s 25 Arms ActTo undergo rigorous

imprisonment for two

years and to pay fine of

Rs.2000/- and in default

of payment of fine to

undergo further RI for

three months.

Jasdeep Singh U/s 304 Part I, read

with Section 34 IPC

To undergo

imprisonment for life

and to pay fine of

Rs.10,000/- and in

default of payment of

fine to undergo further

RI for one year.

Amarpreet Singh

Narula

U/s 304 Part I, read

with Section 34 IPC

To undergo

imprisonment for life

and to pay fine of

Rs.10,000/- and in

default of payment of

fine to undergo further

RI for one year.

4.The occurrence took place at about 12:45 a.m. on 21.04.2011 in the area of

Baba Rasoi Dhaba, Jalandhar. The motive for the occurrence was that the

deceased felt that a raid conducted in the hotel belonging to him and his father

(PW6), the Appellant in Crl. A. No.1586 of 2021, was done at the instance of

the accused. All the accused are friends of each other.

5.PW6 went in search of the deceased on finding that he had not returned home,

though he was in a habit of coming late. On a particular street, he saw the

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accused grappling with the deceased. It was seen by him in the street light.

The occurrence was also witnessed by PW10 who incidentally was a friend of

the deceased. PW13 spoke about the common intention on the part of the

accused on the previous night to do away with the deceased.

6.In pursuance to the statement made by A3 and A4, saying “what are you

seeing now”, A1 took out a gun from his pocket and shot the deceased. A2

took his gun and brandished it against the deceased, prior to the aforesaid

statement made by A3 and A4, followed by the shooting by A1. A3 and A4

made the statement pointing to A1, though A2 was already having the gun

out. It is only thereafter that A1 took out his gun and shot the deceased.

7.The deceased was taken to the hospital situated about 3 kms from the place of

occurrence, notwithstanding the other hospitals nearby. PW23 helped PW6

and PW10 to carry the deceased into the car of PW6. Thereafter PW6 gave

the complaint under Exhibit PL. In the complaint, he did not make any

statement that A3 and A4 exhorted A1 to shoot, except the statement as

referred earlier. However, in his additional statement given under Section 161

CrPC, he improved his version by stating that A3 and A4 instigated A1 to fire.

We may note, A6 is a legally qualified person.

8.PW24 took up the investigation and completed the formalities. Recoveries

have been made, including of the weapons.

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9.Before the trial court, the prosecution examined 27 witnesses and marked

documents in support of its case. On behalf of the defense, 16 witnesses have

been examined along with the documents.

10.Before the trial court, PW10 and PW23 turned hostile. Upon hearing the

counsel appearing for the parties a conviction has been rendered against all

the accused for the offences punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC along

with life sentence. The trial court reasoned that it is not as if the accused were

waiting for the deceased. The deceased went nearer to the accused, as could

be seen from the evidence of PW10 under Exhibit PF/1 and PQ. There was

only one single shot. Though the deceased fell down the accused did not shoot

him thereafter. There was indeed a quarrel preceding the occurrence. The

evidence of PW13 was disbelieved with respect to prior concert. It was noted

that he was a resident of a place 50 kms away from Jalandhar. The evidence

adduced by his cousin (DW1) showed that he was not present at his house at

Jalandhar and there was no reason for going to Jalandhar on 20.04.2011. The

prosecution did not prove that that day was his birthday and there were other

places available nearer to his residence. There was absolutely no material to

hold that he knew the accused at any prior point of time. It would be

improbable that the accused would make a plan to commit a murder in public,

by addressing themselves by names while flaunting their weapons. Further, he

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did not make any complaint. The statement that he visited days thereafter to

seek tires for his jeep was not believed as such tires could be obtained

otherwise in a nearer place.

11.Accordingly, holding that there was no premeditation, and the occurrence

took place in pursuance to a sudden fight, in a heat of passion, the case was

brought under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC.

12.Appeals were filed by all the parties. The High Court concurred with the

views of the trial court. However, it did not specifically deal with the scope of

Section 34 IPC as against A3 and A4 which was accordingly done by the trial

court. We may also note that the trial court did an in-depth, exhaustive

assessment, by considering almost all the material placed before it, including

the statements made by the witnesses.

13.A3 and A4 are before us by filing their respective appeals seeking to overturn

the judgment rendered by the High Court confirming the one by the trial

court. Thus, A1 and A2 have not filed their appeals. We have been informed at

the Bar, by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the de facto

complainant/Appellant in Crl. A. No.1586 of 2021 that A1 has since been let

out on pre-mature release by the State. We do not wish to state anything on

the role of A1 and A2 except to the extent of testing the decision of the High

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Court and the trial court as to whether the case would fall under Section 304

Part I or Section 302 IPC.

Arguments on behalf of the Appellants

14.Since appeals have been filed both by the convicted Appellants and the de

facto complainant, we would like to note the arguments of A3 and A4 first

and thus the other appeal filed by de facto complainant would be taken along

with the arguments of the State.

15.It is submitted by the learned counsel that the evidence of PW13 having been

disbelieved, the courts have committed an error in applying Section 34 IPC.

There is an improvement with respect to the statement made by PW6. A mere

statement per se would not be sufficient to attract Section 34 IPC. It is strange

that both of them made the same statement. The presence of PW6 is very

doubtful. He had deposed that the deceased used to come late and there was

no complaint whatsoever. If A2 brandished the gun before the deceased was

shot by A1, it is only logical that A3 and A4 would have asked A2 to shoot

first. Even the other eyewitness in PW10 has turned hostile and so also

another material witness in PW23. Under those circumstances it is a fit case

where the conviction rendered against A3 and A4 are to be set aside.

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Submission of the Respondents

16.The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the de facto complainant submitted

that the accused are influential persons. The case would come under offense

punishable under Section 302 IPC. The trial court has committed an error as

confirmed by the High Court in bringing it under Section 299 IPC and

therefore wrongly applied Section 304 Part I IPC. It is not necessary that an

accused will have to do a physical act in order to attract Section 34 IPC. Thus,

a mere presence of the accused would suffice. Hence, the appeal filed by the

de facto complainant be allowed while dismissing the appeal filed by the

Accused-Appellants.

17.The counsel appearing for the State submitted that cogent reasoning was

given by the High Court. The trial court considered the entire material

available on record. Recoveries made have been proved. Under those

circumstances there is no need to interfere with the conviction and sentence.

Section 34 IPC

18.We shall first go back into the history to understand Section 34 IPC as it stood

at the inception and as it exists now.

Old Section 34 of IPC New Section 34 of IPC

“When a criminal act is done by

several persons, each of such

“When a Criminal act is done by

several persons, in furtherance of the

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persons is liable for that act in

the same manner as if the act

was done by him alone”

common intention of all, each of such

persons is liable for that act in the

same manner as if it were by him

alone”

19.On a comparison, one could decipher that the phrase “in furtherance of the

common intention” was added into the statute book subsequently. It was first

coined by Chief Justice Barnes Peacock presiding over a Bench of the

Calcutta High Court, while delivering its decision in Queen v. Gorachand

Gope, (1866 SCC OnLine Cal 16) which would have probably inspired and

hastened the amendment to Section 34 IPC, made in 1870. The following

passage may lend credence to the aforesaid possible view:

“It does not follow that, because they were present with the intention of

taking him away, that they assisted by their presence in the beating of

him to such an extent as to cause death. If the object and design of those

who seized Amordi was merely to take him to the thannah on a charge of

theft, and it was no part of the common design to beat him, they would

not all be liable for the consequence of the beating merely because they

were present. It is laid down that, when several persons are in company

together engaged in one common purpose, lawful or unlawful, and one of

them, without the knowledge or consent of the others, commits an

offence, the others will not be involved in the guilt, unless the act done

was in some manner in furtherance of the common intention. It is also

said, although a man is present when a felony is committed, if he take no

part in it, and do not act in concert with those who commit it, he will not

be a principal merely because he did not endeavour to prevent it or to

apprehend the felon. But if several persons go out together for the

purpose of apprehending a man and taking him to the thannah on a

charge of theft, and some of the party in the presence of the others beat

and ill-treat the man in a cruel and violent manner, and the others stand

by and look on without endeavouring to dissuade them from their cruel

and violent conduct, it appears to me that those who have to deal with the

facts might very properly infer that they were all assenting parties and

acting in concert, and that the beating was in furtherance of a common

design. I do not know what the evidence was, all that I wish to point out

is, that all who are present do not necessarily assist by their presence

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every act that is done in their presence, nor are consequently liable to be

punished as principals.”

20. Before we deal further with Section 34 IPC, a peep at Section 33 IPC may

give a better understanding. Section 33 IPC brings into its fold a series of acts

as that of a single one. Therefore, in order to attract Section 34 to 39 IPC, a

series of acts done by several persons would be related to a single act which

constitutes a criminal offense. A similar meaning is also given to the word

‘omission’, meaning thereby, a series of omissions would also mean a single

omission. This provision would thus make it clear that an act would mean and

include other acts along with it.

21.Section 34 IPC creates a deeming fiction by infusing and importing a criminal

act constituting an offence committed by one, into others, in pursuance to a

common intention. Onus is on the prosecution to prove the common intention

to the satisfaction of the court. The quality of evidence will have to be

substantial, concrete, definite and clear. When a part of evidence produced by

the prosecution to bring the accused within the fold of Section 34 IPC is

disbelieved, the remaining part will have to be examined with adequate care

and caution, as we are dealing with a case of vicarious liability fastened on

the accused by treating him at par with the one who actually committed the

offence.

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22.What is required is the proof of common intention. Thus, there may be an

offence without common intention, in which case Section 34 IPC does not get

attracted.

23.It is a team effort akin to a game of football involving several positions

manned by many, such as defender, mid-fielder, striker, and a keeper. A striker

may hit the target, while a keeper may stop an attack. The consequence of the

match, either a win or a loss, is borne by all the players, though they may

have their distinct roles. A goal scored or saved may be the final act, but the

result is what matters. As against the specific individuals who had impacted

more, the result is shared between the players. The same logic is the

foundation of Section 34 IPC which creates shared liability on those who

shared the common intention to commit the crime.

24.The intendment of Section 34 IPC is to remove the difficulties in

distinguishing the acts of individual members of a party, acting in furtherance

of a common intention. There has to be a simultaneous conscious mind of the

persons participating in the criminal action of bringing about a particular

result. A common intention qua its existence is a question of fact and also

requires an act “in furtherance of the said intention”. One need not search for

a concrete evidence, as it is for the court to come to a conclusion on a

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cumulative assessment. It is only a rule of evidence and thus does not create

any substantive offense.

25.Normally, in an offense committed physically, the presence of an accused

charged under Section 34 IPC is required, especially in a case where the act

attributed to the accused is one of instigation/exhortation. However, there are

exceptions, in particular, when an offense consists of diverse acts done at

different times and places. Therefore, it has to be seen on a case to case basis.

26.The word “furtherance” indicates the existence of aid or assistance in producing

an effect in future. Thus, it has to be construed as an advancement or promotion.

27.There may be cases where all acts, in general, would not come under the purview

of Section 34 IPC, but only those done in furtherance of the common intention

having adequate connectivity. When we speak of intention it has to be one of

criminality with adequacy of knowledge of any existing fact necessary for the

proposed offense. Such an intention is meant to assist, encourage, promote and

facilitate the commission of a crime with the requisite knowledge as aforesaid.

28.The existence of common intention is obviously the duty of the prosecution to

prove. However, a court has to analyse and assess the evidence before

implicating a person under Section 34 IPC. A mere common intention per se may

not attract Section 34 IPC, sans an action in furtherance. There may also be cases

where a person despite being an active participant in forming a common

intention to commit a crime, may actually withdraw from it later. Of course, this

12

is also one of the facts for the consideration of the court. Further, the fact that all

accused charged with an offence read with Section 34 IPC are present at the

commission of the crime, without dissuading themselves or others might well be

a relevant circumstance, provided a prior common intention is duly proved. Once

again, this is an aspect which is required to be looked into by the court on the

evidence placed before it. It may not be required on the part of the defence to

specifically raise such a plea in a case where adequate evidence is available

before the court.

29.The essence and scope of Section 34 IPC can be borne out of excerpts from

the following judgements:

Suresh v State of U.P. ((2001) 3 SCC 673):

“24. Looking at the first postulate pointed out above, the accused who is

to be fastened with liability on the strength of Section 34 IPC should

have done some act which has nexus with the offence. Such an act need

not be very substantial, it is enough that the act is only for guarding the

scene for facilitating the crime. The act need not necessarily be overt,

even if it is only a covert act it is enough, provided such a covert act is

proved to have been done by the co-accused in furtherance of the

common intention. Even an omission can, in certain circumstances,

amount to an act. This is the purport of Section 32 IPC. So, the act

mentioned in Section 34 IPC need not be an overt act, even an illegal

omission to do a certain act in a certain situation can amount to an act,

e.g. a co-accused, standing near the victim face to face saw an armed

assailant nearing the victim from behind with a weapon to inflict a blow.

The co-accused, who could have alerted the victim to move away to

escape from the onslaught deliberately refrained from doing so with the

idea that the blow should fall on the victim. Such omission can also be

termed as an act in a given situation. Hence an act, whether overt or

covert, is indispensable to be done by a co-accused to be fastened with

the liability under the section. But if no such act is done by a person,

even if he has common intention with the others for the accomplishment

of the crime, Section 34 IPC cannot be invoked for convicting that

person. In other words, the accused who only keeps the common

intention in his mind, but does not do any act at the scene, cannot be

convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC.

13

xxx xxx xxx

40. Participation in the crime in furtherance of the common intention

cannot conceive of some independent criminal act by all accused persons,

besides the ultimate criminal act because for that individual act law takes

care of making such accused responsible under the other provisions of

the Code. The word “act” used in Section 34 denotes a series of acts as a

single act. What is required under law is that the accused persons sharing

the common intention must be physically present at the scene of

occurrence and be shown not to have dissuaded themselves from the

intended criminal act for which they shared the common intention.

Culpability under Section 34 cannot be excluded by mere distance from

the scene of occurrence. The presumption of constructive intention,

however, has to be arrived at only when the court can, with judicial

servitude, hold that the accused must have preconceived the result that

ensued in furtherance of the common intention. A Division Bench of the

Patna High Court in Satrughan Patar v. Emperor, AIR 1919 Pat 111 held

that it is only when a court with some certainty holds that a particular

accused must have preconceived or premeditated the result which ensued

or acted in concert with others in order to bring about that result, that

Section 34 may be applied.”

Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar, [(2003) 1 SCC 268]:

“22. The above discussion in fine thus culminates to the effect that the

requirement of statute is sharing the common intention upon being

present at the place of occurrence. Mere distancing himself from the

scene cannot absolve the accused — though the same however depends

upon the fact situation of the matter under consideration and no rule

steadfast can be laid down therefor.”

Chhota Ahirwar v. State of M.P., [(2020) 4 SCC 126]:

“24. Section 34 is only attracted when a specific criminal act is done by

several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, in which

case all the offenders are liable for that criminal act in the same manner

as the principal offender as if the act were done by all the offenders. This

section does not whittle down the liability of the principal offender

committing the principal act but additionally makes all other offenders

liable. The essence of liability under Section 34 is simultaneous

consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal act to

bring about a particular result, which consensus can even be developed at

the spot as held in Lallan Rai v. State of Bihar, (2003) 1 SCC 268. There

must be a common intention to commit the particular offence. To

constitute common intention, it is absolutely necessary that the intention

of each one of the accused should be known to the rest of the accused.”

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Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (AIR 1925 PC 1):

"...... the words of S. 34 are not to be eviscerated by reading them in this

exceedingly limited sense. By S. 33 a criminal act in S. 34 includes a

series of acts and, further, “act” includes omissions to act, for example,

an omission to interfere in order to prevent a murder being done before

one's very eyes. By S. 37, when any offence is committed by means of

several acts whoever intentionally co-operates in the commission of that

offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with any

other person, commits that offence. Even if the appellant did nothing as

he stood outside the door, it is to be remembered that in crimes as in

other things “they also serve who only stand and wait”. By S. 38, when

several persons are engaged or concerned in the commission of a

criminal act, they may be guilty of different offences by means of that

act. Read together, these sections are reasonably plain. S. 34 deals with

the doing of separate acts, similar or diverse, by several persons; if all are

done in furtherance of a common intention, each person is liable for the

result of them all, as if he had done them himself, for “that act” and “the

act” in the latter part of the section must include the whole action covered

by 'a criminal act' in the first part, because they refer to it. S. 37 provides

that, when several acts are done so as to result together in the

commission of an offence, the doing of any one of them, with an

intention to co-operate in the offence (which may not be the same as an

intention common to all), makes the actor liable to be punished for the

commission of the offence. S. 38 provides for different punishments for

different offences as an alternative to one punishment for one offence,

whether the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of a

criminal act are set in motion by the one intention or by the other."

Mehbub Shah v. Emperor (AIR 1945 PC 148):

"....Section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a

criminal act. The section does not say "the common intentions of all" nor

does it say "an intention common to all.” Under the section, the essence

of that liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention

animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in

furtherance of such intention. To invoke the aid of S. 34 successfully, it

must be shown that the criminal act complained against was done by one

of the accused persons in the furtherance of the common intention of all;

15

if this is shown, then liability for the crime may be imposed on any one

of the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.

This being the principle, it is clear to their Lordships that common

intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-arranged plan,

and to convict the accused of an offence applying the section it should be

proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-

arranged plan…"

Rambilas Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar [(1989) 3 SCC 605]:

"7…It is true that in order to convict persons vicariously under section 34

or section 149 IPC, it is not necessary to prove that each and every one of

them had indulged in overt acts. Even so, there must be material to show

that the overt act or acts of one or more of the accused was or were done

in furtherance of the common intention of all the accused or in

prosecution of the common object of the members of the unlawful

assembly…"

Krishnan & Another v. State of Kerala [(1996) 10 SCC 508]:

"15. Question is whether it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to

establish commission of overt act to press into service section 34 of the

Penal Code. It is no doubt true that court likes to know about overt act to

decide whether the concerned person had shared the common intention in

question. Question is whether overt act has always to be established? I

am of the view that establishment of an overt act is not a requirement of

law to allow section 34 to operate inasmuch this section gets attracted

when "a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of

common intention of all". What has to be, therefore, established by the

prosecution is that all the concerned persons had shared the common

intention. Court's mind regarding the sharing of common intention gets

satisfied when overt act is established qua each of the accused. But then,

there may be a case where the proved facts would themselves speak of

sharing of common intention: res ipsa loquitur."

Surendra Chauhan v. State of M.P. [(2000) 4 SCC 110]:

"11. Under Section 34 a person must be physically present at the actual

commission of the crime for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the

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offence, the commission of which is the aim of the joint criminal

venture….”

Gopi Nath @ Jhallar v. State of U.P. [(2001) 6 SCC 620]:

“8. …As for the challenge made to the conviction under Section 302 read

with Section 23 IPC, it is necessary to advert to the salient principles to

be kept into consideration and often reiterated by this Court, in the matter

of invoking the aid of Section 34 IPC, before dealing with the factual

aspect of the claim made on behalf of the appellant. Section 34 IPC has

been held to lay down the rule of joint responsibility for criminal acts

performed by plurality or persons who joined together in doing the

criminal act, provided that such commission is in furtherance of the

common intention of all of them. Even the doing of separate, similar or

diverse acts by several persons, so long as they are done in furtherance of

a common intention, render each of such persons liable for the result of

them all, as if he had done them himself, for the whole of the criminal

action – be it that it was not overt or was only covert act or merely an

omission constituting an illegal omission. The section, therefore, has

been held to be attracted even where the acts committed by the different

confederates are different when it is established in one way or the other

that all of them participated and engaged themselves in furtherance of the

common intention which might be of a pre-concerted or pre-arranged

plan or one manifested or developed at the spur of the moment in the

course of the commission of the offence. The common intention or the

intention of the individual concerned in furtherance of the common

intention could be proved either from direct evidence or by inference

from the acts or attending circumstances of the case and conduct of the

parties. The ultimate decision, at any rate, would invariably depend upon

the inferences deducible from the circumstances of each case.”

Ramesh Singh @ Photti v. State of A.P. [(2004) 11 SCC 305]:

"12. …As a general principle in a case of criminal liability it is the

primary responsibility of the person who actually commits the offence

and only that person who has committed the crime can be held guilty. By

introducing Section 34 in the Penal Code the legislature laid down the

principle of joint liability in doing a criminal act. The essence of that

liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention connecting

the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such

intention. Thus, if the act is the result of a common intention, then every

person who did the criminal act with that common intention would be

17

responsible for the offence committed irrespective of the share which he

had in its perpetration.......... "

Nand Kishore V. State Of Madhya Pradesh [(2011) 12 SCC 120)]:

“20. A bare reading of this section shows that the section could be

dissected as follows:

(a) Criminal act is done by several persons;

(b) Such act is done in furtherance of the common intention of all;

and

(c) Each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it

were done by him alone.

In other words, these three ingredients would guide the court in

determining whether an accused is liable to be convicted with the aid of

Section 34. While first two are the acts which are attributable and have to

be proved as actions of the accused, the third is the consequence. Once

the criminal act and common intention are proved, then by fiction of law,

criminal liability of having done that act by each person individually

would arise. The criminal act, according to Section 34 IPC must be done

by several persons. The emphasis in this part of the section is on the word

“done”. It only flows from this that before a person can be convicted by

following the provisions of Section 34, that person must have done

something along with other persons. Some individual participation in the

commission of the criminal act would be the requirement. Every

individual member of the entire group charged with the aid of Section 34

must, therefore, be a participant in the joint act which is the result of their

combined activity.

21. Under Section 34, every individual offender is associated with the

criminal act which constitutes the offence both physically as well as

mentally i.e. he is a participant not only in what has been described as a

common act but also what is termed as the common intention and,

therefore, in both these respects his individual role is put into serious

jeopardy although this individual role might be a part of a common

scheme in which others have also joined him and played a role that is

similar or different. But referring to the common intention, it needs to be

clarified that the courts must keep in mind the fine distinction between

“common intention” on the one hand and “mens rea” as understood in

criminal jurisprudence on the other. Common intention is not alike or

identical to mens rea. The latter may be coincidental with or collateral to

the former but they are distinct and different.

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22. Section 34 also deals with constructive criminal liability. It provides

that where a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the

common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the

same manner as if it was done by him alone. If the common intention

leads to the commission of the criminal offence charged, each one of the

persons sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the

criminal act done by one of them. (Refer to Brathi v. State of Punjab

1991 (1) SCC 519).

23. Another aspect which the court has to keep in mind while dealing

with such cases is that the common intention or state of mind and the

physical act, both may be arrived at the spot and essentially may not be

the result of any predetermined plan to commit such an offence. This will

always depend on the facts and circumstances of the case…”

Shyamal Ghosh V. State of West Bengal [(2012) 7 SCC 646)]:

“87. Upon analysis of the above judgments and in particular the

judgment of this Court in the case of Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, [(2010) 7 SCC 759], it is clear that Section 34 IPC applies

where two or more accused are present and two factors must be

established i.e. common intention and participation of the accused in the

crime. Section 34 IPC, moreover, involves vicarious liability and

therefore, if the intention is proved but no overt act was committed, the

section can still be invoked. This provision carves out an exception from

general law that a person is responsible for his own act, as it provides that

a person can also be held vicariously responsible for the act of others, if

he had the common intention to commit the act. The phrase “common

intention” means a pre-oriented plan and acting in pursuance to the plan,

thus, common intention must exist prior to the commission of the act in a

point of time. The common intention to give effect to a particular act may

even develop on the spur of moment between a number of persons with

reference to the facts of a given case."

30. The aforesaid principle has also been dealt with in extenso by the Apex

Court in Virendra Singh V. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2010) 8 SCC 407)

through the following paragraphs:

"15. Ordinarily, a person is responsible for his own act. A person can also

be vicariously responsible for the acts of others if he had the common

intention to commit the offence. The words "common intention" implies

a prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. It must be

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proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the

prearranged plan. Common intention comes into force prior to the

commission of the act in point of time, which need not be a long gap.

Under this section a pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is

not necessary to be proved. The common intention to bring about a

particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of

persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the

situation. Though common intention may develop on the spot, it must,

however, be anterior in point of time to the commission of the crime

showing a prearranged plan and prior concert. The common intention

may develop in course of the fight but there must be clear and

unimpeachable evidence to justify that inference. This has been clearly

laid down by this Court in the case of Amrik Singh & Ors. v. State of

Punjab, 1972 (4) SCC (N) 42:1972 CriLJ 465.

16. The essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a

common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a

criminal act in furtherance of such intention. Undoubtedly, it is difficult

to prove even the intention of an individual and, therefore, it is all the

more difficult to show the common intention of a group of persons.

Therefore, in order to find whether a person is guilty of common

intention, it is absolutely necessary to carefully and critically examine the

entire evidence on record. The common intention can be spelt out only

from the evidence on record.

17. Section 34 is not a substantive offence. It is imperative that before a

man can be held liable for acts done by another under the provisions of

this section, it must be established that there was common intention in the

sense of a prearranged plan between the two and the person sought to be

so held liable had participated in some manner in the act constituting the

offence. Unless common intention and participation are both present, this

section cannot apply.

xxx xxx xxx

36. Referring to the facts of this case, the short question which arises for

adjudication in this appeal is whether the appellant Virendra Singh can be

convicted under section 302 with the aid of section 34 IPC. Under the

Penal Code, the persons who are connected with the preparation of a

crime are divided into two categories: (1) those who actually commit the

crime i.e. principals in the first degree; and (2) those who aid in the

actual commission i.e. principals in the second degree. The law does not

make any distinction with regard to the punishment of such persons, all

being liable to be punished alike.

37. Under the Penal Code, a person is responsible for his own act. A

person can also be vicariously responsible for the acts of others if he had

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a common intention to commit the acts or if the offence is committed by

any member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common

object of that assembly, then also he can be vicariously responsible.

Under the Penal Code, two sections, namely, Sections 34 and 149, deal

with them circumstances when a person is vicariously responsible for the

acts of others.

38. The vicarious or constructive liability under Section 34 IPC can arise

only when two conditions stand fulfilled i.e. the mental element or the

intention to commit the criminal act conjointly with another or others;

and the other is the actual participation in one form or the other in the

commission of the crime.

39. The common intention postulates the existence of a prearranged plan

implying a prior meeting of the minds. It is the intention to commit the

crime and the accused can be convicted only if such an intention has been

shared by all the accused. Such a common intention should be anterior in

point of time to the commission of the crime, but may also develop on

the spot when such a crime is committed. In most of the cases it is

difficult to procure direct evidence of such intention. In most of the cases,

it can be inferred from the acts or conduct of the accused and other

relevant circumstances. Therefore, in inferring the common intention

under section 34 IPC, the evidence and documents on record acquire a

great significance and they have to be very carefully scrutinized by the

court. This is particularly important in cases where evidence regarding

development of the common intention to commit the offence graver than

the one originally designed, during execution of the original plan, should

be clear and cogent.

40. The dominant feature of Section 34 is the element of intention and

participation in action. This participation need not in all cases be by

physical presence. Common intention implies acting in concert.

41. The essence of Section 34 IPC is a simultaneous consensus of the

minds of the persons participating in criminal action to bring about a

particular result. Russell in his celebrated book Russell on Crime, 12th

Edn., Vol. 1 indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing an effect

in future and adds that any act may be regarded as done in furtherance of

the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally taken for the purpose of

effecting that felony. It was observed by Russell that any act of

preparation for the commission of felony is done in furtherance of the

act.

42. Section 34 IPC does not create any distinct offence, but it lays down

the principle of constructive liability. Section 34 IPC stipulates that the

act must have been done in furtherance of the common intention. In order

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to incur joint liability for an offence there must be a prearranged and

premeditated concert between the accused persons for doing the act

actually done, though there might not be long interval between the act

and the premeditation and though the plan may be formed suddenly. In

order that Section 34 IPC may apply, it is not necessary that the

prosecution must prove that the act was done by a particular or a

specified person. In fact, the section is intended to cover a case where a

number of persons act together and on the facts of the case it is not

possible for the prosecution to prove as to which of the persons who

acted together actually committed the crime. Little or no distinction

exists between a charge for an offence under a particular section and a

charge under that section read with section 34."

On merit

31.Having understood Section 34 IPC, we shall now deal with the case on hand.

32.The evidence of PW13 did not find favour with the courts. The trial court

which had the advantage of noting the deposition of the witnesses, chose to

disbelieve the evidence adduced, by giving cogent reasons. This evidence was

rightly eschewed by the trial court and also by the High Court. There are too

many improbabilities in the testimony of PW13. A person who was living 50

kms away remembered the accused and their names and overheard their plot

to commit the murder. His evidence was belied by the evidence of DW1 who

was none other than his own cousin with whom he was said to be residing at the

relevant point of time.

33.The other material witnesses are PW6 and PW10. PW10 had given prior

statements. Though he turned hostile despite being a friend of the deceased, the

trial court did take into consideration his earlier statement, while coming to the

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conclusion that there was no premeditation and thus the case would fall under

culpable homicide not murder. Though the evidence of PW6 was not rejected,

both the courts did find a clear exaggeration on his part. On many occasions

PW6 made a concerted effort to improve the case of prosecution. The testimony

given by him on the dying declaration, a case inserted by him in his

supplementary statement, made subsequently, was also rightly rejected by the

courts. This was also supported by the medical evidence. The other part of the

evidence with respect to the fight was also dealt with by the courts as evidence

available would suggest that it is the deceased who went nearer, and the accused

were not stationing themselves waiting for his arrival. Therefore, the aforesaid

findings of both the courts in coming to the conclusion that it is not a case which

would attract punishment under Section 301 Part I IPC does not suffer from any

perversity. In view of the above Crl. A. No.1586 of 2021 stands dismissed. At

this stage we also hasten to add that the overt act of A2 being different and in the

absence of any appeal filed by him, we do not wish to make any remark for the

purpose of acquitting him.

34.The only other issue for consideration is the application of Section 34 IPC to the

case of the Appellants. The occurrence was admittedly during the nighttime. It

happened on the street. If A3 and A4 had made such a statement in the same

voice, they should have addressed A2 instead of A1. A2 was already having a

gun and A1 was stated to have taken his gun out only on the statement made by

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A3 and A4. The reasoning of the trial court in disbelieving the evidence of PW6

as he improved on his case subsequently, ought to be applied for the statement

made that A3 and A4 had asked A1 to fire. Admittedly, this was an improvement

to the earlier statement made as could be seen from the evidence of PW6 on

more than one occasion. Thus, in our considered view both the courts ought to

have disbelieved the evidence of PW6 insofar as Section 34 IPC is concerned.

There is no evidence at all on record to hold that A3 and A4 were aware of the

fact that A1 was having a gun with him. The prosecution wanted to implicate A3

and A4 mainly on the evidence of PW13. Once the said evidence was not

accepted, more care ought to have been taken before convicting A3 and A4 under

Section 34 IPC. We have no difficulty in holding that a common intention can be

formed at the time of the occurrence. However, the evidence available is not

sufficient enough to hold that Section 34 IPC is attracted as against A3 and A4,

especially when the testimony of PW13 did not find favour with the courts. We

further note that except the statement said to have been made by A3 and A4,

there was no other material to implicate them.

35.Now, we shall come to the statements. The statement made by A3 and A4 is as

follows: “what are you seeing now”. The question is as to whether the said

statement would constitute an offense punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC.

We have already noted the fact that had A2 fired at the deceased in pursuance to

the statement made by A3 and A4 the situation would have been different. It is

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possible that the said statement has been made only to attack otherwise the

deceased. Suffice it is to hold that the prosecution has not proved its case beyond

reasonable doubt as against A3 and A4 by reflecting the offence committed by

A1, taking umbrage under Section 34 IPC.

36.The High Court did not even consider the import of Section 34 IPC as against A3

and A4. We find that the approach of the trial court cannot be sustained to that

extent in the light of our discussion. Thus, we are inclined to set aside the

judgment of the High Court confirming that of the trial court as against the

Accused-Appellants namely A3 and A4 alone are concerned.

37.In the result Crl. A. No.1584 of 2021 and Crl. A. No.1585 of 2021 are allowed.

The Crl. A. No.1586 of 2021 stands dismissed.

……………………………J.

(SANJAY KISHAN KAUL)

……………………………J.

(M.M. SUNDRESH)

New Delhi,

January 07, 2022

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