2025 INSC 425 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO S. OF 2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS.7930-7931 OF 2020]

JOMON K.K. … APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

SHAJIMON P. & ORS. ETC. … RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

THE APPEAL

1. These appeals, by special leave, take exception to the common

judgment and order dated 2

nd

December, 2019 of the High Court of

Kerala at Ernakulam dismissing the appellant's writ petitions

1

.

FACTS

2. Facts giving rise to these appeals, which are not in dispute, are

these:

a. An advertisement dated 17

th

October, 2012 was published by

the Secretary of Kerala Public Service Commission

2

inviting

applications from interested candidates for filling up 12 vacant

posts of “Boat Lascar” under the Kerala State Water Transport

1

O.P.(KAT) No. 153 of 2019 and O.P.(KAT) No. 154 of 2019

2

KPSC

2

Department

3

. The method of appointment was indicated as

‘direct recruitment’ and the qualifications stipulated therein

read as follows:

7. Qualifications:

(1) Literacy in Malayalam or Tamil or Kannada

(2) Possession of Current Lascar's Licence

Note :- Candidates should possess current Lascar's Licence on

the last date for receipt of applications, during Practical Test

and Interview also.

b. Incidentally, in terms of the Special Rules of 1975

4

for the

Kerala State Water Transport Subordinate Service (Operating

Wing)

5

, the service would consist of 3 classes of officers. While

Class I comprised 2 categories, Classes II and III comprised 3

categories, viz. Category 1, Category 2 and Category 3 .

Syrang, Driver and Lascar are listed at Categories 1, 2 and 3,

respectively, of Class III. In terms of the Schedule appended

to the Special Rules, the post of Syrang can be filled up either

by direct recruitment or by promotion from among Lascars in

the ratio of 1:1 whereas appointment on the post of Lascar is

entirely by direct recruitment. It is also provided in the

Schedule that while literacy in Malayalam or Tamil or Kannada

is the common qualification required for appointment as

Syrang as well as Lascar, an individual aspiring for the post of

3

the department

4

the Special Rules

5

Subordinate Service

3

Syrang must possess current Syrang’s licence while an

individual aspiring for appointment on the post of Lascar is

similarly required to possess a current Lascar’s Licence.

c. The licence noted above is a certificate of competency that is

referred to in Chapter III of the Kerala Inland Vessels Rules,

2010. In terms thereof, any aspiring individual fulfilling the

qualifications statutorily prescribed is issued a certificate of

competency upon succeeding in the “viva voce examination”

that is conducted either for a Syrang’s licence or a Lascar’s

licence. Inter alia, while a person aspiring for a Syrang’s

licence is required to be 10

th

standard pass, it is 8

th

standard

pass for anyone aspiring for a Lascar’s licence.

d. By a letter dated 9

th

October, 2012 addressed to the Director

of the Department, the Director of Ports

6

conveyed to the

following effect:

…

This is to communicate formally that the Syrang, Master

and Driver Certificate issued by the Chief Examiner under

the KIV Rules· 2010 is a certificate superior to Lascar

Certificate. Hence those who possess Syrang, Master and

Driver Certificate will be proficient in Lascar work also. Thus

Syrang and Master Certificate can be considered more than

equivalent to Lascar Certificate and such persons are

eligible for the job 'lacer' (sic, lascar) also.

This communication is issued based on the representation

received from a few candidates who applied to the Public

Service Commission for Lascar job in order to enable them

to complete the application process. Copy of their

representation is enclosed. However the final selection may

6

the Director

4

be done based on practical test, on the skills required, type

of vessel and other requirements of the organization.

…

e. The appellant was the holder of a Syrang’s licence, which was

valid when he noticed the advertisement.

f. Perceiving that possession of a Syrang’s licence makes him

eligible to apply for the post of Lascar which, incidentally,

happens to be the feeder post for promotion to the post of

Syrang, the appellant offered his candidature and acquitted

himself creditably resulting in his name figuring at serial

number 1 (OX category) in the “Ranked List” which was

circulated vide No. 257/17/ERVI and brought into force with

effect from 22

nd

February, 2017. He had secured 45.67 marks.

Based on such rank, the Secretary, KPSC informed the

appellant vide letter dated 2

nd

May, 2017 as follows:

…

You are informed that you have been advised for

recruitment as Boat Lascar on Rs.8,960 -14,260/- in the

above Department against BC Turn. The selection is

subject to Rule 3(c) and 10(b) of the Kerala State and

Subordinate Service Rules, 1958.

Further instructions will be issued to you in due course by

the above Department.

…

g. While the appellant was awaiting an offer of appointment, on

8

th

May, 2017 and 27

th

July, 2017, two sets of original

applications under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals

5

Act, 1985

7

were filed before the Thiruvananthapuram and

Ernakulam Benches of the Kerala Administrative Tribunal

8

.

h. The prayer in O.A. No. 857 of 2017 was for a declaration that

inclusion of ineligible candidates, who do not possess the

essential qualification, is oppressive, arbitrary and illegal; a

direction be issued to restructure the “Ranked List” by

removing all such ineligible candidates; and to pass incidental

orders. In OA (EKM) 1566 of 2017, similarly, the Tribunal was

urged to declare candidates who did not have valid and current

Lascar’s licence as on 17

th

October, 2012, i.e., the last date for

receipt of applications, as not eligible to be included in the

“Ranked List” as well as for issuance of a direction to KPSC to

recast the “Ranked List” by excluding the candidates not

possessing valid Lascar’s licence on 17

th

October, 2012.

i. Importantly, in OA No. 857 of 2017, no private party figured

in the array of respondents and there were only three official

respondents (Director of the department, the Director and

KPSC). In OA (EKM) No. 1566 of 2017, apart from the official

respondents, only 5 of the several selected candidates were

joined as respondents. The appellant was not one among the

five private respondents who were impleaded in the said

application.

7

O.A. No. 857 of 2017 and O.A. (EKM) No. 1566 of 2017

8

Tribunal

6

j. During the pendency of the original applications before the

Tribunal, the appellant came to be appointed on 28

th

July, 2017

as “Boat Lascar”.

k. The reply statement filed by the Director before the Tribunal

on 20

th

February, 2018 is extracted hereunder:

“2. Port Department is implementing KIV Rules 2010 .

Director of Ports is the competent Authority to oversee

the various regulations, under the provisions of KIV Rules

2010. KIV Rules insist that the MASTER, DRIVER AND

SYRANG certificates will be issued only after 2 years from

the date of issue of Lascar certificate by the Chief

Examiner, Department of Ports. So the persons who got

competency certificates for Master, Driver and Syrang

also have sufficient eligibilities to be the boat lascar. The

above competency certificate holders are also eligible to

apply for the post of Lascar and it is stated by the Director

of Ports in the letter No.B3-389/2011 dated 9.10.2012.”

l. In due course, the original applications were heard by the

Tribunal. Vide its judgment and order dated 9

th

March, 2018

9

,

the Tribunal allowed both the original applications and directed

KPSC to recast the “Ranked List” and to cancel the advice to

appoint ineligible candidates.

m. Acting in pursuance of the Tribunal’s order, KPSC issued a show

cause notice dated 31

st

July, 2018 to the appellant calling upon

him to explain why the advice for his appointment be not

treated as cancelled. The appellant responded thereto by his

reply dated 10

th

August, 2018. Thereafter, KPSC issued an

order dated 24

th

October, 2018 cancelling the advice for

9

Tribunal’s order

7

appointment of the appellant following which the Director

cancelled the appellant's appointment as “Boat Lascar” by his

order dated 27

th

October, 2018.

n. On 3

rd

November, 2018, the appellant challenged the

Tribunal’s order before the High Court in separate writ

petitions. However, a Division Bench of the High Court by the

common impugned judgment and order dismissed such writ

petitions.

CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

3. Mr. P. N. Ravindran, learned senior counsel for the appellant, argued

that both the Tribunal in allowing the original applications as well as

the High Court in dismissing the writ petitions fell in error in not

appreciating that a higher qualification could never have been

regarded as a disqualification for appointment on the post of Lascar.

4. Mr. Ravindran relied on the decisions in Parvaiz Ahmed Parry v.

State of Jammu and Kashmir

10

and Chandra Shekhar Singh

and Others v. State of Jharkhand

11

in support of the contention

that a candidate having a higher degree in the subject prescribed

under the advertisement cannot be disqualified by reason of

ineligibility for not possessing the required degree.

5. Mr. Ravindran further argued that by the time the Tribunal was

moved by the unsuccessful candidates, the appellant had not been

10

(2015) 17 SCC 709

11

2025 SCC OnLine SC 595

8

appointed. However, he did figure in the “Ranked List”. During the

pendency of the original applications, the appellant came to be

appointed. Despite such appointment, he was not impleaded as a

respondent in either of the two original applications filed before the

Tribunal. When the original applications were filed, seeking exclusion

of candidates holding Syrang’s licence and recasting of the “Ranked

List”, without the appellant being included as a respondent, no

adverse order could have been passed by the Tribunal qua him.

Since the appellant was not impleaded as a respondent in the

original applications, the same were defective and no relief could

have been granted to the unsuccessful candidates/original

applicants.

6. Mr. Ravindran also submitted that assuming this Court were not

inclined to accept the claim of the appellant that he could have been

considered for selection despite not possessing a current Lascar’s

licence, it was contended that this was an eminently fit case for

exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.

Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in Supreme

Court Bar Association vs Union Of India and Anr.

12

.

7. Per contra, Mr. Nair, learned counsel for KPSC, contended that the

appellant and similarly placed candidates having Syrang’s licence

were considered for selection in view of the letter of the Director

dated 9

th

October, 2012. However, the Tribunal having held that

12

1998 4 SCC 409

9

candidates not possessing current Lascar’s licence could not have

been considered for selection and having directed KPSC to recast

the “Ranked List”, the same was duly complied with resulting in

cancellation of the advice for appointment of the appellant.

8. Mr. Nair relied on the decision in District Collector & Chairman,

Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v. M.

Tripura Sundari Devi

13

for the proposition that when an

advertisement mentions a particular qualification and an

appointment is made in disregard of the same, it is not a matter

only between the appointing authority and the appointee concerned:

the aggrieved are all those who had similar or even better

qualifications than the appointee or appointees but who had not

applied for the post because they did not possess the qualifications

mentioned in the advertisement.

9. According to him, had it been known that anyone not having a

Lascar’s licence but having a Syrang’s licence would be eligible for

consideration for appointment on the post of Lascar, others having

Syrang’s certificate could also have applied thereby enlarging the

zone of consideration. However, keeping the process confined only

to a select few and not extending opportunity to all others similarly

situate like the appellant would contravene Article 16 of the

Constitution and also amount to a fraud on public.

13

(1990) 3 SCC 655

10

10. P.M. Latha and Anr. v. State of Kerala and ors.

14

was also cited

by Mr. Nair in support of his contention that anyone holding a

Syrang’s licence could not have been considered on the ground of

being more qualified than the holder of a Lascar's licence, and that

whether Syrang's licence could be considered as appropriate for

recruitment of a Lascar is a question which ought to be left to be

considered by the authorities concerned. Since , in P.M. Latha

(supra), this Court did not consider candidates having B. Ed degree

as qualified for the vacancies advertised, which required recruitment

to be made from candidates with TTC qualifications, he urged that

dismissal of the appeal is the only logical conclusion.

11. Mr. Nishe Rajan Shonker, learned counsel for the State of Kerala,

adopted the submissions of Mr. Nair.

QUESTION OF LAW

12. The central question of law arising for decision on this appeal is,

whether the appellant who did not hold a current Lascar's licence

but was the holder of a Syrang's licence could have been considered

qualified to participate in the recruitment process as well as

appointed.

13. Certain notable features having a bearing on the issue to be decided

by us are these:

14

2003 3 SCC 541

11

a. The advertisement dated 15

th

September, 2012 did stipulate

that only those holding a current Lascar's licence are eligible

to apply. At the same time, it did not specifically say that

anyone holding a Syrang’s licence or a licence higher than a

Lascar’s licence is not eligible to apply.

b. According to the Director, a Syrang’s licence is something

superior to a Lascar’s licence and that holders of Syrang’s

licence can be considered more than equivalent to Lascar ’s

licence, thus, being eligible for the job of Lascar also.

c. A communication to the above effect was made by the Director

to KPSC, not on his own, but based on the representation

received from a few candidates who, presumably having

Syrang’s licences, had applied for the post of Lascar and

wanted to compete with aspirants having Lascar’s licence.

d. Despite the appellant being selected, his name figuring in the

“Ranked List”, he being recommended by the Secretary, KPSC

on 2

nd

May, 2017 for appointment as “Boat Lascar” as well as

his appointment on 28

th

July, 2017 during the pendency of the

original applications, he was not impleaded as respondent

therein.

e. The original applicants could not have feigned ignorance as to

the identity of candidates possessing Syrang’s licence who

came to be appointed; also, the Tribunal did not take the pain

of passing appropriate orders to have them impleaded. Thus,

12

the Tribunal’s order adverse to the interest of the appellant

was effectively passed behind his back.

f. Despite there being a reference in the show cause notice dated

31

st

July, 2018 to the Tribunal’s order, the appellant chose to

reply to the show cause notice instead of challenging the such

order before the High Court either under Article 226 or 227 of

the Constitution of India.

g. Once the appellant’s appointment as “Boat Lascar” was

cancelled on 27

th

October, 2018 by the Director, such order

provided him a cause of action to move an original application

before the Tribunal under Section 19 of the 1985 Act; however,

instead of moving the Tribunal, the appellant moved the High

Court in its writ jurisdiction, admittedly, when the Tribunal’s

order had been acted upon.

ANALYSIS AND REASONS

14. In our considered opinion, the High Court would have been justified

in dismissing the writ petitions of the appellant at the threshold on

the ground that the order of cancellation had intervened in the

meanwhile providing a cause of action for him to move the Tribunal.

In such original application, he could have even prayed for recall of

the Tribunal’s order on the ground of the same having been passed

behind his back and upon such recall, to hear him on the merits of

the original applications. Such a course of action was available to

the appellant in terms of the decisions of this Court in K. Ajit Babu

13

v. Union of India

15

and Rama Rao v. M. G. Maheshwara Rao

16

.

However, the High Court examined the appellant’s claim on merits

leading to dismissal of his writ petitions and we too having been

addressed on the merits of the appeals, it would be just and fair to

answer the question that we have formulated above without taking

too technical a view.

15. First, we propose to consider the argument touching non-joinder of

the appellant in the proceedings be fore the Tribunal though ,

undoubtedly, he was a necessary party.

16. The effect of non-joinder of a necessary party in proceedings where

an order is passed adverse to the interest of the non -party was

considered by a co-ordinate bench of this Court in Ranjan Kumar

v. State of Bihar

17

.

17. The decision in Ranjan Kumar (supra) was followed by the decision

in Kulwant Singh v. Dayaram

18

, where promotion to the post of

head constables in Chandigarh Police was the subject matter of

consideration. This Court held that after appearing in a competitive

examination and upon being selected, the appointees become an

identified category and that if the rights of such appointees forming

part of such identified category are to be affected by any

determination, the situation commands that they should be

15

(1997) 6 SCC 473

16

(2007) 14 SCC 54

17

(2014) 16 SCC 187

18

2015 3 SCC 177

14

impleaded in the proceedings as necessary parties. The non-joinder

now permits them to take the plea that the impugned order does

not bind them.

18. The decisions in Ranjan Kumar (supra) and Kulwant Singh

(supra) are authorities for the proposition that selectees who are

appointed or promoted must be arra yed as parties in the original

proceedings where their selections are challenged. Kulwant Singh

(supra) has taken a step further and ruled that mere awareness of

pendency of litigation does not make the order passed by the

Court/Tribunal interfering with the selection binding upon such

appointees or promotees.

19. Though there can be little quarrel with the law laid down in Ranjan

Kumar (supra) and Kulwant Singh (supra) and considering what

has been argued by Mr. Ravindran as a proposition of law, noted

above, to be correct, what stands out is that the appellant did not

immediately challenge the Tribunal’s order and rested on his oars to

throw a challenge till his service came to be terminated. In fact, he

took a chance of favourable consideration of his case by responding

to the show cause. Having taken a chance and not being successful,

he cannot, thereafter, succeed before us on the ground of his non-

joinder as a necessary party. Having not initiated appropriate legal

action that the law permitted him to take, he can get back his service

only if the primary contention raised by Mr. Ravindran succeeds.

15

20. Next, turning to the crux of the issue, it is absolutely necessary to

bear in mind that though the posts of Syrang and Lascar are included

in Class III of the Subordinate Service, the requisite qualifications

for appointment on such posts as ordained by the Special Rules are

different. Moreover, it is specifically ordained by Rule 6 of the Special

Rules as follows:

“6. Other Qualifications. - No person shall be eligible for

appointment to the categories specified in column (1) of

the Table below by the method specified in column (2)

unless he possesses the qualifications prescribed in the

corresponding entry in column (3) thereof.”

21. As noted in the factual narrative, possession of a current Lascar’s

licence is an essential qualification for anyone aspiring for the post

of Lascar. This is what is laid down in column (3), i.e., the

qualifications required; and going by what is said therein read with

Rule 6, there can be no gainsaying that apart from those having a

current Lascar’s licence, none else is eligible. The word “current” is

also significant in the sense that the Rules insist on a subsisting

licence, i.e., a certificate of competency, which is valid and operative

during the time the last date for receiving applications intervenes.

22. The advertisement did not require anything else other than what the

Special Rules require. The absence of express mention that those

holding a Syrang’s licence or a Driver’s licence which, according to

the Director, are superior to a Lascar’s licence, is insignificant,

irrelevant and immaterial having regard to the clear terms of Rule 6

(supra).

16

23. Viewed from a different angle, on a conjoint reading of Rule 6 of the

Special Rules and the advertisement, we find both mentioning a

particular qualification, i.e., a current Lascar's licence, which each

aspirant has to possess for being considered eligible to participate

in the process of selection, thereby creating a distinct class and it is

aspirants falling in such class alone who could have applied for being

considered. Thus, any aspirant, even though possessing a Syrang’s

licence or a Driver’s licence not being part of such distinct class,

could not have been considered eligible. The classification has not

been shown to be and is not unreasonable.

24. True it is, from the reply statement of the Director filed before the

Tribunal and also from the 2010 Rules, it does appear that the holder

of a Syrang’s licence is mandatorily required to obtain and have a

Lascar’s licence for 2 years and, therefore, without having a Lascar’s

licence one cannot apply for a Syrang’s licence. By the same

analogy, it could be presumed that the holder of a Syrang’s licence

is having the requisite eligibility to be a Lascar. However, what turns

the tide against the appellant is the requirement of the ‘current’

Lascar’s licence, discussed above, which the appellant did not have

on the last date for receiving applications.

25. We have further seen from the letter of the Director dated 9

th

October, 2010 addressed to KPSC that it was not voluntary; rather,

it was at the behest of candidates who did not possess current

Lascar’s licence. It can well be presumed that the Director buckled

17

under pressure. However, notwithstanding that, qualifications

statutorily laid down could not have been diluted by what the

Director felt should be considered by KPSC and, therefore, it is the

statutorily prescribed qualifications that should prevail.

26. Mr. Nair is also right in referring to us the decision in M. Tripura

Sundari Devi (supra). Although in such decision it was held that it

amounts to a fraud on public to appoint candidates with

qualifications inferior to the qualifications advertised, which is not

precisely the case here because the appellant has higher

qualifications than what was required, yet, the other principle of law

flowing from such decision is squarely applicable. It has neither been

shown that the Director’s letter dated 9

th

October, 2012 was given

wide publicity nor has it been shown by the appellant that KPSC had

issued any corrigendum vide public notice whereby the zone of

consideration was enlarged permitting holders of a Syrang’s licence

to participate in the process. We, thus, hold drawing inspiration from

the said decision that the aggrieved are all those who had similar or

even better qualifications than the appellant but who had not applied

for the post because they were unaware of the fact that persons not

having a current Lascar’s licence would also be eligible to apply and

compete in the process. Equality of opportunity in matters of public

employment being a sine qua non for a fair and transparent selection

process, such equality is conspicuously absent in the present case.

18

27. There is one other important aspect which also cannot be lightly

overlooked. We shall assume for a moment that though the process

was commenced for appointment on vacant posts of Lascar, there

was no illegality in persons having Syrang’s licence being permitted

to participate. Of course, there could be aspirants holding Lascar’s

licence in sufficient numbers who might not have the higher

qualifications necessary for even appearing for a viva voce to aim at

possessing a certificate of competency as Syrang. Those aspirants,

holding a Lascar’s licence, might not also be so capable and/or

competent for obtaining a Syrang’s licence. After all, all individuals

are not blessed with the same level of intelligence, human abilities

and intellect. The distribution of innate abilities and intellectual

prowess being far from uniform, resulting in a diverse spectrum of

human potential, it is axiomatic that aspirants having only a Lascar’s

licence can never be considered for direct recruitment on any post

in Class III of the Subordinate Service other than a Lascar. It is quite

but natural that in the matter of observation, perception and

memorisation of details of principles of navigation, and skill in

respect of seamanship, there would be significant differences in the

faculties of different individuals. If persons holding Syrang's licence

- who are obviously better equipped than persons holding Lascar’s

licence - are allowed to apply and participate in the process for

appointment on the post of Lascar, the probability of the persons

holding Lascar's licence being outperformed by the persons holding

19

Syrang's licence would be quite high. It could also be a distinct

possibility where all the vacant posts of Lascar are filled up by

persons having Syrang's licence but not having a current Lascar’s

licence as per the statutory requirement. That would pose a real

difficulty for persons not so fortunate and lacking in higher

intelligence, abilities and intellect, for, they would cease to have a

level playing field of competing with other similarly qualified

candidates, and left to compete with candidates havi ng higher

qualifications despite the zone of consideration having been specially

carved out for holders of current Lascar’s licence. It is not that the

holders of Syrang’s licence are left in the lurch. Those having

Syrang’s licence could well compete for appointment on the post of

Syrang in the 50% direct recruitment quota along with others having

current Syrang’s licence. If, in case, all the vacant posts of Lascar

are filled up by persons having Syrang’s licence and such holders of

Syrang’s licence do not participate in the process for direct

recruitment to the post of Syrang, it is fairly likely that the persons

holding Lascar’s licence would never secure any public employment.

That could not have been the intention of a welfare State.

28. Also, it cannot be gainsaid that not only the qualifications but the

nature of duties required to be performed and the nature of service

to be rendered by a Lascar and a Syrang are different. Merely

because the post of Lascar is a feeder post for promotion to the post

20

of Syrang does not per se make the holder of a Syrang’s licence

qualified for the job of a Lascar. Thus, nothing much turns on it.

29. Law is well-settled that an appointment made contrary to the

statute/statutory rule would be void [see: Pramod Kumar v. U.P.

Secondary Education Services Commission

19

].

30. Based on such consideration, we are ad idem with the Division Bench

of the High Court that KPSC could not have included candidates with

licences other than a Lascar's licence in the “Ranked List” and

proceed to recommend those candidates for appointment.

31. On merits, therefore, no legally protected right of the appellant

having been affected by the impugned action, he has no valid claim.

32. We have considered the decisions of this Court in Parvaiz Ahmed

Parry (supra) and Chandra Shekhar Singh (supra).

33. In Parvaiz Ahmed Parry (supra) the appellant therein possessed

degrees in BSc with Forestry as one of his major subjects as well as

MSc (Forestry). The qualification prescribed in the Advertisement

was “BSc (Forestry) or equivalent from any university recognised by

ICAR”. This Court held that the appellant’s qualifications were

equivalent to the minimum prescribed qualifications and should be

considered for the concerned post.

34. Chandra Shekhar Singh (supra) was on the question of whether

‘degree’ as mentioned in the advertisement therein included a post-

graduate degree, which the appellants therein possessed. This Court

19

(2008) 7 SCC 153

21

applying the golden rule of interpretation held that the word ‘degree’

would include within its scope and ambit all three degrees –

bachelor's degree, master’s degree and a doctorate degree – unless

a specific expulsion has been made.

35. The said decisions are, thus, distinguishable on facts.

36. We hasten to add that whether or not the action of the employer to

exclude an aspirant from the process of selection (on the ground

that either he is over qualified for a particular post or has

qualifications which, being over and above what is ordained by

statutory rules or rules framed under the proviso to Rule 309 of the

Constitution, does not match the qualification specifically required)

is justified has to be decided considering the rules governing the

selection, the qualifications prescribed, the nature of duty to be

performed, the nature of service to be rendered and a host of other

factors. It has to be remembered that, at times, the employer’s need

to have the right people at the right place, and not always the higher

qualified, has to be conceded. We know of decisions holding that

over-qualification cannot be a disqualification since such an

approach amounts to discouraging the acquisition of qualifications

on the one hand and on the other, such an approach could be seen

as arbitrary, discriminatory and not in national interest. However,

this principle cannot be put in a straitjacket imposing rigid or

inflexible rules or norms. Lack of public employment opportunities

in sufficient numbers may force even a Master degree holder to

22

apply for the job of a peon but, if he is appointed upon his application

being favourably considered, what happens to the aspirants who

have not had the means of pursuing study beyond the 12

th

standard? Do they remain unemployed for ever, if all or majority of

the posts of peon are filled up by such degree holders ? What

happens if the Master degree holder, in pursuit of greener pastures,

leaves the post of Peon for a better and secured higher job

commensurate with his qualifications after a couple of years? Does

it not, in such a case, burden the public exchequer by requiring the

employer to initiate a fresh selection process? Is not the State, as a

model employer, obliged to ensure that the posts of peon are filled

up only by those having the basic qualification, and not by over

qualified candidates, for sub-serving the common good? Does not

the State have the obligation to strive to ensure that all citizens have

adequate means of livelihood? These are questions which no Court

can afford to ignore. We end by saying that each case that comes

before the Court has to be decided on its own peculiar facts and the

problem that it presents for resolution and that there can be no

universally accepted rule that every time, a higher qualified

candidate is to be preferred to a candidate who matches the

essential qualification required for the post.

37. It is now time to consider Mr. Ravindran’s final submission that this

is an eminent case for exercising powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution.

23

38. This Court in Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India

20

held that

if an appointment is illegal, it is non-est in the eye of law and

rendering the appointment a nullity and principles of equity in a case

of such nature would have no role to play ; also that, sympathy

should not be misplaced.

39. Exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution would have

been warranted in the present case if palpable injustice were

demonstrated. Unfortunately for the appellant, despite the

assiduous endeavour of Mr. Ravindran, we have consciously decided

to confine our role to being the dispute-settlors.

40. We are of the considered opinion that the appellant having gained

entry through a process which was not legal and valid, this is not a

fit and proper case where this Court ought, in exercise of its power

under Article 142 of the Constitution, to ignore the illegality and

invalidity to come to his rescue.

CONCLUSION

41. The appeals, accordingly, fail and are dismissed. No costs.

42. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

………..………………… J.

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………………………J .

(MANMOHAN )

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 02, 2025.

20

(2007) 4 SCC 54