As per case facts, the appellant-husband and respondent-wife married and had a son. Their marriage was dissolved by mutual consent, with a clear agreement that the son would live with ... the mother, and neither party would file further cases against each other, nor would the father have visitation or custody rights. Despite this, the father later sought the court's intervention for custody and visitation rights, sending a legal notice which the mother refused. The Family Court dismissed his suit, leading to the current appeal challenging the judgment's legality and claiming it was perverse. The question arose whether the Family Court's decision to deny custody and visitation rights to the father was perverse and if the mutual consent agreement from the divorce superseded the child's welfare as the paramount consideration. Finally, the High Court, after considering the evidence, statutory provisions of the Guardianship and Wards Act, and Apex Court pronouncements on child welfare, held that the Family Court rightly denied custody and visitation rights. It noted the mutual consent agreement from the divorce and emphasized the child's welfare, observing the father worked alone in another city, and had previously relinquished such rights. The Court found no perversity in the Family Court's decision, prioritizing the child's stable environment with the mother.