Page 1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 375 OF 2007

Jupudy Pardha Sarathy Appellant(s)

versus

Pentapati Rama Krishna and others Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

M.Y. Eqbal, J.:

This appeal by special leave is directed against order

dated 21.9.2006 passed by learned Single Judge of the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh, who allowed the appeal preferred by

Defendant no.1 and set aside the judgment and decree of the

trial Court in the original suit preferred by the appellant.

2.The only question that needs consideration in this appeal

is as to whether the High Court is correct in law in

1

Page 2 interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act') in arriving at a

conclusion that the widow of the deceased P. Venkata Subba

Rao acquired an absolute interest in the property by the

operation of Section 14 of the Act.

3.The undisputed facts are that the said suit property

originally belonged to one P. Venkata Subba Rao, who had

three wives. Only the second wife was blessed with two sons

and one daughter, including defendant-Narasimha Rao.

Veeraraghavamma was the third wife of the said P. Venkata

Subba Rao but she did not have any issues. P. Venkata

Subba Rao executed a Will in the year 1920(Exh.A2) in favour

of his 3

rd

wife Veeraghavamma who in turn executed a Will

dated 14.7.1971 (Exh.B1) in favour of defendant-Pentapati

Subba Rao, and thereafter, she died in 1976. The case of the

defendant is that the said P. Narasimha Rao has no right to

transfer the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff.

2

Page 3 4.The plaintiff’s-appellant’s case is that he purchased the

suit property from one P. Narasimha Roa who was having a

vested remainder in respect of the said suit property on the

expiry of life estate of testator’s wife Veeraghavamma.

According to the plaintiff-appellant, during the life time of

Veeraghavamma she enjoyed the properties and after her

death the property devolved upon the vendors of the plaintiff.

5.The trial court noted the undisputed case of both the

parties that Will (Exh.A2) was executed by late P. Venkata

Subba Rao in favour of Veeraghavamma but she had limited

interest to enjoy the property during her life time and

thereafter the remainder vested with P. Narasimha Rao to

enjoy the said property as absolute owner after the death of

Veeraghavamma. However, the trial court held that life estate

of Veeraghavamma under the Will did not become enlarged

into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act and the

vested remainder in favour of P. Narasimha Rao did not get

3

Page 4 extinguished in respect of the scheduled properties.

Accordingly, the suit was decreed.

6.Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court defendant

no.1 - P. Subba Rao preferred an appeal before the High

Court. The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the

judgment and decree of the trial court holding that

Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of the suit

property by virtue of Section 14(1) and she had every right to

bequeath the said property in favour of P. Subba Rao, the first

defendant under Exhibits B1 and B2.

7.Hence, the present appeal by special leave by the

plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal before the High

Court, first defendant died and his legal representatives were

brought on record and are arrayed in the present appeal as

respondent nos.1 to 3. Respondent no. 4 is defendant no.3,

and Legal representatives of Respondent no.5, who was

defendant no.4, were brought on record after his death during

4

Page 5 pendency of this appeal. Rest respondents were brought on

record as legal representatives of second defendant, who died

during pendency of the suit. Since respondent no.4 has

vacated the suit shop and delivered possession to the plaintiff

on 6.7.2006, appellant has moved before us an application for

deletion of respondent no.4 from the array of parties. It is

ordered accordingly.

8.Before we decide the question involved in this appeal we

would like to reproduce the contents of the Will (Exh.A1)

which is as under:-

“I, Pularvathi Venkata Subba Rao, S/o late

Pularvathy Venkamma Vysya, Business, R/o

Rajahmundhry, have executed the Will dt. 24.08.1920 with

good consciousness and wisdom.

I am now approximately 53 years. Now I have less

physical strength and consequently I may not survive for

longer period, hence I have proposed to give all my

properties both movable and immovable mentioned in the

schedule below by way of this Will.

My first wife died issueless. My second wife got two

sons by name Manikyaro and Narasimha Rao and a

daughter by name Nagarathnamma. My 2

nd

wife also died.

Thereafter I married Veeraghavamma my third wife and she

is alive. She has not begotten any children. I have house

property bearing Municipal D.No.6/875, another house

bearing D.No.6/876 and also 5 shop rooms abutting to

them with vacant house site covered by D.No.6/870 in

Innespeta, Rajahmundry Village, Rajahmundry Sub

5

Page 6 Registry, E.G. Dist.I have wet land of extent ac15.17 cents

in Rustumbada village Naraspuram Sub Registry,

Naraspuram Taluk. The said landed property was in the

name of my 2

nd

wife and after her life time my two sons

mentioned above got the same mutated it in their names.

I have a policy bearing No. 23232 in Oriental Life

Insurance Company and I have to receive monies from the

said policy and also silver, gold, brass articles house hold

utensils Beeruva, Furniture, iron safe etc., I have made the

following dispositions which are to take place after my life

time.

My third wife Veeraghavamma shall enjoy for life the

tiled house with site and compound wall and with half right

in the well covered by municipal D.No.6/875, Rajahmundry

and after life time of my wife my 2

nd

son Narasimha Rao

shall have the property with absolute rights such as gift,

sale etc. My second son Narasimha Rao shall have absolute

rights such as gift and sale in respect of the tiled house

bearing D/no.6/876 and the 5 shop rooms covered by

D.No.6/870 and the sit abutting the above two properties

with Chavidi and one Big latrine out of the two and that my

wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for life the small latrine

covered by D.No.6/870 and after her life time my son

Narasimha Rao shall have the property with absolute right.

The said Veeraraghavamma is entitled to fetch water from

the well situated in back yard of house bearing D.No.6/870.

My eldest so Maniyarao shall have absolute rights such as

gift and sale etc., in respect of ac 15.17 cents of

Zeroyiti wet land of Rustumbada Village Narasapuram

Taluk and my eldest son Maniyarao shall pay Rs.650/-

which I am liable to pay to her and thus either

Nagarathnamma or any one has got no right in the said

property.

The amount receivable from the Insurance Company

referred above shall be recovered and my two sons,

daughter and my wife, all the four shall share the same

equally and that the ornaments lying with them shall take

the same absolutely and that one shall not claim or

demand for any oweties against another.

(Emphasis given)

This Will I have executed with full and good

consciousness and the same shall come into force after my

life time. The properties mentioned in this Will are all my

6

Page 7 self acquired properties and I did not get any ancestral

properties.

I reserve my right to change the contents of the Will during

my life time.

Signed Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao

Attesting Witnesses

Modali Subbarayudu

Yendi Surayya

Scribed by Pularvati Venkata Subba Rao

With his own handwriting

The contents of the said will shall come into force after my

life time.

Signed by Pularvati Venkata Subbarao”

9.The trial court although noticed the decision of this

Court in the case of V. Tulasamma and others vs.

Sesha Reddy (dead) by Lrs. (AIR 1977 SC 1944) but

held that in that case on the basis of compromise the

Hindu widow was allotted immoveable properties

expressly in lieu of her maintenance, and hence, Section

14(1) of the Act was readily applicable to that case.

Whereas, the trial court held that the decision of this

Court in the case of Mst Karmi vs. Amru & Ors. , (AIR

1971 SC 745), is applicable because in that case the

Hindu widow succeeded the properties of her husband on

the strength of Will where under she was given life estate

7

Page 8 in the properties. For better appreciation paragraphs 25,

26 and 27 of the trial court’s judgment are quoted thus:-

“25. The first defendant’s counsel placed heavy

reliance on the decision reported in Palchuri

Hanumayamma vs. Tadikamalla Kotilingam (1986 (1)

ALT.546), it is only in that decision it was held that it

is not necessary that the will or other documents

under which property is given to a Hindu female

should expressly specify that the property is given to a

Hindu female should expressly specify that the

property is a given in lieu of a pre-existing right or

right of maintenance and that it is sufficient if only a

right was in existence in favour of the Hindu female on

the date when the document was executed. It is a

judgment rendered by a single judge of the High Court.

It is a case where the High Court was considering the

bequest of property to a Hindu widow under a will as

life estate.

26.In Vaddeboyina Tulasamma vs. Vaddeboyina

Sesha Reddi (A.I.R. 1977 SC 1944) a Hindu widow

obtained a decree for maintenance against the

brothers of her deceased husband and was executing

the said decree for maintenance. During that time,

the Hindu Widow and the brothers of her deceased

husband entered into a compromise where under the

Hindu widow was allotted immovable properties to be

enjoyed only as limited owner power of alienation. It

was a case where the Hindu Widow was allotted

properties expressly in lieu of her maintenance and

satisfaction of her maintenance decree. Therefore,

Sec. 14 (1) of the Act is readily applicable to that case.

On the other hand, in the decision reported in Mst

Karmi vs. Amro ( A.I.R. 1971 SC 745) a Hindu widow

succeeded to the properties of her husband on the

strength of a Will where under she was given life estate

in the properties. In those circumstances the

Supreme Court held that the Hindu widow having

succeeded to the properties of her husband on the

strength of that will cannot claim any rights in these

8

Page 9 properties over and above that given to her under that

will and that the life estate given to her under the will

cannot become an absolute estate under the

provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. It was a

decision rendered by three Judges of Supreme Court.

This decision was not referred to in the subsequent

decision of the year 1977 referred to above. The

decision of the year 1977 was also rendered by three

judges of the Supreme Court. When the latter decision

of the Supreme Court is in all fours with the facts in

the case on hand, the former decision of the Supreme

Court of the year 1977 cannot be applied to the facts

of the present case.

27.In Smt. Culwant Kaur vs. Mohinder Singh (A.I.R.

1987 SC 2251) the provisions of Section 14(1) of the

Act were applied because it was a case where the

Hindu female was put in possession of the property

expressly in pursuance to and in recognition of the

maintenance in her. Similarly, in the decision

reported in Gurdip Singh vs. Amar Singh (1991 (1)

L.W.15) the Supreme Court applied the provisions of

Section 14(1) of the Act where the wife acquired

property by way of gift from her husband explicitly in

lieu of maintenance. In Bai Vajia vs. Thakorbhai

Chelabhai (A.I.R. 1979 SC 993) also the Hindu widow

obtained possession of the property in default of

payment of maintenance to her. So, the Supreme

Court applied the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act

to that case.”

10.On the basis of the ratio decided by this Court in the

decision quoted hereinabove and also other decisions of the

High Court, the trial court held that the life estate of

Veeraghavamma under Exhibit A-2 will not become enlarge

into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Hindu

9

Page 10 Succession Act and did not extinguish vested remainders

interest of Narasimha Rao in the suit property.

11.In appeal, the High Court, after discussing the ratio

decided by this Court in the decisions noted by the trial court

and also other decisions of this Court, reversed the finding of

the trial court and held that the case falls under Section 14(1)

of the Act and Veeraghavamma became the absolute owner of

the suit property and she had every right to bequeath the said

property in favour of the first defendant P. Subba Rao under

Exhibits B-1 and B-2. The High Court held that:-

“In view of the aforesaid authoritative judgment of Hon'ble

Justice Jagannadha Rao following several judgments of the

Apex Court, I am of the opinion that the reasoning given by

the trial Court, that as there is no specific wording in the

instrument Ex.A2 that life estate has been given in lieu of a

pre-existing right or right of maintenance the same do not

become enlarged into absolute estate, is not relevant and is

quite contrary to the aforesaid judgment.

Merely because Veeraraghavamma was appointed as the

guardian of P. Narasimha Rao - vendor of the plaintiff it

could not be said that Veeraraghavamma had no

pre-existing right or right of maintenance in respect of the

property in which a limited interest had been created in her

favour. As the vendor of plaintiff was also having properties

other than the property in question, after the death of his

10

Page 11 natural father, Veeraraghavamma was appointed as his

guardian. Immediately after the vendor of the plaintiff

attained majority the guardianship was discharged and he

used to manage his own movable and immovable properties

individually. It cannot be said that for the first time the life

estate has been created under Ex.A2 Will in favour of

Veeraraghavamma, as undoubtedly, she was having a

pre-existing right to be maintained by her husband,

therefore, it is the duty of her husband to maintain her

during her lifetime. Though no specific words have been

mentioned in Ex.A2 that in lieu of maintenance the life

estate has been created, under Section 14(1) in whatever

form a limited interest is created in favour of a Hindu

female, who is having a pre-existing right of maintenance, it

becomes absolute right after 1956 Act came into force.

As Veeraraghavamma became absolute owner by virtue of

Section 14(1) of the Act she had right to bequeath the said

property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B1 and

B2. Therefore, as the vested remainder of P. Narasimha

Rao got nullified, he had no right or authority to sell the

said property under Ex.A1 sale deed in favour of the

plaintiff. As the limited interest of Veeraraghavamma

blossomed into absolute right, bequeathing the said

property in favour of the first defendant under Exs.B1 and

B2 is legal and valid. In view of the aforesaid facts and

circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the

limited interest to enjoy the property during the lifetime of

Veeraraghavamma blossomed into an absolute right in

accordance with Section 14(1), after the Hindu Succession

Act, 1956 came into force and the vested remainder created

in favour of the vendor of the plaintiff is nullified.”

12.Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate appearing

for the appellant, confined his argument to the question of law

as to whether the High Court erred in law in holding that

Section 14(1) of the Act will be attracted and the widow

11

Page 12 Veeraghavamma have acquired absolute interest in the

properties. Learned counsel made the following submissions:-

“(i)Section 14(1) cannot be interpreted to mean that

each and every Will granting a limited/life interest in a

property to a widow is deemed/assumed to be in lieu

of her maintenance. If the testator in his Will

specifically provides that he is granting only life

interest in the property to his widow, his right to limit

his widow’s right in the property is recognized by

Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Further, the testator’s right to dispose off his property

by will or other testamentary disposition is recognized

by Section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Therefore, Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act,

1956 cannot be interpreted in a manner that renders

Section 14(2) and Section 30 of the same Act otiose.

(ii)In Mst. Karmi vs. Amru & Ors . (1972)4 SCC

86), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court held to the effect

that a widow who succeeded to the property of her

deceased husband on the strength of his will cannot

claim any rights in the property other than those

conferred by the will.. “The life estate given to her

under the Will cannot become an absolute estate

under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act”

(iii)In V. Tulsamma vs. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC

99, this Court clarified the difference between

sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14, thereby

restricting the right of a testator to grant a limited life

interest in a property to his wife. Learned counsel

referred para 62 of the judgment in Tulsamma case.

(iv)V. Tulsamma’s case involved a compromise

decree arising out of decree for maintenance obtained

by the widow against her husband’s brother in a case

of intestate succession. It did not deal with situations

of testamentary succession. Therefore, strictly on

facts, it may not be applicable to cases of testamentary

succession. However, in terms of law declared therein,

12

Page 13 a doubt may arise whether Section 14(1) may apply to

every instance of a Will granting a limited/life interest

in a property to the widow on the ground that the

widow has a pre-existing right of maintenance.

(v)This doubt was resolved by the Supreme Court

in Sadhu Singh vs. Gurdwara Sahib Narike , (2006) 8

SCC 75, where it was held at paras 13 and 14 that the

right under section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act,

1956 cannot be rendered otiose by a wide

interpretation of Section 14(1) and that these two

provisions have to be balanced.

(vi)The above view has been subsequently affirmed

by this Court. In Sharad Subramanayan vs. Soumi

Mazumdar & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 91 (at para 20), this

Court upheld the contention of the learned counsel for

the respondents therein that there was no proposition

of law that all dispositions of property made to a

female Hindu were necessarily in recognition of her

right to maintenance whether under the Shastric

Hindu law or under the statutory law.

(vii)Learned counsel referred para 14 in the case of

Shivdev Kaur vs. R.S. Grewal.

(viii)The position of law as recorded in Sadhu

Singh’s case and followed subsequently, therefore,

appears to be that the question as to whether Section

14(1) applies to a Will granting life interest to a widow

hinges on the finding by the Court that the grant was

in lieu of maintenance. This leads to the second

arguments.”

13.Mr. Viswanathan, learned senior counsel. submitted the

fact that the life interest in property granted to the widow by

way of a Will was actually in lieu of her maintenance needs to

13

Page 14 be specifically pleaded, proved and decided by the Court based

on examination of evidence and material on record.

14.Further, referring paragraph nos. 17, 22 and 24 of the

decision in G. Rama vs. TG Seshagiri Rao , (2008) 12 SCC

392, learned counsel submitted that issues are required to be

framed and evidence has to be led to specifically show that the

Will granted interest in property in lieu of maintenance.

15.It is well settled that under the Hindu Law, the husband

has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is

possessed of properties then his wife is entitled to a right to be

maintained out of such properties. It is equally well settled

that the claim of Hindu widow to be maintained is not a mere

formality which is to be exercised as a matter of concession,

grace or gratis but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right.

From the judicial pronouncement, the right of a widow to be

14

Page 15 maintained, although does not create a charge on the property

of her husband but certainly the widow can enforce her right

by moving the Court and for passing a decree for maintenance

by creating a charge.

16.The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate,

Maintenance and Residence Act, 1946 was enacted giving

statutory recognition of such right and, therefore, there can be

no doubt that the right to maintenance is a pre-existing right.

17.In V. Tulsamma and others vs. Sesha Reddy , AIR

1977 SC 1944 , three Judges Bench of this Court has

elaborately considered the right of a Hindu woman to

maintenance which is a pre-existing right. My Lord Justice

Fazal Ali writing the judgment firstly observed:-

“Thus on a careful consideration and detailed

analysis of the authorities mentioned above and the

Shastric Hindu law on the subject, the following

propositions emerge with respect to the incidents and

15

Page 16 characteristics of a Hindu woman’s right to

maintenance:

(1)that a Hindu woman’s right to

maintenance is a personal obligation so far as the

husband is concerned, and it is his duty to maintain

her even if he has no property. If the husband has

property then the right of the widow to maintenance

becomes an equitable charge on his property and any

person who succeeds to the property carries with it the

legal obligation to maintain the widow;

(2)though the widow’s right to maintenance

is not a right, to property but it is undoubtedly a

pre-existing right in property i.e. it is a jus ad rem not

jus in rem and it can be enforced by the widow who

can get a charge created for her maintenance on the

property either by an agreement or by obtaining a

decree from the civil court;

(3)that the right of maintenance is a matter

of moment and is of such importance that even if the

joint property is sold and the purchaser has notice of

the widow’s right to maintenance, the purchaser is

legally bound to provide for her maintenance;

(4)that the right to maintenance is

undoubtedly a pre-existing right which existed in the

Hindu law long before the passing of the Act of 1937 or

the Act of 1946, and is, therefore, a pre-existing right;

(5)that the right to maintenance flows from

the social and temporal relationship between the

husband and the wife by virtue of which the wife

becomes a sort of co-owner in the property of her

husband, though her co-ownership is of a subordinate

nature; and

(6)that where a Hindu widow is in possession

of the property of her husband, she is entitled to retain

the possession in lieu of her maintenance unless the

person who succeeds to the property or purchases the

same is in a position to make due arrangements for

her maintenance.”

16

Page 17 18.Interpreting the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu

Succession Act, their Lordships observed: -

“In the light of the above decisions of this Court the

following principles appear to be clear:

“(1)that the provisions of Section 14 of the

1956 Act must be liberally construed in order to

advance the object of the Act which is to enlarge the

limited interest possessed by a Hindu widow which

was in consonance with the changing temper of the

times;

(2)it is manifestly clear that sub-section (2) of

Section 14 does not refer to any transfer which merely

recognises a pre-existing right without creating or

conferring a new title on the widow. This was clearly

held by this Court in Badri Pershad case.

(3)that the Act of 1956 has made

revolutionary and far-reaching changes in the Hindu

society and every attempt should be made to carry out

the spirit of the Act which has undoubtedly supplied a

long felt need and tried to do away with the invidious

distinction between a Hindu male and female in

matters of intestate succession;

(4)that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is merely

a proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 and has to be

interpreted as a proviso and not in a manner so as to

destroy the effect of the main provision.”

19.Lastly, His Lordship after elaborate consideration of the

law and different authorities came to the following

conclusions:-

“We would now like to summarise the legal

conclusions which we have reached after an

exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned

above on the question of law involved in this appeal as

17

Page 18 to the interpretation of Sections 14(1) and (2) of the

Act of 1956. These conclusions may be stated thus:

“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an

empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as

a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right

against property which flows from the spiritual

relationship between the husband and the wife and is

recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu law

and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier

Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu.

Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a

right against property and the husband has a personal

obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family

has property, the female has the legal right to be

maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the

maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a

legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a

charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a

pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or

recognising such a right does not confer any new title

but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing

rights.

(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have

been couched in the widest possible terms and must

be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to

advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the

socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this

long needed legislation.

(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a

proviso and has a field of its own without interfering

with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The

proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to

destroy the effect of the main provision or the

protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to

become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to

instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create

independent and new titles in favour of the females for

the first time and has no application where the

instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm,

endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In

such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is

18

Page 19 legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate

in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely

declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a

claim to maintenance or partition or share to which

the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely

no application and the female’s limited interest would

automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by

force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if

any, under the document would have to be ignored.

Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a

female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition,

the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section

(2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any

restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

(5) The use of express terms like ‘property acquired by

a female Hindu at a partition’, ‘or in lieu of

maintenance’, ‘or arrears of maintenance’, etc. in the

Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section

(2) inapplicable to these categories which have been

expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section

(2).

(6) The words ‘possessed by’ used by the Legislature in

Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and

include the state of owning a property even though the

owner is not in actual or physical possession of the

same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the

property under a preliminary decree before or at the

time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not

been given actual possession under a final decree, the

property would be deemed to be possessed by her and

by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute

interest in the property. It is equally well settled that

the possession of the widow, however, must be under

some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the

section does not contemplate the possession of any

rank trespasser without any right or title.

(7) That the words ‘restricted estate’ used in Section

14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in

Section 14(1) and they include not only limited

interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may

be placed on the transferee.”

19

Page 20 20.Mr. Vishwanathan put heavy reliance on the decision of

this Court in the case of Mst. Karmi vs. Amru (1972 Vol. 4

SCC 86). In our considered opinion, the ratio decided in that

case will not apply in the facts of the present case. In Mst.

Karmi case (Supra), one Jaimal, who was the owner of the

property, had executed a Will directing that on his death, his

entire estate would devolve upon his widow Nihali during her

life and thereafter, the same would devolve upon his

collaterals on the death of Jaimal. The properties were

mutated in the name of Nihali who eventually died in 1960.

On her death, the collaterals claimed the properties on the

basis of Will, but the appellant claimed the properties as their

sole legatee from Nihali under her Will of 1958. On these

facts, it was held that Nihali having succeeded to the

properties of Jaimal on the strength of Will cannot claim any

right in those properties over and above that was given to her

under the Will. The Court observed that the life estate given to

her under the Will cannot become an absolute estate under

the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

20

Page 21 21.The facts in Karmi’s case (supra) and that of the present

case are fully distinguishable. In the instant case, the Will

was executed in 1920 in which Subba Rao has mentioned that

his first wife died, the second wife got two sons and one

daughter. Thereafter, second wife also died. He, then, married

to Veeraraghavamma as a third wife, who is alive. The

executant of the Will have also mentioned the description of

the properties owned by him. He, very specifically mentioned

in the Will that his third wife Veeraraghavamma shall enjoy for

life one tiled house situated in the compound wall. For that

enjoyment, it was also mentioned in the Will that the widow

Veeraraghavamma shall also be entitled to fetch water from

the well situated in the backyard of a different house. In other

words, the executant of the Will made arrangements for his

third wife to maintain her enjoyment in the suit schedule

property till her life. The intention of the executant is

therefore clear that he gave the suit schedule property to his

third wife Veeraraghavamma in order to hold and enjoy the

21

Page 22 suit property for her maintenance during her lifetime. It is not

a case like Karmi case that by executing a Will, the executant

directed that his entire estate will devolve upon his widow

Veeraraghavamma.

22.A three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of R.B.

S.S. Munnalal and Others vs. S.S. Rajkumar & Others ,

AIR 1962 SC 1493, while interpreting the provisions of Section

14(1) of the Act observed:-

“16. By Section 14(1) the legislature sought to convert

the interest of a Hindu female which under the Sastric

Hindu law would have been regarded as a limited

interest into an absolute interest and by the

Explanation thereto gave to the expression “property”

the widest connotation. The expression includes

property acquired by a Hindu female by inheritance or

devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or

arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person,

whether a relative or not, before, at or after her

marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by

purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner

whatsoever. By Section 14(1) manifestly it is intended

to convert the interest which a Hindu female has in

property however restricted the nature of that interest

under the Sastric Hindu law may be into absolute

estate. Pratapmull case undoubtedly laid down that till

actual division of the share declared in her favour by a

preliminary decree for partition of the joint family

estate a Hindu wife or mother, was not recognised as

owner, but that rule cannot in our judgment apply

after the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. The

Act is a codifying enactment, and has made far

22

Page 23 reaching changes in the structure of the Hindu law of

inheritance, and succession. The Act confers upon

Hindu females full rights of inheritance, and sweeps

away the traditional limitations on her powers of

dispositions which were regarded under the Hindu law

as inherent in her estate. She is under the Act

regarded as a fresh stock of descent in respect of

property possessed by her at the time of her death. It

is true that under the Sastric Hindu law, the share

given to a Hindu widow on partition between her sons

or her grandsons was in lieu other right to

maintenance. She was not entitled to claim partition.

But the Legislature by enacting the Hindu Womens'

Right to Property Act, 1937 made a significant

departure in that branch of the law; the Act gave a

Hindu widow the same interest in the property which

her husband had at the time of his death, and if the

estate was partitioned she became owner in severalty

of her share, subject of course to the restrictions on

disposition and the peculiar rule of extinction of the

estate on death actual or civil. It cannot be assumed

having regard to this development that in enacting

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the legislature

merely intended to declare the rule enunciated by the

Privy Council in PratapmuIl case. Section 4 of the Act

gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the Act.”

23.Reference may also be made to a three Judges Bench

decision of this Court in the case of Nirmal Chand vs. Vidya

Wanti, (1969) 3 SCC 628. In that case, by a registered

document of partition, the related right was given to the widow

- the user of the land with the condition that she will have no

23

Page 24 right to alienate in any manner. This Court holding that the

case falls under Section 14(1) of the Act held as under:-

“6. If Subhrai Bai was entitled to a share in her

husband’s properties then the suit properties must be

held to have been allotted to her in accordance with

law. As the law then stood she had only a life interest

in the properties taken by her. Therefore the recital in

the deed in question that she would have only a life

interest in the properties allotted to her share is

merely recording the true legal position. Hence it is not

possible to conclude that the properties in question

were given to her subject to the condition of her

enjoying it for a life time. Therefore the trial court as

well as the first appellate court were right in holding

that the facts of the case do not fall within Section

14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Consequently Subhrai Bai must be held to have had

an absolute right in the suit properties, in view of

Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act.”

24.In the case of Thota Sesharathamma vs. Thota

Manikyamma , (1991) 4 SCC 312, life estate was granted to a

Hindu women by a Will as a limited owner and the grant was

in recognition of pre-existing right. Following the ratio decided

in Tulasamma’s case, their Lordships held that the decision

in Mst. Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the

ambit of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act. The Court held:-

24

Page 25 “9. It was clearly held in the above case that Section

14(2) of the Act is in the nature of a proviso or an

exception to Section 14(1) and comes into operation

only if acquisition in any of the methods indicated

therein is made for the first time without there being

any pre-existing right in the female Hindu to the

property. The Bench consisted of Hon. J.C. Shah, V.

Ramaswamy and A.N. Grover, JJ.

10. The case of Mst Karmi v. Amru on which a reliance

has now been placed by learned counsel for the

appellant and petitioners was also decided by a bench

of three Judges Hon. J.C. Shah, K.S. Hegde and A.N.

Grover, JJ. It may be noted that two Hon’ble Judges,

namely, J.C. Shah and A.N. Grover were common to

both the cases. In Mst Karmi v. Amru, one Jaimal died

in 1938 leaving his wife Nihali. His son Ditta

pre-deceased him. Appellant in the above case was the

daughter of Ditta and the respondents were collaterals

of Jaimal. Jaimal first executed a will dated December

18, 1935 and by a subsequent will dated November

13, 1937 revoked the first will. By the second will a life

estate was given to Nihali and thereafter the property

was made to devolve on Bhagtu and Amru collaterals.

On the death of Jaimal in 1938, properties were

mutated in the name of Nihali. Nihali died in 1960/61.

The appellant Mst Karmi claimed right on the basis of

a will dated April 25, 1958 executed by Nihali in her

favour. It was held that the life estate given to a widow

under the will of her husband cannot become an

absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu

Succession Act. Thereafter, the appellant cannot claim

title to the properties on the basis of the will executed

by the widow Nihali in her favour. It is a short

judgment without adverting to any provisions of

Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither

makes any mention of any argument raised in this

regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision

in Badri Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi. The decision in

Mst Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the

ambit and scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act.”

25

Page 26 25.Reference may also be made to the decision of three

Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi

vs. Kamla and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 390, where a Hindu

wife was bequeathed life interest for maintenance by Will with

the condition that she would not have power to alienate the

same in any manner. As per the Will, after death of the wife,

the property was to revert back to his daughter as an absolute

owner. On this fact their Lordships following the ratio

decided in Tulasamma’s case (supra) held that by virtue of

Section 14(1) a limited right given to the wife under the Will

got enlarged to an absolute right in the suit property.

26.Mr. K.Ramamurty, learned senior counsel appearing for

the respondent, also relied upon the decision in the case of

Santosh and Others vs. Saraswathibai and Another ,

(2008) 1 SCC 465, Subhan Rao and Others vs. Parvathi Bai

and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 235 and Sri Ramakrishna Mutt

vs. M. Maheswaran and Others, (2011) 1 SCC 68.

26

Page 27 27. In Santosh’s case (supra), this Court followed the

decision given in Nazar Singh’s case, (1996) 1 SCC 35, and

held that the pre-existing right of wife was crystallized and her

limited interest became an absolute interest in the property

possessed by her in lieu of maintenance.

28. A similar question arose for consideration before this

Court in Subhan Rao case (supra), where a portion of suit

property was given to the plaintiff-wife for her maintenance

subject to restriction that she will not alienate the land which

was given to her maintenance. The question arose as to

whether by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act she became the

owner of the suit property. Considering all the earlier

decisions of this Court, their Lordships held that by virtue of

Section 14(1) of the Act, the pre-existing right in lieu of her

right to maintenance transformed into absolute estate.

27

Page 28 29.In the case of Nazar Singh and Others vs. Jagjit Kaur

and Others, (1996) 1 SCC 35, this Court following the

decision in Tulasamma’s case held as under:-

“9. Section 14 and the respective scope and ambit of

sub-sections (1) and (2) has been the subject-matter of

a number of decisions of this Court, the most

important of which is the decision in V. Tulasamma v.

Sesha Reddy. The principles enunciated in this

decision have been reiterated in a number of decisions

later but have never been departed from. According to

this decision, sub-section (2) is confined to cases

where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the

first time as a grant without any pre-existing right

under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award,

the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the

property. It has also been held that where the property

is acquired by a Hindu female in lieu of right of

maintenance inter alia, it is in virtue of a pre-existing

right and such an acquisition would not be within the

scope and ambit of sub-section (2) even if the

instrument, decree, order or award allotting the

property to her prescribes a restricted estate in the

property. Applying this principle, it must be held that

the suit lands, which were given to Harmel Kaur by

Gurdial Singh in lieu of her maintenance, were held by

Harmel Kaur as full owner thereof and not as a limited

owner notwithstanding the several restrictive

covenants accompany-ing the grant. [Also see the

recent decision of this Court in Mangat Mal v. Punni

Devi where a right to residence in a house property

was held to attract sub-section (1) of Section 14

notwithstanding the fact that the grant expressly

conferred only a limited estate upon her.] According to

sub-section (1), where any property is given to a female

Hindu in lieu of her maintenance before the

commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, such

property becomes the absolute property of such female

Hindu on the commencement of the Act provided the

said property was ‘possessed’ by her. Where, however,

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Page 29 the property is given to a female Hindu towards her

maintenance after the commencement of the Act, she

becomes the absolute owner thereof the moment she is

placed in possession of the said property (unless, of

course, she is already in possession) notwithstanding

the limitations and restrictions contained in the

instrument, grant or award whereunder the property is

given to her. This proposition follows from the words in

sub-section (1), which insofar as is relevant read: “Any

property possessed by a female Hindu … after the

commencement of this Act shall be held by her as full

owner and not as a limited owner.” In other words,

though the instrument, grant, award or deed creates a

limited estate or a restricted estate, as the case may

be, it stands transformed into an absolute estate

provided such property is given to a female Hindu in

lieu of maintenance and is placed in her possession.

So far as the expression ‘possessed’ is concerned, it

too has been the subject-matter of interpretation by

several decisions of this Court to which it is not

necessary to refer for the purpose of this case.”

30.In Sadhu Singh’s case, (2006) 8 SCC 75, the facts of the

case were quite different to that of the present case. In Sadhu

Singh’s case, this Court proceeded on the basis that the

widow had no pre-existing right in the property, and therefore,

the life estate given to her in the Will cannot get enlarged into

absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the Act.

29

Page 30 31.Mr. Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel for the

appellant’s last contention was that in the absence of any

pleading and proof from the side of the appellant to

substantiate the plea that Veeraraghavamma was occupying

the property in lieu of maintenance, Section 14 will not be

automatically attracted. We do not find any substance in the

submission made by the learned counsel. Indisputably,

Exhibit A-2 is a document which very categorically provided

that the property in question was given to Veeraraghavamma

to enjoy the same till her life. Neither the genuineness of the

said Exhibit A-2 was disputed nor it was disputed that

Veeraraghavamma was enjoying the property by way of

maintenance. In our considered opinion, unless the factum of

bequeathing the property in favour of the wife and her

continuous possession are disputed, the question of pleading

and proof does not arise. In other words, no one disputed the

arrangement made in the Will and Veeraraghavamma

continued to enjoy the said property in lieu of maintenance.

30

Page 31 Hence, the ratio decided in G. Rama’s case (supra) does not

apply.

32. Further, indisputably, Mr. P. Venkata Subba Rao, the

original owner of the property, realized the fact that his wife

Veeraraghavamma was issueless and she has a pre-existing

right to be maintained out of his property. He further realized

that physically he was weak and may not survive for long

period. He therefore, decided to give his properties to his

family members. For the maintenance of his third wife

Veeraraghavamma, he gave the tiled house with site and

compound wall with the stipulation that she shall enjoy the

property for life in lieu of maintenance. She will also be

entitled to fetch water from the well and use other facilities.

Admittedly, no one disputed the arrangements made in the

Will and Veeraraghavamma continued to enjoy the said

property. In view of the admitted position, we have no doubt

to hold that by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Act, her limited

right became absolute right to the suit property.

31

Page 32 33.In the impugned judgment, the High Court has

elaborately discussed the facts of the case and the law

applicable thereto and came to the conclusion that the trial

court committed serious error of law in holding that by virtue

of Section 14(2) of the Act, her limited right has not become

absolute.

34.Though no specific word has been mentioned in Exhibit

A-2 that in lieu of maintenance life interest has been created

in favour of Veeraraghavamma, in our opinion in whatever

form a limited interest is created in her favour who was having

a pre-existing right of maintenance, the same has become an

absolute right by the operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu

Succession Act.

35.After giving our anxious consideration to the matter and

the judicial pronouncements of this Court in a series of

32

Page 33 decisions, we hold that the impugned judgment of the High

Court is perfectly in accordance with law and needs no

interference by this Court.

36.For the reasons aforesaid, this appeal has no merit and

dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………… .J.

(M.Y. Eqbal)

…………………………… .J.

(C. Nagappan)

New Delhi

November 06, 2015

33