http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7

PETITIONER:

K.M. SINGH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

SECRETARY, ASSOCIATION OF INDIAN UNIVERSITIESAND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT21/04/1992

BENCH:

YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)

BENCH:

YOGESHWAR DAYAL (J)

PANDIAN, S.R. (J)

REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J)

CITATION:

1992 AIR 1356 1992 SCR (2) 630

1992 SCC (3) 129 JT 1992 (4) 12

1992 SCALE (1)839

ACT:

Indian Evidence Act, 1872:

Section 20- Statement made on special oath by person -

Evidentiary value of -Held an admission of the person.

Code of civil procedure, 1908:

Suit-Disposal of -By special oath-Validity of:

Oaths Act, 1969:

Section 9-Oaths Act, 1873- Repeal of -Whether debars parties

from entering into any contract.

HEADNOTE:

The petitioner in the special Leave petition filed a

suit for declaring that the resignation tendered by him was

involuntary and a result of fraud,coercion and threat as

well as the inducement as alleged in the plaint. During the

pendency of this suit, he filed an application under Order

10 Rule 2 Read with Section 151 of the code of Civil Proce-

dure for a direction that if the respondent officers No.1

and 2 took a special oath in Gurudwara and Mandir respec-

tively to the effect that the resignation of the plaintiff

was not extracted from him under duress, fear, inducement,

fraud, coercion then that part of the claim might be dis-

missed as withdrawn.

The respondent Officers having accepted the challenge

the Additional District Judge appointed a local commissioner

to administer the oath to the said two persons as desired by

the petitioner, and the same having been taken and the court

duly informed, the additional District Judge ordered dis-

missal of that part of the claim covered by the suit.

On the following day of the dismissal of the

application, the

631

petitioner filed another application with a prayer to decide

the aforesaid issue on merits and evidence and that the

respondents might not be allowed to take advantage of the

blunder committed by the petitioner in his application, and

for cancellation of the court's order dismissing the claim.

This application was dismissed by the Trial Judge. The Trial

Court took the view that Section 20 of the Evidence Act was

applicable and that the repeal of the Oath Act, 1873 by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7

Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1969 no where debarred the

parties from entering into any contract.

The petitioner filed revision petition against the two

orders of the Trial Court but the same was dismissed.

In the special leave petition of this Court, the

petitioner contended in person that in view of the repeal of

the Oaths Act, 1873 by the Oaths Act, 1969 the suit could

not be decided on the basis of special oath.

Dismissing the special leave petition, this Court,

HELD: 1. The oath was administered as per the petition-

er's statement and there is thus no manner of doubt that

the oath taken by the two persons in pursuance of the offer

of the petitioner amounted to an admission of the respond-

ent's claim on his part within the meaning of Section 20 of

the Evidence Act.[639 D]

2. The two persons were the nominees of the plaintiff

and the statement of the nominees by virtue of Section 20 of

the Evidence Act would be treated as an admission of the

parties.[639 D-E]

3. The Trial Court was right in its view that Section

20 of the Evidence Act was applicable in the instant case,

and that the repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of

the Oaths Act, 1969 nowhere debarred the plaintiff parties

from entering into any contract. The orders of the Trial

Court are therefore unassailable and the High Court has

rightly dismissed the revision petition.[635 G-H;639 E]

Hirachand Kothari (dead) by Lrs. v. State of Rajasthan

and another, [1985] Supp. SCC 17, referred to.

J. A. Munnuswami Naidu v. K.S.P. Thyagaraya Chettiar

and another, AIR 1977 Madras 273, Vasudeva Shanbog v.

Naraina Rai, 1880 ILR 2 Madras 356, Rustam etc. v. The

Financial Commissioner, etc. 1981-83 PLR

632

759, Mrs.Florabel Skinner and Others v.Jai Bajrang Kala

Mandir Ram Lila Mandal, Hissar, AIR 1980 P & H 284 and

Thakur Singh & Others v. lnder singh, AIR 1976 P & H 287,

approved.

Pacharanda Nanjappa v. Pacharanda Belliappa deceased by

Seethavva & Others, 1979-29 ILR (Karnataka) 2018 and Ananda

Chandra Sahu (deceased by L.R.) & Others. v. Ananta Khuntia

and other, AIR 1983 Orissa 250, over-ruled.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :Special Leave Petition

(civil) No.10436 of 1991.

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.4.91 of the Delhi

High Court in C.R. No. 359 of 1989.

Petitioner-in-person.

P.P. Rao Rajindra Dhawan and Jitendra Sharma for the

Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

YOGESHWAR DAYAL, J. This Special Leave Petition filed

by Sh. K.M. Singh, who was a Finance Officer of the

Association of Indian Universities, AIU House, 16 Kotla

Marg, New Delhi, is against the Judgment dated 26th April,

1991 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of

Delhi in Civil Revision No. 359 of 1989.

In the revision petition the petitioner had sought to

set aside an order dated 30th January, 1989 passed by the

learned Additional District Judge, Delhi, dismissing the

application filed on his behalf wherein he had prayed for

cancelling an order dated 14th October, 1988 vide which a

part of the claim of the suit of the petitioner/plaintiff

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7

covered by issue No.1 was ordered to be dismissed as with-

drawn.

The facts giving rise to the filing of the revision

petition were that the petitioner had filed a suit inter

alia for declaring that the resignation tendered by the

petitioner/plaintiff was involuntary and a result of

fraud,coercion and threat as well as the inducement as

alleged in the plaint. This plea of the petitioner was

subject matter of issue No.1.

During the course of the proceedings the petitioner had

filed an application dated 14th October, 1988 purporting to

be under Order 10

633

Rule 2 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure

In this application it was prayed that if Sh. Amrik Singh

and Sh.R.P. Mahendroo, officers of defendant No.1.took

special oath in Gurudwara and Mandir respectively to the

effect that the resignation of the plaintiff was not ex-

tracted from him on 5th April, 1976 under duress, fear,

inducement,fraud, coercion then that part of the claim might

be dismissed as withdrawn. The plaintiff/petitioner in fact

made this statement before the Additional District Judge and

Sh. Amrik Singh and Sh. Mahendroo accepted the said chal-

lenge. They were ready to take special oath in Gurudwara and

Mandir in terms of the plaintiff's statement. Consequently a

local commissioner was appointed by the Additional District

Judge who administered the oath to the said two person the

Gurudwara and Mandir respectively, as desired by the plain-

tiff/petitioner and accordingly the learned Additional

District Judge ordered on 14.10.1988 dismissal of that part

of the claim covered by issue No.1 as withdrawn. The revi-

sion petition was directed against this order as well.

That on the next date i.e. 15th October, 1988 the

plaintiff/petitioner filed another application with the

prayer to decide the aforesaid issue No.1 on merits and

evidence and the defendants may not be allowed to take

advantage of the blunder committed by the plaintiff/peti-

tioner and for cancelling the order dated 14th October,

1988. This application dated 15th October. 1988 was dis-

missed by the trial court by order dated 30th January,1989.

In the reply filed to the Special Leave Petition it is

pointed out that the suit was fixed on 14th October, 1988

for further evidence of the defendants and in fact on the

said date Dr. Amrik Singh was to be cross-examined by the

petitioner. Dr. Amrik Singh as well as Sh. R.P. Mahendroo,

Under Secretary of the Association of Indian Universities

were present in the Court and when the suit was called the

petitioner filed the application dated 14th October, 1988

wherein he had offered to abide by the statement made by Dr.

Amrik Singh and Sh. R.P. Mahendroo. Whereupon both Dr.Amrik

Singh and Sh. R.P. Mahendroo expressed their willingness and

agreed to take oath and accepted the offer. The petitioner

affirmed the same and made a further statement before the

court as under:-

"Dr. Amrik Singh D.W. present in the Court and

R.P.

634

Mohindru, officials of the respondents take spe-

cial oath in Gurudwara and Mandir respectively to the

effect that the resignation of the plaintiff K.M. Singh was

not extracted from him on 5.4.76 under duress, fear, induce-

ment, fraud or coercion then that portion of the plaint

shall be dismissed as withdrawn."

The said offer made by the petitioner was put to both

Dr. Amrik Singh and Sh. Mahendroo and both of them accepted

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7

the same and also made the following statement in Court as

under:-

"We are ready to take special oath in the Mandir

and Gurudwara as stated by the plaintiff in his statement

above."

In view of the offer made by the petitioner and accept-

ed by both of them the Court thereafter passed the order

reading as under:-

"Present - Plaintiff in person. Counsel for the

defendant.

One witness of the deft. Dr. Amrik Singh is

present for further cross-examination by the plaintiff.

However, the plaintiff has filed an application under rule 2

read with Section 151 C.P.C.and has stated that if the said

witness of the defendant and Shri R.P. Mahendroo Under

Secretary of the defendant No.1 takes special oath in the

Gurudwara and Mandir respectively to the effect that the

resignation of the plaintiff was not extracted from him on

5.4.76 under duress, fear, inducement, fraud or coercion,

then that part of the claim of the plaintiff may be deemed

to be dismissed as withdrawn. The witness and official of

the defendant stated that they are ready to take the said

special oath in the Gurudwara and Mandir respectively. Let

statements be recorded. Statements have been recorded sepa-

rately. The Application filed by the plaintiff stands dis-

posed of. The counsel for the defendant states that the

defendant is ready and willing to pay the admitted part

claim, if any, of the plaintiff.The plaintiff submits direc-

tion to go alongwith the parties and the witness to the

Gurudwara and Mandir respectively for taking special oath.

The plaintiff states that he is ready to bear the expenses

of the local commissioner. Accordingly, I hereby appoint Sh.

A.P.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate, as Local Commissioner present in

Court with the direction to visit alongwith the

635

parties to Gurudwara Sisganj Sahib and Gauri Shanker Mandir

today at 1 p.m. to take special oath by the said persons.

His fee is fixed at Rs.500 to be paid by the plaintiff. The

plaintiff has paid the fee of the Local Commissioner in the

Court."

Thereafter the petitioner paid the fee fixed by the

trial Court to the Local Commissioner. The time and date for

visit to Gurudwara and Mandir were fixed by the Court at the

instance of the petitioner as well as Dr. Amrik Singh and

Sh. Mahendroo. As per the directions of the Court the Local

Commissioner in the company of the petitioner, Dr. Amrik

Singh and Sh. Mahendroo went to Gurudwara Sisganj as well as

Gauri Shanker Mandir both situated in Chandni Chowk, Delhi

where the Local Commissioner administered the oath to both

of them and their statements were recorded. Both of them

denied that the plaintiffs resignation was obtained by

fraud, coercion, threat and or that he was induced to tender

the resignation. After the said oath was taken the matter

was taken up in the afternoon session by the trial court

when the Local Commissioner submitted his report to the

Court whereupon the trial court passed the following order:-

"Present-As before.

The Local Commissioner has filed his report to the

effect that he has got the special oath adminis-

tered to the witness and official of the defend-

ant. In view of the statement of the plaintiff

recorded earlier the suit of the plaintiff

with regard to his resignation and consequential

reinstatement which is covered by Issue No.1 stands

dismissed as withdrawn.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7

Now to come up for making payment by the

defendant of the other claim of the plaintiff, if

any, on 4.11.1988''

As stated earlier, thereafter, on 15th October, 1988

the application was filed for recalling this order

dismissing a part of the suit as withdrawn. The trial court,

however, took the view that Section 20 of the Evidence Act

was applicable and it also took the view that the repeal of

the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of the Oaths Act, 1969 no

where debar the parties form entering into any contract.

High Court, as stated earlier, dismissed the revision

petition and

636

agree with the view of trial court. Before the High Court

reliance was placed on the decision of the Karnataka High

Court in Pacharanda Nanjappa v. Pacharanda Belliappa de-

ceased by Seethavva and others, 1979-29 ITR (Karnataka)

2018. The High Court, however, did not follow the aforesaid

decision and preferred to decide the matter in view of the

decisions of the Madras High Court in J.A. Munnuswami Naidu

v. K.S.P. Thyagaraya Chettair and another, A.I.R. 1977

Madras 273; Vasudeva Ghanbog v. Naraina Pai, 1880 ILR 2

Madras 356 decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

Rustam etc. v. The Financial Commissioner, etc. 1981-83 PLR

759 and Full Bench decision of Punjab and Haryana High Court

in Mrs. Florabel Skinner and others v. Jai Bajrang Kala

Mandir Ram Lila Mandal, Hissar AIR 1980 p & 284.

Before us also the petitioner, who appeared in person,

submitted that in view of the repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873

by the Oaths Act, 1969 the suit could not be decided on the

basis of special oath. The petitioner also relied on the

decision of the Orissa High Court in Ananda Chandra Sahu

(deceased by L.R.) and others v. Ananta Khuntia and others

AIR 1983 Orissa 250.

It may be noticed that both the learned Single Judge of

the Karnataka High Court as well as the learned Division

Bench of the Orissa High Court were correct in noticing the

effect of repeal of the Oaths Act, 1873 by Section 9 of the

Oaths Act, 1969, but it appears the provisions of Section 20

of the Evidence Act were not brought to their notice. The

learned Judges of the Karnataka High Court and Orissa High

Court were right in observing in what cases the provisions

of the Oaths Act, 1873 was to continue to govern and in

which cases they would cease to apply. But as stated earli-

er, the provisions of Section 20 of the Evidence Act were

not brought to their notice. Section 20 of the Evidence Act

reads as follows :-

" 20 Admissions by persons expressly referred to by

party to suit.-Statements mode by persons to whom a

party to the suit has expressly referred for infor-

mation in reference to a matter in dispute are

admissions.

Illustration

The question is, whether a horse sold by A to B is

sound.

A says to B "Go and ask C ,C knows all about itC's

statement is an admission

In Hirachand Kothari (dead) by lrs v. State of Rajasthan and

another (1985)(SUPP) SCC 17, this Court held thus

"Section 20 is the second exception to the general

rule laid down in section 18. It deals with one

class of vicarious admissions. Where a party refers

to a third person for some information or an opin-

ion are matter in dispute the statements made by

the third person are receivable as admission

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7

against the person referring. The word `informa-

tion' occurring in section 20 is not to be under-

stood in the sense that the parties desired to know

something which none of them had any knowledge of.

Where there is a dispute as regards a certain

question and the Court is in need of information

regarding the truth on that point any statement

which the referee may make is nevertheless informa-

tion within the purview of section 20 and is admis-

sible. The reason behind admissibility of the

statement is that when a party refers to another

person for a statement of his views the party

approves of the utterance in anticipation and

adopts that as his own. The principle is the same

as that of reference to arbitration

The reference under section 20 may be by express

words or by conduct but in any case there must be a

clear admission to refer and such admission are

generally conclusive. Admissions may operate as

estoppel and they do so where parties had agreed to

abide by them "

A similar question arose in J.A. Munnuswami Naidu

(supra) before the division bench of the Madras High Court.

There a suit had been filed on 16th June 1971 for recovery

of money against the appellant on the foot of a security

bond. The second respondent in the suit was a puisne mort-

gagee. The appellant filed the written statement that the

respondent, the first mortgagee had fraudulently suppressed

the payment of interest in the security bond and if the

proper account was taken the money will be due to the first

respondent. When the suit was taken up for trail the plain-

tiff agreed to take a special oath on his family deity that

for the suit security bond no money except those shown by

way of endorsement was

638

received by him it was also agreed that the plaintiff mort-

gagee taking such an oath the suit may be decreed. The

plaintiff took a special oath and the suit was decreed. The

judgment debtor filed an un-numbered execution application

praying that the decree be declared as a nullity having been

passed by the civil Court having no jurisdiction. The exe-

cuting court dismissed the objections to the execution and

the matter came up in appeal before the High Court. The

learned single judge of the High Court dismissed the appeal.

Whereupon the matter was taken up before the Division bench

Kailasam C.J(as his lordship then was) and Balasubrahmanyam,

J. dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal. It was submitted

before the division Bench that because the Oaths Act, 1873

has been repealed what the plaintiff had stated on special

oath is not an evidence. The learned single judge who had

heard the appeal was confronted with the arguments that the

date on which the special oath was taken the Oaths Act,

1873,which provided that when a special oath was taken under

section 10, it would be conclusive against the person who

offered was no longer in force as the said Act had been re-

pealed in 1969 and the new act of 1969 dispensed with the

procedure as to the taking of the special oath and its

consequences it was common ground that the special oath was

taken in ignorance of the fact that the Oaths Act,1873,under

which the procedure as to the taking of special oath was

admitted had been repealed and that the new Oaths Act had no

provision for such a procedure. The division bench observed

that they could not accept the contention that because

Oaths Act,1873 has been repealed what the plaintiff has

stated on special oath is not an evidence Earlier the single

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7

judge had taken the same view.

The question directly in issue came up before a divi-

sion bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Thakur

singh and others v.Inder Singh,AIR 1976 P & H 287.The divi-

sion bench took the view that :

"The only effect of exclusion of section 9 to 12

of the oaths Act,1873 by Oaths Act,1969 is that if

any party to any judicial proceeding offers to be

bound by any special oath and the court thinks it

fit to administer such an oath to the other party

consenting thereto and such oath is taken by the

other party the evidence given on such oath as

against persons who offered to be bound as afore-

said would no more be conclusive proof of the

matter stated in such deposition where an agreement

was arrived at between the counsel for parties that

if the

639

Defendant were to take oath in a particular Gurud-

wara stating that the suit land was not of plain-

tiff and that defendant had not executed any agree-

ment in favour of plaintiff, the suit of plaintiff

be dismissed and in pursuance of the order of the

Court on the basis of agreement, the defendant did

take oath there being no special oath either pre-

scribed or taken and the suit having been dismissed

on the basis of such oath

Held that the compromise arrived at between the

counsel for the plaintiff of behalf of his client

and the defendant appellant would be covered by

section 20 the Evidence Act and the plaintiff would

be bound by the statement made by the defendant if

the same is found to have been made strictly in

accordance with the terms offered by him"

It will be noticed that in the present case the oath was

administered as per plaintiffs/petitioners statement

and,therefore there is thus no manner of doubt that the oath

taken by two persons is pursuance of the offer of the peti-

tioner amounted to admission of respondent's claim on his

part within the meaning of section 20 of the Evidence Act.

The two persons were the nominees of the plaintiff and the

statement of the nominees by virtue of section 20 of the

Evidence Act would be treated as an admission of the parties

thus the orders of the Trial court dated 14th October,1988

and 30th January ,1989 were unassailable and the High court

has rightly dismissed the revision petition .

The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed with-

out any order as to costs

N.V.K

Petition dismissed.