REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 281 OF 2003

Lakhwant Singh …Appellant

Versus

Jasbir Singh and Ors. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1.Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned

Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court allowing

the application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (in short the ‘Cr.P.C.’). Respondents had filed

an application praying for quashing the First Information

Report (in short the ‘FIR’) registered against them for alleged

commission of theft on 13.7.1999. Statement in the FIR was

that while executing the order in their favour possession of

land of the complainant was illegally taken in execution of

warrant of possession. The High Court accepted the prayer

holding that the aforesaid aspect of the matter can be

examined if any objections are filed before the concerned

Court that warrant officer/bailiff acted beyond the warrant of

possession, and this could not give rise to registration of the

crime and, therefore, the matter is before us.

2.Learned counsel for the appellant had referred to

document appearing at Annexure R/6 and submitted that

without even analyzing the factual and legal aspects, by an

abrupt conclusion the learned Single Judge should not have

quashed the proceedings. With reference to the objections filed

before the High Court it was pointed out that the challan had

already been filed in the Court, and learned Judicial

Magistrate, Ist Class had committed the case to the court of

Sessions Judge, Amritsar. Certain other factual aspects have

also been referred to. It was further pointed out that while

considering the application filed in terms of Section 438

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Cr.P.C., learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar had

passed a detailed order highlighting the role played by

respondents 1 to 5.

3.Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 5 supported the

judgment of the trial Court.

4.Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case of

this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section

does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only

saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before

the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances

under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised,

namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to

prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise

secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable

to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the

exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment

dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may

possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart

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from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper

discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law.

That is the doctrine which finds expression in the Section

which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the

High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in

the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their

constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right

and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on

the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id

sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person

anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist).

While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not

function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction

under the Section though wide has to be exercised sparingly,

carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is

justified by the tests specifically laid down in the Section itself.

It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and

substantial justice for the administration of which alone

courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of

justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so

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as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such

abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow

any action which would result in injustice and prevent

promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be

justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that

initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of

court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve

the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the

complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When

a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look

into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged

and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations

are accepted in toto.

5.In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab (AIR 1960 SC 866), this

Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent

power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings.

(i)where it manifestly appears that there is

a legal bar against the institution or

continuance e.g. want of sanction;

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(ii)where the allegations in the first

information report or complaint taken at

its face value and accepted in their

entirety do not constitute the offence

alleged;

(iii)where the allegations constitute an

offence, but there is no legal evidence

adduced or the evidence adduced clearly

or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

6.In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in

mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal

evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly

inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where

there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not

support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily

embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is

reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it

accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the

trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an

instrument of oppression or needless harassment. Court

should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion

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and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into

consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an

instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash

vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time

the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to

short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.

The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code

and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise

its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent

abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends

of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of

Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) A note of

caution was, however, added that the power should be

exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. The

illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:

“(1)Where the allegations made in the first

information report or the complaint, even if

they are taken at their face value and accepted

in their entirety do not prima facie constitute

any offence or make out a case against the

accused.

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(2)Where the allegations in the first

information report and other materials, if any,

accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation

by police officers under Section 156(1) of the

Code except under an order of a Magistrate

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the

Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations

made in the F.I.R. or complaint and the

evidence collected in support of the same do

not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute

only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation

is permitted by a Police Officer without an order

of a Magistrate as contemplated under S. 155

(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or

complaint are so absurd and inherently

improbable on the basis of which no prudent

person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar

engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code

or the concerned Act (under which a criminal

proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where

there is a specific provision in the Code or the

concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly

attended with mala fide and/or where the

proceeding is maliciously instituted with an

ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge.”

7.As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very

plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.

Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of

this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power

should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High

Court being the highest Court of a State should normally

refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the

entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the

evidence has not been collected and produced before the

Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of

magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective

without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule

can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court

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will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the

proceeding at any stage. (See : The Janata Dal etc. v. H.S.

Chowdhary and others, etc. (AIR 1993 SC 892), Dr. Raghubir

Saran v. State of Bihar and another (AIR 1964 SC 1)). It would

not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the

complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to

determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on

such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are

to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material

before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded

with. In proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the

inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in

a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is

frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in

the complaint do not constitute the offence of which

cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the

High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent

powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is not, however,

necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case

before the trial to find out whether the case would end in

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conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a

whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in

the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant

that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed

and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala

fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no

justification for interference by the High Court. When an

information is lodged at the police station and an offence is

registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of

secondary importance. It is the material collected during the

investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate

of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against

the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be

the basis for quashing the proceeding. (See : Mrs.

Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar and others (AIR 1990

SC 494), State of Bihar and another v. P. P. Sharma, I.A.S.

and another (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 222), Rupan Deol Bajaj

(Mrs.) and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another (1995

(6) SCC 194), State of Kerala and others v. O.C. Kuttan and

others (1999 (2) SCC 651), State of U.P. v. O. P. Sharma (1996

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(7) SCC 705), Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada

(1997 (2) SCC 397), Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of

Delhi) and another (1999 (8) SCC 728), Rajesh Bajaj v. State

NCT of Delhi and others AIR 1999 SC 1216).

8.These aspects were highlighted in State of Karnataka v.

M. Devendrappa and another (2002 (3) SCC 89).

9.In Jehan Singh v. Delhi Admn. (1974 (4) SCC 522) while

considering a case under Section 561-A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1898 (in short “the Old Code”)

corresponding to Section 482 CrPC, it was observed as

follows: (AIR p.1146)

“Where at the date of filing the petition under

Section 561-A, no charge-sheet or a complaint

has been laid down in court and the matter is

only at the stage of investigation by police, the

court cannot, in exercise of its inherent

jurisdiction under Section 561-A, interfere

with the statutory powers of the police to

investigate into the alleged offence, and quash

the proceedings. Even assuming that the

allegations in the FIR are correct and

constitute an offence so as to remove the legal

bar to institute proceedings in court, the court

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cannot at that stage appraise the evidence

collected by the police in their investigation.

Any petition under Section 561-A at such a

stage is, therefore, premature and

incompetent.” (SCC p. 526, paras 16-18)

10.It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete

and at that stage it was impermissible for the High Court to

look into materials, the acceptability of which is essentially a

matter for trial. While exercising jurisdiction under Section

482 Cr.P.C, it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it

was a trial court. Even when charge is framed at that stage,

the Court has to only prima facie be satisfied about the

existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the

accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can evaluate

material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate

evidence. The Court is not required to appreciate evidence to

conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not

for convicting the accused. In Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal

(1992 (3) SCC 317), it was observed that when the materials

relied upon by a party are required to be proved, no inference

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can be drawn on the basis of those materials to conclude the

complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act on

annexures to the petitions under Section 482 CrPC, which

cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and

proved.

11.These aspects are highlighted in State of Orissa v. Saroj

Kumar Sahoo (2005 (13) SCC 540).

12.Practically non-reasoned order of the High Court does

not reveal that the parameters relating to exercise of power

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. were kept in view. The inevitable

conclusion is that order of the High Court deserves to be set

aside. We direct accordingly.

13.The appeal is allowed.

…………………….……..J.

(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

………………………..….J.

(G.S. SINGHVI)

New Delhi,

September 16, 2008

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