As per case facts, police received intelligence about extremists assembling, planning attacks, and possessing stolen weapons, leading to a raid. During the raid, the accused fired upon the police, resulting ... in the death of a police officer and some extremists. Arms and ammunition were recovered, and several persons were apprehended and tried. The Trial Court convicted them under various sections including IPC and TADA Act, which the appellants challenged. They contended that there was no evidence to classify them as terrorists, the assembly was for self-protection due to a land dispute, no arms were recovered from all arrested individuals, and Section 149 IPC was inapplicable without clear proof of an unlawful common object or overt acts. The question arose whether Section 149 IPC's constructive liability applied when the assembly's purpose was disputed, and if the actions qualified as 'terrorist acts' under TADA, considering the evolving nature of such definitions. Finally, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, ruling that Section 149 IPC was correctly applied. The evidence firmly established the unlawful assembly's common object to resist law enforcement and commit criminal acts, supported by planned preparation, sophisticated arms, and direct firing. These actions were deemed to be in furtherance of the common object and known by the members, thereby constituting 'terrorist activity' under the TADA Act, leading to the dismissal of the appeals.