2026 INSC 698

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 1 of 15

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.29289 of 2025)

MAHINDER & OTHERS. …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

PURAN SINGH …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. Leave Granted.

2. The short but significant question in this case is whether Section 22 of the

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

1

would apply to agricultural land or not. This arises

from an appeal preferred by the original defendants who are aggrieved by the

First Appellate Court

2

, setting aside the finding of the Civil Court

3

which

1

HSA

2

District Judge, Karnal in Civil Appeal no.213 of 2019

3

Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Karnal

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 2 of 15

dismissed the suit by the plaintiff (respondent herein) and such finding being

confirmed by the High Court

4

.

3. The facts lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff and the defendants, are

siblings, being children of one Nanhu, had inherited the agricultural land as

Class-I legal heirs. Defendant nos.1 to 7, either directly or through their legal

heirs, sold their respective shares collectively to a third party vide sale deed dated

28

th

December 2011 to one Mrs. Poonam, who was plaintiff no.9 before the Civil

Court. The plaintiff filed a suit on 8

th

December 2011, being Petition No.35 of

2013, before the Civil Court, challenging the aforesaid alienation by virtue of

Section 22 of HSA. The Civil Court by an order dated 7

th

March 2019 dismissed

the same by placing reliance on the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in

Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana

5

, which held Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-

emption Act 1913

6

as unconstitutional. It was observed that Section 22 of the

HSA was pari materia to the aforesaid Section and, as such the same also has to

be struck down. The First Appellate Court took a different view. It was held that

in Babu Ram v. Santokh Singh

7

, this Court discussed the right of pre-emption

under the HSA and held it to be applicable to agricultural land. It was further

observed that since HSA was a post-independence enactment and the Court in

Atam Prakash was not examining any conflict between Section 15 of the Punjab

Act and Section 22 of HSA, the holding in the latter would not govern the

question. This conclusion is buttressed with reference to certain judgments of the

High Court itself. The High Court, in the second appeal, observed that no

substantial question arose for consideration and as such dismissed the same.

4

RSA 2717 of 2025

5

(1986) 2 SCC 249

6

Punjab Act

7

(2019) 14 SCC 162

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 3 of 15

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The case of the parties is as

follows:

4.1 The original defendants contend that the suit under Section 22 HSA

was not maintainable at the first instance since – (i) all the relevant persons

who were covered within its sweep, were not made parties thereto; (ii) the

sale deed by which the property in question stood transferred to a third

party was never challenged; (iii) once the sale in question stood completed,

the only course of action available to the plaintiff was to file a regular civil

suit; (v)there lies no right of appeal against an adjudication under Section

22; and(vi)the judgment in Babu Ram is not good law for having missed

out Entry 6 of List III and Entries 14 and 18 of List II.

4.2 Per contra, the plaintiff submits inter-alia that – (i)the issue of

nonjoinder of parties was not raised before the High Court and it is settled

law that the same was to be raised at the earliest; (ii)the present case is not

one of partial pre-emption and the prayer of the plaintiff before the Civil

Court was with regard to the entire land; (iii)since the petition under

Section 22 HSA was filed prior in point of time to the sale deed which was

dated 28

th

December 2011, there was no requirement to challenge the sale

deed; (iv)a petition to enforce Section 22, HSA rights is maintainable even

after transfer of property is complete and the same is the consistent view of

the High Courts; (v)Atam Prakash has no application in this case and Babu

Ram is the applicable law since it has settled the question of law,

conclusively; and (vi)Entry 5 list III of the VII schedule read with Article

254 of the Constitution gave complete autonomy to the Central Legislature

to legislate about succession and devolution of agricultural lands. Reliance

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 4 of 15

is placed on West U.P. Sugar Mills Assn. v. State of U.P.

8

, and M.

Karunanidhi v. Union of India

9

,.

4.3 There is no conflict between Atam Prakash and Babu Ram. Section

22 HAS, has been enacted under Entry 5 List III and the same is a neutral,

succession-based provision conferring a limited preferential right amongst

co-heirs. This is the submission of Mr. Indrajit Mahanty, learned senior

counsel assisting the Court as amicus curiae.

4.4 In this backdrop, we consider the question noted in Para 2. We may

take note of the following facets governing the right of pre-emption:

(a) Originally, pre-emption was an import of Mohammedan law,

particularly in places such as Bihar and Gujarat, which later came

to be adopted into customs through the reasons of convenience,

in these areas. (Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria

10

)

(b) Its origin lies in custom and was subsequently codified; the

objective is to keep out strangers from coming into the property

otherwise held by class I heirs. (Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar

11

)

(c) It is a right of substitution exercisable by a person who has a

superior right, not a right of re-purchase; (Gobind

Dayal v. Inayatullah

12

)

(d) It is a legal servitude that goes alongside the land inherited by the

parties. It imposes a right to restrict another person’s use of the

property (Audh Behari Singh v. Gajadhar Jaipuria

13

)

8

(2020) 9 SCC 548

9

(1979) 3 SCC 431

10

(1954) 1 SCC 836 (Constitution Bench)

11

(2001) 8 SCC 24 (Constitution Bench)

12

[(1885) ILR 7 All 775, 809)])

13

(1954) 1 SCC 836 (Constitution Bench)

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(e) It is jus ad rem alienum acquirendum and not a jus in re aliena-

“A right to the offer of a thing about to be sold is not identical

with a right to the thing itself, and that is the primary right of the

pre-emptor.” (Plowden, J.

14

)

(f) The right of pre-emption is a weak right, since acquiescence by a

positive act to a sale amount to giving up the right of pre-emption

or signals forfeiture thereof.(Radhakishan Laxminarayan

Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi

15

, Jagad Bandhu

Chatterjee v. Nilima Rani

16

)

(g) Somewhere it is recognised as an outdated right, but till and such

time that it occupies space in the statute book, it has to be

enforced.

5. Relevant provision, Section 22, HSA is reproduced below:

“22. Preferential right to acquire property in certain cases.—(1)

Where, after the commencement of this Act, an interest in any

immovable property of an intestate, or in any business carried on by

him or her, whether solely or in conjunction with others, devolves upon

two or more heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule, and any one of

such heirs proposes to transfer his or her interest in the property or

business, the other heirs shall have a preferential right to acquire the

interest proposed to be transferred.

(2) The consideration for which any interest in the property of the

deceased may be transferred under this section shall, in the absence of

any agreement between the parties, be determined by the court on

application being made to it in this behalf, and if any person proposing

to acquire the interest is not willing to acquire it for the consideration

so determined such person shall be liable to pay all costs of or incident

to the application.

(3) If there are two or more heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule

proposing to acquire any interest under this section, that heir who offers

the highest consideration for the transfer shall be preferred.

Explanation.—In this section, “Court” means the court within the limits

of whose jurisdiction the immovable property is situate or the business

14

136 P.R. 1894, at page 511)

15

1960 SCC OnLine SC 308 (Constitution Bench )

16

(1969) 3 SCC 445 (Three-Judge Bench)

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is carried on, and includes any other court which the State Government

may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.

(Emphasis supplied)

5.1 A bare perusal of the above-mentioned Section reveals its following

ingredients:

(a) This right exists between co-heirs of an intestate succession;

(b) It gives a right to one heir, preferential in nature, over the

property of other co-heirs in case of alienation to a third party;

(c) The Section itself provides for the intervention of the Court

to enable the co-heir holding the preferential right to seek

enforcement thereof, not through a specially laid out

procedure, but only through the general procedure for

enforcement of a civil right;

(d) The right of pre-emption is to be asserted at a point in time

prior to completion of a transaction, by which it is alleged that

such a right would be offended;

5.2 A four-judge Bench in Bishan Singh v. Khazan Singh

17

had also

summarised principles for the application of the right of pre-emption:

“ To summarize : (1) The right of pre-emption is not a right to the

thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold. This

right is called the primary or inherent right. (2) The pre-emptor has

a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. (3) It

is a right of substitution but not of re-purchase i.e., the pre-emptor

takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the original

vendee. (4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and

not a share of the property sold. (5) Preference being the essence of

the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee

or the person substituted in his place. (6) The right being a very weak

right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee

allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted

in his place.”

17

1958 SCC OnLine SC 88 (Four-Judge Bench)

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ATAM PRAKASH vs. BABU RAM- CONFLICT?

6. Now let us discuss the two judgments Atam Prakash and Babu Ram:

6.1 Atam Prakash - In this case, a Constitution Bench was considering

the validity of Section 15 of the Punjab Act, insofar as its application to the

State of Haryana is concerned. The Section reads as follows:

“15. Persons in whom right of pre-emption vests in respect of sales of

agricultural land and village immovable property.—(1) The right of

pre-emption in respect of agricultural land and village immovable

property shall vest—

(a) where the sale is by a sole owner—

First, in the son or daughter or son's son or daughter's son of the

vendor;

Secondly, in the brother or brother's son of the vendor;

Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's son of the

vendor;

Fourthly, in the tenant who holds under tenancy of the vendor the

land or property sold or a part thereof;

(b) where the sale is of a share out of joint land or property and is

not made by all the co-sharers jointly—

First, in the sons or daughters or sons' sons or daughters' sons of

the vendor or vendors;

Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendor or

vendors;

Thirdly, in the father's brother or father's brother's sons of the

vendor or vendors;

Fourthly, in the other co-sharers;

Fifthly, in the tenants who hold under tenancy of the vendor or

vendors the land or property sold or a part thereof;

(c) where the sale is of land or property owned jointly and is made

by all the co-sharers jointly—

First, in the sons or daughters or sons' sons or daughters' sons of

the vendors;

Secondly, in the brothers or brother's sons of the vendors;

Thirdly, in the father's brothers or father's brother's sons of the

vendors;

Fourthly, in the tenants, who hold under tenancy of the vendors or

any one of them the land or property sold or a part thereof.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1):

(a) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which she has

succeeded through her father or brother or the sale in respect of such

land or property is by the son or daughter of such female after

inheritance, the right of pre-emption shall vest:

(i) if the sale is by such female, in her brother or brother's son;

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 8 of 15

(ii) if the sale is by the son or daughter of such female, in the

mother's brothers or the mother's brother's sons of the vendor or

vendors;

(b) where the sale is by a female of land or property to which

she has succeeded through her husband, or through her son in

case the son has inherited the land or property sold from his

father, the right of pre-emption shall vest,—

First, in the son or daughter of such husband of the female;

Secondly, in the husband's brother or husband's brother's son of

such female.”

After discussing Bhau Ram v. Baij Nath Singh

18

wherein the right of

pre-emption was held to be a reasonable restriction to a right conferred

by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution; it moved to the ground of

challenge raised before it i.e., under Article 14. The list of persons given

under Section 15 was held to detract from the theory of agnatic right of

succession. It was concluded that there was no justification for the

classification contained therein. The relevant discussion is, Para 12

which is as under:

“12. A scrutiny of the list of persons in whose favour the right

of pre-emption is vested under Section 15 reveals certain

glaring facts which appear to detract from the theory of

preservation of the integrity of the family and the theory of

agnatic right of succession. First we notice that neither the

father nor the mother figures in the list though the father's

brother does. The son's daughter and the daughter's daughter

do not appear though the son's son and the daughter's son do.

The sister and the sister's son are excluded though the brother

and the brother's son are included. Thus relatives of the same

degree are excluded either because they are women or because

they are related through women. It is not as if women and those

related through women are altogether excluded because the

daughter and daughter's son are included. If the daughter is to

be treated on a par with the son and the daughter's son is treated

on a par with the son's son it does not appear logical why the

father's son (brother) should be included and not the father's

daughter (sister). These are but a few of the intrinsic

contradictions that appear in the list of relatives mentioned in

Section 15 as entitled to the right of pre-emption. It is

ununderstandable why a son's daughter, a daughter's daughter,

a sister or a sister's son should have no right of pre-emption

18

1962 SCC OnLine SC 324 (Constitution Bench)

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whereas a father's brother's son has that right. As Section 15

stands, if the sole owner of a property sells it to his own father,

mother, sister, sister's son, daughter's daughter or son's

daughter, the sale can be defeated by the vendor's father's

brother's son claiming a right of pre-emption.”

Since the classification mentioned therein was deemed to have no

justification, the pre-emption right as contained in Section 15 of the

Punjab Act was held to be inconsistent with the constitutional scheme,

along with observing that pre-emption based on consanguinity is a relic

of the past. In this case there was no consideration of the right of pre-

emption as contained in Section 22 of HSA.

6.2 In Babu Ram, this Court was confronted with the same question

as has arisen in this appeal, i.e., the application of Section 22 HSA to

agricultural land, and not the provisions of the Punjab Act. Section 22

with which we are concerned already stands extracted in Para 6 above.

The Court noted divergent views of the High Courts and then, after

discussing the earlier judgment in Vaijanath v. Guramma

19

, concluded

as follows:

“24. We may consider the matter with the following three

illustrations:

(a) Three persons, unrelated to each other, had jointly

purchased an agricultural holding, whereafter one of them

wished to dispose of his interest. The normal principle of pre-

emption may apply in the matter and any of the other joint

holders could pre-empt the sale in accordance with rights

conferred in that behalf by appropriate State legislation.

(b) If those three persons were real brothers or sisters and had

jointly purchased an agricultural holding, investing their own

funds, again like the above scenario, the right of pre-emption

will have to be purely in accordance with the relevant

provisions of the State legislation.

(c) But, if, the very same three persons in Illustration (b) had

inherited an agricultural holding and one of them was desirous

of disposing of his or her interest in the holding, the principles

of Section 22 of the Act would step in.

19

(1999) 1 SCC 292

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 10 of 15

The reason is clear. The source of title or interest of any of the

heirs in the third illustration, is purely through the succession

which is recognised in terms of the provisions of the Act. Since

the right or interest itself is conferred by the provisions of the

Act, the manner in which the said right can be exercised has

also been specified in the very same legislation. Therefore, the

content of preferential right cannot be disassociated in the

present case from the principles of succession. They are both

part of the same concept.

25. When Parliament thought of conferring the rights of

succession in respect of various properties including

agricultural holdings, it put a qualification on the right to

transfer to an outsider and gave preferential rights to the other

heirs with a designed object. Under the Shastric Law, the

interest of a coparcener would devolve by principles of

survivorship to which an exception was made by virtue of

Section 6 of the Act. If the conditions stipulated in Section 6

were satisfied, the devolution of such interest of the deceased

would not go by survivorship but in accordance with the

provisions of the Act. Since the right itself in certain cases was

created for the first time by the provisions of the Act, it was

thought fit to put a qualification so that the properties

belonging to the family would be held within the family, to the

extent possible and no outsider would easily be planted in the

family properties. In our view, it is with this objective that a

preferential right was conferred upon the remaining heirs, in

case any of the heirs was desirous of transferring his interest

in the property that he received by way of succession under the

Act.

26. We, therefore, conclude that the preferential right given to

an heir of a Hindu under Section 22 of the Act is applicable

even if the property in question is an agricultural land. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

OUR VIEW

7. Having considered the two judgments, we proceed to examine the

contention of the parties regarding their applicability. It appears to us quite plainly

that using Atam Prakash supra to say that the concept of pre-emption itself is

unconstitutional would be a stretch of the observations made therein. The primary

reason for holding Section 15 of the Punjab Act unconstitutional was that the list

of persons mentioned therein did not conform to the theory of agnatic succession,

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 11 of 15

and there was no justification for their inclusion. Reliance on the observations

made further ahead, are reproduced as under:

“The right of pre-emption based on consanguinity is a relic of the

feudal past. It is totally inconsistent with the constitutional scheme. It

is inconsistent with modern ideas. The reasons which justified its

recognition quarter of a century ago, namely, the preservation of the

integrity of rural society, the unity of family life and the agnatic theory

of succession are today irrelevant.”

To impute a finding that the concept of pre-emption itself has been held to be

unconstitutional would be nothing but a wholly incorrect reading of the passage.

It is quite clear that those observations are informed by the idea of consanguinity

being the problem and not pre-emption. That apart, to use observations made in

the specific context of a challenge to an Act, to also, in effect, strike down another

provision of an otherwise unconnected legislation which was never in the zone of

consideration in the judgment, would be too wide an application of the

observations made therein. To put it differently, if the constitutional validity of

Section 22 HSA was never put to challenge where does the occasion arise for any

Court whatsoever, to say that the same cannot be enforced?

8. If duly enacted legislation could be so easily struck down by importing

observations made elsewhere, we would invite a situation of judicially created

anarchy, laying waste to cherished principles and also the well-established limited

grounds on which an otherwise duly enacted legislation can be examined as being

conformant to the Constitution or not.

9. On the aspects of the submission that the two provisions i.e., Section 15 of

the Punjab Act and Section 22 of HAS being pari materia, reference can be made

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 12 of 15

to Ahmedabad (P) Primary Teachers' Assn. v. Administrative Officer,

20

wherein

the principle was noticed in the following terms:

“ 12. … See the following observations contained in Principles of

Statutory Interpretation by G.P. Singh (8th Edn.), Syn. 4, at pp. 235 to

239:

“Statutes in pari materia

It has already been seen that a statute must be read as a

whole as words are to be understood in their context.

Extension of this rule of context permits reference to other

statutes in pari materia i.e. statutes dealing with the same

subject-matter or forming part of the same system. Viscount

Simonds in a passage already noticed conceived it to be a

right and duty to construe every word of a statute in its

context and he used the word context in its widest sense

including ‘other statutes in pari materia’. As stated by Lord

Mansfield ‘where there are different statutes in pari materia

though made at different times, or even expired, and not

referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed

together, as one system and as explanatory of each other’.

***

The application of this rule of construction has the merit of

avoiding any apparent contradiction between a series of

statutes dealing with the same subject; it allows the use of

an earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase

used in a later statute in the same context; it permits the

raising of a presumption, in the absence of any context

indicating a contrary intention, that the same meaning

attaches to the same words in a later statute as in an earlier

statute if the words are used in similar connection in the two

statutes; and it enables the use of a later statute as

parliamentary exposition of the meaning of ambiguous

expressions in an earlier statute.”

”

While it may be true that both the Sections do deal with the right of pre-emption,

they are not pari-materia. Under the Punjab Act the right of pre-emption was

granted to those in consanguinity whereas Section 22 HSA limits its application

to only Class-I heirs. The scope is different. Even if arguendo we say that they

were pari-materia, observations made in one context can be lifted, lock stock

and barrel, to decide the fate of a provision which was not even in contemplation,

would undoubtedly be stepping well beyond the contours of the principle which

20

(2004)1 SCC 755

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 13 of 15

provides for the ability to use the earlier one, to shed light on the latter. Needless

to say, shedding light does not permit deciding the validity of provisions

themselves.

10. Moving to the next argument of the original defendants, which, in effect,

is that Babu Ram postulates bad law. We find it difficult to accept this submission.

The provisions of List II of the State List and List III of the Concurrent List are

as follows:

“List II-State List

Entry

14. Agriculture, including agricultural education and research,

protection against pests and prevention of plant diseases.

18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the

relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and

alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural

loans; colonization.

List III- Concurrent List

Entry

5. Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills, intestacy

and succession; joint family and partition; all matters in respect of

which parties in judicial proceedings were immediately before the

commencement of this Constitution subject to their personal law.

6. Transfer of property other than agricultural land; registration of deeds

and documents.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Regarding Entry 14 List II of the State List, the argument that is sought to be

advanced is lost on us for the reason that the wording of the Entry is fairly clear.

It pertains to agriculture as a profession and education and research therein. What

application it has in the context of Section 22 HSA is anyone’s guess. Entry 6 List

III of the Concurrent List, in our view, meets a similar fate as Entry 14 List II.

11. For Entry 18, List II we may observe that while it does deal with ‘transfer

and alienation of agricultural land’ and the alienation of the property by

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 14 of 15

defendant nos.1 to 7 is indeed an alienation to the third party, we find Babu Ram

to have answered this scenario in Para 20 and 24. The illustration provided for in

Para 24 particularly illustration (c) makes it clear that when the parties are siblings

and have inherited the property, Section 22 HSA would apply by virtue of Entry

5 List III which provides that both the State and Centre shall have the legislative

competence to make law regarding, among other issues mentioned therein,

‘intestacy and succession’. To be abundantly clear, it is also observed that nobody

has put forth the case that any other law apart from HSA governs the disputed

property.

12. In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the appellant’s submission that the

entries discussed above escaped the attention of the co-ordinate bench is

misplaced and has to be rejected. No occasion arises for Babu Ram supra to be

considered by a larger Bench.

13. Another submission may be dealt with here. The appellant contends that

the sale deed was never challenged. It is a matter of record that the petition under

Section 22 HSA was filed prior to the execution of the sale deed, particularly on

8

th

December 2011. In this manner, it conforms to the principle that the right of

pre-emption applies to what is about to happen, not what has already happened.

Once the matter was already pending in the file of the concerned Court, the

plaintiff had taken the steps required by law. There is no reason for him to

subsequently challenge the sale deed since the same was executed in the face of

his assertion of the right available to him.

14. Consequent to the above discussion, the appeal is dismissed. The findings

of the First Appellate Court and the High Court are affirmed. No costs.

Civil Appeal No…/2026 @ SLP(C)No.29289 of 2025 Page 15 of 15

Pending applications, if any, shall stand closed.

………………… ……………………… .…J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

……………………………… …………… ..J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

July 14, 2026

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO……………….OF 2026

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.29289 of 2025)

MAHINDER & OTHERS …APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

PURAN SINGH …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

1. I have gone through the erudite judgment rendered by

esteemed Brother, Sanjay Karol, J., with which I am in full

agreement. However, I would like to supplement the same in

respect of the issue of the validity of Section 22 of the Hindu

Succession Act, 1956 (for short “HSA”) and the competence of the

Parliament to enact the same.

2. As regards the submission of the Appellants that Parliament

lacked legislative competence to enact Section 22 of the HSA

insofar as it relates to agricultural land, by reason of Entry 6 of

List III and Entries 14 and 18 of List II, in our considered view, this

submission proceeds on a fundamental mischaracterisation of the

nature of Section 22 of HSA and must be rejected.

2

3. The right of pre-emption as conferred under Section 22 of the

HSA is, in its pith and substance, an incident of succession and

nothing more. It does not exist in isolation but is intrinsically

associated with succession amongst Hindus. It does not apply

between co-owners who have jointly purchased property, or

between persons who share no succession relationship. It arises

exclusively amongst the parties who are co-heirs, who have

inherited property under the Act. It does not operate between

strangers. The moment the succession relationship, as recognised

and created by the HSA, is removed from the transaction, the right

under Section 22 simply ceases to exist. Though the exercise of the

aforesaid right of pre-emption will involve transfer in the land, it is

intrinsically and inseparably linked to succession. The right is,

therefore, not independent of succession. Parliament, in enacting

the HSA, conferred succession rights upon Class I heirs among

others, in respect of all properties of the intestate, including

agricultural land, and simultaneously placed a qualification upon

those rights, that any heir wishing to transfer his inherited interest

must first offer it to his co-heirs. The preferential right and the

succession right are two limbs of the same legislative design

dealing with succession amongst the Hindus under the Act. They

cannot be read apart and must be read together. This cannot be

termed as transfer simpliciter, but essentially arising out of

succession, that too confined to Class I heirs only.

4. This is precisely what distinguishes Section 22 of the HSA

from Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. Section 15

of the Punjab Act conferred the right of pre-emption upon a wide

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circle of persons connected not only by consanguinity, which

includes brothers, cousins, father's brothers and their sons, but

also individuals who are not part of the family, such as, tenants

and co-owners, irrespective of whether they had any succession

relationship with the vendor. It was, in that sense, a free-standing

pre-emption right rooted not only in blood relationship, but also to

others, having no necessary connection with succession or

inheritance. Section 22 of the HSA, by contrast, is confined strictly

and exclusively to succession in respect of Class I heirs under the

Schedule to the HSA, i.e., persons who have inherited together

from the same intestate. No tenant, no distant blood relation, no

co-owner can invoke Section 22 as in the case of the Punjab Act.

It is a right that lives and dies with the succession relationship.

The two provisions are, therefore, fundamentally different in

character and scope, and thus, what was held in respect of Section

15 of the Punjab Act in Atam Prakash can have no bearing on

interpreting Section 22 of the HSA.

5. Turning then to the constitutional entries, viz., Entry 5 of List

III, the Concurrent List, covers “marriage and divorce; infants and

minors; adoption; wills, intestacy and succession; joint family and

partition….” Critically, there is no exclusion of agricultural land

from Entry 5. This is not an oversight. Under the Government of

India Act, 1935, the corresponding entry, i.e., Item 7 of the

Concurrent List, expressly read “wills, intestacy and succession,

save as regards agricultural land.” Thus, agricultural land was

excluded. When the Constitution was framed, that exclusionary

clause was deliberately omitted. Entry 5 of List III, as it stands

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today, is unqualified and unrestricted; it covers succession to all

property and does not exclude agricultural land. Parliament’s

competence under Entry 5 of List III to legislate on intestacy and

succession, insofar as it relates to agricultural land, is therefore

complete and beyond doubt, as this Court recognised in Vaijanath

v. Guramma, (1999) 1 SCC 292.

6. Entry 6 of List III, on the other hand, covers "transfer of

property other than agricultural land." As already discussed above,

Section 22 of the HSA is not, in its true and dominant character,

a provision regulating the transfer of property, including

agricultural land. It does not prescribe the formalities of transfer.

It does not regulate the mode or conditions of a transfer

transaction. What it does is to place a succession-based

qualification upon a co-heir's right to exit — a qualification that is

an integral part of the succession scheme created by the HSA itself.

The fact that Section 22 is triggered by a proposed transfer does

not convert it into a transfer provision of property. The trigger for

the exercise of a right is not the same as the nature and source of

that right. Applying the well-settled doctrine of pith and substance,

the true character of Section 22 of the HSA is that of a succession

provision falling squarely within Entry 5 of List III, and any

incidental connection it may have with the transfer of agricultural

land does not displace its dominant character or affect the

Parliament's competence to enact it.

7. Furthermore, Entry 5 of List III being part of the Concurrent

List, both the Parliament and State Legislature have competence

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to legislate upon intestacy and succession. In the present case, no

State legislation governing the subject of succession to the

disputed property has been brought to our notice. Indeed, it has

not been the case of any party that any law other than the HSA

governs the succession to the disputed property. In the absence of

any State legislation on the subject of intestacy and succession

and consequently, in the absence of any conflict between a State

law and the Central Act, the question of repugnancy under Article

254 of the Constitution does not arise at all for consideration. The

HSA, as the only legislation operating in this field, will govern the

matters relating to succession amongst the Hindus covered under

the HSA. The submission that Parliament lacked competence to

enact Section 22 of the HSA in respect of agricultural land is,

therefore, not only incorrect in principle but also unsupported by

any factual foundation in the present case. The question of non-

competence of the Parliament, thus, does not arise.

In view of the above, the challenge to the validity of Section

22 of the Hindu Succession Act must fail.

……..……………..………………….………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

JULY 14, 2026