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AFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA No. 617 of 2018

Reserved On 24/11/2025

Delivered On 09/01/2026

1 - Mamta Yadav W/o Late Rakesh Kumar Yadav Aged About 52 Years

R/o Vivekanand Nagar, Street No. 4, Dak Bunglow Ward, Dhamtari,

Tahsil And District- Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari,

Chhattisgarh

... Petitioner(s)

versus

1 - Mohammad Akmal Rizvi S/o Hazi Mohammad Alanoor Aged About

45 Years R/o Indira Ward, Near Main Post Office, Jagdalpur, District-

Bastar, Chhattisgarh.....(Plaintiff), District : Bastar(Jagdalpur),

Chhattisgarh

2 - Siddarth Yadav S/o Late Rakesh Kumar Yadav Aged About 23 Years

R/o Vivekanand Nagar, Dak Bunglow Ward, Dhamtari, Tahsil And

District- Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh..........(Defendent No. 3), District :

Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh

... Respondent(s)

For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Manoj Paranjpe Senior Advocate assisted

by Mr. Vinay Shrivastava and Mr. Sandeep

Patel, Advocates

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Kshitij Sharma, Advocate

(Division Bench)

Hon’ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

Hon’ble Shri Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad

C A V Order

Per, Amitendra Kishore Prasad, J.

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1.The appellants are gravely aggrieved by the Judgment and

Decree dated 28.09.2018 passed by the learned Additional

District Judge, Dhamtari (Chhattisgarh) in Civil Suit No. 08-

A/2014, titled Mohammad Akmal Rizvi versus Mamta Yadav and

Others, whereby the learned Trial Court has decreed the suit

against the appellants. The impugned Judgment and Decree are

contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case, based on

erroneous appreciation of pleadings and evidence on record, and

suffer from serious errors of law as well as jurisdiction. The

findings recorded by the learned Court below are perverse,

unsustainable, and have resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.

Being dissatisfied and prejudiced by the aforesaid Judgment and

Decree, the appellant is constrained to prefer the present appeal

on the grounds set forth hereinbelow, seeking interference by this

Hon’ble Court in the interest of justice.

2.Facts of the case :- The Respondent No.1/Plaintiff instituted a

civil suit for specific performance of an alleged agreement to sell

dated 26.07.2010 against the Appellants/Defendants No.1 and 2

and Respondent No.3/Defendant No.3 before the Court of the

learned Additional District Judge, Dhamtari, asserting that the suit

property bearing Khasra No. 7/145, admeasuring 0.045 hectare

(4914 sq. ft.), along with a double-storied house constructed over

1350 sq. ft., situated at Vivekanand Nagar, Ward No.4,

Dhamtari, originally belonged to late Rakesh Kumar Yadav,

whose legal heirs are the present defendants; it was pleaded that

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an agreement to sell was executed by the said Rakesh Kumar

Yadav on 26.07.2010, pursuant to which a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-

was allegedly paid as advance, possession of 3564 sq. ft. of

open land was stated to have been delivered to the plaintiff, and

the defendants had purportedly consented by signing on the

reverse of the agreement deed along with annexing their

photographs, followed by a further alleged payment of

Rs.5,00,000/- on 21.08.2010 through cheque, which was

acknowledged by Defendant No.3, thereby asserting receipt of a

total consideration of Rs.15,00,000/-; it was further pleaded that

the plaintiff had obtained a bank loan of Rs.37,00,000/- for

registration of the sale deed, but despite readiness and

willingness, the defendants failed to execute the same, leading

also to initiation of criminal proceedings and issuance of legal

notice, and eventually filing of the suit on 20.03.2014, after the

death of Rakesh Kumar Yadav on 20.04.2013; the defendants,

however, filed a detailed written statement denying all plaint

averments, contending inter alia that the suit property was worth

more than Rs.1 crore, that late Rakesh Kumar Yadav had been

suffering from serious mental illness since 2007 and was not of

sound disposing mind, that he never intended to sell the property,

and that the alleged agreement and endorsements were forged

and fabricated, obtained by the plaintiff and his associate under

coercion, threat, and undue influence, including threats of suicide,

without any free consent or payment of consideration, and that no

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possession was ever delivered; the defendants further pleaded

cancellation of earlier agreements due to his mental condition with

refund of amounts, rebuttal of public notices issued by the plaintiff,

misuse of signatures of Defendant No.3 obtained on blank papers,

an offer dated 23.05.2011 to refund the alleged amount without

admission of liability, non-filing of the suit during the lifetime of

Rakesh Kumar Yadav to avoid scrutiny, bar of limitation, dismissal

of a pre-litigation case before the Lok Adalat for non-prosecution,

improper valuation and deficit court fee, and prayed for dismissal

of the suit; however, the learned Trial Court, after framing issues,

recording evidence and hearing the parties, decreed the suit for

specific performance of the agreement dated 26.07.2010 in favour

of the plaintiff, giving rise to the present first appeal, with a copy of

the impugned judgment and decree annexed herewith as

Annexure A-1.

3.Learned counsel for the appellants respectfully submits that the

impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court

are vitiated by serious errors of law and fact and are liable to be

set aside, inasmuch as the Court below has erroneously relied

upon the alleged agreement dated 26.07.2010, purportedly

executed by late Rakesh Kumar Yadav, which on its face records

delivery of possession of 3564 sq. ft. of the suit land and therefore

partakes the character of a “conveyance” within the meaning of

Section 2(10) of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, requiring proper

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stamping under Article 23 of Schedule I-A and compulsory

registration under Section 17-A of the Registration Act, 1908, and

being unstamped and unregistered, is inadmissible in evidence

under Sections 35 of the Stamp Act and 49 of the Registration Act,

rendering the decree founded thereon wholly unsustainable;

further, though a specific objection as to admissibility of the said

document was raised at the stage of evidence and kept open, the

learned Trial Court failed to decide the same and nonetheless

decreed the suit, which amounts to a material illegality; the Court

below has also gravely erred in holding the execution of the

agreement and payment of Rs.15 lakhs as proved, ignoring the

consistent defence that late Rakesh Kumar Yadav was suffering

from serious mental illness, including senile dementia, and was

not of sound disposing mind, a fact duly established by the

testimony of treating doctors examined as defence witnesses and

the medical documents exhibited, which clearly demonstrate that

he was incapable of understanding the nature and consequences

of his acts and therefore incompetent to enter into any valid

contract, rendering the alleged agreement void and unenforceable

in the eye of law; the learned Trial Court further failed to scrutinize

the genuineness of the alleged agreement, which is replete with

suspicious circumstances, including absence of dates of alleged

cash payment of Rs.10 lakhs, absence of signatures of all

defendants acknowledging receipt of Rs.15 lakhs, defective

notarization without proper endorsement, seal or verification of the

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notarial register, and material contradictions in the plaintiff’s own

testimony admitting absence of documentary proof of payment,

thereby clearly indicating that the document is forged and

fabricated; it is also submitted that the plaintiff’s conduct

demonstrates lack of readiness and willingness to perform his part

of the contract, as he approached the Court at the fag end of

limitation, despite earlier denials and rebuttals by the defendants,

and failed to prove payment of huge cash amounts allegedly

advanced in violation of statutory prohibitions under income tax

law, without receipts, bank entries or corresponding financial

disclosures, making the entire story of consideration wholly

improbable; the learned Trial Court further erred in overlooking the

settled principles under Sections 10 to 19 and 19-A of the Indian

Contract Act, 1872, governing free consent and capacity to

contract, and in exercising the discretionary relief of specific

performance arbitrarily, without due regard to equity, hardship to

the appellants, inadequacy of consideration vis-à-vis the real

value of the property exceeding one crore rupees, and the

plaintiff’s failure to establish readiness and willingness by cogent

evidence; additionally, the dismissal of the appellants’ application

under Order XIV Rule 5 CPC for framing additional issues, non-

consideration of vital documentary and oral evidence, and

erroneous assumptions regarding alleged bank loan, which was

never credited to the appellants’ account, cumulatively render the

impugned judgment perverse and unsustainable; hence, the

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appellants respectfully submit that the decree for specific

performance is illegal, unjust and contrary to law, and pray that

the same be set aside with dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit,

reserving liberty to urge additional grounds at the time of final

hearing, in the interest of justice.

4.Further, learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the

judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of

R. Nagaraj (Dead) through Lrs. And Another Vs. Rajmani &

Others reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 762 as well as relied

upon the judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court

in the matter of Ramshankar Rao & Anr. Vs. Nandlal Occhwani

passed in FA No.88 of 2022 decided on 08.08.2025.

5.Learned counsel for the respondents respectfully submits that the

present appeal is wholly misconceived and liable to be dismissed,

as it seeks to assail a well-reasoned and legally sustainable

judgment and decree dated 28.09.2018 passed by the learned

Trial Court, whereby the suit for specific performance instituted by

the respondent–plaintiff was rightly decreed after due appreciation

of pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and settled

principles of law under the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the execution

of the agreement to sell dated 26.07.2010 by late Rakesh Kumar

Yadav stands duly proved, the defendants being consenting

parties thereto, and the agreement bearing their signatures,

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photographs and notarization, leaving no manner of doubt as to its

genuineness, while the plea of alleged mental illness of the

executant is a bald, afterthought defence unsupported by

convincing evidence and was rightly rejected by the Trial Court;

the respondent–plaintiff has conclusively proved payment of a

substantial part of the sale consideration amounting to

Rs.15,00,000/- and his continuous readiness and willingness to

perform his part of the contract by issuing legal notices,

reminders, tendering the balance consideration through demand

draft, marking his presence before the Sub-Registrar and even

availing a bank loan, thereby fully satisfying the mandate of

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act; the conduct of the

appellants, including their reply proposing refund of the amount

received and their evasive acts during the subsistence of the

agreement, clearly establishes deliberate avoidance of

performance and disentitles them from any equitable

consideration; the suit was filed well within limitation, and mere

passage of time cannot defeat a lawful claim for specific

performance; objections regarding stamping, registration, framing

of issues or alleged inadequacy of consideration are hyper-

technical, cause no prejudice, and have been rightly negatived by

the Trial Court, which exercised its discretion judiciously under

Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act based on sound reasons and

binding precedents; therefore, the impugned judgment and decree

are legal, equitable and based on cogent evidence, call for no

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interference by this Hon’ble Court, and the appeal deserves to be

dismissed with affirmation of the decree for specific performance

in the interest of justice.

6.To fortify his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent

placed reliance upon a catena of judicial pronouncements,

namely, Lalan Singh v. Balram Kerketta & Others, reported in AIR

Online 2022 Chh 560; Gulab Devi Singh & Another v. Ritesh

Singh & Another, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine Chh 2170; M.

Mohammed Ismail & Others v. K. P. Subbiah & Others, decided in

Second Appeal No. 628 of 2008 on 23.02.2015; and the

authoritative judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kamal

Kumar v. Premlata Joshi & Others, reported in (2019) 3 SCC 704;

further reliance was placed on A. Kanthamani v. Naseer Ahmed,

reported in (2017) 4 SCC 654, P. Daivasigamani v. S.

Sambandan, decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil

Appeal No. 9006 of 2011 on 12.10.2022, and lastly, Gaddipati

Divija & Another v. Pathuri Samrajyam & Others, reported in 2023

SCC OnLine SC 442 , to substantiate the legal propositions

canvassed on behalf of the respondent.

7.We have listened to the learned counsel representing the parties

and scrutinized the documents placed on record with careful

attention.

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8.From the pleadings of the parties, it appears that on the basis of

an unregistered Agreement to Sell dated 11.08.2010 (Exhibit P-2),

late Rakesh Yadav, who expired prior to the institution of the civil

suit, had entered into an agreement for the sale of land and a

house bearing Khasra No. 145, admeasuring 0.045 hectare

(approximately 4,914 square feet), along with a double-storied

house situated at Vivekananda Nagar, Ward No. 4, Dhamtari. The

said Agreement to Sell also bears the signatures of the legal

representatives of late Rakesh Yadav, namely his widow,

daughter, and son (the defendants), thereby indicating their

consent to the said transaction.

9.From a perusal of Exhibit P-2, it is apparent that possession of a

portion of the open land had already been handed over to the

plaintiff, whereas the residential house was to be vacated upon

execution of the sale deed. From a bare perusal of the plaint, it is

evident that the plaintiff has specifically pleaded his readiness and

willingness to purchase the suit property. It has been categorically

stated that a sum of ₹10,00,000/- was paid in cash and

₹5,00,000/- was paid by cheque to late Rakesh Yadav, and the

said payments were duly endorsed on the reverse side of the

Agreement to Sell. The plaintiff has further averred that, in order to

complete the purchase within the stipulated period, he had

arranged the requisite funds by availing loans. However, before

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the sale deed could be executed, late Rakesh Yadav expired, as a

result of which the sale deed could not be executed.

10.The legal heirs of late Rakesh Yadav, i.e., the defendants, did

not execute the sale deed despite the efforts made by the plaintiff,

compelling him to institute the suit for specific performance of

contract. From the perusal of the evidence of PW-1, it transpires

that on the basis of the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), the

defendants, including late Rakesh Yadav, had agreed to sell the

suit land and house for a total consideration of ₹15,00,000/-, out

of which ₹10,00,000/- and ₹5,00,000/- had already been paid.

Paragraph 6 of the Agreement to Sell clearly shows that

possession of a portion of the suit property had already been

handed over to the plaintiff. Since possession was delivered, the

document fell within the ambit of a conveyance requiring proper

stamping and registration. During the course of evidence, the Trial

Court observed that the document appeared to be hit by Sections

33, 35, and 38 of the Indian Stamp Act and recorded that the

issue would be decided at the time of final judgment. The

document was, however, permitted to be exhibited subject to such

decision.

11.Surprisingly, the said issue was not decided by the Trial Court at

the time of final judgment and has remained undecided. Moreover,

while framing the issues, the Trial Court failed to frame any issue

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regarding the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff to perform

his part of the contract, which is an essential and integral

requirement for deciding a suit for specific performance under

Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.

12.In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be

appropriate to advert to Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act,

1963, along with Explanation (ii) thereto, which bars the grant of

specific performance of a contract in favour of the plaintiff. Section

16(c), read with Explanation (ii), as it stood prior to its amendment

with effect from 01.10.2018, reads as under:—

“16. Personal bars to relief. - Specific performance of a

contract cannot be enforced in favour of person -

(a) and (b)

(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has

always been ready and willing to perform the essential

terms of the contract which are to be performed by him,

other than terms the performance of which has been

prevented or waived by the defendant.

Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (c), -

(i) XXX XXX XXX

(ii) the plaintiff must aver performance of, or readiness and

willingness to perform, the contract according to its true

construction."

Explanation (ii) suffered with amendment w.e.f.

01.10.2018. After amendment, states as under:-

Specific "16. Personal bars to relief. performance of a

contract cannot be enforced in favour of person -

(a) and (b)

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(c) who fails to aver and prove that he has performed or has

always been ready and willing to perform the essential

terms of the contract which are to be performed by him,

other than terms the performance of which has been

prevented or waived by the defendant.

Explanation. - For the purpose of clause (c), -

(i) XXX XXX XXX

(ii) the plaintiff must prove performance of, or readiness and

willingness to perform, the contract according to its true

construction."

13.The amended Section 16(c) along with Explanation (ii) of the

Specific Relief Act, 1963 came up for consideration before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Haridasan v. Anappath Parakkattu

Vasudeva Kurup and Others reported in AIR 2023 SC (Civil);

AIR Online 2023 SC 64, wherein it was held that the deletion of

the words “who fails to aver” in Section 16 of the Act does not

bring about any substantive change in the legal position as it

stood prior to the amendment.

14.PW-1 has made several assertions regarding his readiness and

willingness; however, in the absence of a specific issue, no

focused evidence was led on this vital aspect. From the

examination-in-chief and cross-examination of PW-1, it appears

that the defendants took the plea that late Rakesh Yadav was not

in a fit mental condition at the time of execution of the Agreement

to Sell and that the agreement was obtained fraudulently. PW-1

further stated that the allegations regarding non-service of notice

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were incorrect and that the notices sent to the defendants were

duly served.

15.PW-2, who is an attesting witness to the Agreement to Sell

(Exhibit P-2), stated that he had not received any summons from

the Court and further stated that in his presence no amount was

paid by the plaintiff to the defendants. He also expressed

ignorance regarding the payment of ₹10,00,000/-. Another

attesting witness stated that he was not aware of the exact terms

of the agreement between the parties. PW-4, a witness for the

plaintiff and a land broker, stated that he came to know about the

agreement through late Rakesh Yadav, who informed him that he

had entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for the sale of the

suit land. PW-5 stated that he knew late Rakesh Yadav and

defendant No. 1 Mamta Yadav; however, in cross-examination, he

denied having such knowledge. PW-6 to PW-14 were found to be

not material witnesses.

16.The defendants are the legal heirs of late Rakesh Yadav.

Defendant No. 1, Smt. Mamta Yadav, widow of late Rakesh

Yadav, was examined and categorically stated that her husband

was not in a fit mental condition and was under medical treatment.

She further stated that for about five years prior to his death, he

was undergoing treatment, including in April 2013. She admitted

that earlier agreements to sell were executed by her husband with

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other persons, though they did not materialise. However, she

denied the valid execution of the present Agreement to Sell.

17.The defendants examined Dr. Arunanshu as PW-1 and Dr.

Pramod Gupta as PW-3 to establish that late Rakesh Yadav was

suffering from dementia and was not in a sound mental condition.

According to these witnesses, a person suffering from dementia

lacks proper memory, concentration, and control over his faculties.

18.In order to decide the controversy involved in the present case,

the foremost issue is the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff

to perform his part of the contract. Surprisingly, no issue on this

vital aspect was framed by the Trial Court. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court, in a catena of judgments, has consistently held that the

plaintiff is required to plead and prove his continuous readiness

and willingness to perform his part of the contract, and for that

purpose, a specific issue must be framed. In the absence of such

an issue, the essential requirement under Section 16(c) of the

Specific Relief Act cannot be properly adjudicated.

19.The next question for consideration relates to the admissibility of

the Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2). The document clearly shows

that possession of a part of the suit property, admeasuring 356

square feet, had already been delivered to the plaintiff. The Trial

Court, while exhibiting the document, observed that since it was

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unregistered and appeared to be a conveyance requiring

registration and proper stamping, the issue of admissibility would

be decided at the time of final judgment. However, this issue was

neither decided nor adjudicated upon at the time of final judgment

and was left completely open.

20.In the considered opinion of this Court, the failure of the Trial

Court to decide the admissibility of the unregistered Agreement to

Sell (Exhibit P-2), by which possession of a part of the property

was delivered, amounts to a serious illegality. This issue goes to

the root of the matter, as an unregistered document involving

delivery of possession cannot be admitted in evidence for the

purpose of proving the contract unless duly registered and

stamped. By not deciding this crucial issue, the judgment suffers

from material illegality.

21.Since two vital issues:- first, regarding readiness and willingness

of the plaintiff, and second, regarding the admissibility of the

Agreement to Sell (Exhibit P-2), were neither properly framed nor

decided, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court are

not in accordance with law. The Trial Court ought to have framed

specific issues to enable the parties to lead appropriate evidence.

Without such adjudication, a decree for specific performance

cannot be legally sustained.

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22.The Hon’ble Supreme Court, has categorically held that it is the

bounden duty of the plaintiff to prove his continuous readiness

and willingness to perform his part of the contract till the final

disposal of the suit by adducing cogent evidence in this regard

reliance be placed upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the matter of P. Ravindranath & Anr. Vs. Sasikala &

Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1749 , as well as on the

subsequent decision in the matter of Sangita Sinha Vs.

Bhawana Bhardwaj & ors reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC

723. The relevant paragraphs thereof are reproduced

hereinbelow:

•P. Ravindranath (supra)

“22. Having considered the submissions, our analysis is as

follows:

(i) Relief of specific performance of contract is a

discretionary relief. As such, the Courts while exercising

power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be

extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and

the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs

have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have

made out case for grant of relief of specific performance of

contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and

balances which must be fulfilled and established by the

plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief.

The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be

very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific

performance based on bald and vague pleadings must

necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act

requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and

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proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of

contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and

held to be mandatory. A few of authorities on the point are

referred hereunder:

a) In the case of Man Kaur v. Hartar Singh Sangha, this

Court held in paragraph 40 which is reproduced hereunder:

“40………A person who fails to aver and prove that he has

performed or has always been ready and willing to perform

the essential terms of the contract which are to be

performed by him (other than the terms the performance of

which has been prevented or waived by the defendant) is

barred from claiming specific performance. Therefore, even

assuming that the defendant had committed breach, if the

plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or prove that he was always

ready and willing to perform the essential terms of contract

which are required to be performed by him (other than the

terms the performance of which has been prevented or

waived by the plaintiff), there is a bar to specific

performance in his favour. Therefore, the assumption of the

respondent that readiness and willingness on the part of the

plaintiff is something which need not be proved, if the

plaintiff is able to establish that the defendant refused to

execute the sale deed and thereby committed breach, is not

correct………….”

b) In the case of U.N. Krishnamurthy (Since Deceased) Thr.

Lrs. v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, following was held in paragraph

46:

“46. It is settled law that for relief of specific performance,

the Plaintiff has to prove that all along and till the final

decision of the suit, he was ready and willing to perform the

part of the contract. It is the bounden duty of the Plaintiff to

prove his readiness and willingness by adducing evidence.

This crucial facet has to be determined by considering all

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circumstances including availability of funds and mere

statement or averment in plaint of readiness and

willingness, would not suffice.”

c) In the case of His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh

Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, it was held under paragraph 2:

“2. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the

contract and willingness to perform the contract. By

readiness may be meant the capacity of the plaintiff to

perform the contract which includes his financial position to

pay the purchase price. For determining his willingness to

perform his part of the contract, the conduct has to be

properly scrutinised. There is no documentary proof that the

plaintiff had ever funds to pay the balance of consideration.

Assuming that he had the funds, he has to prove his

willingness to perform his part of the contract. According to

the terms of the agreement, the plaintiff was to supply the

draft sale deed to the defendant within 7 days of the

execution of the agreement, i.e., by 27-2-1975. The draft

sale deed was not returned after being duly approved by the

petitioner. The factum of readiness and willingness to

perform plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with

reference to the conduct of the party and the attending

circumstances. The court may infer from the facts and

circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready and was

always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.

The facts of this case would amply demonstrate that the

petitioner/plaintiff was not ready nor had the capacity to

perform his part of the contract as he had no financial

capacity to pay the consideration in cash as contracted and

intended to bide for the time which disentitles him as time is

of the essence of the contract.”

(ii) In the present case, we find from a perusal of the plaint

that, at the first instance, the plaintiffs failed to plead

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specifically with details about the restriction said to have

been imposed by the State on registration of sale deeds

relating to similar survey numbers and revenue sites. No

details of the Government Order are mentioned. Neither the

Government Order is placed on record as evidence to

connect that such restriction was actually applicable to the

land in question.

(iii) Defendant nos. 1 to 5 executed sale deeds in April and

June, 1983 in favour of the appellant as also other

purchasers. It is recorded by the Trial Court as also the High

Court, that these sale deeds were executed by the

defendants 1 to 5 after depositing some betterment

charges, getting the land converted and then effecting the

transfer. The plaintiffs do not seem to have ever approached

the defendants to get this kind of a status change and,

thereafter, get the sale deeds executed. It has not come

either in pleadings or in evidence of the plaintiffs that the

alleged ban imposed by the State Government had been

lifted but still the sale deeds were executed in favour of the

appellants and other purchasers in 1983.

(iv) If the plaintiffs were actually keen, ready and willing to

get the land transferred or get the agreement to sell

enforced, they should have made an effort in that regard.

Neither any specific date has been mentioned in the

pleadings or in the evidence, on which date the plaintiffs

tendered the balance amount with a request to the

defendants 1 to 5 to get the land status changed and

execute the sale deed, or otherwise also, request the

defendants 1 to 5 to execute the sale deed with the same

status of the land in suit.

(v) Even before filing a suit, there is no evidence

forthcoming on behalf of the plaintiffs to show that they

tendered the balance consideration or a draft sale deed to

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the defendants 1 to 5 and requested for execution and

registration of the sale deed.

(vi) The Courts below have proceeded to hold that there

was readiness and willingness primarily relying upon the

restriction imposed by the State. According to them, as the

restriction had not been lifted, there was no obligation on

the part of the plaintiffs to have expressed any readiness or

willingness. However, the Courts below failed to take into

consideration that there was no evidence regarding the said

ban. Further the Courts below also failed to take into

consideration that a keen and a willing buyer would have

found out a way for execution of the sale deed just as

defendants 6 & 7 and C. Nagaraju.

(vii) The Courts below also fell into error in recording a

finding that the defendants 1 to 5 had committed breach of

contract and had dishonestly proceeded to get the status of

the land changed and, thereafter, execute the sale deed in

favour of the appellant and other purchasers.

(viii) It is clear from the record that the defendant no. 1 had

given a written notice in September, 1981, then legal notice

in November, 1981 and also another communication in

December, 1981 requesting for payment of balance sale

consideration and, thereafter communicating that advance

amount had been forfeited and the agreement to sell had

come to an end as the plaintiffs failed to get the sale deed

executed within three months. After December, 1981, the

plaintiffs kept silent. They neither responded to the last

communication of the defendant no. 1 of December, 1981,

nor did they take any steps to file the suit for specific

performance of contract for more than one and a half years

after the defendant no. 1 had communicated forfeiture of the

earnest money and the cancellation of the agreement to

sell. There is no communication from the plaintiffs after

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December, 1981 till July, 1983 when they filed the suit.

There is not even a notice by the plaintiffs before filing the

suit of showing their readiness and willingness by tendering

the amount of balance sale consideration and sending a

draft sale deed for approval and fixing a date for execution

and registration of the sale deed.

(xi) We are thus unable to agree with the findings of the

courts below that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing

to get the sale deed executed and registered. As a matter of

fact, the conduct of the plaintiffs throughout gives credence

and strength to the contention of the defendant nos. 1 to 5

that the plaintiffs never had the funds available with them to

clear the balance sale consideration and that they were

middlemen only interested in blocking the property and,

thereafter, selling it on a higher price to third parties and

make profit thereof. The plaintiffs were never the real

purchasers interested in buying the land in suit for

themselves.

(x) Under such facts and circumstances as discussed

above, we are of the confirmed view that the decree of

specific performance was not warranted in the present case

and ought to have been denied and the suit was liable to be

dismissed.

(xi) In view of the finding on the issue of readiness and

willingness being decided against the plaintiffs in the facts of

the present case, we are not inclined to enter into other

arguments raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the

parties.

(xii). However, in order to adjust equities between the

parties, as the plaintiffs made a payment of Rs. 12,000/- as

advance money on 24.05.1981 or before, that being an

admitted position, they need to be suitably compensated for

the same. About 43 years have passed since the date of the

23

agreement to sell. According to the appellant as stated in

the written brief, the value of the property is about four

crores. The respondents have not given any such figure of

the approximate value of the property in question.

Considering the facts and circumstances, we direct that the

appellant compensate the plaintiffs by paying an amount of

Rs. 24 lakhs in lieu of the advance and further Rs. 6 lakhs

as cost of litigation. Total amount of Rs. 30 lakhs to be paid

within a period of three months from today and file proof of

such payment before this Court within the next four months.

In the event, such proof is not filed, the Registry will list the

matter before the Court immediately after expiry of the

aforesaid period for further orders.

•Sangita Sinha (supra)

“16. It is settled law that under the Act, 1963, prior to the

2018 Amendment, specific performance was a discretionary

and equitable relief. In Kamal Kumar v. Premlata Joshi,

(2019) 3 SCC 704, which has been followed in P.

Daivasigamani v. S. Sambandan, (2022) 14 SCC 793, this

Court framed material questions which require consideration

prior to grant of relief of specific performance. The relevant

portion of the judgment in Kamal Kumar (supra) is

reproduced hereinbelow:

“7. It is a settled principle of law that the grant of relief of

specific performance is a discretionary and equitable relief.

The material questions, which are required to be gone into

for grant of the relief of specific performance, are:

7.1. First, whether there exists a valid and concluded

contract between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit

property.

7.2. Second, whether the plaintiff has been ready and willing

to perform his part of contract and whether he is still ready

and willing to perform his part as mentioned in the contract.

24

7.3. Third, whether the plaintiff has, in fact, performed his

part of the contract and, if so, how and to what extent and in

what manner he has performed and whether such

performance was in conformity with the terms of the

contract;

7.4. Fourth, whether it will be equitable to grant the relief of

specific performance to the plaintiff against the defendant in

relation to suit property or it will cause any kind of hardship

to the defendant and, if so, how and in what manner and the

extent if such relief is eventually granted to the plaintiff;

7.5. Lastly, whether the plaintiff is entitled for grant of any

other alternative relief, namely, refund of earnest money,

etc. and, if so, on what grounds.

8. In our opinion, the aforementioned questions are part of

the statutory requirements [See Sections 16(c), 20, 21, 22,

23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and Forms 47/48 of

Appendices A to C of the Code of Civil Procedure]. These

requirements have to be properly pleaded by the parties in

their respective pleadings and proved with the aid of

evidence in accordance with law. It is only then the Court is

entitled to exercise its discretion and accordingly grant or

refuse the relief of specific performance depending upon the

case made out by the parties on facts.”

17. It is trite law that ‘readiness’ and ‘willingness’ are not one

but two separate elements. ‘Readiness’ means the capacity

of the Respondent No. 1-buyer to perform the contract,

which would include the financial position to pay the sale

consideration. ‘Willingness’ refers to the intention of the

Respondent No. 1-buyer as a purchaser to perform his part

of the contract, which is inferred by scrutinising the conduct

of the Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser, including

attending circumstances.

25

18. Continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the

Respondent No. 1-buyer/purchaser from the date of

execution of Agreement to Sell till the date of the decree, is

a condition precedent for grant of relief of specific

performance. This Court in various judicial pronouncements

has held that it is not enough to show the readiness and

willingness up to the date of the plaint as the conduct must

be such as to disclose readiness and willingness at all times

from the date of the contract and throughout the pendency

of the suit up to the decree. A few of the said judgments are

reproduced hereinbelow:—

A. In Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, (1967)

1 SCR 227, it has been held as under:—

“6. But the respondent has claimed a decree for specific

performance and it is for him to establish that he was, since

the date of the contract, continuously ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract. If he fails to do so, his claim

for specific performance must fail. As observed by the

Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ardeshir Mama v.

Flora Sassoon, 1928 SCC OnLine PC 43:

“In a suit for specific performance, on the other hand, he

treated and was required by the Court to treat the contract

as still subsisting. He had in that suit to allege, and if the

fact was traversed, he was required to prove a continuous

readiness and willingness, from the date of the contract to

the time of the hearing, to perform the contract on his part.

Failure to make good that averment brought with it the

inevitable dismissal of his suit.”

The respondent must in a suit for specific performance of an

agreement plead and prove that he was ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract continuously between the

date of the contract and the date of hearing of the suit….”

26

B. In Vijay Kumar v. Om Parkash, 2018 SCC OnLine SC

1913, it has been held as under:—

“6. In order to obtain a decree for specific performance, the

plaintiff has to prove his readiness and willingness to

perform his part of the contract and the readiness and

willingness has to be shown throughout and has to be

established by the plaintiff….”

C. In J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao, (2011) 1 SCC 429, it

has been held as under:—

“27. It is settled law that even in the absence of specific plea

by the opposite party, it is the mandate of the statute that

the plaintiff has to comply with Section 16(c) of the Specific

Relief Act and when there is non-compliance with this

statutory mandate, the court is not bound to grant specific

performance and is left with no other alternative but to

dismiss the suit. It is also clear that readiness to perform

must be established throughout the relevant points of time.

“Readiness and willingness” to perform the part of the

contract has to be determined/ascertained from the conduct

of the parties.”

D. In Umabai v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan (Dead) By LRs.,

(2005) 6 SCC 243, it has been held as under:—

“30. It is now well settled that the conduct of the parties, with

a view to arrive at a finding as to whether the plaintiff-

respondents were all along and still are ready and willing to

perform their part of contract as is mandatorily required

under Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act must be

determined having regard to the entire attending

circumstances. A bare averment in the plaint or a statement

made in the examination-in- chief would not suffice. The

conduct of the plaintiff- respondents must be judged having

regard to the entirety of the pleadings as also the evidence

brought on records.”

27

E. In Mehboob-Ur-Rehman (Dead) through Legal

Representatives v. Ahsanul Ghani (supra), it has been held

as under:—

“16. Such a requirement, of necessary averment in the

plaint, that he has already performed or has always been

ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the

contract which are to be performed by him being on the

plaintiff, mere want of objection by the defendant in the

written statement is hardly of any effect or consequence.

The essential question to be addressed to by the Court in

such a matter has always been as to whether, by taking the

pleading and the evidence on record as a whole, the plaintiff

has established that he has performed his part of the

contract or has always been ready and willing to do so…”

F. In C.S. Venkatesh v. A.S.C. Murthy (Dead) by Legal

Representatives (supra), it has been held as under:—

“16. The words “ready and willing” imply that the plaintiff

was prepared to carry out those parts of the contract to their

logical end so far as they depend upon his performance.

The continuous readiness and willingness on the part of the

plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant the relief of

performance. If the plaintiff fails to either aver or prove the

same, he must fail. To adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready

and willing to perform his part of contract, the court must

take into consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior, and

subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending

circumstances. The amount which he has to pay the

defendant must be of necessity to be proved to be available.

Right from the date of the execution of the contract till the

date of decree, he must prove that he is ready and willing to

perform his part of the contract. The court may infer from

the facts and circumstances whether the plaintiff was ready

and was always ready to perform his contract.

28

17. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao [N.P.

Thirugnanam v. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115], it

was held that continuous readiness and willingness on the

part of the plaintiff is a condition precedent to grant of the

relief of specific performance. This circumstance is material

and relevant and is required to be considered by the court

while granting or refusing to grant the relief. If the plaintiff

fails to either aver or prove the same, he must fail. To

adjudge whether the plaintiff is ready and willing to perform

his part of the contract, the court must take into

consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior to and

subsequent to the filing of the suit along with other attending

circumstances. The amount of consideration which he has

to pay to the defendant must necessarily be proved to be

available.

18. In Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani

James [Pushparani S. Sundaram v. Pauline Manomani

James, (2002) 9 SCC 582], this Court has held that

inference of readiness and willingness could be drawn from

the conduct of the plaintiff and the totality of circumstances

in a particular case. It was held thus : (SCC p. 584, para 5)

“5. … So far these being a plea that they were ready and

willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the

pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by

itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready

and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief

Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the

same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances,

how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was

granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of

the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the

plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this

suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the

29

said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has

to be proved.”

23.In view of the above, as the core issues regarding readiness and

willingness and admissibility of the Agreement to Sell have not

been adjudicated, the matter requires reconsideration.

Accordingly, the impugned judgment and decree are set aside,

and the matter is remanded to the Trial Court with a direction to

frame proper issues regarding readiness and willingness and

admissibility of Exhibit P-2 and to decide the suit afresh in

accordance with law after affording due opportunity to both

parties.

24.With these observations and directions, the impugned judgment

and decree are hereby set aside .

Sd/- Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey) (Amitendra Kishore Prasad)

Judge Judge

Saxena

The date when

the judgment is

reserved

The date when the

judgment is pronounced

The date when the judgment is

uploaded on the website.

24/11/2025 09/01/2026

Operative Full

09/01/2026 09/01/2026