2026 INSC 719 Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 1 of 17

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.4516 of 2025)

MANI @ SUBRAMANIYAM …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

STATE REP BY

THE DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order dated

13.08.2024, passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras, in Criminal

Appeal No.800 of 2018, whereby the High Court partly allowed the appeal

preferred by the appellant-convict. However, while partly confirming judgment

passed by the Special Court for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Principal Sessions Court), Erode

1

, in

Special Case No.19 of 2018, the High Court vide the impugned order acquitted

the appellant of offences under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

1

Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 2 of 17

(Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015

2

and modified the sentence

awarded to the appellant in the following manner:

Section Trial Court High Court

294(b) IPC 3 Months of S.I. with fine of

Rs.2,000/-

3 Months of S.I. with fine of

Rs.2,000/-

326 IPC 5 Years of S.I. with fine of

Rs.3,000/-

1 Year with fine of

Rs.3,000/-

506 (II) IPC 5 Years of S.I. with fine of

Rs.1,000/-

6 Months with fine of

Rs.1,000/-

3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 22.08.2017, an altercation

allegedly took place between the appellant and Ramasamy, complainant’s

brother-in-law, over a land dispute. Two days thereafter, on 24.08.2017 at about

10:45 A.M., the appellant alleged to have quarrelled with and abused the

complainant’s nephew (PW-4) over the said land dispute. When the complainant

(PW-1) intervened and confronted the appellant, the latter allegedly used obscene

words and caste-based slurs against him. It is further alleged that the appellant,

thereafter, brought a billhook (M.O.1) from his house and assaulted PW-1 on his

forehead, nose and left thumb, inflicting multiple injuries. PW-1 was immediately

rushed to the Government Hospital, Bhavani, where he was examined by Dr. R.

Dhinakar (PW-2), a Senior Civil Surgeon.

4. On the basis of the aforesaid, Sub-Inspector of Police (PW-6) registered an

FIR No.227/2017 on 24.08.2017 at PS Appakoodal, under Sections 294(b), 324

and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

3

and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and

3(2)(va) of the SCST Act 2015.

2

‘SCST Act 2015’ for short.

3

‘IPC’ for short.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 3 of 17

5. Upon completion of the investigation, Additional Superintendent of Police,

Sivagangai District (PW-7), filed a chargesheet on 24.10.2017. While all the

sections mentioned in the FIR were retained, the charge under Section 324 IPC

was altered to Section 326 IPC, in view of the grievous injuries sustained by PW-

1. The case was thereafter committed to trial wherein four charges were framed

against the appellant, who pleaded not guilty.

6. To bring home the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution examined 7

witnesses and exhibited 14 documents. The defence, however, neither examined

any witnesses nor adduced any documentary evidence.

7. The Trial Court, in Special Case No.19 of 2018, vide judgment and order

dated 16.11.2018, convicted the appellant under Sections 294(b) IPC; 3(l)(r) &

3(1) (s) of the SC/ST Act 2015; 326 IPC r/w 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act 2015; and

506(ii) IPC r/w 3(2)(va) of SC/ST Act 2015. The Court held that the testimonies

of Mahalingam (PW-1), Gunavathi (PW-3) and Ramachandran (PW-4) clearly

establish occurrence of the incident. The said witnesses unanimously deposed that

the appellant had uttered obscene words against PW-1; insulted and humiliated

him, by referring to his caste in a public place; both oral and documentary

evidence proved that the appellant had assaulted PW-1 with a billhook and

inflicted grievous injuries. Consequently, all the charges framed against the

appellant were held to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

8. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred an appeal before the High Court

which, vide the impugned judgment and order dated 13.08.2024, acquitted the

appellant of offences under the SC/ST Act 2015; however, the High Court

confirmed his conviction under Sections 294(b), 326 and 506(ii) of IPC. The

relevant extract of the impugned judgment is as follows:

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 4 of 17

“5.1 Rival submissions are carefully weighed and there is considerable

merit in this. This Court carefully perused the entire evidence on record

and nowhere it finds that the appellant had abused P.W 1 or P W.2 with

reference to their community. Secondly the motive for the offence

which gets established through the evidence of P.W.4, where he had

deposed in his chief-examination that a certain discussion over the land

deal between the appellant and his father had developed into an

altercation. This would imply that the appellant did not entertain

anything against P W 1 based on his community. Therefore, no offence

under the provisions of SC/ST Act will be attracted.

5.2 It is not in dispute that the nasal bone of P.W.I was fractured which

imply the injury was a grievous injury, and this Court does not find

anything to disbelieve the prosecution-s version that the appellant had

assaulted P.W.1.

6. This Court necessarily have to confirm the judgment of the trial Court

convicting the appellant for offence under Sections 294(b), 326 and

506(ii) IPC. Turning to sentence part, this Court finds the trial Court

has imposed a sentence of five years simple imprisonment on the

appellant with a fine of Rs.5,000/-. Given the nature of injury and given

the fact that there was no previous enmity, this Court finds that the

sentence slapped on the appellant by the trial Court is far excessive and

disproportionate to the nature of the offence And this has to be

necessarily reduced.

7. In conclusion, this appeal is partially allowed. This Court confirms

the judgment of the trial Court convicting the appellant only for the

offence under Sec.294(b) and acquits him for all the offences under

Section 3(l)(r) & 3(1) (s) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities)

Amendment Act, 2015. …”

9. Still aggrieved, the appellant-convict, pleading his innocence, is before us.

Pertinently, neither the State nor the complainant have filed any appeal

challenging the acquittal of the appellant under the provisions of the SC/ST Act

2015.

OUR VIEW

10. We have heard learned counsels for the parties, and also Mr. Shailesh

Madiyal, learned senior counsel, appearing as amicus curiae appointed by us and

perused the material placed on record. The issue that arises for our consideration

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 5 of 17

is whether the conviction of the appellant under Sections 294(b), 326 and 506(ii)

of IPC can be sustained in law.

11. We would first examine whether the offence punishable under Section

294(b) IPC is made out against the appellant or not. Section 294 IPC reads as

follows:

“294. Obscene acts and songs.—Whoever, to the annoyance of others,

(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or

(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near

any public place,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term

which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.”

(emphasis supplied)

A plain reading of this Section shows that in order to secure a conviction under

Section 294 IPC, the prosecution is required to prove two essential ingredients.

First, the offender has done an obscene act in a public place or has sung, recited,

or uttered any obscene word, ballad or song in or near any public place. Secondly,

such an act or utterance has caused annoyance to others.

12. Pertinently, Section 294 IPC uses the word “obscene” which is not defined

under IPC. This Court has, however, on several occasions, while interpreting

Section 292 IPC, explained the meaning and the tests to determine ‘what is

obscene’. In the context of Section 292 IPC, it has been held that a material or

object can be said to be obscene only when, if taken as a whole, it: (i) is lascivious;

(ii) appeals to prurient interests of people; and (iii) has a tendency to deprave and

corrupt persons who are likely to see, hear or read it. Here, we may refer to few

such judicial pronouncements:

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 6 of 17

12.1. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State

of Maharashtra

4

, explained that obscenity is something which can deprave

and corrupt the susceptible minds:

“14. The Indian Penal Code borrowed the word from the English

Statute. As the word “obscene” has been interpreted by English

Courts something may be said of that interpretation first. … The

section of the English Act is long (they were so in those days),

but it used the word “obscene” and provided for search, seizure

and destruction of obscene books etc. and made their sale,

possession for sale, distribution etc. a misdemeanour. The section

may thus be regarded as substantially in pari materia with

Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code in spite of some differences

in language. In Hicklin case the Queen's Bench was called upon

to consider a pamphlet, the nature of which can be gathered from

the title and the colophon … the latter half of the pamphlet

according to the report was “grossly obscene, as relating to

impure and filthy acts, words or ideas”. Cockburn, C.J. laid down

the test of obscenity in these words:

“… I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of

the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those

whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose

hands a publication of this sort may fall … it is quite certain that

it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even

to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and

libidinous character.”

15. This test has been uniformly applied in India.

16. The important question is whether this test of obscenity

squares with the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed

under our Constitution, or it needs to be modified and, if so, in

what respects. … The Indian Penal Code does not define the word

“obscene” and this delicate task of how to distinguish between

that which is artistic and that which is obscene has to be

performed by courts, and in the last resort by us. The test which

we evolve must obviously be of a general character but it must

admit of a just application from case to case by indicating a line

of demarcation not necessarily sharp but sufficiently distinct to

distinguish between that which is obscene and that which is not.

None has so far attempted a definition of obscenity because the

meaning can be laid bare without attempting a definition by

describing what must be looked for. It may, however, be said at

once that treating with sex and nudity in art and literature cannot

be regarded as evidence of obscenity without some thing more. It

is not necessary that the angels and saints of Michael Angelo

should be made to wear breeches before they can be viewed. If

the rigid test of treating with sex as the minimum ingredient were

4

1964 SCC OnLine SC 52.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 7 of 17

accepted hardly any writer of fiction today would escape the fate

Lawrence had in his days. Half the book-shop would close and

the other half would deal in nothing but moral and religious books

which Lord Campbell boasted was the effect of his Act.

… … …

21. The Court must, therefore, apply itself to consider each work

at a time. … An overall view of the obscene matter in the setting

of the whole work would, of course, be necessary, but the obscene

matter must be considered by itself and separately to find out

whether it is so gross and its obscenity so decided that it is likely

to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to influences

of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall. In this

connection the interests of our contemporary society and

particularly the influence of the book etc. on it must not be

overlooked… In other words, treating with sex in a manner

offensive to public decency and morality (and these are the words

of our Fundamental Law), judged of by our National standards

and considered likely to pander to lascivious prurient or sexually

precocious minds, must determine the result. We need not attempt

to bowdlerize all literature and thus rob speech and expression of

freedom. A balance should be maintained between freedom of

speech and expression and public decency and morality but when

the latter is substantially transgressed the former must give way.

22. … In our opinion, the test to adopt in our country (regard

being had to our community mores) is that obscenity without a

preponderating social purpose or profit cannot have the

constitutional protection of free speech and expression and

obscenity is treating with sex in a manner appealing to the carnal

side of human nature, or having that tendency. Such a treating

with sex is offensive to modesty and decency but the extent of

such appeal in a particular book etc. are matters for consideration

in each individual case.”

(emphasis supplied)

This case was followed by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chandrakant

Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra

5

, wherein it was held that the

concept of obscenity differs from country to country, depending on the standards

of morality of contemporary society. We may add, inter alia, place, customs,

tradition and social background would also matter.

5

(1969) 2 SCC 687.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 8 of 17

12.2. In Aveek Sarkar v. State of W.B.

6

, this Court adopted the

community standard test to determine ‘what is obscenity’ and held as

under:

“Community standard test

23. We are also of the view that Hicklin test [R. v. Hicklin, (1868)

LR 3 QB 360] is not the correct test to be applied to determine

“what is obscenity”. Section 292 of the Penal Code, of course,

uses the expression “lascivious and prurient interests” or its

effect. Later, it has also been indicated in the said section of the

applicability of the effect and the necessity of taking the items as

a whole and on that foundation where such items would tend to

deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all

the relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter

contained or embodied in it. We have, therefore, to apply the

“community standard test” rather than the “Hicklin test”

[R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360] to determine what is

“obscenity”. A bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 292,

makes clear that a picture or article shall be deemed to be obscene

(i) if it is lascivious;

(ii) it appeals to the prurient interest; and

(iii) it tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to

read, see or hear the matter, alleged to be obscene.

Once the matter is found to be obscene, the question may arise as

to whether the impugned matter falls within any of the exceptions

contained in the section. A picture of a nude/semi-nude woman,

as such, cannot per se be called obscene unless it has the tendency

to arouse the feeling of or revealing an overt sexual desire. The

picture should be suggestive of deprave mind and designed to

excite sexual passion in persons who are likely to see it, which

will depend on the particular posture and the background in which

the nude/semi-nude woman is depicted. Only those sex-related

materials which have a tendency of “exciting lustful thoughts”

can be held to be obscene, but the obscenity has to be judged from

the point of view of an average person, by applying contemporary

community standards.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. For adjudication of the present case, we may now consider whether the

words uttered by the appellant fall within the ambit of Section 294(b) IPC. To

answer this question, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the use of

6

(2014) 4 SCC 257.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 9 of 17

“obscene” and “abusive” or “vulgar” words. Let’s be clear, legally, obscenity is

not synonymous with “vulgarity”, “abuse” or “profanity”. Use of mere swear

words, profanities and vulgar expletives, however distasteful or uncivil they may

be, cannot be equated with obscenity.

14. The test to determine whether the words complained of are obscene or not

is to see whether the words are lascivious, appeal to prurient interests and have

the tendency to deprave and corrupt the impressionable minds. Further, it must

also be shown that the use of such words has caused annoyance to others. Unless

presence of essential ingredients is established, the offence of obscenity cannot

be said to be made out.

15. Words which are merely vulgar or abusive may evoke a feeling of disgust,

revulsion or shock, but that by itself does not make them obscene in law. It is for

this reason that this Court, through various judicial pronouncements, has held that

the use of abusive, vulgar or profane language does not necessarily constitute

obscenity.

15.1. This Court, in Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra

7

, while considering

a Bengali novel, held that the use of slang, unconventional words or

vulgar language may create a feeling of disgust or revulsion, but that does

not necessarily amount to obscenity. Drawing a distinction between

“obscenity” and “vulgarity”, this Court observed that:

“29. In England, as we have earlier noticed, the decision on the

question of obscenity rests with the jury who on the basis of the

summing up of the legal principles governing such action by the

learned Judge decides whether any particular novel, story or

writing is obscene or not. In India, however, the responsibility of

the decision rests essentially on the court. … The court must take

an overall view of the matter complained of as obscene in the

7

(1985) 4 SCC 289.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 10 of 17

setting of the whole work, but the matter charged as obscene must

also be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it

is so gross and its obscenity so pronounced that it is likely to

deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to influence of

this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall. … The

concept of obscenity is moulded to a very great extent by the

social outlook of the people who are generally expected to read

the book. It is beyond dispute that the concept of obscenity

usually differs from country to country depending on the

standards of morality of contemporary society in different

countries. In our opinion, in judging the question of obscenity, the

Judge in the first place should try to place himself in the position

of the author and from the viewpoint of the author the Judge

should try to understand what is it that the author seeks to convey

and whether what the author conveys has any literary and artistic

value. The Judge should thereafter place himself in the position

of a reader of every age group in whose hands the book is likely

to fall and should try to appreciate what kind of possible influence

the book is likely to have in the minds of the readers. A Judge

should thereafter apply his judicial mind dispassionately to decide

whether the book in question can be said to be obscene within the

meaning of Section 292 IPC by an objective assessment of the

book as a whole and also of the passages complained of as

obscene separately. …

… … …

35. … This book is read by teenagers, young boys, adolescents,

grown-up young men and elderly people. We are not satisfied on

reading the book that it could be considered to be obscene.

Reference to kissing, description of the body and the figures of

the female characters in the book and suggestions of acts of sex

by themselves may not have the effect of depraving, debasing and

encouraging the readers of any age to lasciviousness and the novel

on these counts, may not be considered to be obscene. It is true

that slang and various unconventional words have been used in

the book. Though there is no description of any overt act of sex,

there can be no doubt that there are suggestions of sex acts and

that a great deal of emphasis on the aspect of sex in the lives of

persons in various spheres of society and amongst various classes

of people, is to be found in the novel. Because of the language

used, the episodes in relation to sex life narrated in the novel,

appear vulgar and may create a feeling of disgust and revulsion.

The mere fact that the various affairs and episodes with emphasis

on sex have been narrated in slang and vulgar language may

shock a reader who may feel disgusted by the book does not

resolve the question of obscenity. … The observations made by

them and recorded earlier go to indicate that in their thinking there

has been a kind of confusion between vulgarity and obscenity. A

vulgar writing is not necessarily obscene. Vulgarity arouses a

feeling of disgust and revulsion and also boredom but does not

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 11 of 17

have the effect of depraving, debasing and corrupting the morals

of any reader of the novel, whereas obscenity has the tendency to

deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral

influences. … On a very anxious consideration and after carefully

applying our judicial mind in making an objective assessment of

the novel we do not think that it can be said with any assurance

that the novel is obscene merely because slang and

unconventional words have been used in the book in which there

have been emphasis on sex and description of female bodies and

there are the narrations of feelings, thoughts and actions in vulgar

language. Some portions of the book may appear to be vulgar and

readers of cultured and refined taste may feel shocked and

disgusted. Equally in some portions, the words used and

description given may not appear to be in proper taste. In some

places there may have been an exhibition of bad taste leaving it

to the readers of experience and maturity to draw the necessary

inference but certainly not sufficient to bring home to the

adolescents any suggestion which is depraving or lascivious. … ”

(emphasis supplied)

[See also: S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal

8

]

15.2. This Court in Madhanagopal v. Lalitha

9

held that in order to

constitute an offence under Section 294(b) IPC, the words uttered must

contain some lascivious element capable of arousing sexual thoughts or

feelings and must further be shown to have caused annoyance to others.

It was observed that:

“7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity under Section

294(b)IPC is whether the tendency of the matter charged as

obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open

to such immoral influences. The following passage from the

judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was)

reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T.

Chacko v. Nainan Chacko, 1967 SCC OnLine Ker 125 : 1967

KLT 799] explains as follows : (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6)

“5. The only point argued was that the 1st accused has

not committed an offence punishable under Section

294(b)IPC, by uttering the words above-mentioned.

The courts below have held that the words uttered

were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to

8

(2010) 5 SCC 600.

9

(2022) 17 SCC 818.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 12 of 17

the public. I am not inclined to take this view.

In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360] ,

QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. Laid down the test of

“obscenity” in these words : (QB p. 371)

‘… the test of obscenity is this, whether the

tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to

deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open

to such immoral influences.…’”

(emphasis supplied)

[See also: Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra

10

]

15.3. In Apoorva Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi)

11

, this Court,

while referring to Section 292 IPC and Section 67 of the

Information Technology Act, 2000, observed:

“41. … It is well established from the precedents cited that

vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to

obscenity. [Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC

289, para 35 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 523 : 1985 INSC

205; Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon,

(1996) 4 SCC 1, para 29 : 1996 INSC 595; N.S.

Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, (2022) 17 SCC 818 : 2022

SCC OnLine SC 2030 : 2022 INSC 1323.] While a person

may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be

distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by

itself is not sufficient to be “obscene”. Obscenity relates

to material that arouses sexual and lustful thoughts, which

is not at all the effect of the abusive language or

profanities that have been employed in the episode.

Rather, such language may evoke disgust, revulsion, or

shock. [Samaresh Bose case, (1985) 4 SCC 289, para 35 :

1985 SCC (Cri) 523 : 1985 INSC 205] …

43. It is evident from the above passages that the High

Court has taken the meaning of the language in its literal

sense, outside the context in which such expletives have

been spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms used

may be sexual in nature and they may refer to sexual acts,

their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in any

10

(2026) 2 SCC 622.

11

(2024) 6 SCC 181.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 13 of 17

viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather,

the common usage of these words is reflective of emotions

of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement.

By taking the literal meaning of these words, the High

Court failed to consider the specific material (profane

language) in the context of the larger web series and by

the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and

prudence”. When we notice the use of such language in

the context of the plot and theme of the web series, which

is a light-hearted show on the college lives of young

students, it is clear that the use of these terms is not related

to sex and does not have any sexual connotation. Neither

did the creator of the web series intend for the language to

be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on a

reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore,

there is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the

High Court in analysing and examining the material to

determine obscenity.”

(emphasis supplied)

[See also: Sivakumar v. State

12

]

16. In the present case, during altercation, the appellant allegedly uttered that:

“Hey Motherfucker! You son of a whore! Are you coming in support of your elder

sister's son? Just fuck off, you ‘Kurutha’ Fucker’…”. It is this which is sought to

be invoked under Section 294(b) of the IPC. Going by the version of PW-1

himself, the words and verbal slang used by the appellant were, at best, abusive

or vulgar in nature. The Collins English Dictionary defines the word “abusive”

as a language which ‘is extremely rude and insulting’

13

. Whereas the word

‘vulgar’ is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as “rude and likely to upset or

anger people, especially by referring to sex and the body in an unpleasant way”

14

.

These definitions clearly show that words may be insulting, offensive or

unpleasant without necessarily being obscene in law.

12

2026 SCC OnLine SC 529.

13

https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/abusive.

14

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/vulgar.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 14 of 17

17. For an utterance to be considered obscene, it must be shown that it was

lascivious, appealed to prurient interests and had the tendency to deprave and

corrupt the minds of those who are exposed to it. Tested on this anvil, even if all

the allegations levelled in the complaint are taken at their face value and accepted

to be true in entirety, the same cannot be held to be obscene. Such words,

howsoever abusive, unpalatable or uncivil, do not satisfy the requirement of

Section 294(b) IPC for there being nothing on record to show that they had any

one or all three elements referred to hereinabove. Further, it is nobody’s case that

use of such words caused annoyance to others in a public place, which is a

mandatory ingredient of the Section, much less to the complainant . In absence

thereof, we find that the offence under Section 294(b) IPC is not made out.

18. Furthermore, we find it equally difficult to sustain the conviction under

Section 506 (ii) IPC. For an offence of criminal intimidation to be made out under

Section 506 IPC, it must be shown that there was an act of: (1) Threatening a

person with any injury; (i) to his person, reputation or property; or (ii) to the

person, or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested and (2) Such

threat was intentional; (i) to cause alarm to that person; or (ii) to cause that person

to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the

execution of such threat; or (iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which

that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such

threat. [See: Naresh Aneja v. State of U.P.

15

]

19. In the present case, the prosecution seeks to establish the charge of criminal

intimidation primarily on the basis of the statement of PW-1 contained in the FIR,

which reads as: “… Subramaniam intimidated me waving the billhook at me

saying ‘You had escaped this day. I will not rest until I hack you’ and flung the

15

(2025) 2 SCC 604.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 15 of 17

billhook right there and left the place”. The same position was reiterated by PW-

3 and PW-4 in their testimonies. However, in our considered view, even if the

aforesaid allegation is accepted in its entirety, the charge under Section 506(ii)

IPC is not borne out. Mere use of threatening words during the course of an

altercation, without the proof that it was intended to cause alarm to the

complainant or to compel him to do or omit to do any act, would not be sufficient

to bring in the application of this provision. Apart from the bald assertion referred

to above, there is nothing on record to indicate that the appellant intended to cause

alarm to PW-1 so as to criminally intimidate him. Thus, we set aside the

conviction of the appellant under Section 506(ii) IPC.

20. We shall now consider the conviction of the appellant under Section 326

IPC. Section 326 IPC deals with the offence of voluntarily causing grievous hurt

by dangerous weapons or means. The essential ingredients required to attract the

said provision are: (i) voluntarily causing hurt; (ii) the hurt caused must be

grievous in nature; and (iii) such grievous hurt must have been caused by

dangerous weapons or means. [See: Mathai v. State of Kerala

16

] Grievous Hurt

is defined under Section 320 IPC as follows:

“320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only are designated

as “grievous”:—

…

Seventhly.—Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.

Eighthly.—Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer

to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable

to follow his ordinary pursuits.”

(emphasis supplied)

21. In the present case, PW-1 deposed that the appellant had assaulted him with

a billhook (M.O.1) on his forehead, nose and left thumb as a result of which he

sustained multiple injuries. PW-3 and PW-4 also testified to the same effect. PW-

16

(2005) 3 SCC 260.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 16 of 17

1 was thereafter taken to the hospital, where he was examined by PW-2, Dr. R.

Dhinakar, Senior Civil Surgeon, who noticed the following injuries:

“1. A laceration on the forehead in the dimensions of 2 x 0.5x 1cm

2. A laceration on the nose in the dimensions of 2 x 1 x 1.5cm.

3. Lots of small lacerations in the right palm middle finger, forefinger

and thumb”

Subsequently, upon CT scan, it was found that the nasal bone of PW-1 was

fractured. On the basis thereof, PW-2 opined that the injuries sustained by PW-1

were grievous in nature and the possibility of such injuries being caused by a

billhook (M.O.1) could not be ruled out. The medical evidence, therefore, fully

corroborates the testimony of PW-1, PW-3 and PW-4. The appellant, per contra,

has contended that Section 326 IPC would not be attracted because the injuries

sustained were not in the form of incised wounds. We are, however, unable to

agree with the said contention. The evidence on record clearly establishes that

PW-1 had a nasal bone fracture, which injury squarely falls under the definition

of ‘grievous hurt’ as laid under Section 320 IPC. The said injury was further

proved to have been caused by using a billhook, which is undoubtedly a dangerous

weapon. Therefore, upon a careful examination of the evidence on record, we find

no reason to interfere with the conviction of the appellant under Section 326 IPC

and accordingly affirm the same.

22. However, considering the fact present incident occurred due to animosity

between the appellant and complainant’s family over a land dispute, and keeping

in view the age of the appellant, who is about 70 years old, and his health

condition, we are inclined to modify the sentence to be served by the appellant

till the rising of the Court on a day as maybe specified by the concerned Court.

He shall also be liable to pay a fine to the tune Rs.50,000/-. The same shall be

done within a period of two months.

Crl.App.No.. of 2026 @ SLP(Crl)No.4516 of 2025 Page 17 of 17

23. The appeal is allowed accordingly. Pending application(s), if any, shall

stand disposed of.

……………………………………J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………………………….J.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

NEW DELHI;

17 JULY 2026