2026:JHHC:18667-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

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Cr. Appeal (D.B) No. 34 of 2000(R)

(Against the judgement of conviction dated 20.12.1999 and the order of

sentence dated 05.01.2000 passed by the learned 1

st

Additional Sessions

Judge, Bokaro in Sessions Trial No. 90 of 1998)

Mansu Manjhi @ Mansa Manjhi, son of late Sohrai Manjhi, resident of

Village-Vansimli, PS-Balidih, District-Bokaro

..... … Appellant

Versus

The State of Bihar … … Respondent

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA

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For the Appellant : Mr. A.K. Sahani, Advocate

For the State : Mrs. Nehala Sharmin, Spl.PP

C.A.V On 15.06.2026 Pronounced on 25/06/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant criminal appeal under section 374(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against the judgment of conviction dated

20.12.1999 and the order of sentence dated 05.01.2000 passed by the learned

1

st

Additional Sessions Judge, Bokaro in Sessions Trial No. 90 of 1998 whereby

and whereunder the appellant, above-named, has been convicted under section

302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life

for the said offence.

Factual Matrix

2. The prosecution story, in brief, as per the fardbayan of the informant

Rooplal Manjhi (PW-12) is that on 02.09.1996 in the morning, informant’s

mother Chandmani Manjhian (deceased) went out of her house to the nearby

paddy field to attend call of nature and thereafter, the informant also went

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towards the same field. Informant further stated that at about 6:30 AM Mansu

Manjhi (appellant herein) armed with tangi and Raghunath Manjhi armed with

stick approached her and they dragged her and there Mansu Manjhi started

assaulted his mother on her head with tangi while Raghu Nath Manjhi assaulted

her with a danda (stick) on her head and hands, as a result, his mother fell down.

On seeing this, the informant started shouting and ran forward to rescue his

mother but he was chased by the assailants.

3. Meanwhile, the informant’s wife also arrived there and on halla, seeing

the villagers coming, both the accused persons fled away. Thereafter, the

informant along with his wife and the villagers, came near to his mother, but

they found her lying dead with two cut injuries on the back of her head, left

temple and below elbow of the right hand. They lifted her and placed her at the

ridge of the fields and the informant went to inform the chowkidar.

4. The reason for the murder, according to the informant is that the

accused persons used to consider his mother as “Dain” (witch) and for this

reason they had also assaulted the informant’s father one year ago and

regarding this a case was also lodged at the police station and several times

panchayati was also held and lastly in the night just prior to the day of

occurrence on 29.08.1996, a panchayati was held regarding this matter.

5. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant Balidih P.S. case no.

75/96 dated 02.09.1996 was registered against the accused persons, namely,

Mansu Manjhi (the present appellant) and Raghunath Manjhi under sections

302/34 of I.P.C.

6. After investigation charge sheet was submitted against the accused

persons and after cognizance, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions.

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7. Charges were framed against the accused persons under sections

302/34 of the IPC to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

8. Trial commenced and the statements of the accused persons were

recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.

9. At the conclusion of trial, the accused person, namely, Raghunath

Manjhi was acquitted of the charge and the present appellant, namely, Mansu

Manjhi was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid by the learned trial Court.

10. The aforesaid order of conviction and sentence is under challenge in

this appeal.

Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant:

11. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken the following

grounds for interfering with the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in

the impugned judgment:

(i) The prosecution has miserably failed to establish the charge said to

be proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

(ii) It has been contended that the conduct of the informant is highly

unnatural and improbable and there is no justified reason as to why the

informant did not raise halla when the accused persons dragged the

deceased to nearby field and thereafter assaulted her due to which she

succumbed to injuries which makes the entire case of prosecution

suspicious.

(iii) It has been contended that the informant himself has admitted in

the fardbeyan that there was enmity in between the accused persons

and his family and to resolve the same several panchayati were

convened and the last panchayati was convened on the last night of the

occurrence but he did not inform the police or the village chowkidar

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which makes the prosecution suspicious as due to enmity the accused

persons were falsely implicated in the present case.

(iv) It has been contended that the prosecution witnesses are none other

than the interested witnesses and there is lack of any positive evidence

and, hence, conviction and sentence of the appellant is bad in law.

(v) It has been contended that the prosecution has failed to establish the

intention or motive behind the crime as alleged.

(vi) It has been contended that as per the fardbeyan of the informant, it

was alleged that after the occurrence several villagers had assembled at

the place of occurrence but none of them had stated to have seen the

occurrence, but the learned trial Court has failed to taken into

consideration the aforesaid fact.

(vii) It has been contended that independent witnesses either have been

declared hostile or they denied to have seen the occurrence, rather they

are hearsay witnesses and, as such, the conviction of the appellant was

purely based upon the testimonies of the interested witnesses which

cannot be sustainable in the eyes of law.

(viii) It has been contended that PW10-Basanti Devi, the wife of the

informant has stated that on hearing hallah that her mother-in-law

(deceased) had been murdered by the appellant she went to the place of

occurrence with her husband (the informant) and found her mother-in-

law lying dead there and at that time no one was present there whereas

the informant had himself claimed to be an eye witness of the

occurrence who had seen the occurrence assaulting her mother at the

hands of the appellant, which falsifies the statement of the informant,

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as such, the testimony of the informant is not reliable and informant has

deliberately implicated the appellant due to old enmity.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid

grounds, has submitted that the impugned judgment of conviction passed by

the learned trial Court convicting the appellant under sections 302 of the Indian

Penal Code, therefore, is not sustainable in eye of law and fit to be set aside.

Submission of the learned counsel for the State:

13. On the contrary, the learned Spl. PP appearing for the State has

defended the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by taking

the following grounds:

(i) The conviction under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code

against the present appellant does not suffer from an error, since,

ample evidence has been produced by the prosecution.

(ii) It has been contended that the informant P.W.-12 has

supported the prosecution story as he is the eye witness to the

assault on his deceased mother and, therefore, appellant has been

rightly convicted under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and,

as such, the impugned judgment does not require any interference.

(iii) The argument has also been advanced that P.W.-12 has

supported the prosecution version which has been supported by the

medical evidence.

14. The learned State counsel, based upon the aforesaid premise, has

submitted that the impugned judgment passed against the present appellant

does not suffer from any error and same does not require any interference under

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section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, hence, the present criminal appeal is fit

to be dismissed.

Analysis

15. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the documents

available on record as also the finding recorded by the trial Court in the

impugned judgment.

16. We have also gone through the testimonies of the witnesses as available

in the Trial Court records as also the exhibits appended therewith.

17. Learned trial Court, based upon the testimonies of witnesses, has passed

the impugned judgment of conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code and sentenced the appellant as referred hereinabove.

18. This Court, before considering the argument advanced on behalf of the

parties, is now proceeding to consider the testimonies of witnesses which have

been recorded by the learned trial Court.

19. It is evident from the record that in order to substantiate the case, the

prosecution has altogether examined 13 witnesses out of whom P.W.-12

Rooplal Manjhi, is the informant of the case, P.W.-1- Shiv Charan Bauri, PW2-

Kitya Bauri, PW3-Fakir Bauri, PW4-Mahipal Kalindi, PW5-Kandu Devi,

PW6-Hiramoni Devi, PW7-Savitri Devi, PW8-Dr. R.P. Verma, who conducted

postmortem over the dead body of the deceased, PW9-Surajmani Devi, PW10-

Basanti Devi (the wife of the informant), PW11-Shyamlal Manjhi (the elder

son of the deceased) and PW13-Bhim Pado Mahto, is a formal witness of the

case. The Investigating Officer of the case has not been examined.

20. Out of these prosecution witnesses, PW-1- Shiv Charan Bauri,

PW2-Kitya Bouri, PW3-Fakir Bauri, PW4-Mahipal Kalindi, PW5-Kandu

Devi, PW6-Hiramani Devi, PW7-Savitri Devi and PW9-Surajmani Devi have

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been declared hostile by the prosecution on the ground that they have failed to

support prosecution’s case in course of their respective examination-in-chief

itself.

21. On the other hand, the defence had also examined three witnesses to

save the accused/appellant on the pretext that the appellant is a psychiatric

patient. DW1-Dr. T.P. Singh who had examined the appellant in injured

condition, DW2-Dr. T. Sudhir is a consultant Psychiatrist who treated the

appellant and DW3-Jugal Majhi is the son of the appellant who deposed by

stating that his father is a psychiatric patient.

22. PW1-Shiv Charan Bauri has stated in his examination-in-chief that

neither he knows any Chandramani Devi (the deceased) nor Rooplal Manjhi

(the informant) of his village. He has stated that he did not have knowledge

about the occurrence and the police did not ask him about the occurrence. This

witness has been declared hostile.

23. PW2-Kitya Bauri has stated in his examination-in-chief that he did not

know any Chandramani Devi nor did he know about the murder of said

Chandramani Devi at his village and the police came to his village to investigate

the matter. He has stated that the police had asked him about the murder of the

wife of Lakhan Manjhi, one year ago. He had not stated to the police about the

occurrence. This witness has also been declared hostile.

24. PW3-Fakir Bauri has stated that the occurrence was of two years ago

and he knows Chandramani Devi who had been murdered. He has further stated

that the police came to his village to inquire the matter and the police had

interrogated him. He had identified his signature on the carbon copy of inquest

report which has been marked as Ext-1 with objection by defense. He has stated

that he knows Rooplal Manjhi and Basanti Devi, who belong to his village but

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there was no discussion with them about the murder of Chandramani Devi.

PW3 has also been declared hostile.

25. PW4-Mahipal Kalindi has stated in his examination-in-chief that the

occurrence was of two and half years ago. It was 7:00 AM and at that time he

was on duty and at 2.30 PM, when he returned from his duty, he heard that

Chandramani Devi had died. He has further stated that the police had come to

the village to inquire the matter and his signature was taken in a plain paper.

This witness has also been declared hostile.

26. PW5-Kandu Devi has stated in her examination-in-chief that

Chandramani Devi (the deceased) was of her village and she had been murdered

for about two and half years ago. She has further stated that at that time she was

at her sasural and she did not know how Chandramani Devi had been murdered.

This witness has also been declared hostile.

27. PW6-Hiramani Devi has stated in her evidence that she knows

Chandramani Devi but she did not have knowledge that how Chandramani Devi

had been murdered. She has stated that the police had not inquired from her

about the murder. This witness has also been declared hostile.

28. PW7-Sawitri Devi has stated in her evidence that she knows

Chandramani Devi, who had been murdered three years ago but the police did

not inquire from him about the occurrence. This witness has also been declared

hostile.

29. P.W.-8 Dr. R.P. Verma, had conducted postmortem examination of the

deceased. He had stated in his evidence that on 03.09.1996 during his posting

at Sadar Hospital as Medical Officer, he had performed post mortem

examination of dead body of Chandmuni Majhian wife of Lakha Majhi of

Bansimali, and found the following injuries on her body:

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External appearance: Rigor mortis present in lower extremities. Eyes

closed, mouth closed, blood streaks at nostrils and left angle of moth. Dried

blood stains in the meatus of the left ear. Lepi and eyes were swollen. Foul

smell was coming out.

Doctor found the following injuries on the dead body:

(i) Abrasion 1” x ½” on the back of right elbow;

(ii) Cut 1 ½” x ½” scalp deep behind the left ear on the head;

(iii) Cut 3” x 1” scalp deep on back of the left side of the head in

occipital region.

On Dissection. There was deepest fracture of the left mastoid

bone and part of the left parietal bone. There was fracture

of the occipital bone on the left side. There was tear and

laceration of the meninges on the left side and the brin tissue

was also torn and lacerated. The cranial cavity was full of

blood and blood clots.

Doctor opined that the injuries found on the person of the deceased

were antemortem and that injury no.1 was caused by hard and blunt object

while injury nos.2 and 3 were caused by hard heavy sharp cutting weapon or

substance.

Doctor opined that cause of death was due to massive intra cranial

hemorrhage and injury to the brain. The time elapsed since the death was

within one to two days. P.W 8 has identified the postmortem report in his

writing and signature which has been marked as Ext.-2.

30. In his cross-examination, Doctor (P.W.-8) has stated that the injuries

may be caused when any heavy sharp cutting weapon is dashed against head.

He further stated that he is not sure about the age of the injuries.

31. PW9-Surajmani has stated in her evidence that he did not know

Chandramani Devi but again stated that she knows her. She further stated

Chandramani Devi had died but she did not know how Chandramani Devi had

been murdered. PW-9 was declared hostile.

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32. PW10-Basanti Devi is the wife of the informant. She has stated in her

examination-in-chief that incident took place about four years ago at 6 AM. At

that time, she was working in the cow-shed at home and in the meantime, she

heard hallah that Manu Majhi had killed her mother-in-law. Then, she went to

the field along with her husband(informant), where they found her mother-in-

law lying dead and no one from the village had come there at that time. Police

came at village and inquired from her. She had identified the appellant, namely,

Mansu Manjhi and co-accused, namely, Raghu Manjhi in the dock. She stated

that villager had raised halla ,but, who told her that Mansu Manjhi had killed

her mother-in-law, she did not now.

During her cross-examination, she has stated that there was an uproar

only over the name of Mansu Majhi.

33. PW11-Shyamlal Majhi is the younger brother of the informant. In his

examination-in-chief he had stated that the occurrence took place on

02.09.1996 in between 6 AM to 6:30 AM in the morning and at that time, he

went to his school. His brother Rooplal Manjhi (the informant) came to his

school and told him that Mansu Majhi and Rooplal Majhi (instead of Raghunath

Majhi) had killed his mother Chandmani Devi. On this information, he came to

his house and went to the field and found his mother lying dead in the field.

There was a wound on her neck and head and there were injuries on her hands

and hand was skinned. Rooplal went to the police station and informed the

police. The police came to the village and had inquired from him also. He has

further stated that prior to his occurrence, Mansu Manjhi and Raghunath

Manjhi used to say that his mother is a Dain(witch) and about this a panchayati

was held in the village in which it was decided that the deceased should not be

said as witch. One day prior to the occurrence also, a panchayati was convened

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in which the accused Mansu Manjhi and Raghunath Manjhi were adamant that

the deceased was a witch but in spite of that his mother had been murdered on

the next day of said panchayati. PW-11 had identified both the accused persons

in the dock.

34. In his cross-examination, PW-11 stated that the written record of the

panchayati proceeding was made and he gave the same to the police but he has

no duplicate copy of it. He has further stated that Haridas Senapati, Fakir Bauri

and other villagers had said that the accused persons called his mother as witch.

He has admitted that there was no sarpanch/village head in his village. He did

not recall that who was sarpanch/village head in the village at that time and

there was no sarpanch/village head in the said panchayati and only villagers

were there. He did not know that in the village there was any tribal community.

He had stated to the police that his brother had come to the school and informed

him that Mansu Manjhi and Raghunath Manjhi had murdered his mother. He

had admitted that prior to the occurrence there was no case instituted either in

the Court or at the police station against the accused persons. Mansu Manjhi

had staged a drama by slitting his own throat and he was admitted in B.G.

Hospital.

35. PW12-Rooplal Manjhi is the informant of the case. In his examination-

in-chief informant stated that on 02.09.1996 at about 6-6.30 AM, in the

morning, the occurrence took place and at that time he was in his house. His

mother Chandmani had gone to the fields to ease herself and after ten minutes,

he also went to the field, where he saw that his mother was being assaulted by

Mansu Manjhi with sword, while Raghunath Manjhi was holding her from

behind. His mother was shouting for help and when, he went near to intervene,

the accused Mansu Manjhi chased him to assault. He returned home and

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informed the villagers, namely, Haridas, Hopi, Kartik etc. that accused persons

Mansu Manjhi and Raghunath Manji were assaulting his mother to which the

villagers told him to inform the chowkidar. He informed the chowkidar and the

chowkidar came along with him and went to the field where he saw his mother

lying dead in the fields. Then, he went to the police station along with the

chowkidar and informed about the occurrence. His statement was recorded by

the police officer on which he had put his signature. Informant had identified

his signature on the fardbeyan which has been marked Ext.-1/2. He has further

stated that Mansu Manjhi and Raghunath Manjhi used to tell his mother witch.

He has identified both the accused person in the dock.

36. In his cross-examination, informant had denied that the accused Mansu

Manjhi was a mental patient but he admitted that Mansu had slitted his throat

and he was treated at B.G.H. When her mother had raised halla at that time he

was only present there and no villager was present at the place of occurrence.

When he went to the field, he saw the assault. He has stated that in his fardbeyan

given to the police, he stated that his mother was assaulted with sword. He did

not give statement in his fardbeyan that there was an assault on the head of his

mother with lathi but he has further stated that Raghunath was holding lathi in

his hands. He told to the police that Raghunath Manjhi had caught hold his

mother from behind.

37. In course of his cross-examination, informant further stated that the

distance in between his house and the paddy filed is about half kilometer and

that when he returned home from the paddy field, he met his wife Basanti and

also that he and his wife are not on inimical terms.

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38. PW13-Bheem Pado Mahto is a formal witness through whom writing

contained in the case diary prepared by the Investigating Officer of the case has

been proved in evidence and has been marked as Ext.-3.

39. On the other hand, DW1-Dr. T.P. Singh, had treated accused/appellant,

Mansu Majhi @ Mansa Majhi. He has stated that Mansu Majhi was admitted

to B.G.H. on 02.09.1996 and on the same day at 1:15 PM he had examined the

appellant and had found incised wound in front of neck above pomi-adomi of

size 6” x 2” x 1” with cut trachea. The doctor opined that the above injury was

grievous in nature and caused by sharp cutting weapon. Age of injury was less

than 6 hours before examination. DW1 had proved the injury report which is

marked Ext.-A. He has further stated that the patient was admitted to the

General surgery and psychiatric department. He has opined that the injury could

have been self-inflicted.

40. DW2- Dr. T. Sudhir is the consultant psychiatrist in Bokar General

Hospital. He has deposed that on 14.11.1994 one patient, namely, Mansu

Manjhi of Basnuli Radhanangar, B.S City P.S was referred to him for

examination. He examined the patient on that day and found him he was

suffering from depression and started his treatment. He further deposed that he

prescribed medicines to the patient and advised him to visit once in every month

during the period of medication and that the patient used to visit him for regular

follow up punctually and further stated that he examined the patient last on

21.08.1996 and found him to be maintaining well though he advised him to

continue medicines. He had diagnosed his case as case of psychotic depression.

He has further stated that he again examined the patient on 04.03.1997 on being

referred by the authorities of Chas Jail. He was admitted to the psychiatric ward

of B.G.H. and he availed his treatment. After nine days of treatment, he was

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sent back to jail. He has proved the prescriptions of the various dates numbering

16 sheets and the same have been marked Ext. B to B/15 on behalf of the

defence. He has identified the accused Mansa Majhi as the patient in dock.

During cross-examination, he has stated that patient was satisfactorily

responding to the medication as was observed by him during the patient’s

periodical check-up. He has admitted that he did not find out what could be

grave provocation leading to psychiatric depression but he has admitted at the

same time that the patient’s mental condition was not such as to be easily

prompted by any person to indulge in acts of violence although such patient

may have hallucination as delusions on which they may act even violently.

41. DW3- Jugal Majhi is the son of the appellant Mansu Manjhi. He has

admitted that his father was a psychiatric patient and his medical examination

was done by the Medical Board on 12.07.1997. He has proved the writings of

Dr. K.P. Sharma pertaining to the medical report submitted by the Medical

Board, which was filed in G.R. Case No.1073/96 in the Court of the learned

C.J.M, Chas. The medical report, has been marked Ext.-C on behalf of the

defence. He has further stated that his father was admitted earlier to the mental

hospital at Kanke where he was treated for mental condition and his father was

suffering from mental ailment even prior to the date of the occurrence.

42. This Court, on the basis of aforesaid factual aspect vis-à-vis argument

advanced on behalf of parties, is now proceeding to examine the legality and

propriety of impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence by

formulating following questions to be answered by this Court:

(I). Whether the informant PW12, who is alleged to be the sole eye

witness of the case is trustworthy and reliable, to convict the appellant

under Section 302 of IPC?

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(II) Whether contradiction and discrepancies shown in the deposition

of Informant PW-12 inter se and PW-10, who is informant’s wife, is

enough to disbelieve the case of the prosecution?

Re: First Issue:

43. Regarding the first issue, this Court finds from the impugned judgment

that learned trial Court has convicted the appellant relying on the testimony of

the informant Rooplal Manjhi (P.W.-12), who is the sole eyewitness to the

assault on Chandmani Manjhian(deceased). Learned trial Court had found that

testimony of the informant was substantiated by P.W.-10 and P.W.-11 and

further the testimony of sole eyewitness has also been corroborated by the

inquest report and Post-Mortem Report.

44. Before we analyze and appreciate the circumstances that have weighed

with the trial court, this court think it apposite to refer to certain authorities

pertaining to evidentiary value of the sole eyewitness.

45. It is settled proposition of law that the judgment of conviction can be

passed on the basis of the testimony of sole eyewitness but the testimony of

said witness should be trustworthy and inspire confidence in the mind of the

Court.

46. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole

testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Evidence

Act, 1872. But if there are doubts about the testimony the Courts will insist on

corroboration. In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is

material. The time-honored principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not

counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible

and trustworthy, or otherwise.

47. The law is well settled that the judgment of conviction can be passed

also on the basis of the testimony of sole witness but the testimony of said

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witness should be trustworthy as per the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91,

the relevant paragraphs 30 to 34 of the said judgment are being referred

hereunder as :-

"30. Shri Bagga has also submitted that there was sole testimony

of Sujit Mondal, PW 1, and the rest i.e. depositions of PW 2 to PW

8, could be treated merely as hearsay. The same cannot be relied

upon for conviction.

31. In Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) this Court

repelled a similar submission observing that:

(SCC p. 371, para 9) "9. ... as a general rule the court can and

may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly

reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on

the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section

134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts about the

testimony the courts will insist on corroboration."

In fact, it is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is

material. The time-honoured principle is that evidence has to be

weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a

ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise.

32. In Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra this Court reiterated the

similar view observing that it is the quality and not the quantity of

evidence which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. The

legal system has laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of

evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of

witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and

completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction.

Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of

several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence.

33. In Kunju v. State of T.N., a similar view has been reiterated

placing reliance on various earlier judgments of this Court

including Jagdish Prasad v. State of M.P. and Vadivelu Thevar v.

State of Madras.

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34. Thus, in view of the above, the bald contention made by Shri

Bagga that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary

eyewitness has no force and is negatived accordingly."

solitary eyewitness has no force and is negatived accordingly."

48. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kuriya and another

vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) 10 SCC 433 has held as under: -

" 33. ---The Court has stated the principle that, as a general rule, the Court

can and may act on the testimony of a single eyewitness provided he is

wholly reliable and base the conviction on the testimony of such sole

eyewitness. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole

testimony of a single witness."

49. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kalu @ Amit vs. State

of Haryana, (2012) 8 SCC 34 held as under:

"11. We find no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court which has

rightly affirmed the trial court's view. It is true that the accused have

managed to win over the complainant PW 4 Karambir Yadav, but the

evidence of PW 5 Ram Chander Yadav bears out the prosecution case. It

is well settled that conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole

eyewitness if his evidence inspires confidence. This witness has

meticulously narrated the incident and supported the prosecution case. We

find him to be a reliable witness."

50. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Sheelam Ramesh v. State of A.P.,

(1999) 8 SCC 369 in Para -18 held as follows: -

"18. According to learned counsel for the accused appellants, though PW

3 has deposed that 10-15 persons were in the vicinity at the time of

occurrence, no independent witness was examined by the prosecution.

There is nothing on evidence to show that there was any other eyewitness

to the occurrence. Having examined all the eyewitnesses even if other

persons present nearby were not examined, the evidence of the

eyewitnesses cannot be discarded. Courts are concerned with quality and

not with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial, conviction can be

based on the sole evidence of a witness if it inspires confidence."

51. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion it is apparent that the

conviction can be based on the evidence of a sole eyewitness if his evidence

2026:JHHC:18667-DB

18

inspires confidence reason being that Courts are concerned with quality and not

with quantity of evidence and in a criminal trial as per the statute there is no

legal impediment on relying upon the testimony of sole eyewitness.

52. At this juncture, it would be pertinent to examine the testimony of the

alleged sole eyewitness Rooplal Manjhi (PW-12), who is the informant of the

case, in the backdrop of aforesaid legal proposition.

53. Hence, this Court is proceeding to examine the evidence of the

informant Rooplal Manjhi (PW-12) vis-à-vis PW-10, in order to appreciate the

veracity of the prosecution case that due to the alleged assault on Chandmani

Manjhian(deceased), by the accused/appellant, death of the deceased occurred.

54. This Court finds that informant P.W.-12, in his evidence had stated that

incident occurred at about 6.00-6.30 AM, in the morning and at that time he

was in his house and his mother Chandmuni Devi (deceased) had gone to the

field and after ten minutes, informant also proceeded for the field and there, he

saw accused/appellant Mansu Manjhi was assaulting his mother with sword and

accused Raghunath Manjhi had caught her mother from behind. When

informant went near them, then, accused/appellant Mansu Manjhi chased him

to assault.

55. But, ongoing to the testimony of Basanti Devi (PW-10), who is the wife

of the informant, this Court finds that Basanti Devi had stated that on the day

of occurrence at about 6 AM in the morning, she was in her house and was

working in the cow shed. In the meantime, she heard halla that her mother-in-

law had been murdered, then, she and her husband (i.e. informant Rooplal

Manjhi), went to the field and there they saw her mother-in-law, lying dead.

56. Hence, vital contradiction has emerged in the testimony of the

informant PW-12, when compared to the testimony of the PW-10 Basanti Devi,

2026:JHHC:18667-DB

19

as informant had deposed that he had seen the occurrence of assaulting the

deceased by the appellant with sword, but, PW-10 has not supported the

aforesaid stand, rather she had stated that while she was working in the house

in cow-shed, she came to know on hearing halla that her mother-in-law has

been killed by the accused/appellant Mansu Manjhi. She thereafter, rushed to

the place of occurrence along with her husband (informant PW-12) and found

the deceased dead lying therein. Therefore, the version of informant (PW-12 )

that he had seen the appellant assaulting the deceased with sword, is in

contradiction what has been stated by PW-10.

57. Therefore, the testimony of the informant that he had proceeded for the

field after ten minutes, his mother Chandmuni Devi(deceased) had gone to the

field and in the field, he had witnessed the assault on her mother by the accused/

appellant is falsified by the testimony of informant’s wife (PW-10) itself.

58. Thus, from the aforesaid discussion this Court is of the considered view

that the testimony of PW-12 who had been claimed as sole eyewitness is not

trustworthy.

59. Therefore, this Court is of view that learned trial Court had on wrong

assumption and surmises and without properly appreciating the evidence of the

sole eye-witness PW-12, had convicted the appellant.

60. Accordingly, Issue no.1 is hereby answered.

Re: Issue no. II

61. The issue No. (ii) is whether contradiction and discrepancies shown in

the deposition of Informant PW-12 inter se and PW-10, who is informant’s

wife, is enough to disbelieve the case of the prosecution?

62. Submission has been made by the learned counsel for the appellant that

in the testimony of the Informant P.W-12 and the informant’s wife P.W-10,

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20

there are vital contradiction. But the learned trial Court has overlooked the

contradictions and has convicted the appellant.

63. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein the settled position of law that

not every discrepancy or contradiction matters for assessing the reliability and

credibility of a witness, unless the discrepancies and contradictions are so

material that it destroys the substratum of the prosecution case.

64. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta (Dr.) v.

State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC 657, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court

has dealt with material contradiction, which is being quoted hereunder for ready

reference-

“30. While appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into

consideration whether the contradictions/omissions had been of such

magnitude that they may materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions,

inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements on trivial matters without

effecting the core of the prosecution case should not be made a ground to

reject the evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the

entire evidence, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses

and the appellate court in normal course would not be justified in reviewing

the same again without justifiable reasons. (Vide State v. Saravanan1.)

31. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious

doubt about the truthfulness of a witness and the other witness also makes

material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence

acceptable, it cannot be safe to rely upon such evidence. (Vide State of

Rajasthan v. Rajendra Singh2.)

32. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found to be not

minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their

evidence. In such circumstances, witnesses may not inspire confidence and

if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other

evidence or with the statement already recorded, in such a case it cannot be

held that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. (Vide

Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P.3)

33. In case, the complainant in the FIR or the witness in his statement under

Section 161 CrPC, has not disclosed certain facts but meets the prosecution

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21

case first time before the court, such version lacks credence and is liable to

be discarded. (Vide State v. Sait4.)

34. In State of Rajasthan v. Kalki5, while dealing with this issue, this Court

observed as under : (SCC p. 754, para 8)

“8. … In the depositions of witnesses there are always normal

discrepancies however honest and truthful they may be. These

discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of

memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and

horror at the time of the occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies

are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person.”

35. The courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy belongs.

While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s

case, material discrepancies do so. (See Syed Ibrahim v. State of A.P.6

and Arumugam v. State7.)

36. In Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh8 this Court examined

the issue and held: (SCC p. 192, para 9)

“9. Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But it can be

one of the factors to test the credibility of the prosecution version, when

the entire evidence is put in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone

of credibility.”

37. While deciding such a case, the court has to apply the aforesaid tests.

Mere marginal variations in the statements cannot be dubbed as

improvements as the same may be elaborations of the statement made by

the witness earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in

material particulars i.e. go to the root of the case/materially affect the

trial or core of the prosecution case, render the testimony of the witness

liable to be discredited.”

65. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Shyamal Ghosh v.

State of West Bengal, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 646, wherein, paragraphs-46,

it has been held as under:

“46. Then, it was argued that there are certain discrepancies and

contradictions in the statement of the prosecution witnesses inasmuch as

these witnesses have given different timing as to when they had seen the

scuffling and strangulation of the deceased by the accused. It is true that

there is some variation in the timing given by PW 8, PW 17 and PW 19.

Similarly, there is some variation in the statement of PW 7, PW 9 and PW

11. Certain variations are also pointed out in the statements of PW 2, PW

4 and PW 6 as to the motive of the accused for commission of the crime.

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22

Undoubtedly, some minor discrepancies or variations are traceable in

the statements of these witnesses. But what the Court has to see is whether

these variations are material and affect the case of the prosecution

substantially. Every variation may not be enough to adversely affect the

case of the prosecution.’’

66. Thus, from the aforesaid proposition of law it is evident that minor

discrepancies, embellishments and contradictions in the evidence of the

eyewitness do not destroy the essential fabric of the prosecution case, the core

of which remains unaffected. But at the same time, it is equally settled that the

discrepancies which go to the root of the matter and shake the basic version of

the witnesses that can be annexed with due importance.

67. Reverting to the factual aspects of the present case. In his fard beyan

informant had stated that accused/appellant Mansu Manjhi had assaulted his

deceased mother with an axe on her head. But, contrary to this, in his testimony

informant had deposed that he saw accused/appellant Mansu Manjhi was

assaulting his mother with sword.

68. So, there is vital contradiction in fard beyan vis-a-vis in the testimony

of the informant regarding the weapon used by the accused/appellant.

69. Again, contradiction in the evidence of the informant is also apparent

from the cross-examination of the informant wherein informant had stated that

he had met his wife (PW-10) when he was returning home from the field. But,

contrary to this informant’s wife (PW-10) had stated in his testimony that, after

hearing halla that her mother-in-law had been killed, she along with her

husband (i.e. informant) had gone to the field.

70. Hence, when as per testimony of PW-10 Basanti Devi that she had

rushed to the place of occurrence along with husband (informant PW-12), on

hearing halla that her mother-in-law had been killed then the testimony of the

2026:JHHC:18667-DB

23

informant given in his cross-examination that he had met his wife (P.W.-10)

when he was returning home from the field, is self-contradictory.

71. Hence, from the forgoing discussion, this Court comes to the

conclusion that there is vital contradiction in the testimony of the informant as

to weapon used in the assault. This variation is material and has substantially

affected the prosecution case.

72. Accordingly, issue no. II, is hereby answered.

73. Further, in the present case Investigating officer was not examined by

the prosecution. Hence, the learned trial Court relying on the inquest report and

inquest report witnesses PW-3 and PW-4 to prove the place of occurrence has

come to conclusion that dead body was found by the side of the ridge within

the informant’s paddy field.

74. But both the inquest report witnesses PW-3 and PW-4 were declared

hostile by the prosecution. In his cross-examination PW-3 deposed that he had

not given statement to the police that he had seen the dead body of Chandmuni

Devi(deceased) in the paddy field and police had taken his signature in the

blank paper. Likewise, PW-4 had also deposed that police had taken his

signature in the blank paper.

75. Hence, due to non-examination of the Investigating Officer, place of

occurrence has not been proved and prejudice has been caused to the appellant.

76. At this juncture, it needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court in

catena of decision has propounded the proposition that in the criminal trial,

there cannot be any conviction if the charge is not being proved beyond all

reasonable doubts, as has been held in the case of Rang Bahadur Singh & Ors.

Vrs. State of U.P., reported in (2000) 3 SCC 454, wherein, at paragraph-22, it

has been held as under:-

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24

"22. The amount of doubt which the Court would entertain regarding the

complicity of the appellants in this case is much more than the level of

reasonable doubt. We are aware that acquitting the accused in a case of this

nature is not a matter of satisfaction for all concerned. At the same time we

remind ourselves of the time-tested rule that acquittal of a guilty person

should be preferred to conviction of an innocent person. Unless the

prosecution establishes the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt a

conviction cannot be passed on the accused. A criminal court cannot afford

to deprive liberty of the appellants, lifelong liberty, without having at least

a reasonable level of certainty that the appellants were the real culprits. We

really entertain doubt about the involvement of the appellants in the crime."

77. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Krishnegowda & Ors.

Vrs. State of Karnataka, 2017 (13) SCC 98, has held at paragraph-26 as under:

"26. Having gone through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and the

findings recorded by the High Court we feel that the High Court has failed

to understand the fact that the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond

reasonable doubt and this is a classic case where at each and every stage of

the trial, there were lapses on the part of the investigating agency and the

evidence of the witnesses is not trustworthy which can never be a basis for

conviction. The basic principle of criminal jurisprudence is that the accused

is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable

doubt."

Further, it needs to refer herein the principle of 'benefit of doubt'

belongs exclusively to criminal jurisprudence. The pristine

doctrine of 'benefit of doubt' can be invoked when there is

reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused,

reference in this regard may be made to the judgment

rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of

Haryana Vrs. Bhagirath & Ors., reported in (1999) 5 SCC

96, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-7 as under:

"7. The High Court had failed to consider the implication of the evidence of

the two eyewitnesses on the complicity of Bhagirath particularly when the

High Court found their evidence reliable. The benefit of doubt was given to

Bhagirath "as a matter of abundant caution". Unfortunately, the High Court

did not point out the area where there is such a doubt. Any restraint by way

of abundant caution need not be entangled with the concept of the benefit of

doubt. Abundant caution is always desirable in all spheres of human activity.

But the principle of benefit of doubt belongs exclusively to criminal

jurisprudence. The pristine doctrine of benefit of doubt can be invoked when

2026:JHHC:18667-DB

25

there is reasonable doubt regarding the guilt of the accused. It is the

reasonable doubt which a conscientious judicial mind entertains on a

conspectus of the entire evidence that the accused might not have committed

the offence, which affords the benefit to the accused at the end of the criminal

trial. Benefit of doubt is not a legal dosage to be administered at every

segment of the evidence, but an advantage to be afforded to the accused at

the final end after consideration of the entire evidence, if the Judge

conscientiously and reasonably entertains doubt regarding the guilt of the

accused."

78. It needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the case of

Allarakha K. Mansuri v. State of Gujarat reported in (2002) 3 SCC 57 has

laid down the principle that the golden thread which runs through the web of

administration of justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the

evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the

other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be

adopted, for ready reference, paragraph 6 thereof requires to be referred herein

which reads hereunder as :-

“6. ------The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of

justice in criminal case is that if two views are possible on the evidence

adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to

his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be

adopted. —"

79. It needs to refer herein before laying down the aforesaid view, the

Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of

Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 has already laid down the same

view at paragraph 163 which is required to be referred which read hereunder

as-

“163. We then pass on to another important point which seems to have been

completely missed by the High Court. It is well settled that where on the

evidence two possibilities are available or open, one which goes in favour

of the prosecution and the other which benefits an accused, the accused is

undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt.---"

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80. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect and legal position

as discussed hereinabove, is of the view that informant (PW-12), who is

claimed to be the sole eye witness of the case is not trustworthy and reliable.

Informant’s presence at the place of occurrence is doubtful and consequently,

his testimony that he had witnessed the assault on the deceased by the appellant

cannot be relied upon. Further, the informant himself has given contradictory

statement as to weapon used in the crime. The prosecution has also failed in

proving the place of occurrence.

81. Hence, this Court is of the view that the conviction of the appellant

which is based upon the testimony of the informant PW-12, who has been

considered as sole eye witness, but the said consideration is not just and proper

if testimony of PW-10 is taken into consideration.

82. Hecne, this Court is of the view that the prosecution has failed to prove

the charge under sections 302 of the Indian Penal Code against the appellant,

namely, Mansu Manjhi @ Mansa Manjhi, beyond all reasonable doubt and, as

such, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence requires

interference by this Court.

83. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of conviction dated 20.12.1999

and the order of sentence dated 05.01.2000 passed by the learned 1

st

Additional

Sessions Judge, Bokaro in Sessions Trial No. 90 of 1998, is hereby quashed

and set aside.

84. Since, as per record, the appellant, namely, Mansu Majhi @ Mansa

Majhi has been released on bail after suspension of sentence vide order dated

28.01.2000 and, as such, he is discharged from the liability of bails bonds.

85. In the result, the instant criminal appeal stands allowed.

86. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

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87. Let the Trial Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned

forthwith, along with the copy of this Judgment.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

I Agree.

(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)

Sudhir

Jharkhand High Court,

Dated:25/06/2026

AFR

Uploaded on 25/06/2026