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PETITIONER:

MANSUKHLAL VITHALDAS CHAUHAN

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/09/1997

BENCH:

M.K. MUKHERJEE, S. SAGHIR AHMAD

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

S. SAGHIR AHMAD. J.

The appellant, who as Divisional Accountant, held a

Class III Post, in the medium Irrigation Project Division at

Ankleshwar, Gujarat, was prosecuted for offences under

Section 161 IPC and Section 5(2) of the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 and was ultimately convicted and

sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of

Rs.15,000/- for the offence under Section 5(2) of the Act

and another two years rigorous imprisonment for the offence

under Section 161 IPC, by the trial court namely, Special

Judge, Bharuch. This was upheld by the High Court in appeal.

2. Mr. U.R. Lalit, Senior counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant has strenuously contended that the entire

proceedings, namely, the proceedings before the trial court

as also the High Court are liable to be set aside as there

was no valid sanction within the meaning of Section 6 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to

as "the Act") with the consequence that the trial court had

no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these offences, much

less try them. This contention is challenged by the counsel

appearing on behalf of the State of Gujarat, who has

contended that there was proper and valid sanction granted

within the meaning of the Act and it was thereafter that the

trial court took cognizance of the offences and initiated

the case which ultimately ended in the conviction of the

appellant. The trial court as also the High Court before

whom the question of want of "sanction" was raised have held

concurrently theat there was proper sanction by the

competent authority and therefore, the appellant was rightly

convicted particularly as the charges were proved against

him.

3. In order to appreciate the controversy as regards

"sanction", we may set out following few facts.

4. M/s R.L. Kalathia & Company, a partnership firm of

eleven partners, one of whom was Mr. Harshadrai Laljibhai

Kalathia, were awarded, in 1979, the contract for

constructing Pigut Dam in Valia Taluka of District Bharuch

at an estimated cost of Rupees eighty six lacs. The work was

completed on 31st December, 1982. Excluding the payments

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made against running bills, there still remained a sum of

Rupees eighty lacs to be paid to the contractor from whom

the appellant allegedly demanded Rs.20,000/- but Harshadrai

Laljibhai Kalathia reported the matter to the Deputy

Director (Anti Corruption), Shri Vaghela, who, in his turn,

briefed the Police Inspector, Shri Agravat and the latter,

namely Shri Agravat arranged and laid a trap on 4.4.83. The

currency notes, treated with anthracene powder, were offered

to the appellant who was, allegedly, caught red-handed by

the raiding party. Police Inspector Agravat examined the

hands of the appellant in the light of the ultra violet lamp

which indicated marks of anthracene powder on the tips, palm

and fingers of the left hand as also on his right hand. Some

marks of blue anthracene powder were also found on the

currency notes. Inspector Agravat gave a receipt of

Rs.20.000/- to the appellant and took the currency notes in

his possession. The usual Panchnama was prepared and further

investigation was carried out by Shri Agravat.

5. In the meantime, the appellant submitted an application

(Ex. 45) to the Home Minister on 9.3.1984 for investigation

being handed over to an independant officer. The Home

Minister by his order dated 13.3.1984 directed fresh

investigation of the case, in pursuance of which the

investigation was taken up by the Assistant Director, Shri

Vaghela, who submitted a fresh report in December, 1984

against the appellant. On the receipt of this report, the

Secretary, Gujarat Vigilance Commission, by his letter dated

3.1.1985, wrote to the Government to grant sanction for

prosecuting the appellant as a prima facie case was made out

against him after fresh investigation. The Government,

however, did not immediately grant the sanction and

consequently the complainant, Shri Harshadrai Laljibhai

Kalathia, filed, in the name of the firm, M/s R.L. Kalathia

& Company, a Special Civil Application No. 5126 of 1984 in

the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution

for a direction to the respondents, namely the State of

Gujarat and others, to sanction prosecution of the appellant

for offence punishable under Section 161 IPC and 5(2) of the

Act. The Gujarat High Court, by its order dated 2.1.1985,

partly allowed the petition and passed the following

operative order :

"In the result, this petition is

partly allowed. Respondent No. 7

(newly added) is directed to accord

sanction under the relevant

provisions of the Prevention of

Corruption Act to prosecute M.V.

Chauhan who was woking as

Divisional Accountant of Medium

Irrigation Project at Ankleshwar as

stated above. It need not be stated

the prosecution will be for

offences punishable under the

relevant provisions of law.

Respondent No. 7 is directed to

accord sanction within one month

from the receipt of the writ of

this Court.

Rule made absolute to the extent

stated above with no order as to

costs."

6. From the above it will be seen that the Secretary of

the Department who was not originally a party in the writ

petition, was impleaded as respondent No. 7, and a direction

was given by the High Court to the Secretary to grant

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sanction for prosecuting the appellant.

7. In view if the judgment of the Gujarat High Court,

sanction was given and the appellant was prosecuted.

8. Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code which deals

with the prosecution of Judges and Public Servants for

offence alleged to have been committed by them while acting

or purporting to act in the discharge of their official

duty, lays down that no court shall take cognizance of such

offences except with the previous sanction either of the

Central Government or the State Government, as the case may

be. Section 6 of the Act, however, contains a special

provision for sanction for prosecution for a few specific

offences, including the offence punishable under Section 161

IPC. It provides as under :

"6, Previous sanction necessary for

prosecution.- (1) No court shall

take cognizance of an offence

punishable under Section 161 [or

Section 164] or Section 165 of the

Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), or

under sub-section (2) [or sub-

section (3A) of Section 5 of its

Act, alleged to have been committed

by a public servant, except with

the previous sanction,

(a) in the case of a person who is

employed in connection with the

affairs of the [Union} and is not

removable from his office save by

or with the sanction of the Central

Government, [of the] Central

Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is

employed in connection with the

affairs of [a State] and is not

removable from his office save by

or with the sanction of the State

Government, [of the] State

Government;

(C) in the case of any other

person, of the authority competent

to remove him from his office.

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever

any doubt arises whether the

previous sanction as required under

sub-section (1) should be given by

the Central or State Government or

any other authority such sanction

shall be given by that Government

or authority which would have been

competent to remove the public

servant from his office at the time

when the offence was alleged to

have been committed."

This Section places a bar on the Court from taking

cognizance of the offences specified in Sub-section (1)

against Public Servants unless the prosecution for those

offences has been sanctioned either by the Central

Government, if the person who has allegedly committed the

offence, is employed in connection with the affairs of the

Union Government and is not removable from his office except

with the sanction of the Central Government, or by the State

Government if that person is employed in connection with the

affairs of the State Government. But if the "public servant"

is not employee of either the Central Government or the

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state Government, sanction, is not be given by the authority

competent to remove him from the office held by him.

10. "Public servant" is defined in Section 21 of the IPC as

a person falling under any of the categories specified

therein. Twelfth Clause of Section 21 embraces within the

fold of "public servant", every person who is:-

(a) In the service of the Government or remunerated by fees

or commission for the performance of any public duty by

the Government.

(b) In the service or pay of a local authority, a

Corporation establish by or under a Central, Provincial

or other State Act or a Government company as defined

in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956.

11. Clause Twelfth was added by the Criminal Law

(Amendment) Act (2 of 1958) and was substituted, in its

present from, by Anti-Corruption Laws (Amendment) Act, 1964

(11 of 1964). The definition of "public servant", as set out

in Section 21 of the IPC, has been adopted by the Act so

that there is no difference between the "public servant" as

defined in the Code and the public servant defined in the

Act.

12. Once the person against whom prosecution is to be

launched is found to be covered by the definition of "public

servant" and the requirement to that extent is satisfied,

the next question whether he is to be prosecuted or not is

considered either by the Central Government or by the State

Government and if the person is neither the employee of the

Central Government nor of the State Government, the question

of sanction is considered by the person who is competent to

remove him from the office held by him.

13. Sub-section (2) of Section 6 is clarificatory in nature

inasmuch as it provides that if any doubt arises whether the

sanction is to be given by the Central Government or the

State Government or any other authority, it shall be given

by the appropriate Government or the authority, it shall be

given by the appropriate Government or the authority, which

was competent to remove that person from the office on the

date on which the offence was committed. This rule is a

departure from the normal rule under which the relevant date

is the date of taking cognizance, as laid down by this Court

in R.S. Nayak vs. A.R. Antulay, AIR 1984 SC 684 = 1984

Cr.L.J.613.

14. From a perusal of Section 6, it would appear that the

Central or the State Government or any other authority

(depending upon the category of the public servant) has the

right to consider the facts of each case and to decide

whether that "public servant" is to be prosecuted or not.

Since the Section clearly prohibits the Courts from taking

cognizance of the offences specified therein, it envisages

that Central or the State Government or the "other

authority" has not only the right to consider the question

of grant of sanction, it has also the discretion to grant or

not to grant sanction.

15. In Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka V. The King, AIR 1948

PC 82, it was pointed out that:-

"The sanction to prosecute is an

important matter, it constitutes a

condition precedent to the

institution of the prosecution and

the Government have an absolute

discretion to grant or withhold

their sanction. They are not, as

the High Court seen to have

thought, concerned merely to see

that the evidence discloses a prima

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facie case against the person

sought to be prosecuted. They can

refuse sanction on any ground which

commends itself to them, for

example, that on political or

economic grounds they regard a

prosecution of substance it is

plain that the Government cannot

adequately discharge the obligation

of deciding whether to give or

withhold a sanction without a

knowledge of the facts of the

case."

16. In Basdeo Agarwalla v. Emperor, AIR 1945 FC 16, it was

pointed out that sanction under the Act is not intended to

be, nor is an automatic formality and it is essential that

the provisions in regard to sanction should be observed with

complete strictness. This Court in State through Anti-

Corruption Bureau, Government of Maharashtra, Bombay vs.

Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani. (1996) 4 SCC 472, while

considering the provisions of Section 6 of the Act held that

one of the guiding principles for sanctioning authority

would be the public interest and, therefore, the protection

available under Section 6 cannot be said to be absolute.

17. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. The grant of

sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise

but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to

Government Servants against frivolous prosecutions. ( See:

Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC

677). Sanction is a weapon to ensure discouragement of

frivolous and vexatious prosecutions and is a safeguard for

the innocent but not a shield for the guilty.

18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend

upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority

and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and

evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority.

Consideration implies application of mind. The order of

sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning

authority had considered the evidence and other material

placed before it. This fact can also be established by

extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the

Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the

sanctioning authority. (See also: Jaswant Singh vs. The

State of Punjab, 1958 SCR 762 = AIR 1958 SC 12; State of

Bihar & Anr. vs. P.P. Sharma, 1991 Cr.L.J. 1438 (SC)).

19. Since the validity of "Sanction" depends on the

applicability of mind by the sanctioning authority to the

facts of the case as also the material and evidence

collected during investigation, it necessarily follows, that

the sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent

mind for the generation of genuie satisfaction whether

prosecution has to be sanctioned or not. The mind of the

sanctioning authority should not be under pressure from any

quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to

take decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to

grant or not to grant sanction vests absolutely in the

sanctioning authority, its discretion should be shown to

have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If

is shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply

its independent mind for any reason whatsoever or was under

an obligation or compulsion or constraint to grant the

sanction, the order will be had for the reason that the

discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away

and it was compelled to act mechanically to sanction the

prosecution

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20. The narration of facts, set out in the beginning of

judgment would show that while the matter of grant of

sanction was under the consideration of the State

Government, Harashadrai had filed a petition of behalf of

his firm in the Gujarat High Court under Article 226 pf the

Constitution for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing

the State Government to grant sanction. In this petition ,

the Secretary of Department who, originally was not

impleaded, was, subsequently, arrayed as respondent No.7 and

a direction was issued to him to grant sanction and the

Secretary, acting in pursuance of the order of the High

Court, granted the sanction.

21. The question is whether the High Court could issue a

mandamus of their and whether the order of Sanction, in

these circumstances, is valid.

22. Mandamus which is a discretionary remedy under Article

226 of the Constitution is requested to be issued, inter

alia, to compel performance of public duties which may be

administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature.

Statutory duty may be either directory or mandatory.

Statutory duties, if they are intended to be mandatory in

character, are indicated by the use of the words "shall" or

"must". But this is not conclusive as "shall" and "must"

have, sometimes, been interpreted as "may" . What is

determinative of the nature of duty, whether it is

obligatory, mandatory or directory, is the scheme of the

Statute in which the 'duty" has been set out. Even if the

"Duty" is not set out clearly and specially in the Statute,

it may be implied as co-relative to a "Right".

23. In the performance of this Study, if the authority in

whom the discretion is vested under the Statute, does not

act independently and passes an order under the instructions

and orders of another authority, the Court would intervene

in the matter, quash the orders and issue a mandamus to that

authority to exercise its own discretion.

24. In The Vice-Chancellor, Utkal University and others vs.

S.K. Ghosh and others, (1945) SCR 883 = AIR 1954 SC 217,

this Court pointed out that in a proceeding for mandamus,

the Court cannot sit as a Court of Appeal or substitute its

own discretion for that of the authority in which the

Statute had vested the discretion. It was pointed out:-

"(18). We also think the High Court

was wrong on the second point. The

learned Judges rightly hold that in

a `mandamus' petition the High

Court cannot constitute itself into

a Court of appeal from authority

against which the appeals is

sought, but having said that they

went on to do just what they said

they could not. The learned Judges

appeared to consider that it is not

enough to have facts established

from which a leakage can

legitimately be inferred by

reasonable minds but that there

must in addition be proof of its

quantum and amplitude though they

do not indicate what the yard-stick

of measurement should be. That is a

proposition to which we are not

able to assent.

(19). We are not prepared to

perpetrate the error into which the

learned High Court Judges permitted

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themselves to be led and examine

the facts for ourselves as a Court

of appeal but in view of the

strictures the High Court has made

on the Vice-Chancellor and the

Syndicate we are compelled to

observe that we do not fell they

are justified . The question was

one of urgency and the Vice-

Chancellor and the members of the

Syndicate were well within their

rights in exercising their

discretion in the way they did. It

may be that the matter could have

been handled in some other way, as,

for example, in the manner the

learned Judges indicate, but it is

not the function of Courts of law

to substitute their wisdom and

discretion for that of the persons

to whose judgment the matter in

question is entrusted by the law."

25. This principle was reiterated in Tata Cellular vs.

Union of India. AIR 1966 SC 11 = (1994) 6 SCC 651, in which

it was, inter alia, laid down that the Court does not sit as

a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the

decision was made particularly as the Court does not have

the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a

review of the administrative decision is permitted, it will

be substituting its own decision which itself may be

fallible. The Court pointed out that they duty of the Court

is to confine itself to the question of legality. Its

concern should be :

1. Whether a decision-making

authority exceeded its powers?

2. committed an error of law;

3. committed, a breach of the rules

of natural justice;

4. reached a decision which no

reasonable Tribunal would have

reached; or

5. abused its powers.

26. In this case, Lord Denning was quoted as saying :

"Parliament often entrusts the

decision of a matter to a specified

person or body, without providing

for any appeal. it may be a

judicial decision, or a quasi-

judicial decision, or an

administrative decision. Sometimes

Parliament says its decision is to

be final. At other times it says

nothing about it. In all these

cases the Courts will not

themselves take the place of the

body of whom Parliament has

entrusted the decision. The Courts

will not themselves embark on a

rehearing of the matter : See

Healey v. Minister of Health (1955)

1 QB 221."

27. Lord Denning further observed as under :

"If the decision-making body is

influenced by considerations which

ought not influence it; or fails to

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take into account matters which it

ought to take into account, the

Court will interfere : see,

Padfield v. Minister of

Agriculture, Fisheries and Food

1968 AC 997."

28. In Sterling Computers Ltd. vs. M/s M & N Publications

Ltd. and others, AIR 1966 SC 51 = (1993) 1 SCR 81 = (1993) 1

SCC 445, it was pointed out that while exercising the power

of judicial review, the Court is concerned primarily as to

whether there has been any infirmity in the decision-making

process? In this case, the following passage from Professor

Wade's Administrative Law was relied upon :

"The doctrine that powers must be

exercised reasonably has to be

reconciled with the no less

important doctrine that the Court

must not usurp the discretion of

the public authority which

Parliament appointed to take the

decision. Within the bounds of

legal reasonableness is the area in

which the deciding authority has

genuinely free discretion. If it

passes those bounds, it acts ultra

vires. The Court must therefore

resist the temptation to draw the

bounds too tightly, merely

according to its own opinion. It

must strive to apply an objective

standard which leaves to the

deciding authority the full range

of choices which legislature is

presumed to have intended."

29. It may be pointed out that this principle was also

applied by Professor Wade to quasi-judicial bodies and their

decisions. Relying upon the decision in The Queen v. Justice

of London, (1895) 1 QB 214, Professor, Wade laid down the

principle that where a public authority was given power to

determined a matter, mandamus would not lie to compel it to

reach some particular decision.

30. A Division Bench of this Court comprising of Kuldip

Singh and B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ. in U.P Financial

Corporation vs. M/s. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd. and others,

AIR 1993 SC 1435 = (1993) 2 SCR 149 = (1993) 2 SCC 229,

observed as under :

"The obligation to act fairly on

the apart of the administrative

authorities was evolved to ensure

the Rule of Law and to prevent

failure of justice. This doctrine

is complementary to the principles

of natural justice which the Quasi-

Judicial Authorities are bound to

observe. It is true that the

distinction between a quasi-

Judicial and the administrative

action has become thin, as pointed

out by this court as far back as

1970 in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of

India AIR 1970 SC 150. Even so the

extent of judicial

scrutiny/judicial review in the

case of administrative action

cannot be larger than in the case

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of quasi judicial action. If the

High Court cannot sit as an

appellate authority over the

decisions and orders of quasi-

judicial authorities it follows

equally that it cannot do so in the

case of administrative authorities.

In the matter of administrative

action, it is well-known, more than

one choice is available to the

administrative authorities; they

have a certain amount of discretion

available to them. They have "a

right to choose between more than

one possible course of action upon

which there is room for reasonable

people to hold differing opinions

as to which is to preferred" (Lord

Diplock in Secretary of State for

Education v. Tameside Metropolitan

Borough Council - 1997 AC 1014 at

1064). The Court cannot substitute

its judgment for the judgment of

administrative authorities in sch

cases. Only when the action of the

administrative authority is so

unfair or unreasonable that no

reasonable person would have taken

that action, can the Court

intervene."

31. In the background of the above principles, let us now

scrutinise the judgment of the Gujarat High Court which, let

us say here and now, could only direct the Govt. for

expeditious disposal of the matter of sanction.

32. By issuing a direction to the Secretary to grant

sanction, the High Court closed all other alternatives to

the Secretary and compelled him to proceed only in one

direction and to act only in one way, namely, to sanction

the prosecution of the appellant. The Secretary was not

allowed to consider whether it would be feasible to

prosecute the appellant; whether the complaint of Harshadraj

of illegal gratification which was sought to be supported by

"trip" was false and whether the prosecution would be

vexatious particularly as it was in the knowledge of the

Govt. that the firm had been black-listed once and there was

demand for some amount to be paid to Govt, by the firm in

connection with this contract. The discretion not to

sanction the prosecution was thus taken away by the High

Court.

33. The High Court put the Secretary in a piquant

situation. While that Act gave him the discretion to

sanction or not to sanction the prosecution of the

appellant, the judgment gave him no choice except to

sanction the prosecution as any other decision would have

exposed him to action in contempt for not obeying the

mandamus issued by the High Court. The High Court assumed

that role of the sanctioning authority, considered the whole

matter, formed an opinion that it was a fit case in which

sanction should be granted and because it itself could not

grant sanction under Section 6 of the Act, it directed the

Secretary to sanction the prosecution so that the sanction

order may be created to be an order passed by the Secretary

and not that of the High Court. This is a classic case where

a Brand name is changed to give a new colour to the package

without changing the contents thereof. In these

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circumstances the sanctions order cannot but be held to be

wholly erroneous having been passed mechanically at the

instance of the High Court.

34. Learned counsel for the State of Gujarat contended that

the judgment passed by the High Court cannot be questioned

is these proceedings as it had become final. The contention

is wholly devoid of substance. The appellant has questioned

the legality of "sanction" on many grounds one of which is

that the sanctioning authority did not apply its own mind

and acted at the behest of the High Court which had issued a

mandamus to sanction the prosecution. On a consideration of

the whole matter, we are of the positive opinion that the

sanctioning authority, in the instant case, was left with no

choice except to sanction the prosecution and in passing the

order of sanction, it acted mechanically in obedience to the

mandamus issued by the High Court by putting the signature

on a pro forma drawn up by the office. Since the correctness

and validity of the `sanction order' was assailed before us,

we had necessarily to consider the High Court judgment and

its impact on the "Sanction". The so-called finality cannot

shut out the scrutiny of the judgment in terms of actus

curiae neminem gravabit as the order of the Gujarat High

Court in directing the sanction to be granted, besides being

erroneous, was harmful to the interest of the appellant, who

had a right, a valuable right, of pair trial at every stage,

from the initiation till the conclusion of the proceedings.

35. There is another aspect of the matter.

36. The High Court by its order dated 21.1.1985 had

directed the Secretary, Road & Building Department, to grant

sanction within one month from the receipt of the order. The

sanction order (Exhibit 9) is dated 23rd January, 1985 and

is signed by Shri J.P. Lade Deputy Secretary to the

Government of Gujarat, Road & Building Department. Shri Lade

has been examined as PW-8. He stated that on the relevant

date, he was serving as Under Secretary and was also holding

the additional charge of Deputy Secretary, Road & Building

Department and in that capacity, he gave the sanction as he

felt that there was sufficient evidence against the

appellant warranting his prosecution.

37. PW-14, Shri Pravinchandra Jaisukhlal, who was the

Secretary, Road, & Building Department, where Shri Lade was

the Under Secretary, stated that he had given the sanction

for prosecution of the appellant. He further stated that

before according sanction he had seen all the papers. He

also stated that the signature on Exhibit 9 was that of Shri

Lade as the correspondence is usually done by the Under

Secretary after the orders are passed on the file.

38. From the nothings of the Secretariat file, contained in

Exhibit 70, as also the conflicting statement made by the

Secretary and the Under Secretary, it is not possible to

hold as to who actually granted the sanction. The Gujarat

High Court has held that the Sanction was granted by the

Deputy Secretary, Shri Lade (PW-8), ignoring the fact that

the file was also placed before the Secretary and he had

also put his signature thereon. The file had, admitted, been

sent to the office of the Chief Minister from where it was

received back on 30th January, 1985 and as such it is not

understandable as to how sanction could be granted on 23rd

January, 1985. This confusion also appears to be the result

of the order passed by the High Court that the sanction must

be granted within one month. Secretary being the head of the

Department stated on oath that he had granted the sanction,

particularly as the mandamus was directed to him and he had

to comply with that direction Deputy Secretary, who actually

issued the order of sanction, had signed it and, therefore,

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he owned the sanction and stated that he had sanctioned the

prosecution. Both tried to exhibit that they had faithfully

obeyed the mandamus issued by the High Court and attempted

to save their skin, destroying, in the process, the legality

and validity of the sanction which constituted the basis of

appellant's prosecution with the consequence that whole

proceedings stood void ab initio.

39. Normally when the sanction order is held to be bad, the

case is remitted back to the authority for re-consideration

of the matter and to pass a fresh order of sanction in

accordance with law. But in the instant case, the incident

is of 1983 and therefore, after a lapse of fourteen years,

it will not, in our opinion, be fair just to direct that the

proceedings may again be initiated from the stage of

sanction so as to expose the appellant to another innings of

litigation and keep him on trial for an indefinitely long

period contrary to the mandate of Article 21 of the

Constitution which, as a part of right to life,

philosophizes early and of criminal proceedings through a

speedy trial.

40. The appeal is consequently allowed. The judgment passed

by the trail court as also by the High Court are set aside

and appellant is acquitted. He is on bail. He need not

surrender. His bail bonds are cancelled.