criminal law, Punjab case, conviction appeal, Supreme Court
0  15 Sep, 2003
Listen in 00:45 mins | Read in 12:00 mins
EN
HI

Megh Singh Vs. State of Punjab

  Supreme Court Of India Criminal Appeal /452/2003
Link copied!

Case Background

As per case facts, police apprehended Megh Singh sitting on gunny bags containing poppy husk, while two others fled. Following recovery and sampling, he was convicted under Section 15 of ...

Hello! How can I help you? 😊
Disclaimer: We do not store your data.
Document Text Version

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3

CASE NO.:

Appeal (crl.) 452 of 2003

PETITIONER:

Megh Singh

RESPONDENT:

State of Punjab

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/2003

BENCH:

DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

Appeal preferred by appellant-Megh Singh questioning his

conviction under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985 (for short the 'Act') was dismissed by learned

Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the impugned

judgment. He has questioned the legality thereof in the present appeal.

The compass of controversy as unfolded during trial by the

prosecution is as follows:

On 22.2.1993, police party headed by SI Chanan Singh, In-charge of

Police Station Dharamgarh (PW 1/B) was going on kacha road towards drain

from village Dharamgarh in connection with patrol duty and when they

reached near brick kiln, Santa Singh son of Bachan Singh met them and

joined in the police party. When the police party was little short of

the drain, they saw three persons sitting on gunny bags. Two of them

fled from the spot and the third one, accused-appellant Megh Singh was

apprehended. He disclosed the names of the persons who had run away to

be Baldev Singh and Pillu. Twenty-five bags containing poppy husk were

found at the spot. Two samples of 250 gms. were taken from each bag and

after taking the samples, weight of bags was found to be 36 kgs. 500

gms. each. All the fifty samples and 25 bags of poppy husk were sealed

with seal 'CS' which after use was handed over to HS Mithu Singh (PW-2).

The case property was taken into possession vide recovery memo Exhibit

PC attested by witnesses including Santa Singh. On the basis of ruqa

Exhibit PE. F.I.R. Exhibit PE/1 was registered. Baldev Singh who had run

away from the spot was arrested on 27.2.1993 and Pillu Singh was

arrested on 10.3.1993. Case property was produced before Baldev Singh,

SHO of Police Station, Sunam (PW-3) who verified the investigation and

sealed the same with seal 'BS'. On chemical examination, the samples

were found to be of poppy husk vide report Exhibit PK.

Trial Court after considering the evidence on record held that the

accusations against appellant-Megh Singh have been found established;

accordingly convicted him under Section 15 of the Act and sentenced him

to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh with default

condition of further RI for 1 year. Appellant challenged the conviction

and sentence before the High Court. Primary stand was that accused had

been arrested on 19.2.1993 and telegram had been sent in that regard to

the police officials. It was contended that when benefit of doubt has

been given to the other co-accused persons, there was no basis for

convicting the accused-appellant. There was no material to show any

conscious possession which is sine qua non for conviction under Section

15 of the Act. In any event, requirements of Section 50 were not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 3

complied with. High Court discarded the plea regarding arrest of Megh

Singh on 19.2.1993 on the ground that the evidence on record establishes

that the application/telegram was received on 24.2.1993 and merely

because an earlier date was indicated, it cannot be said that the

accused was really arrested on 19.2.1993. Coming to the plea of

conscious possession it was held that the prosecution had produced ample

evidence that accused was in physical possession and in terms of Section

54 of the Act conscious possession was presumed unless proved to the

contrary. Accused has failed to do so. Therefore, conscious possession

was established. Accordingly the appeal filed by the accused was

dismissed. It was further held that Section 50 has no application

because there was no personal search of the applicant. Consequentially

conviction and sentence were upheld.

Learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant submitted that

the facts of the case greatly resemblance with that of Avtar Singh and

Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7) SCC 419). Since conscious possession

has not been proved, the conviction of the accused-appellant cannot be

stand on a different footing from those co-accused who have been

acquitted. Non-compliance with requirements of Section 50 of the Act

vitiates the conviction.

In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted

that conscious possession has been established and by application of

logic of Section 54 of the Act when physical possession is established,

there is presumption of conscious possession. Merely because co-accused

persons have been acquitted that cannot be a factor to hold the accused-

appellant innocent. It is submitted that since there was no personal

search, Section 50 of the Act has no application.

Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with

reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out

from the evidence on record is that the accused was sitting atop gunny

bags containing the contraband articles.

Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence.

Section 20 appears in chapter IV of the Act which relates to offence for

possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the

possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession.

It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with

requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody

without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not

attracted.

The expression 'possession' is a polymorphous term which assumes

different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings

in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed

in Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil

Kumar Bhunja and Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 52), to work out a completely logical

and precise definition of "possession" uniformally applicable to all

situations in the context of all statutes.

The word 'conscious' means awareness about a particular fact. It

is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

As noted in Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P. (AIR 1972 SC 1756)

possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be

constructive, having power and control over the article in case in

question, while the person whom physical possession is given holds it

subject to that power or control.

The word 'possession' means the legal right to possession (See

Health v. Drown (1972) (2) All ER 561 (HL). In an interesting case it

was observed that where a person keeps his fire arm in his mother's flat

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 3

which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in

possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness (1976 (1) All

ER 844 (QBD).

Once possession is established the person who claims that it was

not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to

be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act

gives a statutory recognition of this position because of presumption

available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where

also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit

articles. This position was highlighted in Madan Lal and Anr. v. State

of Himachal Pradesh (2003 (6) SCALE 483).

In the factual scenario of the present case not only possession

but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by

the accused-appellant that the possession was not conscious in the

logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.

Now comes the question whether there was non-compliance of Section

50 of the Act.

A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of

personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle

or a container or a bag, or premises. (See Kalema Tumba v. State of

Maharashtra and Anr. (JT 1999 (8) SC 293), The State of Punjab v. Baldev

Singh (JT 1999 (4) SC 595), Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana (2001(3)

SCC 28). The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search

has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search of premises,

vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the

Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh's case (supra). Above being the

position, the contention regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the

Act is also without any substance.

The decision in Avtar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7)

SCC 419) was rendered in a different factual background. In that case

the articles were being carried in a truck. There were several persons

in the truck. It had not been established by evidence that any one of

them had any conscious possession. That also was not the only factor

taken note of. While the accused was examined under Section 313 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code'), the essence of

accusations was not brought to his notice, more particularly with

possession aspect. It was also noticed that the possibility of the

accused persons being labourers of the truck was not ruled by the

evidence. Since the decision was rendered on consideration of several

peculiar factual aspects specially noticed in that case, it is of no

assistance to the accused also.

Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may

make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases or between

two accused in the same case. Each case depends on its own facts and a

close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a

single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more

pronounced in criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact

based.

We find no substance in this appeal, which deserves dismissal, and

we so direct.

Description

['

The Landmark Ruling on Conscious Possession: Megh Singh v. State of Punjab (2003)

\n

The Supreme Court of India\'s decision in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab (2003) stands as a pivotal ruling concerning NDPS Act conviction and the intricate concept of conscious possession in drug cases. This authoritative judgment, widely referenced, is readily available and analyzed on CaseOn, offering crucial insights into the application of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

\n\n

Case Summary: Megh Singh v. State of Punjab (2003)

\n

This analysis delves into the Supreme Court\'s decision in Megh Singh v. State of Punjab, a significant case concerning the interpretation and application of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).

\n\n

Issue Presented

\n

The core issues before the Supreme Court were:

\n
    \n
  1. Whether the appellant, Megh Singh, had "conscious possession" of the poppy husk, a prerequisite for conviction under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.
  2. \n
  3. Whether the provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS Act, pertaining to the search of persons, were complied with, and if their non-compliance vitiated the conviction.
  4. \n
  5. Whether the acquittal of co-accused persons should have automatically led to the appellant\'s acquittal.
  6. \n
\n\n

Key Legal Rules Applied

\n

The Court considered several crucial provisions of the NDPS Act and established legal principles:

\n
    \n
  • Section 15, NDPS Act: This section criminalizes the possession of poppy husk.
  • \n
  • Section 35, NDPS Act: Stipulates a presumption of culpable mental state (including conscious possession) unless the contrary is proved.
  • \n
  • Section 54, NDPS Act: Allows for a presumption to be drawn from the possession of illicit articles, placing the burden on the accused to explain such possession.
  • \n
  • Section 50, NDPS Act: Outlines the procedure for searching a person, requiring the individual to be informed of their right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate.
  • \n
  • Definition of \'Possession\': The Court reiterated that possession isn\'t limited to physical custody but can be constructive, implying power and control over the article. It emphasized "conscious possession" as awareness and intent, citing cases like Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P. and Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja.
  • \n
  • Applicability of Section 50: Drawing on precedents like The State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh, the Court reaffirmed that Section 50 is specifically for the personal search of an individual and does not extend to the search of vehicles, containers, bags, or premises.
  • \n
\n\n

Factual Background and Court\'s Analysis

\n

On February 22, 1993, a police party encountered three individuals sitting on gunny bags near a brick kiln. Two fled, but Megh Singh was apprehended. Upon inspection, 25 gunny bags, each weighing 36.5 kg, containing poppy husk were discovered. Samples were taken, sealed, and chemical analysis confirmed the presence of poppy husk.

\n

The Trial Court convicted Megh Singh under Section 15 of the NDPS Act, sentencing him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. The High Court upheld this conviction, dismissing Megh Singh\'s appeal.

\n

Before the Supreme Court, Megh Singh argued:

\n
    \n
  • He was arrested earlier than claimed, on February 19, 1993. The Court dismissed this, noting evidence of the telegram being received on February 24, 1993.
  • \n
  • Conscious possession was not proven, and co-accused persons were acquitted. The Supreme Court highlighted that Megh Singh was found sitting atop the bags, which strongly indicated physical and, by extension, conscious possession, especially given the presumptions under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act. The acquittal of co-accused was deemed irrelevant as each case hinges on its specific facts, differentiating it from Avtar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, where conscious possession was not established for any occupant in a truck and accused were labourers.
  • \n
  • Section 50 of the NDPS Act was not complied with. The Court firmly reiterated that Section 50 applies only to the personal search of an individual. Since the search involved gunny bags (articles), and not a personal body search, Section 50\'s requirements were not applicable.
  • \n
\n\n

For legal professionals and students seeking to quickly grasp the nuances of such rulings, CaseOn.in offers concise 2-minute audio briefs that distill complex judgments like Megh Singh v. State of Punjab into easily digestible insights.

\n\n

Conclusion of the Supreme Court

\n

The Supreme Court found no merit in Megh Singh\'s appeal. It affirmed the High Court\'s decision, upholding the conviction and sentence, concluding that conscious possession was adequately established and Section 50 of the NDPS Act had no bearing on the facts of the case.

\n\n

Why this Judgment Matters for Legal Professionals & Students

\n
    \n
  • Clarity on Conscious Possession: This judgment reinforces the interpretation of "conscious possession" under the NDPS Act, emphasizing that circumstantial evidence and statutory presumptions (Sections 35 & 54) play a vital role. It clarifies that merely being in physical proximity to contraband, especially when found \'on\' or \'atop\' it, can lead to the inference of conscious possession, shifting the burden onto the accused to prove otherwise.
  • \n
  • Scope of Section 50 NDPS Act: The ruling provides an unambiguous clarification on the limited applicability of Section 50, reiterating that it pertains exclusively to the personal search of an individual and not to the search of objects, vehicles, or premises. This is a critical distinction for police procedures and defense strategies in NDPS cases.
  • \n
  • Distinguishing Precedents: The Court\'s careful distinction of Avtar Singh highlights the importance of specific factual matrices in criminal law. It serves as a reminder that similar cases might yield different outcomes based on subtle yet significant factual variations, making a thorough analysis of evidence paramount.
  • \n
  • Evidentiary Value: For students, this case illustrates how courts weigh evidence, deal with presumptions, and discard unsubstantiated claims (like the premature arrest claim). For practitioners, it underscores the strength of evidence gathered when an accused is found directly in possession of illicit articles.
  • \n
\n\n

Final Thoughts

\n

The Megh Singh v. State of Punjab judgment from 2003 is a testament to the rigorous application of the NDPS Act. It underscores the judiciary\'s stance on combating drug trafficking by upholding convictions where conscious possession is clearly established, while also meticulously defining the procedural safeguards provided by the Act. This ruling remains a foundational text for understanding the interplay between factual evidence, statutory presumptions, and procedural law in NDPS cases.

\n\n

Disclaimer

\n

All information provided in this article is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are advised to consult with a qualified legal professional for advice on specific legal issues. CaseOn.in and its authors are not liable for any actions taken based on the information presented herein.

']

Legal Notes

Add a Note....