-WP-11314-2025.DOC

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 11314 OF 2025

Mehboob Abdul Gafar Shaikh

Age- 52 years, Occ: Business,

R/at: Malwadi, Hadapsar,

Taluka Haveli, District-Pune.

...Petitioner

(Org. Plaintiff)

Versus

1. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India LLP,

A Limited Liability Partnership incorporated

Under the provisions of the Limited Liability

Partnership Act, 2008

Having its registered office at:-

Office Nos. 1 to 5, Millennium Star,

Dhole Patil Road, Opp. Ruby Hall Clinic,

Pune – 411 001.

And formerly known as

(M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India Pvt Ltd)

Through its Designated Partners:-

Mr. Ravindra Naupatlal Sakla

Age- 63 Years, Occ: Business.

2. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India Pvt Ltd,

Company registered under the Companies Act,

Office Nos. 1 to 5, Millennium Star,

Dhole Patil Road, Opp. Ruby Hall Clinic,

Pune – 411 001.

3. M/s Raviraj Lunkad Infracon India Pvt Ltd,

Through its Director:-

Ravindra Naupatlal Sakla,

Age – 63 years, Occ: Agriculture and Business,

Office Nos. 1 to 5, Millennium Star,

Dhole Patil Road, Opp. Ruby Hall Clinic,

Pune – 411 001.

…Respondents (R/1-

Appellant in MCA No.

138/2025)

(R/2 and 3-Org.

Defendants in RCS

No. 537/2025)

ARS 1/23 2026:BHC-AS:8292

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

Mr. Surel Shah, Senior Advocate, with Sandeep Phatak, for the

Petitioner.

Mr. Ashish Kamat, Senior Advocate, with Srushti Chalke, Parth Jain

and Pallavi Pukale, i/b Drupad Patil, for the Respondents.

CORAM : N. J. JAMADAR, J.

RESERVED ON :28

th

JANUARY 2026

PRONOUNCED ON : 17

th

FEBRUARY 2026

JUDGMENT:

1.Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. With the consent of the

learned Counsel for the parties heard finally.

2.This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India

assails the legality, propriety and correctness of a judgment and order

dated 19

th

June 2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Pune in MCA

No. 138 of 2025, whereby the Appeal preferred by Respondent No.1-the

original Defendant No.1 against an order passed by the trial Court on

an Application for temporary injunction (Exhibit 5) in SCS No. 537 of

2025, thereby granting temporary injunction, came to be allowed by

setting aside the said order dated 24

th

March 2025.

3.Background facts leading to this Petition can be stated in brief as

under:

3.1 An Agricultural land bearing Survey No. 163/8/1A/2,

admeasuring 1H 8 R, originally belonged to Anjanabai, Sopan Talekar

ARS 2/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

and Balu Sopan Talekar. Upon demise of Anjanabai, Balu Talekar

became the sole holder of the said land (“larger property”).

3.2Balu Talekar executed an irrevocable Power of Attorney dated 17

th

August 2002 in favour of Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar purportedly in

consideration of the latter delivering possession of the house premises,

situated at Janta Vasahat, Malwadi, Hadapsar, Pune to Balu Talekar,

3.3The Plaintiff claims the said Power of Attorney of Balu Talekar

sold 48 R land out of the larger property (“the suit property”) for a

consideration of Rs. 16 Lakhs by executing a registered Sale Deed dated

5

th

October 2010. The name of the Petitioner came to be mutated to the

Record of Rights of the suit property vide Mutation Entry No. 32102.

3.4In the meanwhile, Balu Talekar, the owner of the larger property,

transferred 38 R land out of the larger property under a registered Sale

Deed dated 12

th

January 2007 in favour of Lunkad Infrastructure. The

said parcel of land was further transferred by Lunkad Infrastructure in

favour of M/s Ashray Premises Private Limited Company (“M/s Ashray

Properties”) under a registered Sale Deed dated 26

th

August 2010.

3.5In the year 2024, the Petitioner-Plaintiff entered into negotiations

with Bhaskar Reddy to sell the suit property. On 30

th

November 2024,

Mr Reddy, the prospective purchaser, published a public notice in the

newspapers. Defendants raised objections to the proposed transaction

on multiple grounds. A copy of the Sale Deed dated 7

th

April 2017

ARS 3/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

which indicated that the Defendants had purchased 54 R land from M/s

Ashray Premises, was forwarded. Despite requisitions, the Defendants

did not furnish the copies of other documents.

3.6The Plaintiff claims that, in the month of February 2025, the

Defendants started to cause obstruction to the peaceful possession and

enjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit property. Upon further enquiry, it

transpired that M/s Ashray Properties had obtained a purported Sale

Deed dated 23

rd

October 2008 in respect of the 70 R land out of the

larger property from Balu Talekar and others. However, the said Sale

Deed was registered on 2

nd

November 2011, only.

3.7Asserting that the said Sale Deed is not legal, valid and does not

bind the interest of the Plaintiff over the suit property, the suit came to

be instituted seeking a declaration that the Plaintiff is the owner of the

suit property and the consequential relief of injunction to restrain the

Defendants from causing obstruction to the possession and enjoyment

of the Plaintiff over the suit property and for compensation for the

damage caused to the tin fencing erected by the Plaintiff over the suit

property.

3.8In the said Suit an Application for temporary injunction to

restrain the Defendants from causing obstruction to the possession and

enjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit property was filed.

3.9The Defendants resisted the Application.

ARS 4/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

3.10It was, inter alia, contended that Balu Talekar had executed a

Sale Deed in favour of the M/s Ashray Properties in the year 2008 itself.

Thereafter, Balu Talekar, the original owner had completely divested

himself of any right, title and interest in the larger property. Therefore,

the purported Sale Deed executed in favour of the Plaintiff by the

alleged Power of Attorney of the original owner, in the year 2010, was

non est in the eyes of law and did not confer any title on the Plaintiff. It

was further contended that, the Plaintiff did not approach the Court

with clean hands and suppressed the fact that the original owner had

instituted a suit against the Plaintiff, being SCS No. 25 of 2014, seeking

a declaration that the purported Sale Deed in favour of the Plaintiff

dated 5

th

October 2010, is illegal, null and void, and that the

predecessor-in-title of the Defendants had raised objection to the

transaction between Power of Attorney holder of the original owner and

the Plaintiff in the year 2010, itself.

3.11It was refuted that the Plaintiff was in possession and enjoyment

of the suit property. On the contrary, the Defendants contended, the

Plaintiff had attempted to cause obstruction to the possession and

enjoyment of the Defendants over the suit property by employing

hirelings.

3.12By an order dated 24

th

March 2025, the learned Civil Judge,

Senior Division, Pune, was persuaded to allow the Application for

ARS 5/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

temporary injunction opining inter alia that a prima facie case of the

Plaintiff being in possession of the suit property, pursuant to a

registered instrument and the consequent certification of Mutation

Entry, was made out. The learned Civil Judge was of the view that the

failure to refer to SCS No. 25 of 2014 instituted by the original owner

against the Plaintiff did not constitute suppression of a material fact.

Thus, the trial Court restrained the Defendants from disturbing the

possession of the Plaintiff over the suit property during the pendency of

the suit.

3.13Being aggrieved, Defendant No.1 preferred an Appeal. By the

impugned judgment and order, the learned District Judge allowed the

Appeal observing that though the Sale Deed in respect of the larger

property was executed on 23

rd

October 2008, yet, in view of its

registration on 2

nd

September 2011, the said instrument operates from

the date of its execution. Thus, the said instrument would prevail over

the Sale Deed purportedly executed in favour of the Plaintiff on 5

th

October 2010.

3.14 The learned District Judge was also of the view that under the

Power of Attorney executed by the original owner in favour of Shaikh

Umar Latif Inamdar, the possession of the suit property was not

delivered. Adverting to the suppression of SCS No. 25 of 2014 and the

correspondence which had ensured before the Sale Deed came to be

ARS 6/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

executed in favour of the Plaintiff, the learned District Judge observed

that the Plaintiff was not entitled to an equitable relief.

3.15Being aggrieved, the Plaintiff has invoked the writ jurisdiction.

4. I have heard Mr. Surel Shah, the learned Senior Advocate for the

Petitioner/Plaintiff, and Mr. Ashish Kamat, the learned Senior Advocate

for the Respondents, at some length. The learned Senior Advocates took

the Court through the pleadings before the trial Court and the material

on record.

5.Mr. Shah, the learned Senior Advocate for the Petitioner, took a

slew of exceptions to the impugned order. Firstly, the learned District

Judge, according to Mr. Shah, transgressed the jurisdictional limits in an

Appeal against a discretionary order. It was not open for the learned

District Judge to substitute his view for the one taken by the trial Court.

By no stretch of imagination, Mr. Shah submitted, it could be urged that

the order passed by the trial Court is perverse. In the absence of the

perversity in the order, the Appellate Court could not have interfered

with the discretionary order on the premise that a different view was

possible. To buttress these submissions, Mr. Shah placed a very strong

reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramakant

Ambalal Choksi Vs Harish Ambalal Choksi and Ors.

1

6.Secondly, Mr. Shah would urge, the learned District Judge

committed a manifest error in not appreciating that the registered

1 (2024) 11 SCC 351.

ARS 7/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

Power of Attorney was executed by the original owner in favour of the

Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar in the year 2002 much before the execution

of the instruments in favour of M/s Ashray Properties. Since the said

registered Power of Attorney was in force, the authority of the Power of

Attorney was not diluted by execution of an unregistered Sale Deed

dated 23

rd

October 2008 by the original owner in favour of M/s Ashray

Properties. Thirdly, the learned District Judge was in error in holding

that the subsequent registration of the said Sale Deed dated 23

rd

October 2008, pursuant to a Deed of Confirmation dated 11

th

May

2011, made the said Sale Deed dated 23

rd

October 2008 valid and

effective from 23

rd

October 2008. It was submitted that the

Confirmation Deed dated 11

th

May 2011 was a self-serving instrument.

7.Lastly, Mr. Shah would urge, incontrovertibly the name of the

Plaintiff came to be mutated to the Record of Rights of the suit property

pursuant to a registered instrument. At no point of time any of the

Defendants or their predecessor-in-title has assailed the said mutation

entry. The Plaintiff has, thus, been in continuous and uninterrupted

possession of the suit property, since the year 2010. In that backdrop,

the learned District Judge could not have interfered with the order of

injunction which restrained the Defendants from causing obstruction to

the possession and enjoyment of the Plaintiff over the suit property.

ARS 8/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

8.In opposition to this, Mr. Kamat, the learned Senior Advocate for

the Respondents, would submit that, at the outset the challenge to the

impugned order, at the instance of the Petitioner cannot be entertained.

The Petitioner, after the impugned order and during the pendency of

this Petition, has sold his purported right, title and interest in the suit

property to third parties under a registered Sale Deed dated 16

th

September 2025. The Petitioner has not brought the said fact on record

nor the transferees have been impleaded as parties to the Petition. Since

the Petitioner no longer holds any interest in the suit property nor can

claim to be in possession thereof, the challenge to the impugned order

at the instance of the Petitioner deserves to be rejected at the threshold.

9.Mr. Kamat would urge, the suit suffers from gross suppression of

facts. Apart from the suppression of the suit instituted by Balu Talekar

against the Plaintiff, i.e. SCS No. 25 of 2014 and the correspondence

that ensured after a public notice inviting objections to the transaction,

preceding the purported sale in favour of the Plaintiff, there is no

reference to the prior claims and a Consent Decree passed by the Civil

Judge, Junior Division in RCS No. 1696 of 2006, under which Balu

Talekar, had acknowledged the liability to execute the Sale Deed in

favour of the persons at the instance of the Decree Holders therein.

Pursuant to the said Consent Decree, the Sale Deed was executed by

ARS 9/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

Balu Talekar in favour of M/s Ashray Properties to which the Decree

Holders were the consenting parties.

10.Mr. Kamat would further submit that the Power of Attorney dated

17

th

August 2002 executed by Balu Talekar in favour of Shaikh Umar

Latif Inamdar does not advance the case of the Plaintiff to the extent

desired. The said Power of Attorney nowhere indicates that the

possession of the suit property was delivered to the Power of Attorney

thereunder. At any rate, before the said Power of Attorney could be

acted upon, Balu Talekar had already executed the Sale Deed in respect

of 70 R land in favour of M/s Ashray Properties and the Sale Deed

remained to be registered only for the reason that the matter of

adjudication of stamp duty was pending before the authorities under

the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. By the time the purported Sale Deed

in favour of the Plaintiff came to be executed, Balu Talekar had divested

himself of the ownership over the suit property.

11.Mr. Kamat would urge the aforesaid factors were not at all

adverted to by the learned Civil Judge and, thus, the learned District

Judge was justified in correcting the error in the exercise of discretion

by the trial Court. In these circumstances, according to Mr. Kamat, no

case for interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction is made

out.

ARS 10/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

12.To begin with, it is necessary to note the jurisdictional limits of

both the Appellate Court, in an Appeal against a discretionary order,

and the High Court in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction, are

required to be kept in view.

13.The legal position is well recognized. Ordinarily, the appeal

Court is not expected to interfere with the exercise of discretion in the

matter of grant of injunction by the trial Court and substitute its own

discretion for the same, except where it can be demonstrated that the

discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or perversely, or the impugned

order is contrary to the settled principles of law. An arbitrariness in the

exercise of discretion or perversity in the order passed by the trial Court

can arise where the injunction has been granted sans material or the

trial court has declined to grant temporary injunction, despite existence

of justifiable material.

14.A profitable reference in this context can be made to a three

Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd.

and Anr. V/s. Antox India P. Ltd.

2

wherein the following observations

have been made :

“14.The appeals before the Division Bench were

against the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge.

In such appeals, the Appellate Court will not interfere

with the exercise of discretion of the court of first

instance and substitute its own discretion except

2 1990 (Supp) SCC 727.

ARS 11/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

where the discretion has been shown to have been

exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or

where the court had ignored the settled principles of

law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory

injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is

said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate Court will

not reassess the material and seek to reach a

conclusion different from the one reached by the court

below if the one reached by the court was reasonably

possible on the material. The appellate court would

normally not be justified in interfering with the

exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the

ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial

stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If

the discretion has been exercised by the Trial Court

reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the

appellate court would have taken a different view may

not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of

discretion. After referring to these principles

Gajendragadkar, J. in Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. V/s.

Pothan Joseph

3

:

“... These principles are well established, but as has

been observed by Viscount Simon in Charles Osention

& Co. v. Johnston the law as to the reversal by a court

of appeal of an order made by a judge below in the

exercise of his discretion is well established, and any

difficulty that arises is due only to the application of

well settled principles in an individual case.

The appellate judgment does not seem to defer

to this principle.”

(emphasis supplied)

3 (1960) 3 SCR 713

ARS 12/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

15.Another three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of

Skyline Education Institute (India) Pvt. Ltd. V/s. S.L.Vaswani and Anr.

4

after referring to the previous precedents, culled out the principles

which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction against discretionary

orders, as under :

“22. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments in that

once the Court of first instance exercises its discretion to

grant or refuse to grant relief of temporary injunction

and the said exercise of discretion is based upon

objective consideration of the material placed before the

Court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate

court will be loath to interfere simply because on a de

novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the

appellate Court to form a different opinion on the issues

of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable

injury and equity.” (emphasis supplied )”

16.In the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi (Supra), on which

reliance was placed by Mr. Shah, after adverting to aforesaid judgment

in the case of Wander Ltd (Supra) the Supreme Court enunciated that

the principles of law explained by the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd

(Supra) have been reiterated in a number of subsequent decisions of the

Supreme Court. However, over a period of time the test laid down by

the Supreme Court as regards the scope of interference has been made

more stringent. The emphasis is now more on perversity rather than a

4 (2010) 2 SCC 142

ARS 13/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

mere error of fact or law in the order granting injunction pending the

final adjudication of the suit. It was further observed that the Appellate

Court in an Appeal from interlocutory order granting or declining to

grant interim injunction is only required to adjudicate the validity of

such order applying the well settled principles governing the scope of

jurisdiction of the Appellate Court under Order 43 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908. The Appellate Court should not assume unlimited

jurisdiction and should guide its power within the contours laid down in

the Wander Ltd (Supra).

17.At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the perversity in the

order passed by the trial Court may creep in on account of non-

consideration of the material which bears upon the controversy, or

consideration of the material which has no bearing on the questions the

Court is called upon to determine at an interim stage.

18.In the case of Seema Arshad Zaheer and Ors. V/s. Municipal

Corporation of Greater Mumbai and Ors.

5

the Supreme Court

expounded how the perversity may arise in the discretionary orders.

The observations in paragraph 32 are material, and, hence, extracted

below :

“32.Where the lower court acts arbitrarily,

capriciously or perversely in the exercise of its

discretion, the appellate court will interfere. Exercise of

discretion by granting a temporary injunction when

5 (2006) 5 SCC 282

ARS 14/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

there is 'no material', or refusing to grant a temporary

injunction by ignoring the relevant documents

produced, are instances of action which are termed as

arbitrary, capricious or perverse. When we refer to

acting on 'no material' (similar to 'no evidence'), we

refer not only to cases where there are total dearth of

material, but also to cases where there is no relevant

material or where the material, taken as a whole, is not

reasonably capable of supporting the exercise of

discretion. In this case, there was 'no material' to make

out a prima facie case and therefore, the High Court in

its appellate jurisdiction, was justified in interfering in

the matter and vacating the temporary injunction

granted by the trial court.”

(emphasis supplied)

19.The contours of writ jurisdiction were illuminatingly postulated

by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajendra

Diwan vs. Pradeep Kumar Ranibala and another

6

as under:

“85. The power of superintendence conferred by Article

227 is, however, supervisory and not appellate. It is

settled law that this power of judicial Superintendence

must be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts

and tribunals within the limits of their authority. When a

Tribunal has acted within its jurisdiction, the High Court

does not interfere in exercise of its extraordinary writ

jurisdiction unless there is grave miscarriage of justice or

flagrant violation of law. Jurisdiction under Article 227

cannot be exercised “in the cloak of an appeal in

disguise”.

6 (2019) 20 SCC 143.

ARS 15/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

86. In exercise of its extraordinary power of

superintendence and/or judicial review under Articles

226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High

Courts restrict interference to cases of patent error of law

which go to the root of the decision; perversity;

arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of

principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and

usurpation of powers. The High Court does not re-assess

or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record.

Whether the High Court would exercise its writ

jurisdiction to test a decision of the Rent Control

Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of

the case. The writ jurisdiction of the High Court

cannot be converted into an alternative appellate

forum, just because there is no other provision of

appeal in the eye of law.”

20.On the aforesaid touchstone, reverting to the facts of the case at

hand, it is imperative to note that the registered Power of Attorney

executed by Balu Talekar in favour of Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar is

fulcrum of the Plaintiff’s case. Thus, the nature of the said instrument is

required to be construed, albeit prima facie. The said instrument is

titled, “an irrevocable Power of Attorney”. Nomenclature of document,

it is trite, is not of decisive significance. The document is required to be

read as a whole. Intention of the parties is required to be gathered from

the words of the document and in the light of the attendant

circumstances.

ARS 16/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

21.From the perusal of the said Power of Attorney, it becomes

abundantly clear that apart from the use of the term “irrevocable,” the

recitals and covenants of the said document nowhere indicate that,

under the said document, any interest in the property which forms the

subject matter of the agency was created in favour of the said agent,

Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar. The stated case of the Plaintiff that the said

Power of Attorney was executed in lieu of transfer of the house premises

by the said Power of Attorney in favour of Balu Talekar, the principal,

does not find mention, even remotely, in the said Power of Attorney.

22.Secondly, the factum of delivery of possession of the suit property

to the said Power of Attorney by Balu Talekar also does not find

mention in the said document. Instead, it records that the suit property

was in the possession and enjoyment of Balu Talekar and Power of

Attorney was executed as it was not possible for the principal to obtain

the requisite permissions and manage the property.

23.A Power of Attorney is essentially an expression of contract of

agency. Section 201 of the Contract Act, 1872, contains various modes

of termination of agency. The principal can terminate the contract of

agency unless such revocation is precluded by Section 202 of the Act,

1872. Under Section 202, where an agent has himself an interest in the

property, which forms subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot,

in the absence of an express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of

ARS 17/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

such interest. Thus, Section 202 of the Contract Act, is an exception to

the general revocability of the contract of the agency by the principal.

Section 207 of the Contract Act, provides that the revocation or

renunciation of agency may be expressed or may be implied in the

conduct of the principal or agent, respectively. Illustration to Section

207 reads as under :

“A empowers B to let A’s house. Afterwards, A lets it

himself. This is an implied revocation of B’s authority.”

24.Thus, to constitute an embargo on the revocability and render the

agency irrevocable under Section 202 fo the Contract Act, there ought

to be a relationship of principal and agent and agent’s interest should

have been created in the subject matter of the agency.

25.A useful reference in this context can be made to a judgment of

the Supreme Court in the case of M.S.Ananthamurthy and Anr. V/s. J.

Manjula and Ors.

7

, wherein the Supreme Court enunciated that the

power of attorney is a creation of an agency by which the grantor

/donor /executant authorizes the grantee/donee/holder/attorney to do

the acts specified on his behalf, which will be binding on the executant

as if the acts were done by him. When POA is coupled with an interest,

it metamorphosizes to an irrevocable agency unless expressly stated

7 (2025) 10 SCC 596

ARS 18/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

otherwise. The observations in paragraph Nos.35 and 45 are material

and, hence, extracted below :

“35. Therefore, , the essentials of Section 202 of the

Contract Act are, first, there shall be a relationship in

the capacity of ‘principal and agent’ between the

parties and secondly, there shall be agent’s interest in

the subject-matter of the agency. If both the conditions

are fulfilled the agency becomes irrevocable and

cannot be terminated unilaterally at the behest of the

principal……..”

45.Further, a mere use of the word ‘irrevocable’ in

a POA does not make the POA irrevocable. If the POA

is not coupled with interest, no extraneous expression

can make it irrevocable. At the same time, even if there

is no expression to the effect that the POA is

irrevocable but the reading of the document indicates

that it is a POA coupled with interest, it would be

irrevocable……”

26.In the light of aforesaid position in law, in the absence of the

material to prima facie show that the Power of Attorney was

irrevocable, in the sense that, interest was created in favour of the

agent, and the possession of the suit property was delivered to the

agent, the substratum of the Plaintiff’s case that Shaikh Umar Latif

Inamdar had absolute authority to transfer the suit property as the said

Power of Attorney was for consideration, prima facie, falls through.

ARS 19/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

27.The material on record indicates that subsequent to the execution

of the aforesaid Power of Attorney dated 17

th

August 2002 by Balu

Talekar in favour of Shaikh Umar Latif Inamdar, a number of

instruments were brought into existence in respect of the larger

property.

28.It seems that on 6

th

November 2001, Balu Talekar had executed

an Agreement for Sale in respect of the larger property in favour of

Ramdas Khandve and Vikas Bhukan. The abovenamed transferees

instituted RCS No. 1696 of 2006 for specific performance of the

contract contained in Agreement for Sale dated 6

th

November 2001. In

the said suit, on 14

th

December 2006, Mr. Balu Talekar, the original

owner and the abovenamed transferees filed a compromise pursis and

thereupon, a consent decree was passed. The consent decree records

that the parties settled the dispute in accordance with the agreement

dated 5 December 2006.

29.Pursuant to the Agreement dated 5

th

December 2006 executed

between the parties, the original owner agreed to execute a Sale Deed

in respect of larger property and, also not to cause obstruction to the

possession and enjoyment of the said transferees over larger property.

30.In accordance with the terms of the Agreement dated 5

th

December 2006, initially the Sale Deed in respect of 38 R land was

executed by Balu Talekar and his wife and children in favour of Lunkud

ARS 20/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

Infrastructure on 26

th

December 2006; the Decree Holders in RCS No.

1696 of 2006, Ramdas Khandve and Vikas Bhukan were the consenting

parties thereto.

31.Subsequently, on 23 October 2008, a Sale Deed in respect of 70 R

land out of the larger property was executed in favour of M/s. Ashray

Premises by Balu Talekar, his wife and children and the decree holders

in RCS No.1696 of 2006 were the consenting parties thereto. Thus,

under the second Sale Deed dated 23 October 2008, Balu Talekar seems

to have divested his right, title and interest in the entire larger property.

Whether the Sale deed which was subsequently registered pursuant to a

Deed of Confirmation dated 11 May 2011, constitutes a revocation of

the Power of Attorney in favour of Shaikh Umer Latif Inamdar, can be

said to be a matter for adjudication. At this stage, and in this

proceeding, it may not be appropriate to delve deep into the effect of

the registration of the Sale Deed dated 23 October 2008 on the basis of

the Deed of Confirmation dated 11 May 2011. However, the courts

were required to take into account the fact that, prima facie, the

aforesaid two sale deeds were in pursuance of a consent decree passed

in RCS No.1696 of 2006.

32.At this stage, the element of suppression of facts which have a

bearing upon the exercise of equitable jurisdiction assumes significance.

The learned District Judge has specifically referred to the fact that the

ARS 21/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

Plaintiff did not disclose the pendency of SCS No.25 of 2014 instituted

by the original owner for a declaration that the sale deed dated 5

October 2010 in favour of the Plaintiff was void. What further

exacerbates the situation is the fact that, before entering into the said

transaction and executing the sale deed dated 5 October 2010, the

Plaintiff has, as noted by the learned District Judge, issued a public

notice on 25 November 2009, inviting objections. The Defendants, at

that point of time itself, had raised objection to the transaction. Yet, the

Plaintiff went ahead with the transaction and got the sale deed

executed.

33.This factor, prima facie, demolishes the case sought to be put up

by the Plaintiff regarding the knowledge of the adverse interest asserted

by the Defendants and their predecessor-in-title. When such objection

was raised, the Plaintiff can be said to have entered into the transaction

at his own peril.

34.The learned Civil Judge had not appreciated the implications of

the aforesaid suppression of facts and lightly brushed them aside as

immaterial. The learned District Judge, in the considered view of this

Court, correctly appreciated the consequences that entailed the

aforesaid suppression of facts from the point of view of grant of

equitable relief.

ARS 22/23

-WP-11314-2025.DOC

35.As noted above, the Petitioner – Plaintiff has also transferred his

interest in the suit property in favour of third party, after the impugned

judgment.

36.In the totality of the circumstances, in exercise of the supervisory

jurisdiction, this court does not find that the impugned judgment and

order suffers from either patent error of law, perversity or

unreasonableness or results in grave miscarriage of justice. Therefore,

no interference is warranted in the impugned order. The Writ Petition,

therefore, deserves to be dismissed.

37.Hence, the following order:

: O R D E R :

(i) The Writ Petition stands dismissed.

(ii)Rule discharged.

(iii)No costs.

[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

38.At this stage, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner seeks

continuation of ad-interim relief for a period of two weeks.

39.Since the interim relief granted by the learned District Judge has

been in operation till today, the said order shall continue to operate for

a period of two weeks from today.

[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]

ARS 23/23