2026 INSC 565

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 1 of 18

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2902 OF 2026

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.573 of 2026)

MOHAMMAD HANIF JAINUM

KHALIFA …APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant herein, who was serving as a driver

in the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation

1 bus,

came to be tried and convicted by the Court of learned 1

st

Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Athani at Athani

2 by judgment

and order dated 26.12.2015 passed in C.C. No.933 of 2011

for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A of the Indian

1

Hereinafter, “KSRTC”.

2

Hereinafter, “trial court”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 2 of 18

Penal Code, 1860

3 and under Section 134 read with Section

187 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

4. The appellant came to

be sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for four

months for the offence punishable under Section 279, IPC

and to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the

offence punishable under Section 304A, IPC.

2.1 The Court of VII Addl. Dist. & Sessions Judge,

Belagavi, sitting at Chikodi

5 dismissed Criminal Appeal

No.12 of 2016 preferred by the appellant against the

judgment of the trial court by maintaining the conviction

and sentence recorded by the trial court.

2.2 The aggrieved appellant approached the High Court

of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench

6 by filing Criminal Revision

Petition No.100222 of 2018 under Section 397 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The High Court, by order dated

25.03.2025 which is the order impugned in this appeal,

allowed the Revision Petition in part, maintaining the

conviction of the appellant, however, observed that the

3

Hereinafter, “IPC”.

4

Hereinafter, “MV Act”.

5

Hereinafter, “Appellate Court”.

6

Hereinafter, “High Court”.

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doctrine of merger would apply and since the sentence of six

months’ simple imprisonment was awarded for the offence

punishable under Section 304A, IPC, sentence under

Section 279, IPC could not have been separately awarded.

Accordingly, the High Court set aside the sentence of four

months simple imprisonment imposed by the trial court for

the offence punishable under Section 279, IPC, maintaining

the rest of the sentence.

3. As per the case in the complaint filed by the

informant, who was a permanent resident of village

Mangasuli, on 17.04.2011 at around 03.30 pm, he along

with his sister-in-law Shobha and her mother Housabai took

the bus bearing registration No.KA-23-F-390 driven by the

appellant to travel from Athani to return home. At around

04.30 pm, since they were to alight from the bus, the bus

conductor whistled to stop the bus near Mallayya Temple.

3.1 It is the prosecution case that while the informant

along with his sister-in-law and mother were in the process

of taking off from the bus, the appellant-accused, driver of

the said bus, moved the bus in a rash and negligent manner

which resulted in falling down of said Shobha from the bus.

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She sustained grievous injuries on her head. She was

thereafter shifted to the hospital, however, later she

succumbed to her injuries. Based on the complaint of the

informant, First Information Report

7 was registered against

the appellant at Kagawad Police Station for the offences

punishable under the aforementioned sections of IPC and

MV Act.

3.2 For convicting the appellant, the trial court

reasoned that the informant (PW1) and Housabai (PW4)-

mother of deceased testified consistently that the appellant-

accused moved the bus while deceased Shobha was in the

process of getting down from the bus, and thus she fell down

from the bus and subsequently died due to injuries

sustained by her. It was held that starting the vehicle before

the passenger could safely disembark would constitute rash

and negligent driving. It was further observed that the

evidence of Popat Ramchandra Patil (PW5), who was coming

from behind the said bus on a motorcycle, corroborated that

7

Hereinafter, “FIR”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 5 of 18

the bus had stopped near Mallayya Temple and that it

started moving when Shobha was getting down.

3.3 The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal

confirming the judgment and order passed by the trial court

convicting and sentencing the appellant by relying upon the

testimonies of PW1, PW4 and PW5. It was the defence taken

by the appellant that the deceased tried to alight from the

bus herself in a hurried manner and because of that she

suffered injuries. As stated above, the High Court partly

allowed the Revision Petition by maintaining the conviction

of the appellant, however, setting aside the sentence in

respect of the offence punishable under Section 279, IPC

and the sentence for the offence punishable under Section

304A, IPC was maintained.

3.4 Offence under Section 279, IPC relates to rash

driving or riding on a public way. It says whoever drives any

vehicle or rides on any public way in a manner so rash or

negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause

hurt or injury to any other person, shall be punished with

imprisonment which may extend to six months or fine or

with both. The other section under which the appellant was

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charged was Section 304-A, IPC, which is about causing

death by negligence. The offence is committed when anyone

causes the death of any person by doing any rash or any

negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, and such

offender shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to two years or with

fine or with both.

4. Heard learned advocate-on-record Mr. Deshpande

Chinmay Arvind for the appellant and learned Additional

Advocate General Mr. Prateek K Chadha assisted by learned

advocate-on-record Mr. Naveen Sharma and other advocates

for the respondent. They took the court through the relevant

evidence on record.

5. Taking a bird’s eye view of the evidence led by the

prosecution, it consisted of the testimony of the complainant

Shamra Yalu Mane (PW1) who deposed about his going in

the bus with deceased Shobha and her mother and about

they having told the conductor that they would be getting

down near Mallaiah Temple. PW1 stated that when they

were getting down, the bus conductor whistled to stop the

bus, upon which the bus was stopped. While said Shobha

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 7 of 18

had been alighting, the accused driver drove the bus leading

to her fall from the bus and suffer fatal injury, it was stated.

Housabai Dadasaheb Mali (PW4), mother of deceased

Shobha, also travelling along, narrated the similar account

that the driver moved the bus while her daughter Shobha

was yet to get down. In her cross-examination, she stated

that the conductor and the driver stopped the bus in order

to enable them to get down from the bus but drove the bus

early and negligently.

5.1 Rajaram Sukaram Male (PW2) was called by the

police for the Panchnama purpose. He turned hostile

partially and stated that the police did not take his signature

on the Panchnama and he did not sign the Panchnama.

Govind Maruthi Inamdar (PW3), who was another witness,

going on his motorcycle at the place in question, stated in

his deposition that his signature was taken by the police

who insisted him that he (PW3) had seen the accident and

accordingly his signature was taken on the document.

Nothing material came out from the deposition of PW1 and

PW3. PW5, Popat Ramachandra Patil, who was coming from

behind the bus on a motorcycle, was examined and stated

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 8 of 18

that he saw the deceased falling down from the bus and

suffering a head injury. Investigating Officer Jayappa

Sharanappa Nyamegoudar (PW7), who had carried out the

investigation and filed the chargesheet, was another witness

examined.

5.2 Figures in the set of evidence is the testimony of

Kalludeppa Muthappa Batakurki (PW6), who was the

conductor in the bus in question. The translated version of

the examination-in-chief of PW6 as on record, in its relevant

part, is extracted below,

“On the said date when the passengers asked me to

stop the said bus near the cross, and I gave the

signal for stopping the bus by whistling. And on my

whistling the accused have stopped the bus and the

passengers have got down from the bus. And after

the passengers got down from the bus, I have told

to the accused to move the bus, and while the

accused was driving the bus, I heard the

passengers the screaming noise and when I looked

into,…”

5.2.1 PW6 further stated that he saw a woman falling

down from the bus and after the bus was stopped,

subsequently, they took the said woman (Shobha) to

Mangasuli Hospital, and thereafter to Miraj Hospital for

treatment, where she subsequently died. The aforequoted

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part of evidence of PW6 remained intact during his cross-

examination. He denied in his cross-examination that it was

correct to suggest that it was on account of negligence of the

accused driver that Shobha fell down from the bus.

5.2.2 It unequivocally emanates from the testimony of

PW6-conductor of the bus that the passenger had asked him

to stop the bus, that he gave signal by whistling for stopping

the bus, that the bus was therefore stopped by the

appellant-accused-driver, at which juncture the passengers

alighted from the bus. He stated that after passengers got

down from the bus, he told the driver to move the bus. At

that time, he listened to the screaming of the passengers.

5.3 It needs no more than the common knowledge that

in any vehicle, particularly in a passenger bus, the

conductor happens to be a person in-charge, who not only

issues the tickets, but also discharges the function to

regulate the movement of the bus. It is at the indication of

the conductor by whistling or by ringing bell, as the case

may be, that the driver of the bus is conveyed as to when

the bus should be stopped to enable the passengers to alight

at a particular station and when to start the bus again.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 10 of 18

5.3.1 It is the conductor who signals the driver in

appropriate way to start the bus or to start again after

stoppage, the passengers having got off the bus. The driver

of the bus, who would otherwise be concentrating on the

driving, would depend upon the indications, signals or

whistling from the conductor to monitor and regulate the

movement of the bus. The application of the mind by the

driver has to stay in driving of the bus for the stakes of

safety, while he would follow the conductor’s signals for

starting, stopping and moving the bus. The above aspect

and the consideration would be material and would weigh in

concluding about the negligence of the bus driver-appellant-

accused.

5.4 The testimony of PW6 in terms suggests that upon

his whistle, the accused driver has stopped the bus and after

the passenger got down from the bus, he again whistled.

Thereupon the appellant started the bus. In other words, the

appellant-driver acted by following the indication of

whistling provided by the conductor for stopping and

restarting the bus, as deceased Shobha, her mother and the

appellant were to get down from the bus near Mallaiah

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Temple. When the appellant accused had followed the

instructions of the conductor in stopping and moving the

bus, which the appellant was duty-bound to do, it would be

both unreasonable and illogical to attribute any negligence

on his part.

5.4.1 The appellant driver was not expected to turn his

head back and to see himself whether the passengers had

alighted. His dependence on the signal of whistling to start

the bus was a normal and natural conduct. Holding that the

appellant-accused in capacity of the driver conducted

himself without due care or with negligence would not be a

justifiable conclusion in the facts of the case. It is therefore

difficult to conclude with definitiveness that deceased

Shobha had died on account of driver’s negligence. The

driver acted as per the conductor’s indicative instructions.

The deceased might have slipped from the bus due to her

own conduct less than careful. The driver, in any view,

deserves to be exonerated from the charge of acting

negligently.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 12 of 18

5.5 Ravi Kapur vs. State of Rajasthan

8

, was the case

of a road accident involving an issue of rash and negligent

driving. This Court expressed itself about relevant

considerations and nature of proof to be applied. It was

observed that the negligence has to be inferred from the

attendant circumstances. It quoted with approval the

concept of negligence analysed in Halsbury's Laws of

England (4th Edition), Volume 34, Para 1 (pg. 3), which

stated,

“Negligence is a specific tort and in any given

circumstances is the failure to exercise that care

which the circumstances demand. What amounts

to negligence depends on the facts of each

particular case. It may consist in omitting to do

something which ought to be done or in doing

something which ought to be done either in a

different manner or not at all. Where there is no

duty to exercise care, negligence in the popular

sense has no legal consequence…”

5.5.1 In Ravi Kapur (supra), the Court highlighted the

concept of “culpable rashness” and “culpable negligence”.

These concepts and considerations become relevant in the

road accident cases to judge the negligence for becoming an

offence in eye of law. The “culpable rashness” or “culpable

8

(2012) 9 SCC 284.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 13 of 18

negligence” amounts to acting with the consciousness that

mischievous and illegal consequences may follow by such

act, but with the hope that they will not, and often with the

belief, that the actor has taken sufficient precautions to

prevent their happening.

5.5.2 In the facts of the case, it could not be said that the

driver did not exercise the due care which he was required

to take. In the totality of facts and the scenario from evidence

emerging, this Court is not inclined to hold that there was

any culpable negligence on the part of the appellant.

5.6 “Recklessness” is perhaps a higher degree of

“carelessness”. One acts reckless when one conducts

himself regardless or heedless of the possible harmful

consequences of one’s act. The recklessness covers a whole

range of state of mind from failing to give any thought to

what is to be acted upon. Recklessness presupposes that no

thought was given in the matter by the doer before he did

the act.

5.6.1 When the appellant-driver acted by following the

conductor’s instructions and moved the bus, he cannot be

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 14 of 18

said to be reckless, even though the movement of the bus

had the consequence of the passenger falling down. The act

on part of the appellant was preceded by a thought and the

thoughtfulness of the mind by heeding to and guided by the

conductor’s whistling. The passenger in the present case,

though fell down, the appellant-driver could not have been

saddled with the negligence. Nor was it a case of res ipsa

loquitur.

5.7 It was observed in Ravi Kapur (supra) that

negligence and rashness, to be punishable in terms of

Section 304A, IPC must be attributable to a state of mind

wherein the criminality arises because of no error of

judgment but of a deliberation in the mind risking the crime

as well as the life of the person who may lose his life as a

result of the crime. The factor of such “deliberation in mind”

could be said to be absent in the instant case on part of the

driver, who acted bona fide on the instructions of the

conductor in moving the bus. He could not be said to have

acted with negligence, much less criminally negligence.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 15 of 18

5.8 In State of Karnataka vs. Satish

9

, this Court

observed that merely because a truck was driven at a high

speed, it does not bespeak of either “negligence” or

“rashness” by itself. These are relative terms, observed the

Court. In a given case, therefore, “rashness” or “negligence”

cannot become presumptive, but must be informed by

attendant facts, circumstances and the evidence.

6. The dictum of common sense often guides the

process of interpretation and application of law, for, the law

is also common sense when exposed to certain set of facts

and circumstances. In natural exposition, the law becomes

common sense. Therefore, the common sense and common

wisdom can well be a canon for appreciating the evidence.

This is more true when it comes to dealing with or judging

human conduct. Applying common sense, common wisdom

and common understanding while appreciating day-to-day

affairs and natural human activities in the walks of life helps

one to judge the things nearer to the truth. The truth, more

often than not, emanates from common sense. Therefore,

applying the yardstick of common sense and common

9

(1998) 8 SCC 493

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 16 of 18

wisdom in appreciating the evidence and the effect thereof,

more particularly in criminal cases, brings home the correct

picture.

6.1 The factum obtained that the appellant-driver acted

regarding stoppage and movement of the bus upon whistling

of the conductor, as established from the above-highlighted

evidence of PW6, guides this Court to conclude that the

driver could not have been held negligent. He discharged his

duty to drive the bus and regulate the movement of the bus

in accordance with the instructive signals from the

conductor. In the ultimate analysis, it was the conductor

who was to ensure the due movement of the bus and who

would be stepping inside the bus or alighting from the bus,

as the case may be. The evidence does not suggest that the

driver was negligent and whose negligence resulted into the

fall of said passenger-Shobha from the bus while getting off

the bus.

7. In light of the above facts, circumstances and the

principles of law to be applied, it is not possible to hold that

the appellant-driver acted “in a manner so rash or

negligent”. He could not have been treated as guilty of some

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 17 of 18

omission or doing something which may require him to

adjudge as negligent, nor the appellant was guilty of any

rash or negligent act satisfying the ingredients of Section

304A, IPC. It is difficult to conclude with definitiveness by

pinpointing and attaching negligence on the part of the

appellant that deceased-Shobha died on account of

negligence in driving or because of rash or reckless driving

by the appellant.

7.1 The deceased might have slipped while alighting

from the bus because of her own movement being less than

careful at the time of getting down. The appellant-driver

acted as per the conductor’s indicative instructions in

moving the bus. The appellant deserves to be exonerated

from the charge of acting negligently.

8. For the discussion and the reasons supplied as

above, the courts below as well as the High Court committed

a concurrent manifest error in convicting and sentencing the

appellant.

9. The impugned order dated 25.03.2025 passed by

the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in Criminal

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No. 573 of 2026 Page 18 of 18

Revision Petition No. 100222 of 2018, convicting the

appellant for the offences under Sections 279 and 304A, IPC

and sentencing him under Section 304A IPC, deserves to be

set aside. The same is hereby set aside.

10. The appellant is held not guilty and is acquitted of

the offences under Section 279 as well as under Section

304A, IPC. He shall be released forthwith if still behind the

bars, provided his detention is not required for any other

offence.

11. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Any interlocutory application, as may be pending,

shall not survive in view of disposal of the main appeal.

……………………………………...J.

[PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]

………………………….J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

NEW DELHI;

MAY 27, 2026.