FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 1 of 21

$~ J-1

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 17

th

November, 2025

Date of Decision: 28

th

January, 2026

Uploaded on: 29

th

January, 2026

+ FAO(OS)(COMM)182/2022, CM APPL. 31553/2022 & CM

APPL. 48614/2024

MR. AMRISH GUPTA .....Appellant

Through: Mr. Ravi Gupta, Sr. Adv. with Mr.

Gaurav Rana, Ms. Muskaan Mehra &

Ms. Pragya Dahiya, Advs.

versus

LATE GURCHAIT SINGH CHEEMA

GURCHAIT SINGH CHIMA (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LR

AND WIDOW MRS. DALJEET KAUR CHIMA ..... .Respondent

Through: Mr. Kanhaiya Singhal, Mr. Prasanna,

Mr. Ajay Kumar, Ms. Vaani, Mr.

Pulkit Jolly, Mr. Rishabh Bhardwaj,

Mr. Kanav Gupta, Mr. Rajat Pandey,

Ms. Nivedita Tiwari, Ms. Shatakshi

Singh, Mr. Shaswat Tiwari, Ms.

Avantika Shankar and Ms. Rhythm

Bharadwaj, Advs.

CORAM:

JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH

JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN

JUDGMENT

SHAIL JAIN, J.

1. This hearing has been done through hybrid mode.

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 2 of 21

2. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 13 of

the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 37(1)(c) of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred as ‘A&C

Act,1996’), challenging the impugned judgment dated 18

th

April 2022, passed

by the learned Single Judge of this Court in O.M.P. (COMM.) No. 68 of

2021, titled Amrish Gupta v. Gurchait Singh Chima (Deceased) through his

Legal Representative and widow Mrs. Daljeet Kaur Chima (hereinafter

referred to as the “impugned judgment”).

Factual Background

3. The present appeal arises out of arbitral proceedings concerning an

Agreement to Sell (hereinafter referred as ‘The Agreement’) dated 07

th

August 2014, purportedly executed between the Appellant, Mr. Amrish

Gupta, and the Respondent, Late Mr. Gurchait Singh Chima, who is now

represented through his legal heir and widow, Smt. Daljeet Kaur Chima.

4. The dispute pertains to an immovable property bearing No. B-II/46,

Mohan Cooperative Industrial Estate, New Delhi, comprising a plot of

land measuring approximately 2390 sq. yards along with superstructures

constructed thereon (hereinafter referred as “the subject property”).

5. According to the Respondent, the Agreement to Sell dated 07

th

August 2014 was negotiated and executed through Mr. Surinder Kumar

Wadhwa, who acted as the duly authorised General Power of Attorney

holder and representative of the Respondent. Under the said Agreement, the

total sale consideration for the subject property was fixed at ₹11 crores. Out

of the said consideration, a sum of ₹3 crores was paid on 07

th

August 2014,

and the balance amount of ₹8 crores was payable upon the Appellant

furnishing a Conveyance Deed in favour of the Respondent after conversion

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 3 of 21

of the property into freehold. The Respondent asserts that the entire sale

consideration stood paid in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

6. The Appellant, however, disputes the execution of the Agreement and

has consistently asserted that his signatures appearing on the said document

are forged and that the Agreement is fabricated. According to the Appellant,

no transaction of sale was ever agreed upon between the parties.

7. After the execution of the Agreement, the Respondent addressed a

letter dated 24

th

January, 2017 calling upon the Appellant to complete the

transaction and execute the Sale Deed in terms of the Agreement. In

response thereto, the Appellant, by his reply dated 07

th

February, 2017,

denied having entered into any agreement for sale of the subject property

and asserted that the Agreement relied upon by the Respondent was false

and fabricated.

8. The Agreement contained an arbitration clause providing for

reference of disputes to arbitration. The relevant clause reads as under:

“That any dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement

shall be referred to sole Arbitration of Mr. Vineet Malhotra, Advocate,

Flat No. 30, 8th Floor, Dakshineshwar, 10, Barakhamba Road, New

Delhi, whose decision shall be final and binding on the parties. The

proceedings shall be held in accordance with the provisions of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.”

9. The named Arbitrator declined to enter upon the reference.

Thereafter, the Respondent proposed the appointment of another Arbitrator,

which was not agreed to by the Appellant. In these circumstances, the

Respondent approached this Court by filing a petition under Section 11 of

the A&C Act,1996, being ARB. P. No. 325/2017. By an order dated 12

th

October, 2017, this Court appointed Justice Manmohan Sarin (Retd.), former

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 4 of 21

Judge of this Court, as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between

the parties.

10. The Arbitral Tribunal, upon completion of pleadings and after a

detailed consideration of oral evidence, documentary material, and expert

testimony led by both parties, rendered an arbitral award dated 17

th

October,

2020. By the said award, the Tribunal allowed the claim for specific

performance of the Agreement dated 07

th

August, 2014, along with

consequential reliefs, and rejected the defences and objections raised by the

Appellant.

11. Challenging the arbitral award, the Appellant filed a petition under

Section 34 of the A&C Act,1996, being O.M.P. (COMM.) No. 68/2021,

before the learned Single Judge of this Court. Vide judgment dated 18

th

April, 2022, the learned Single Judge dismissed the Petition under Section

34 of the A&C Act,1996, holding that the arbitral award did not suffer from

patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional infirmity, and that no ground

for interference was made out within the limited scope of Section 34 of the

A&C Act,1996.

12. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 18

th

April, 2022 passed by the

learned Single Judge, the Appellant has instituted the present appeal under

Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996, seeking setting aside of the impugned

judgment as well as the arbitral award dated 17

th

October, 2020.

Submissions on behalf of parties

13. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr. Ravi Gupta, learned Senior Counsel,

assails the impugned order primarily on the ground that the Agreement dated

07

th

August, 2014 is a forged and fabricated document. It is submitted that

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 5 of 21

the underlying transaction was never intended to be a sale of immovable

property but was merely a loan transaction negotiated through one Mr.

Wadhwa.

14. It was further submitted that out of the alleged consideration of ₹12

crores, a sum of ₹1 crore was admittedly returned by the Appellant, which,

according to him, conclusively indicates the nature of the arrangement as a

loan. Learned Senior Counsel further contends that there was never any

consensus between the parties regarding the appointment of an Arbitrator

and submits that, from the inception, the Appellant consistently took the

position that the Agreement was a forged and non-existent document.

15. Reliance is also placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in The

Managing Director Bihar State Food And Civil Supply Corporation

Limited & Anr. V. Sanjay Kumar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1604 where the

question as to whether forgery can be considered by the Arbitrator or not has

been discussed in detail. Reference is made to paragraphs 21(III), 21(V),

21(VI), 21(VII), 21(IX), 21(X) and 21(XI) of the said judgment to submit

that allegations of forgery and “serious fraud” fall within the exception to

arbitrability. It is urged that in matters where the very existence of the

arbitration agreement is disputed on the ground of forgery, the arbitral

tribunal lacks jurisdiction to proceed. The said paragraphs are extracted

below:

“III. Same set of facts may lead to civil and criminal

proceedings. A civil dispute could involve questions of

coercion (section 15 of Contract Act), undue influence

(section 16 of Contract Act), fraud (section 17 of Contract

Act), misrepresentation (section 18 of Contract Act) for

example, and such disputes can be adjudicated as civil

proceedings for determination of civil or contractual

liabilities between the parties. The same set of facts could

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 6 of 21

have their co-relatives in criminal law. The mere fact that

criminal proceedings can or have been instituted in respect

of the same incident(s) would not per se lead to the

conclusion that the dispute which is otherwise arbitrable

ceases to be so.

V. For an important policy consideration, our Court has

drawn a distinction between “serious fraud” and “fraud

simpliciter” to segregate and exclude disputes involving

serious fraud from arbitrability. Disputes involving serious

fraud may not be submitted to arbitration as explained, to

some extent in Ayyasamy (supra) as they, “are very serious

allegations of fraud which make a virtual case of criminal

offence or where allegations of fraud are so complicated

that it becomes absolutely essential that such complex issues

can be decided only by the civil court on the appreciation of

the voluminous evidence that needs to be produced, the

court can sidetrack the agreement by dismissing the

application under Section 8 and proceed with the suit on

merits […]”

VI. “Serious allegations of fraud” is to be understood in the

context of facts. In Rashid Raza (supra)23 this Court laid

down two tests. The first test is satisfied only when it can be

said that the arbitration clause or agreement itself cannot

be said to exist in a clear case in which the court finds that

the party against whom breach is alleged cannot be said to

have entered into the agreement relating to arbitration at

all. The second test can be said to have been met in cases in

which allegations are made against the State or its

instrumentalities of arbitrary, fraudulent, or mala fide

conduct, thus necessitating the hearing of the case by a writ

court in which questions are raised which are not

predominantly questions arising from the contract itself or

breach thereof, but questions arising in the public law

domain.

VII. Disputes involving allegations of serious fraud need

more clarity so that there is certainty about the availability

of the remedy. At least one instance of serious fraud will be

where disputes involving allegations having criminal law

implications transcend inter se disputes between the

contracting parties and attain public implications, where

the ramifications could directly or indirectly affect

nonparties and impact, integrity in governance,

accountability in public service, distribution of essential

commodities, safety and security of the nation for example.

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 7 of 21

Consideration of such disputes have public law implications

and shall ‘not be submitted to arbitration’

IX. However, the allegations of fraud with respect to the

arbitration agreement itself stand on a different footing.

This position is generally recognized as a dispute which is

in the realm of non-arbitrability. In such cases, the arbitral

tribunal will not examine the allegation of fraud but will

consider the submission only for the purpose of examining

exclusion of jurisdiction. This principle, in its application,

can be seen in the judgment of this Court in Avitel.

X. The burden of proof is on the party who raises the plea.

XI. When a plea of non-arbitrability is raised, the Court will

examine it as a jurisdictional issue only to enquire if the

dispute has become non-arbitrable due to one or the other

reason as indicated by us hereinabove.”

16. Learned Senior Counsel also submits that the present case is not one

of mere fraud simpliciter, but involves allegations of serious fraud going to

the root of the agreement itself, thus attracting the proviso 2 to Section 36(3)

of A&C Act, 1996, as introduced by the 2021 amendment with retrospective

effect from 2015. It is contended that such disputes must necessarily be

adjudicated by a civil court and not by an arbitrator.

17. It is further argued that the dispute is purely private in nature,

involving no public law implications, and therefore the reasoning of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court on public-interest exceptions, as discussed in

Sanjay Kumar (supra), does not assist the Respondent. Learned Senior

Counsel also points out that parallel criminal proceedings between the

parties are pending investigation, which, according to him, further

demonstrates that the genuineness of the disputed document cannot be

presumed for the purpose of upholding the arbitral award.

18. Per contra, on behalf of the Respondent, Mr. Singhal, learned

Counsel, submits that the Appellant’s plea of forgery is a mere afterthought

and stands completely contradicted by his own conduct during the arbitral

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 8 of 21

proceedings. He relies upon the cross-examination of the Respondent’s

witness, Mr. Surinder Kumar Wadhwa, conducted on 09

th

May, 2018,

wherein the Appellant put specific questions premised on the existence of

the Agreement, including the terms concerning payment of ₹3 crores at the

time of execution and the nature of the buyer–seller relationship between the

parties. It is argued that such questions could not have been put unless the

Appellant accepted the existence of the document.

19. Learned Counsel further submits that even at the stage of Section 11

of the A&C Act, 1996, proceedings, although the Appellant raised

allegations of forgery, the learned Single Judge, while appointing the

Arbitrator, found no basis to hold the arbitration agreement vitiated. The

learned Arbitrator, in the Order dated 17

th

October, 2020, is stated to have

dealt with the allegations of forgery in detail. Attention is drawn to the

learned Single Judge’s impugned order, wherein the fact that the Appellant

signs his name in two different styles i.e. one beginning with a capital ‘G’

and the other with a small ‘g’ has been noted, supporting the Respondent’s

case that the signatures on the Agreement were indeed those of the

Appellant.

20. Reliance is also placed on the report of the Economic Offences Wing

dated 28

th

September, 2020, wherein the following finding has been arrived

at:

“Further complainant Mr. Amrish Gupta have been confronted

with different types of signatures and asked that why didn’t he

disclose this fact earlier. He didn’t reply satisfactorily but he

accepted signing in two different ways. It is pertinent to mention

here that Mr. Amrish Gupta denied entire Agreement to Sells and

other transfer documents related to sale of his entire four (4)

properties and alleged that he did not sign these documents.”

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 9 of 21

21. Learned Counsel further refers to the conclusion recorded in

paragraph 16.17 of the cancellation report under Section 173 CrPC, which

reads as under:

“16.17. Conclusion in respect of property no. B-II/46, Mohan

Cooperative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, New Delhi

As per the detailed further investigation carried out w.r.t. the

question i.e. B-II/46, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Estate,

Mathura Road, New Delhi, it is established from the forensic

opinion and records of IT Department of the contemporary

period, the Agreement to Sell dt. 07.08.2014 was executed by the

complainant itself by using his second type (‘g’) of signatures.

Moreover, he is unable to provide any documents in favour of his

alleged version of loan transactions from Late Gurchait Singh

Chima. No document to show the deduction of any TDS on the

interest amount or payment of interest was provided ‘by the.

Complainant. Admittedly, the complainant is the beneficiary of

Rs.11 Crores. Whereas, Late Sh. Gurchait Singh Chima has been

a real victim out of this transaction. Otherwise also, complainant

never stated about any inducement by Late Sh. Gurchait Singh

Chima or by any other person. Further, the property in question is

still in possession of complainant and he has not delivered the

property to Late Mr. Gurchait Singh Chima as per ATS even after

getting the full consideration. There was no loss caused to the

complainant, whereas Late Gurchait Singh Chima suffered a loss

of Rs. 11 more as he paid the some to the complainant as per the

ATS and neither the property was given to him nor his amount

was returned”

22. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the Respondent that the

scope of the present appeal under Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996, is

limited and does not permit a re-appreciation of factual disputes or a fresh

determination on allegations of forgery, particularly when the Arbitrator has

already adjudicated the issue and the learned Single Judge has examined the

matter in detail.

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 10 of 21

Analysis and Findings

23. In order to appreciate the scope of the present appeal, reference may

be made to Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996, which reads as under:

“Section 37: Appealable orders.

37. (1) 1[Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for

the time being in force, an appeal] shall lie from the following

orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by law to hear

appeals from original decrees of the Court passing the order,

namely:—

2[(a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;

(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;

(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under

section 34.]

(2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral

tribunal—

(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section

(3) of section 16; or

(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section

17.”

24. The first and foremost question that arises for consideration in this

Appeal is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in

upholding the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon the

plea of forgery raised by the appellant.

25. The principal objection of the appellant is founded on an alleged

absence of consensus ad idem, premised on the denial of having written or

signed the Agreement. On this basis, it is contended that the appellant never

entered into the contract at all and, consequently, never consented to the

arbitration clause contained therein. It is argued that the present case

involves “serious fraud” in as much as the Arbitration Agreement itself is

alleged not to exist, thereby ousting arbitral jurisdiction and necessitating

adjudication by a civil court.

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 11 of 21

26. This submission, however, proceeds on an erroneous understanding of

the law governing arbitrability of disputes involving allegations of fraud and

forgery. The jurisprudence on this issue has undergone a marked evolution,

and it is no longer the law that a mere allegation of fraud or forgery ipso

facto renders a dispute non-arbitrable.

27. The Arbitral Tribunal squarely addressed this objection at the

threshold. Upon consideration of the pleadings and evidence, the Arbitral

Tribunal rejected the plea that allegations of forgery rendered the dispute

non-arbitrable, upon consideration of the judgments of the Supreme Court,

in the following terms:

“In view of the foregoing discussion and analysis, it is held that

the plea of lack of jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal deserves to

be rejected and the issue of execution of the Agreement to Sell,

asserted by claimant and denied by respondent can be

conveniently decided with sufficient evidence available on

record.”

28. The Tribunal noted that the appellant had participated fully in the

arbitral proceedings, had not disputed the existence of the arbitration clause

at the inception, and had raised the plea of non-arbitrability only after

leading evidence on merits.

29. The learned Single Judge, while exercising jurisdiction under Section

34 of the A&C Act, 1996, independently examined this objection and

affirmed the Tribunal’s conclusion. The learned Single Judge correctly

noted that the arbitration clause had never been independently assailed as

forged or fabricated, and that the plea of absence of consent was, in

substance, a factual defence to be tested on evidence rather than a

jurisdictional bar. The Court further held that the appellant, having failed to

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 12 of 21

invoke Section 16 of the A&C Act, 1996 at the appropriate stage and having

participated in the proceedings without protest, had waived his right to

object to jurisdiction under Section 4 of the A&C Act, 1996.

30. The learned Single Judge also relied upon the settled position of law

as expounded by the Supreme Court in A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam

(2016) 10 SCC 386, Rashid Raza v. Sadaf Akhtar (2019) 8 SCC 710,

Avitel Post Studioz Ltd. v. HSBC PI Holdings (2021) 4 SCC 713 and

Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (2021) 2 SCC 1, wherein it

has been consistently held that only those allegations of fraud which

permeate the arbitration agreement itself or involve public law elements

would render a dispute non-arbitrable. Simple allegations of forgery or

denial of execution, which are capable of being adjudicated on evidence, do

not oust the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. In particular, the court held that the

two-fold test laid down in Rashid Raza ( Supra) were found to be not

satisfied in the present case. The conditions are reproduced as below:

“4. The principles of law laid down in this appeal make a

distinction between serious allegations of forgery/fabrication in

support of the plea of fraud as opposed to “simple allegations”.

Two working tests laid down in para 25 are: (1) does this plea

permeate the entire contract and above all, the agreement of

arbitration, rendering it void, or (2) whether the allegations of fraud

touch upon the internal affairs of the parties inter se having no

implication in the public domain.”

31. Further In Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation (supra) the

Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that fraud can be made a subject matter of

arbitration. The Court further propounded a four-fold test for determining

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 13 of 21

whether a dispute is arbitrable. The relevant passage from the said decision,

articulating this four-fold test, is reproduced below:

“76. In view of the above discussion, we would like to propound a

fourfold test for determining when the subject-matter of a dispute

in an arbitration agreement is not arbitrable:

76.1. (1) When cause of action and subject-matter of the dispute

relates to actions in rem, that do not pertain to subordinate rights

in personam that arise from rights in rem.

76.2. (2) When cause of action and subject-matter of the dispute

affects third-party rights; have erga omnes effect; require

centralised adjudication, and mutual adjudication would not be

appropriate and enforceable.

76.3. (3) When cause of action and subject-matter of the dispute

relates to inalienable sovereign and public interest functions of the

State and hence mutual adjudication would be unenforceable.

76.4. (4) When the subject-matter of the dispute is expressly or by

necessary implication non-arbitrable as per mandatory

statute(s).”

32. It is noted that the dispute was confined to private contractual rights

inter se the parties and did not involve any element warranting exclusion

from arbitration. This Court finds no infirmity in the approach adopted by

either the Arbitral Tribunal or the learned Single Judge. The objection raised

by the appellant does not go to the existence of the arbitration agreement

itself but pertains to the merits of the dispute, which the Tribunal was

competent to adjudicate. The findings returned are in consonance with

settled law and are supported by cogent reasoning, and do not disclose any

perversity or patent illegality.

33. In view of the same, reliance placed by the Appellant on the decision

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in The Managing Director Bihar State Food

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 14 of 21

And Civil Supply Corporation Limited & Anr. V. Sanjay Kumar, 2025

SCC OnLine SC 1604 is misplaced.

34. Accordingly, this Court holds that the learned Single Judge did not err

in affirming the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate upon the

issue of forgery. The challenge under Issue No. 1 is, therefore, devoid of

merit and is rejected.

35. The second issue to be determined is whether the finding that the

transaction was one of sale and not a loan is perverse or patently erroneous.

The Appellant has assailed the concurrent findings of the Arbitral Tribunal

and the learned Single Judge holding that the transaction between the parties

was one of sale and purchase of the property in question and not a loan

transaction. It is contended that the amounts received by the Appellant were

in the nature of loans or cross-loans arising out of alleged financial dealings

between the parties, and not towards sale consideration.

36. The Arbitral Tribunal examined this plea in detail and, upon a

comprehensive appreciation of the evidence on record, rejected the same.

The Tribunal noted that the Appellant failed to produce any

contemporaneous material evidencing a loan transaction. No loan

agreement, acknowledgment of debt, repayment schedule, stipulation of

interest, or supporting financial record was placed on record. The Tribunal

further took note of the absence of any proof of payment of interest or

deduction of tax at source, which would ordinarily accompany an interest-

bearing loan in commercial practice.

37. The Tribunal also found the Appellant’s case to be internally

inconsistent. While asserting financial distress necessitating a loan, the

Appellant simultaneously claimed to have advanced substantial sums as

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 15 of 21

cross-loans to third parties. This explanation was found to be implausible

and unsupported by documentary evidence.

38. Upon a cumulative consideration of the material on record, the

Arbitral Tribunal recorded the following conclusion:

On appreciation of the evidence on record and in particular,

remittances of the consideration amount of Rs. 11 crores from

claimant’s bank account and due execution of the agreement Ex-

CW-1/B being proved by the attesting witness and claimant’s

attorney, the plea of respondent of the payment of Rs. 11 crores

being pursuant to oral agreement of loans

and cross-loans remain wholly unsubstantiated and is rejected.

39. Thereafter, when the award was assailed under Section 34 of the A&C

Act, 1996, the learned Single Judge independently examined the aforesaid

findings within the limited scope of judicial review. The learned Single

Judge held that the conclusions drawn by the Arbitral Tribunal were based

on a proper appreciation of evidence and could not be characterized as

perverse or patently illegal.

40. The learned Single Judge further held that the Appellant’s plea of a

loan transaction was an afterthought, raised in an attempt to resile from

contractual obligations under a concluded agreement, and observed that

mere disagreement with factual findings or an alternative interpretation of

evidence does not furnish a ground for interference under Section 34 of the

A&C Act, 1996.

41. In this regard, the learned Single Judge, while affirming the findings

of the Arbitral Tribunal on the plea of a loan transaction, recorded as

follows:

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 16 of 21

62. This Court finds no merit in the aforesaid contention. There was

no dispute that the aggregate sum of ₹11 crores was received by the

petitioner. The fact that the petitioner had received a sum of ₹12

crores over a period of time and returned ₹1 crore did not establish

that the entire amount of ₹12 crores was received as a loan. The

Arbitral Tribunal found that the petitioner had neither paid any

interest to the respondent nor deducted any income tax (TDS), which

would have been necessary if the petitioner had paid or recognized

his liability to pay any interest. Thus, although the petitioner claims

that he had availed an interest-bearing loan, but the fact that no TDS

has been deposited by the petitioner with the Income Tax Authority,

indicates the contrary. The petitioner also claimed that he had

utilized the funds for advancing loans to Mr. Surinder Kumar

Wadhwa (Power of Attorney Holder of the respondent), his family

members and his affiliates. The Arbitral Tribunal found that this

explanation was inconsistent with the petitioner’s stand that he had

availed the loan as he was in need of money. More importantly, the

petitioner filed certain cases in respect of the amounts advanced to

certain friends (whom he now states were affiliates of Mr. Surinder

Kumar Wadhwa). However, the pleadings in those cases did not

reflect that the funds had been borrowed from Mr. Gurchait Singh

Chima and there was any arrangement of setting off loans or interest,

as was sought to be suggested before the Arbitral Tribunal.

63. The decision of the Arbitral Tribunal is a well-considered

decision and this Court finds no grounds to interfere with the same.

42. Applying the aforesaid principles, this Court is of the considered view

that the concurrent findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal and affirmed

by the learned Single Judge do not disclose any perversity, patent illegality,

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 17 of 21

or jurisdictional infirmity. The submissions advanced before this Court

essentially invite a re-appreciation of evidence and a re-assessment of

factual conclusions, which is impermissible within the limited appellate

jurisdiction under Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996. The challenge raised on

this issue is, therefore, rejected.

43. The next issue raised by the Appellant pertains to the allegation that

the signatures appearing on the Agreement to Sell dated 7

th

August, 2014

were forged and that the learned single judge erred in rejecting the said plea.

44. The record reveals that the Arbitral Tribunal examined the issue in

detail. It was established before the Tribunal that the Appellant was

accustomed to signing in more than one manner. The Tribunal noted that

while the second letter “G” in the Appellant’s signature appeared in

uppercase in certain instances, it appeared in lowercase in others. This

factual aspect assumed significance, as the Appellant sought to disown

signatures bearing the lowercase “g” while accepting those containing the

uppercase “G”. For ease of reference and to dispel any ambiguity, the two

admitted variants of the Appellant’s signatures, as brought on record, are

reproduced below:

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 18 of 21

45. Both parties led expert evidence on the question of authenticity. Upon

consideration of the expert reports, the Tribunal did not treat such opinions

as conclusive but proceeded to undertake its own comparison of the disputed

and admitted signatures in exercise of powers under Section 73 of the Indian

Evidence Act, 1872. In doing so, the Tribunal examined a range of admitted

documents, including contemporaneous financial, corporate, and statutory

records, several of which contained signatures with a lowercase “g”. Upon

an overall evaluation of the material on record, the Tribunal recorded a clear

finding that the signatures appearing on the Agreement to Sell were

consistent in flow, formation, and authorship with the admitted signatures of

the Appellant. In arriving at this conclusion, the Tribunal correctly applied

the settled principle that expert evidence is advisory in nature and must be

assessed in conjunction with other evidence. Reliance was placed on the

decision of the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram,

(1979) 2 SCC 158, which underscores that an expert’s role is confined to

placing material before the adjudicatory forum, while the ultimate

responsibility of evaluating such evidence rests with the forum itself. The

Tribunal’s reasoning clearly reflects that the conclusion was reached after an

independent and conscious appraisal of the entire material and not by

mechanical acceptance of expert opinion.

46. The learned Single Judge, while exercising jurisdiction under Section

34 of the A&C Act, 1996, examined this aspect at length and found that the

Arbitrator had undertaken a reasoned analysis, had independently assessed

the expert evidence, and had supported the conclusion with corroborative

material. The learned Single Judge held that the arbitral finding was neither

perverse nor irrational and did not warrant interference.

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 19 of 21

47. The findings of Learned Single Judge on this issue is a reasoned and

plausible conclusion, based on expert evidence, documentary material, and

the Tribunal’s own comparison, and does not suffer from perversity or

patent illegality.

48. Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the

conclusion of the Arbitral Tribunal, as affirmed by the learned Single Judge,

that the signatures appearing on the Agreement to Sell were genuine. The

challenge raised by the Appellant stands untenable within the limited

confines of Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996.

49. At the outset, it is necessary to reiterate the well-settled position that

the scope of interference under Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996 is even

more circumscribed than that under Section 34 of the A&C Act, 1996.

Interference is permissible only where the judgment under Section 34 of the

A&C Act, 1996 or the arbitral award suffers from patent illegality, manifest

perversity, jurisdictional error, or violation of principles of natural justice.

Re-appreciation of evidence or substitution of a plausible view with another

is impermissible.

50. The Supreme Court has consistently underscored these limitations,

notably in a recent judgment, Punjab State Civil Supplies Corpn. Ltd. v.

Sanman Rice Mills (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2632) , the Hon’ble Supreme

Court summarized the settled position as follows:

“16. It is seen that the scope of interference in an appeal under Section

37 of the Act is restricted and subject to the same grounds on which an

award can be challenged under Section 34 of the Act. In other words,

the powers under Section 37 vested in the court of appeal are not

beyond the scope of interference provided under Section 34 of the Act.

17. In paragraph 14 of MMTC Limited v. Vedanta Limited, it has been

held as under:

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 20 of 21

“14. As far as interference with an order made under

Section 34, as per Section 37, is concerned, it cannot be

disputed that such interference under Section 37 cannot

travel beyond the restrictions laid down under Section 34.

In other words, the court cannot undertake an

independent assessment of the merits of the award, and

must only ascertain that the exercise of power by the court

under Section 34 has not exceeded the scope of the

provision. Thus, it is evident that in case an arbitral

award has been confirmed by the court under Section 34

and by the court in an appeal under Section 37, this Court

must be extremely cautious and slow to disturb such

concurrent findings.”

18. Recently a three-Judge Bench in Konkan Railway Corporation

Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking referring to MMTC

Limited (supra) held that the scope of jurisdiction under Section 34 and

Section 37 of the Act is not like a normal appellate jurisdiction and the

courts should not interfere with the arbitral award lightly in a casual

and a cavalier manner. The mere possibility of an alternative view on

facts or interpretation of the contract does not entitle the courts to

reverse the findings of the arbitral tribunal.”

51. In the present case, the findings of the learned Arbitrator on execution

of the Agreement, arbitrability, and nature of the transaction have been

affirmed by the learned Single Judge after a detailed scrutiny. These are

concurrent findings based on appreciation of evidence.

52. What the appellant essentially seeks before this Court is a third

evaluation of facts and a re-assessment of evidence under the guise of

jurisdictional challenge. Such an exercise lies wholly outside the narrow

confines of Section 37 of the A&C Act, 1996.

Conclusion

53. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no infirmity in

the approach or conclusions of the Arbitral Tribunal or the learned Single

FAO (OS) (COMM) 182/2022 Page 21 of 21

Judge. The issues raised by the appellant were comprehensively examined at

both stages and do not disclose any patent illegality, perversity, or

jurisdictional error warranting interference under Section 37 of the A&C Act,

1996.

54. The appeal is therefore dismissed, being devoid of merit. The pending

applications (CM APPL. 31553/2022 and CM APPL. 48614/2024) also

stand disposed of.

SHAIL JAIN

JUDGE

PRATHIBA M. SINGH

JUDGE

JANUARY 28, 2026

RM/DG