As per case facts, M/S. CRRC CORPORATION Limited, a government-owned entity, bid for a metro project. The respondent, METRO LINK EXPRESS FOR GANDHINAGAR & AHMEDABAD (MEGA) COMPANY Limited, disqualified the ...
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12065 OF 2016
M/S. CRRC CORPORATION LTD. …APPELLANT
VERSUS
METRO LINK EXPRESS FOR GANDHINAGAR &
AHMEDABAD (MEGA) COMPANY LTD. …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
AMITAVA ROY, J.
The dissension centers around the exposition of an
eligibility norm engrafted in the tender conditions qua a
prestigious project with global participation. The
appellant stands disqualified by the respondent on the
touchstone of its perception of the relevant qualifying
criterion as endorsed by the High Court vide judgment
and order dated 18.11.2016 rendered in Special Civil
2
Application No.18439 of 2016, thus propelling it to this
Court for redress.
2. We have heard Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned senior
counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned
senior counsel for the respondent.
3. The pleaded facts though encompass various
facets, those having a direct bearing on the issue raised,
only would be alluded to.
4. The appellant-corporation has introduced itself to
be an amalgam of M/s. CSR Corporation Ltd. and M/s.
CNR Corporation Ltd., both claimed to be the world's
largest and oldest suppliers of rail transport equipments
with most complete product lines and leading
technologies with their business activities enfolding R&D
design, manufacture, repair, sale, lease and technical
services for railway rolling stock, EMUs, metro coaches,
urban rail transit vehicles, engineering machinery,
consulting services etc. along with several subsidiaries
under their full control. On 09.03.2015, these two
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entities namely; M/s. CSR Corporation Ltd. and M/s.
CNR Corporation Ltd. got merged after securing the
approval of the concerned state authorities, as a result
whereof, all assets of these two integrant corporations,
together with liabilities, businesses, qualifications, staff,
contracts along with all rights and obligations stood
transferred to the appellant-corporation w.e.f.
01.06.2015. Following such assimilation, the
appellant-corporation was, as a joint stock limited
company incorporated in the Peoples Republic of China
with limited liability and owned and controlled by the
Chinese Central Government. As a consequence of such
merger, the subsidiaries of M/s CSR. Corporation Ltd.
and M/s CNR. Corporation Ltd., became the subsidiaries
of the appellant-corporation and their names were
changed as well. According to the appellant, thereafter it
successfully participated and was awarded various
international contracts, based on the experience of its
subsidiary companies.
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5. On 15.01.2016, the respondent company
(hereinafter to be referred to also as “MEGA”) invited
tenders/bids for the project “Design, manufacture,
supply, installation, testing, commissioning of 96 nos. of
standard gauge cars and training of personnel” and
organized a pre-bid meeting, amongst others on
12.03.2016 inviting all prospective bidders. The last date
for submission of the bids was eventually fixed on
25.05.2016.
6. As per the tender conditions, the offer was to be
made in three envelopes, to be submitted simultaneously,
as hereunder:
(i) First Envelope called – “Initial
Filter–cum-Qualification Requirement Bid”.
(ii) Second Envelope - “Technical Bid”
(iii) Third Envelope - “Price Bid”
7. In response to the notice inviting tender, the
appellant and three others namely; (i) Consortium of
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Bombardier Transportation India Pvt. Ltd. & Bombardier
Transportation GmbH; (ii) M/s. Hyundai Rotem Company
(HRC) and (iii) Consortium of Alstom Transport India
Ltd., & A1stom Transport SA, offered their bids by the
date fixed.
8. As per the tender prescriptions, an affirmative
determination of the eligibility and qualification criteria,
on the basis of the particulars furnished in the first
envelope was to be the pre-requisite for the opening of the
envelopes containing the “technical bids” and the “price
bids” in that order applying the same test. Prior thereto,
pre-bid meetings were held, as referred to hereinabove, in
which representatives of various participating bidders
attended and submitted their queries for clarifications as
per clause No.7 of Instructions to Bidders, which were
accordingly deliberated upon. Clarifications, as sought
for, were furnished accordingly. The appellant has
averred that it did submit the envelopes, as required,
containing all essential documents/certificates, as
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mandated fulfilling, amongst others, the requirements of
the General/Specific Experiences. On 25.05.2016, as
scheduled, the envelopes containing the “Initial
Filter-cum-Qualification Requirement Bid” of the four
bidders were opened and thereafter on 09.06.2016, the
respondent raised 16 queries and required the appellant
to submit its response thereto.
9. The queries, amongst others, related to the norm of
experience as contained in clause 2.4 of Section III of the
Tender Documents. It is inessential to detail the queries
and the replies offered by the appellant, having regard to
the focused contentions raised before us, as would be
referred to shortly hereinafter. Suffice it to state, as
claimed by the appellant, it did adequately and completely
answer the queries and supplemented the same with
contemporaneous records.
10.It was thereafter that the appellant came to learn
that the respondent on 15.10.2016 had rejected its
“Initial Filter-cum-Qualification Requirement Bid” and
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thus had disqualified it for further participation in the
tender process. The appellant thereafter unsuccessfully
pleaded with the respondent corporation by filing various
representations and requests and the same having failed
to evoke any affirmative response, sought refuge of the
legal process. Prior thereto, it was served as well with a
caveat application filed by the respondent in the High
Court mentioning about its disqualification following the
rejection of its “Initial Filter-cum-Qualification
Requirement Bid” .
11.The respondent-corporation, apart from raising
preliminary objection to the maintainability of the writ
petition filed by the appellant, pleading non-joinder of
necessary parties, i.e. the surviving tenderers in the fray,
asserted that the project was financed through budgetary
resources of State of Gujarat, Government of India and
Japan International Co-operation Agency (for short
hereinafter to be referred to as “JICA”). It also mentioned
that through international competitive Bidding, the
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General Engineering Consultant, which is a consortium of
four renowned companies, had been appointed to provide
independent expert professional advice regarding the
preparation of tender documents, evaluation of tender
offers etc. for works related to the Ahmadabad Metro Rail
Project - Phase I, i.e. the project in hand. While
generally admitting the facts pertaining to the issuance of
the notice inviting tender on 15.01.2016 and the
participation of the four bidders including the appellant,
MEGA, however, categorically asserted that in course of
the pre-bid meetings, it was clarified in response to a
pointed query, that the experience of subsidiary
companies/group companies will not be taken into
account in any case and that if the parties are desirous of
such experience being counted, the subsidiary
companies/group companies would have to form a Joint
Venture (hereafter referred to also as “JV”) or a
Consortium.
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12.According to it, the first envelope containing the
“Initial Filter-cum-Qualification Requirement Bid” of the
participating bidders were opened in presence of their
representatives and on the next date, those were
forwarded to the General Engineering Consultant (for
short, hereinafter referred to as “GEC”) for evaluation
thereof and submission of report in connection therewith.
The GEC, in turn, vide its letter dated 09.06.2016
submitted its interim report recommending that further
clarifications be sought for from the respective bidders, on
the points as outlined therein. It was thereafter that the
respondent forwarded 16 queries to the appellant inter
alia on the aspect of experience, as contemplated in
clause 2.4 of the Evaluation and Qualification Criteria of
the tender documents.
13.It is the stand of the MEGA that the appellant,
instead of furnishing the clarifications as sought for,
submitted additional details, thereby virtually revising its
original offer and further endeavoured to make up the
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deficiency in its experience, as prescribed, by falling back
on the experience of its so called subsidiary companies.
According to MEGA, as the subsidiary companies of the
appellant, retained their independent existence as
separate legal entities, their experience, in terms of the
relevant tender norms, could not be counted to be that of
the appellant as it (appellant) did submit its offer as a
single entity and neither as a joint venture nor as a
consortium with its subsidiary companies. Though in its
reply, the MEGA also expressed its reservation with
regard to the appellant's stand alone financial credentials,
it is unnecessary to refer thereto, as the same did not
figure in course of the rival exchanges in the appeal.
14.The GEC, according to the MEGA, after scrutinizing
the bid documents together with the clarifications re-laid
before it, opined that the appellant was found to be
non-responsive to the requirements of clauses 2.3 and 2.4
of Section III relating to “Evaluation and Qualification
Criteria” of the “Tender Document”. It would be sufficient
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for the present purpose to extract the relevant excerpt of
the findings of the GEC vis-à-vis clauses 2.4.1 and 2.4.2
for immediate reference:
ClausesRelevant Eligibility
and Qualification
Criterion of Tender
Document in
question
Gist of Finding arrived at by
GEC
…....
2.4.1
….................
General Experience
Experience in the role
of prime contractor
(single entity or JV'
member),
Subcontractor, or
management
contractor for at least
last ten (10) years
starting 1
st
January,
2006.
….................................
CRRC does not meet this
criterion. Since the Parent
Company cannot claim
experience of its Subsidiary
Company even if it has 100%
ownership as long as a
company is a separate legal
entity. CRRC has submitted
its offer as a sole Bidder. It
has also not submitted any
intent of forming a joint
venture/consortium with its
Subsidiary Company,
supported by a letter of intent
in terms of ITB para 4.1. As
per pre-bid meeting
clarification issued to all
bidders 'The subsidiary
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company/group company may
bid together with the parent
company as a DV/consortium
member for parents/group
company experience to be
taken into account.
2.4.2
(a)
Specific Experience
A minimum number of
two (2) similar
contracts that have
been satisfactorily and
substantially
completed as a prime
contractor considered
in favour considered
of CRRC (single entity
or JV member)
between 1
st
January,
2006 and the Bid
submission deadline.
CRRC does not meet this
criterion, since the
execution/completion of any
contract by its Subsidiary
companies cannot be
considered in favour of CRRC.
15.This report dated 28.07.2016 of the GEC was
thereafter forwarded to JICA for its concurrence and the
latter gave its “no objection” and instructed MEGA to
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proceed with the technical evaluation of the bids of the
remaining bidders and to finalize the process early.
16. Accordingly, the remaining three bidders were
declared to be qualified at the stage of “Initial
Filter-cum-Qualification Requirement Bid” by discarding
the appellant, as it failed to fulfill the requirements
contemplated in clause 2.3 “Financial Situation” and
clause 2.4 “Experience” of Section III of the “Evaluation
and Qualification Criteria” of the “Tender Document”.
17.According to MEGA, the appellant was intimated of
its disqualification by letter dated 02.11.2016. It has
maintained that the impugned action is strictly in
accordance with the tender norms and being objective
and transparent, is unassailable.
18.Referring to clause 4.1 of Section I of the “Tender
Document”, the appellant, in reiteration, pleaded that
the clarification referred to by MEGA excluding the
experience of the subsidiary/group companies from
being accounted for in absence of a joint venture or
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consortium was in respect of a query in a totally different
context and was wholly inapplicable to its bid.
According to the appellant, the query was raised by a
subsidiary company before the respondent as to whether
it could avail the experience of its parent/group
company and in response thereto, it was explained that
if a subsidiary company did wish to use the experience
of the parent company, the parent company or the group
company should form with it a Consortium or a JV, as
the case may be. The appellant thus insisted that it
having submitted its bid, as a single entity being the
holding company of its subsidiaries and had claimed the
experience of its fully owned subsidiaries, the
clarification relied upon by the GEC and acted upon by
MEGA to oust it (appellant) from the process as
disqualified, was patently flawed. It further stood by its
responses to the queries made, contending that those
adequately did answer the same and demonstrate that
its bid was fully compliant of the essential tender
conditions.
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19.The High Court on an analysis of clause 2.4 of the
“Evaluation and Qualification Criteria” contained in
Section III of the “Tender Documents”, in the backdrop of
the rival orientations founded on the pleaded facts and
the documents in support thereof, held that while a
holding company may control its subsidiary companies,
which may have the requisite experience, as the
subsidiary companies would not be required to execute
the work, the holding company cannot avail the benefit of
their experience. It was of the view that since the
subsidiaries have an identity separate from the holding
company, they ipso facto, by virtue of they being
subsidiaries of the holding company, do not become a
party to the contract and are in no manner liable to the
employer for the execution thereof. It distinguished the
contingency, where a J.V. or a Consortium of different
companies/ persons is formed, each constituent whereof
would be liable for execution of the contract. It was of the
estimate that in such a formation of a J.V. or a
Consortium, the benefit of experience of the constituent
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companies would be available to the J.V. or a Consortium
and not otherwise. In essence, it thus held that the
appellant-corporation on a stand alone basis, did not
possess the requisite experience, as laid down in the
tender conditions and that it was not permissible for it to
avail the experience of its subsidiaries to make up such
deficiency. As a community of interest in the performance
of the work between the appellant and its subsidiary
companies, was absent, the impugned action of
disqualifying it for lack of experience in terms of clause
2.4 of the “Evaluation and Qualification of Criteria” could
not thus be faulted.
20.To reiterate, the parties before us are at issue only
on the aspect as to whether the appellant-corporation, to
meet the experience norm, as prescribed by clause 2.4 of
the “Evaluation and Qualification of Criteria”, can utilize
the experience of its subsidiary companies to qualify in
the “Initial Filter-cum-Qualification Requirement Bid”.
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No other contention has been raised. The present
scrutiny thus would be limited only to this facet of the lis.
21.It has been insistently urged on behalf of the
appellant that the exposition of clause 2.4 of the
“Evaluation and Qualification of Criteria” furnished on
behalf of MEGA and endorsed by the High Court is
patently erroneous and is wholly incompatible with the
letter and spirit of clause 4.1 and disregardful of the
materials on record pertaining to the constitution of the
appellant and the functional mechanism qua its
subsidiary companies and is thus liable to be dismissed
as absurd, arbitrary and in defiance of logic.
22.Mr. Sundaram has argued that it being apparent
on the face of the records that the query in response to
which, the clarification provided by the
appellant-corporation was that a subsidiary
company/group company may bid together with the
parent company as a J.V./Consortium member, for
parent/group company experience to be taken into
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account, had been raised by a subsidiary company with
a request to allow the experience of the parent
company/group company to be taken into account for
meeting the qualification requirement of experience of a
subsidiary company. The learned senior counsel has
thus maintained that this clarification had no
application whatsoever to the appellant-corporation who
had offered its bid as the single entity, as permissible
under clause 4.1 and in view of its formational and
functional configuration, it was legally entitled to avail
the experience of its subsidiaries to meet the tender
conditions. According to Mr. Sundaram, the
disqualification of the appellant-corporation, in this
overwhelming legal and factual premise, is grossly
arbitrary, unreasonable and unjust calling for the
intervention of this Court. The learned senior counsel
principally relied in endorsement of his assertions on the
decision of this Court in New Horizons Ltd. and
another Vs. Union of India and others – (1995) 1SCC
478.
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23.In persuasive refutation, learned senior counsel for
the respondent has maintained that as the appellant
squarely failed to meet the technical eligibility,
predicated in clauses 2.4.1 and 2.4.2(a),(b) and (c) on a
correct interpretation of the scope and ambit of clause
4.1, in conjunction with the clarifications provided, no
interference with the view taken by the High Court is
warranted. As admittedly the appellant’s experience sans
that of its subsidiaries falls short of the one mandated by
the tender conditions, the impugned action of MEGA is
unimpeachable, he urged. Mr. Rohatgi argued that
merely because the subsidiary companies of the
appellant, which by themselves are separate legal
entities, are eligible in terms of experience, it does not
ipso facto confer eligibility to it (appellant), the parent
holding company. According to him, the appellant having
applied as a single entity in the contract if awarded
would be inter se, the appellant and the MEGA and the
subsidiary companies would not figure in the deal, so
much so that it would be impossible to secure their
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performance or to hold the subsidiary companies
responsible in case of an eventuality necessitating such
an initiative. The learned senior counsel argued that as
was demonstrable from clause 4.1 as well as 2.4 of the
tender conditions in question, the experience of a
subsidiary company was permissible to be availed only if
it was a member of a J.V. or a Consortium. The
appellant, having offered its bid as a single entity, as a
holding company, it was not entitled to utilize the
experience of its subsidiary companies to make up the
short fall in its experience, as prescribed by the tender
conditions. While contending that the dictum in New
Horizons Ltd. (supra) was of no avail to the appellant in
the facts of the case, the learned senior counsel sought
to draw sustenance principally from the following
decision of this Court:
(1)Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Nagpur
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. & Anr. – 2016
(8) SCALE 765
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(2)Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution
Corporation Ltd. Vs. CSEPDI – Trishe
Consortium – 2016 (10) SCALE 69
(3)Montecarlo Ltd. Vs. NTPC Ltd. – 2016 (10)
SCALE 50
(4)Core Projects and Technologies Ltd. Vs.
The State of Bihar – 2011 (59) BLJR 183
(5)Rohde and Schwarz Gmbh and Co. Kg. Vs.
Airport Authority of India and Anr. –
(2014) 207 DLT 1
24.The contentious pleadings and the assertions
based thereon have been duly evaluated. The issue that
confronts the present adjudicative pursuit, did fall for the
scrutiny of this Court, albeit in the context of another
project, in which the appellant (respondent No. 2 therein)
had been awarded the contract, a decision that stood
upheld in C.A. Nos. 1353-1354 of 2017 - Consortium of
Titagarh Firema Adler SPA -Titagarh Wagons Ltd.
vs. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Limited (decided
on 9.5.2017). Clause 4.1 dealing with eligibility criteria of
the prospective tenders, as involved in that decision,
deserves extraction to facilitate an immediate comparison
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of the text thereof with that of clause 4.1 as involved
herein.
“4.1 A bidder may be a firm that is a
private entity, a government-owned entity –
subject to ITB 4.3 – or any combination of
such entities in the form of a joint venture
(JV) under an existing agreement or with the
intent to enter into such an agreement
supported by a letter of intent. In the case
of a joint venture, all members shall be
jointly and severally liable for the execution
of the contract in accordance with the
contract terms. The JV shall nominate a
representative who shall have the authority
to conduct all business for and on behalf of
any and all the members of the JV during
the bidding process and, in the event the JV
is awarded the contract, during contract
execution. Unless specified in the BDS,
there is no limit on the number of members
in a JV.”
25.Section V of the “Tender Documents” of that
contract dwelling on “eligibility criteria and social and
environmental responsibility” further mandated that
bidders that are government owned enterprises or
institutions may participate, only if they can establish
that they are (i) legally and financial autonomous (ii)
Operate under commercial law.
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26.The award of the contract for “design, manufacture,
supply, testing, commissioning of 69 passenger rolling
stock (Electrical Multiple Units)” and training of personnel
at Nagpur Metro Rail Project, which was funded by KfW
Development Bank, Germany in favour of the appellant
was unsuccessfully assailed before the High Court, a
verdict that was upheld by this Court, as referred to
hereinabove.
27.One of the principle limbs of challenge against the
eligibility of the appellant was its lack of experience as a
single entity and that it having submitted its bid on the
strength of the experience of the subsidiaries of its
erstwhile parent/original companies, following the merger
whereof it had come into existence, it was not eligible as
per the qualification norms. It was urged there as well
that unless the subsidiaries are the constituents of a J.V.
or a Consortium, their experience cannot be taken into
consideration to gauge the experience of the holding
company and that as it on a standalone basis, was not
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possessed of the requisite experience as prescribed, it
ought to have been disqualified on that count alone.
28.Following an exhaustive analysis of the facts, the
relevant tender conditions as well as the law adumbrated
by the pronouncements of this Court, this plea against
the eligibility of the appellant-corporation was negated.
29.It would be advantageous, in view of the striking
analogy of the overall perspectives, to recount the relevant
observations recorded therein and having a decisive
bearing on the issue under scrutiny.
“24. The core issue, as we perceive, pertains to
acceptance of the technical bid of the
respondent No. 2 by the 1
st
respondent and we
are required to address the same solely on the
touchstone of eligibility criteria regard being
had to the essential conditions. The decision
on other technical aspects, as we are advised at
present, is best left to the experts. We do not
intend to enter into the said domain though a
feeble attempt has been made on the said
count.
…… … … … … … … …
26.What is urged before this Court is that the
respondent No. 2 could not have been regarded
as a single entity and, in any case, it could not
have claimed the experience of its subsidiaries
25
because no consortium or joint venture with its
subsidiaries was formed. With regard to
relationship of holding and subsidiary
companies, we have been commended to the
authorities in Balwant Rai Saluja (supra) and
also the judgment of the Delhi High Court in
Rohde and Schwarz Gmbh and Co. K.G.
(supra). The essential submission is that
respondent No. 2 as the owner of the
subsidiary companies including their assets
and liabilities, cannot claim their experience
and there is necessity to apply the principle of
“lifting the corporate veil”, as has been laid
down in Renusagar Power Co. (supra) and
Life Insurance Corporation of India v.
Escorts Ltd. and others
1
. It is also argued
that the Government owned entity cannot be
treated differently, for a Government owned
entity is distinct from the Government and, for
the said purpose, inspiration has been drawn
from the authority in Western Coalfields
Limited v. Special Area Development
Authority, Korba and another
2
. It has also
been urged that when the tender has required
a particular thing to be done, it has to be done
in that specific manner, for the law envisages
that where a power is given to do a certain
thing in a certain way, the thing must be done
in that way or not at all. For the aforesaid
purpose, inspiration has been drawn from the
authority in Central Coalfields Ltd. (supra)
wherein reliance has been placed on Nazir
Ahmad v. King Emperor
3
.
1
(1986) 1 SCC 264
2 (1982) 1 SCC 125
3
AIR 1936 PC 253
26
27.Before we proceed to deal with the
concept of single entity and the discretion used
by the 1
st
respondent, we intend to deal with
role of the Court when the eligibility criteria is
required to be scanned and perceived by the
Court. In Montecarlo Ltd. (supra), the Court
referred to TATA Cellular (supra) wherein
certain principles, namely, the modern trend
pointing to judicial restraint on administrative
action; the role of the court is only to review
the manner in which the decision has been
taken; the lack of expertise on the part of the
court to correct the administrative decision;
the conferment of freedom of contract on the
Government which recognizes a fair play in the
joints as a necessary concomitant for an
administrative body functioning in an
administrative sphere or quasi-administrative
sphere, were laid down. It was also stated in
the said case that the administrative decision
must not only be tested by the application of
Wednesbury principle of reasonableness but
also must be free from arbitrariness not
affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. The
two-Judge Bench took note of the fact that in
Jagdish Mandal (supra) it has been held that,
if the decision relating to award of contract is
bona fide and is in public interest, courts will
not, in exercise of power of judicial review,
interfere even if a procedural aberration or
error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer,
is made out. The decisions in Master Marine
Services (P) Ltd. v. Metcalfe & Hodgkinson
(P) Ltd. and another
4
, B.S.N. Joshi & Sons
Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. and others
5
and Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. (supra)
have been referred to. The Court quoted a
4 (2005) 6 SCC 138
5 (2006) 11 SCC 548
27
passage from Afcons Infrastructure Ltd.
(supra) wherein the principle that
interpretation placed to appreciate the tender
requirements and to interpret the documents
by owner or employer unless mala fide or
perverse in understanding or appreciation is
reflected, t he constitutional Courts should not
interfere. It has also been observed in the said
case that it is possible that the owner or
employer of a project may give an
interpretation to the tender documents that is
not acceptable to the constitutional Courts but
that by itself is not a reason for interfering
with the interpretation given. After referring to
the said authority, it has been ruled thus:
“24. We respectfully concur with the
aforesaid statement of law. We have
reasons to do so. In the present
scenario, tenders are floated and
offers are invited for highly complex
technical subjects. It requires
understanding and appreciation of
the nature of work and the purpose
it is going to serve. It is common
knowledge in the competitive
commercial field that technical bids
pursuant to the notice inviting
tenders are scrutinized by the
technical experts and sometimes
third party assistance from those
unconnected with the owner’s
organization is taken. This ensures
objectivity. Bidder’s expertise and
technical capability and capacity
must be assessed by the experts. In
the matters of financial assessment,
consultants are appointed. It is
because to check and ascertain that
28
technical ability and the financial
feasibility have sanguinity and are
workable and realistic. There is a
multi-prong complex approach;
highly technical in nature. The
tenders where public largesse is put
to auction stand on a different
compartment. Tender with which we
are concerned, is not comparable to
any scheme for allotment. This arena
which we have referred requires
technical expertise. Parameters
applied are different. Its aim is to
achieve high degree of perfection in
execution and adherence to the time
schedule. But, that does not mean,
these tenders will escape scrutiny of
judicial review. Exercise of power of
judicial review would be called for if
the approach is arbitrary or malafide
or procedure adopted is meant to
favour one. The decision making
process should clearly show that the
said maladies are kept at bay. But
where a decision is taken that is
manifestly in consonance with the
language of the tender document or
sub-serves the purpose for which the
tender is floated, the court should
follow the principle of restraint.
Technical evaluation or comparison
by the court would be impermissible.
The principle that is applied to scan
and understand an ordinary
instrument relatable to contract in
other spheres has to be treated
differently than interpreting and
appreciating tender documents
relating to technical works and
29
projects requiring special skills. The
owner should be allowed to carry out
the purpose and there has to be
allowance of free play in the joints.”
… … … … … … … … ...
29.In Reliance Telecom Ltd. and another
v. Union of India and another , the Court
referred to the authority in Asia Foundation
& Construction Ltd. v. Trafalgar House
Construction (I) Ltd. and others wherein it
has been observed that though the principle
of judicial review cannot be denied so far as
exercise of contractual powers of Government
bodies are concerned, but it is intended to
prevent arbitrariness or favouritism and it is
exercised in the larger public interest or if it
is brought to the notice of the court that in
the matter of award of a contract power has
been exercised for any collateral purpose.
Thereafter, the Court in Reliance Telecom
Ltd. (supra) proceeded to state thus:
“75. … In the instant case, we are
unable to perceive any arbitrariness
or favouritism or exercise of power
for any collateral purpose in the NIA.
In the absence of the same, to
exercise the power of judicial review
is not warranted. In the case at
hand, we think, it is a prudent
decision once there is increase of
revenue and expansion of the range
of service.”
And again:
30
“76.It needs to be stressed that in
the matters relating to complex
auction procedure having enormous
financial ramification, interference
by the Courts based upon any
perception which is thought to be
wise or assumed to be fair can lead
to a situation which is not
warrantable and may have
unforeseen adverse impact. It may
have the effect potentiality of
creating a situation of fiscal
imbalance. In our view, interference
in such auction should be on the
ground of stricter scrutiny when the
decision making process
commencing from NIA till the end
smacks of obnoxious arbitrariness
or any extraneous consideration
which is perceivable.”
… … … … … … … … ...
32. Respondent No. 2, as is evident, is a
company owned by the People’s Republic of
China and, therefore, it comes within the
ambit of Clause 4.1 of the bid document as
a Government owned entity. We have
already reproduced the said clause in earlier
part of the judgment. As perceived by the 1
st
respondent, a single entity can bid for itself
and it can consist of its constituents which
are wholly owned subsidiaries and they may
have experience in relation to the project.
That apart, as is understood by the said
respondent, where the singular or unified
31
entity claims that as a consequence of
merger, all the subsidiaries form a
homogenous pool under its immediate
control in respect of rights, liabilities, assets
and obligations, the integrity of the singular
entity as owning such rights, assets and
liabilities cannot be ignored and must be
given effect. While judging the eligibility
criteria of the second respondent, the 1
st
respondent has scanned Article164 of the
Articles of Association of the respondent No.
2 which are submitted along with the bid
from which it is evincible that the Board of
Directors of the respondent No. 2 has been
entrusted with the authority and
responsibility to discharge all necessary and
essential decisions and functions for the
subsidiaries as well. According to the 1
st
respondent, the term “Government owned
entity” would include a government owned
entity and its subsidiaries and there can be
no matter of doubt that the identity of the
entities as belonging to the Government
when established can be treated as a
Government owned entity and the
experience claimed by the parent of the
subsidiaries can be taken into
consideration. Learned senior counsel for
the 1
st
respondent has drawn our attention
to the “lifting of corporate veil” principle or
doctrine of “piercing the veil” and in that
context, reliance has been placed on
Littlewoods Mail Order Stores, Ltd. v.
McGregor
6
, DHN Food Distributors Ltd.
and others v. London Borough of Tower
Hamlets
7
and Harold Holdsworth & Co.
6 (1969) 3 All ER 855
7 (1976) 3 All ER 462
32
(Wakefield) Ld. v. Caddies
8
. Learned
senior counsel has also placed reliance
upon the principles stated in Renusagar
Power Co. (supra) that have been reiterated
in New Horizons Ltd. (supra). In the
written submission filed on behalf of the 1
st
respondent, the relevant paragraphs from
Renusagar Power Co. (supra) have been
copiously quoted. It is also urged that in
the current global economic regime the
multinational corporations conduct their
business through their subsidiaries and,
therefore, there cannot be a hyper-technical
approach that eligibility of the principal
cannot be taken cognizance of when it
speaks of the experience of the subsidiaries.
It is also contended by Mr. Subramaniam
that in the context of fraud or evasion of
legal obligations, the doctrine of “piercing
the veil” or “lifting of the corporate veil” can
be applied but the said principle cannot be
taken recourse to in a matter of the present
nature.
33. With regard to the satisfaction of the 1
st
respondent, it has been highlighted before
us that the said respondent had thoroughly
examined the bid documents and satisfied
itself about of the capability, experience and
expertise of the respondent No. 2 and there
has been a thorough analysis of the
technical qualification of the respondent No.
2 by the independent General Consultant
and the reports of the Appraisal and Tender
Committee of the 1
st
respondent and also
the no-objection has been received from KfW
Development Bank, Germany which is
8 (1955) 1 WLR 352
33
funding the entire project. Narrating the
experience of the respondent No. 1, it has
been stated in the written submission filed
on behalf of the 1
st
respondent:
“36. That it is further clear from the
record that besides being the lowest
bidder, the experience of R 2 in
supplying Metro Trains across the
world exceeds the Petitioner’s
experience by a huge margin. Where
for clause 12, R 2 has shown a
figure of 594 Metro Cars, Petitioner
has shown only 72 Cars; and for
clause 12.1 where R 2 has shown
432 Cars, Petitioner has again
shown only 72 Cars. This vast
experience of R 2 would be beneficial
for the project and would further
public interest.
37.That R 1 without any malice, or
malafide has treated R 2 along with
its 100% subsidiaries as one entity.
This understanding of the clause
has been at the ends of both parties
viz. R 1 and R 2, who were ad idem
vis-à-vis the eligibility of the parent
company to bid using the experience
and executing the contract through
its various 100% wholly owned
subsidiaries.
38.That the above understanding
of R 1 of treating R 2 along with its
100% subsidiaries is supported by
the understanding of the Delhi
Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., which
has on a similarly, if not same,
34
worded bid-document granted the
tender/agreement to R 2, which had
even there bid as a parent company
claiming experience of and
execution through 100% wholly
owned subsidiaries.
39.That moreover, there is no bar,
whatsoever, express or implied, in
the tender document to treat the
parent company along with its 100%
wholly owned subsidiaries as one
entity. Therefore, the scope of
judicial review should be limited in
adjudging the decision taken by R 1
in the best interest of the project,
and thereby, the public.
40. That arguendo, no prejudice,
whatsoever, has been caused to the
project or to other bidders including
the Petitioner by the above
understanding of the tender
conditions by R 1. It is humbly
submitted that R 2 fulfilled all the
technical requirements. The
bid-document itself provided for
bidding as a consortium, and did
not require in such a case fulfilment
of any material condition, which if
not fulfilled would prejudice any
parties or the project. Moreover, the
scheme of the bid-document is such
that it itself provides for a Parent
Company Guarantee. According to
this Parent Company Guarantee
Form, a parent company would
have to perform the works under
the agreement in case the
35
subsidiary failed. Therefore, the
objections raised by the Petitioner
are hyper-technical and have been
raised only to stall the project once
it was found to be unsuccessful.”
34.As is noticeable, there is material on
record that the respondent No. 2, a
Government company, is the owner of the
subsidiaries companies and subsidiaries
companies have experience . The 1
st
respondent, as it appears, has applied its
commercial wisdom in the understanding and
interpretation which has been given the
concurrence by the concerned Committee and
the financing bank. We are disposed to think
that the concept of “Government owned
entity” cannot be conferred a narrow
construction. It would include its subsidiaries
subject to the satisfaction of the owner. There
need not be a formation of a joint venture or a
consortium. In the obtaining fact situation,
the interpretation placed by the 1
st
respondent in the absence of any kind of
perversity, bias or mala fide should not be
interfered with in exercise of power of judicial
review. Decision taken by the 1
st
respondent,
as is perceptible, is keeping in view the
commercial wisdom and the expertise and it
is no way against the public interest.
Therefore, we concur with the view expressed
by the High Court.”
30.Be that as it may, it would notwithstanding the
above, be indispensable to examine and decipher the
import of the relevant clauses pertinent to the question to
36
be addressed. Clause 4.1 of Section 1 of the Instructions
to Bidders which defines “eligible bidders” is in following
terms:
“Eligible Bidders:-
4.1. A Bidder may be a firm that is a single
entity or any combination of such ent ities in
the form of a joint venture (JV) under an
existing agreement or with the intent to enter
into such an agreement supported by a letter
of intent . In the case of a J V :
Consortium formation is acceptable.
Tender condition Prevails.
(a)All members shall be jointly and severally
liable for the execution of the Contract in
accordance with the Contract terms, and
(b)The JV shall nominate a Representative
who shall have the authority to conduct
all business for and on behalf of any and
all the members of the JV during the
bidding process and, in the event the JV
is awarded the Contract during Contract
execution.”
31. A relevant extract of Clause 7.1 of the same
Section, which provides for clarification of bidding
documents, site visit pre-bid meeting, is furnished
hereinbelow:
37
“A Bidder requiring any clarification of the
Bidding Documents shall contact the
Employer is writing at the Employer’s address
specified in the BDS or raise his enquiries
during the pre-bid meeting if provided for in
accordance with ITB.7.4.”
32. Clauses 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 (a) & (b) of the “Evaluation
and Qualification of Criteria”, Section III are also
extracted as hereunder:
“G eneral Experience (Cl ause 2.4.1)
Experience in the role of prime contractor
(single entity or JV member), Subcontractor or
management contractor for at least last ten
(10) years starting 1
st
January, 2006.
Specific Experience Clause 2.4.2( a )
A minimum number of two ( 2) similar
contracts that have been satisfactorily and
substantially completed as a prime contractor
(single entity or JV member) between 1
st
January, 2006 and the Bid submission
deadline.
Specific Experience (2.4.2(b)
Experience under contracts in the role of
prime contractor (single entity or JV member)
for Vehicle Design, Interface (with other
designated Contractors such as signaling,
Track Traction, etc.), Assembly & Supply,
Testing and Commissioning of minimum of
total 150 metro (i.e. MRT, LRT, Sub-urban
Railways or high speed railways) cars made of
38
either Stainless Steel or Aluminum with
similar features including three phase traction
propulsion system ATP/ ATO systems, etc .
between 1
st
January, 2006 and the Bid
submission deadline.
AND
Out of 150 or more cars supplied and
commissioned as above have minimum o f
total 75 metro (i.e. MRT, LRT, Sub-urban
Railways or high speed railways) cars
supplied and in satisfactory revenue
operation continuously for at least five
years:
EITHER in at least 1 (one) country outside the
country of origin OR in India.”
33.It is a matter of record that between 16.03.2016
and 30.04.2016, in course of the pre-bid meetings with
the bidders, certain queries were raised by them to which
clarifications had been furnished by MEGA. The following
queries and clarifications as available from the records
being pre-eminently relevant are quoted hereinbelow:
Query raised Clarification issued
Serial No. 50: Existing
requirement that the
consortium members
experience shall only be
The subsidiary
company./group
company may bid
together with the parent
39
counted for qualification
Kindly allow Parent
companies/Group
companies experience to
be taken into account for
meeting the qualification
requirement as this will
simplify the Contract
structure. The same has
been allowed in several
large tenders in India
recently.
company as a
JV/consortium member,
for parents/group
company experience to be
taken in to account.
Tender Condition
prevails.
Serial No.52: Kindly
accept letter of credit
facility issued by the
bank in favor of
JV/Consortium or
companies belong to
same global group of
companies rather than
individual cap in case the
applicant is
JV/Consortium.
Each member of
JV/Consortium is a
separate entity with a
distinct role assigned as
per MOU and, therefore,
the requirement are
specified
Tender Condition
prevails.
Serial No. 54. For a
proper local
management, we suggest
you to kindly allow a fully
owned Indian subsidiary
can use the date and
references of the parent
company and participate
in tender on/its own and
The subsidiary
company/group company
may bid together with the
parent company as a
JV/consortium member,
for Parents/group
company experience to be
taken in to account.
Each member must meet
40
or as consortium with
parent company
borrowing the technical &
financial credentials or
the parent company
the requirement.
Serial No.56: For a
proper local
management, we suggest
you to kindly allow a fully
owned/Indian subsidiary
can part of
consortium/JV with their
parents company, even
100% subsidiary doesn’t
have 10 years experience
and doesn’t meet other
eligibility conditions
mentioned in Clause No.2
of Section-III of
Evaluation and
Qualification Criteria.
The subsidiary
company/group company
may bid together with the
parent company as a
JV/consortium member,
for Parents/group
company experience to be
taken in to account.
34. A plain reading of clause 4.1 reveals that a bidder
can be a single entity or a combination of such entities in
the form of a J.V. or a Consortium under an existing
agreement or with the intent to enter into such an
agreement supported by a letter of intent. Thus a single
41
entity has been construed to be a valid bidder for all
intents and purposes.
35.Having regard to the magnitude of the project as
well as the experience and expertise essential for the
quality execution thereof, there seems to be no
justification to infer, at the first place, to exclude a
government owned entity with its 100% wholly owned
subsidiaries to be ineligible to participate in the process.
A single entity, in our comprehension, would assuredly
include such a government owned entity along with its
100% wholly owned subsidiaries. This is more so on the
touchstone of otherwise imperative facilitation of a
broad based participation of entities with competing
worth and capabilities, in the overall interest of the timely
and quality execution of a public project.
36.As recorded in Consortium of Titagarh Firema
Adler SPA (supra) , the appellant-corporation is a
government owned entity with 100% wholly owned
subsidiaries as a composite unit, so much so that the
42
experience of any one of its constituent 100% wholly
owned subsidiaries would be construable as its
experience. It was proclaimed that the petitioner
(respondent no.2 therein) was a Government Company
and the owner of its subsidiary companies and that the
concept of “government own entity” could not be given a
narrow construction so as to exclude its subsidiaries with
their experience and that there was no necessity for the
formation of a joint venture and consortium for the
Government own entity to avail the benefit of the
experience of its subsidiary companies. That the
acceptance of the petitioner (respondent no.2) therein in
the context of the work awarded to it was in accord with
public interest, having regard to the overall commercial
concept and the demand of expertise, was underlined as
well. Noticeably, the process of merger of M/s. CNR
Corporation and M/s. CSR Corporation and the
integration thereof along with their subsidiaries to
metamorphosise into the appellant-corporation is borne
out by the coeval records.
43
37 In that view of the matter, the status and the
entitlements of the appellant-corporation, as already
adjudicated in Consortium of Titagarh Firema Adler
SPA (supra), as a single entity bidder in the present
tender process would also by the yardstick of simple
logic and analogy be available to it. Absence of the words
“government owned entity” in clause 4.1, presently under
consideration, is of no consequence. The plea of the
respondent that the tender conditions involved demand a
different perspective in the overall conceptual framework
thereof, lacks persuasion. Significantly, in clause 4.1
involved in Consortium of Titagarh Firema Adler SPA
(supra), “government owned entity” had been
contemplated as one of the bidders in contradistinction to
“private entity” and “any combination of such entities” in
the form of a joint venture (J.V)..... The expression used
in the present clause being “single entity”,
understandably, it is inclusive of a private as well as a
44
government owned entity. The unit envisaged as a single
entity is thus independent of any combination or
formation in the form of a J.V. or a Consortium and thus
is visualised to be one integral and composite whole. In
such a logical premise, a government owned company
with its 100% wholly owned subsidiaries has to be
comprehended as a single entity, eligible to bid in terms
of clause 4.1 of the tender conditions and is to be
regarded as single, coherent and homogeneous existence
and not a disjointed formation.
38.The queries and the clarifications, relatable to the
discord, as presented, also in our discernment, do not
substantiate the plea of MEGA in any manner
whatsoever. The foundation of its rejection of the
appellant's bid is the clarification to the query mainly at
serial No. 50. It is patent therefrom that it was in
response to a query made by a subsidiary company to
allow for its benefit, the experience of the parent
company/group companies to meet the qualification
45
requirement with regard thereto. It was in that context
that the clarification furnished was that the subsidiary
company/group companies may bid together with the
parent company as J.V./Consortium member, for
parent/group company's experience to be taken into
account. This clarification was extended and applied
vis-a-vis the appellant qua clauses Nos. 2.4.1, 2.4.2(a),
2.4.2(b) and 2.4.2.(c) to disqualify it on the ground that
on stand alone basis, it was deficient in the experience
prescribed and that it could not have availed of the
experience of its subsidiaries companies. As rightly
contended on behalf of the appellant, we are of the view
that this clarification has no application to its case and,
therefore, the decision to disqualify it on this ground is
apparently arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable,
illogical and non-transparent, thus rendering the same
irreversibly illegal, unjust and unfair. The improvement
endeavoured by the respondent in its reply affidavit is
belied by the records and is unacceptable. No other view
or elucidation of the relevant clauses of the tender
46
conditions is at all possible. The interpretation offered by
the respondent and endorsed by the High Court in the
contextual framework is thus patently impermissible and
absurd.
39.Not only the appellant as the record testifies had
offered its responses to the clarifications sought for, its
status as a government owned corporation, by no means,
has been disputed by MEGA. Further, in the face of its
demonstrated structural integrity and functional unity
qua its subsidiaries with all consequential legal
implications, the apprehension of MEGA that the
subsidiary companies of the appellant, if necessity so
arises, would not be available for the execution of the
project, not being a party to the contract, to say the least,
is speculative, unfounded, farfetched and wanting in
reason and rationale. Whether the subsidiary companies
of the appellant would be responsible for the execution of
the work is evinced by the formational specifics and
functional dynamics of the appellant and its wholly
47
owned subsidiary companies, as noticed in Consortium
of Titagarh Firema Adler SPA (supra) in the affirmative
and does not call for further dilation. In the face of a
forensic analysis of the decisions cited at the Bar in the
above adjudication, it is inessential as well to retraverse
the same.
40.In the wake up of above determination, the
impugned disqualification of the appellant on the ground
of deficiency, in experience in terms of clause 2.4, is
unsustainable in law and on facts being grossly illegal,
arbitrary and perverse. As a corollary, the judgment and
order of the High Court in challenge is also set-aside.
The tender process in view of the above conclusion,
would be furthered hereinafter as per the terms and
conditions thereof and in accordance with law and taken
to its logical end as expeditiously as possible. We make it
clear that the present adjudication is confined only to
the issue of disqualification of the appellant on the
ground of experience on the touchstone of clause 2.4 of
48
the “Eligibility and Qualification Criteria” of “Tender
Document” and no other aspect. The appeal is allowed.
In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be
no order as to costs.
...........................J.
[Dipak Misra]
............................J.
[Amitava Roy]
New Delhi;
May 15, 2017
ITEM NO.1A COURT NO.2 SECTION IX
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 12065/2016
M/S CRRC CORPORATION LTD. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M Link Express for Gandhinagar Ahmedabad
(MEGA) Company Ltd. Respondent(s)
Date : 15/05/2017 This appeals was called on for judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Prabhjit Jauhar, Adv.
Mr. S.S. Jauhar, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Mahesh Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. Abhinav Agrawal, Adv.
Mr. M. Bhatt, Adv.
Mr. Rishabh Parikh, Adv.
Mr. E.C. Agrawala, AOR
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy pronounced the judgment of the
Bench consisting of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra and His
Lordship.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable
judgment. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
no order as to costs.
(Gulshan Kumar Arora) (H.S. Parasher)
Court Master Court Master
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)
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