HIGHCOURTOFANDHRAPRADESH

****

COMMERCIALCOURTAPPEALNo.21of2025

Between:

M/s.JPRProjects,Gajuwaka,

Visakhapatnamrep.throughits

PartnersMr.ManthenaVivekVarmaandanother

.....APPELLANT

AND

AxisBank,MVPColonyBranch,

Rep.byitsAuthorizedOfficer,

and2others

.....RESPONDENTS

DATEOFJUDGMENTRESERVED :11.12.2025

DATEOFJUDGMENTPRONOUNCED:27.02.2026

DATEOFJUDGMENTUPLOADED : 27.02.2026

SUBMITTEDFORAPPROVAL:

THEHON'BLESRIJUSTICERAVINATHTILHARI

&

THEHON'BLESRIJUSTICEMAHESWARARAOKUNCHEAM

1.WhetherReportersofLocalnewspapersmay

beallowedtoseetheJudgments?

Yes/No

2.Whetherthecopiesofjudgmentmaybe

markedtoLawReporters/Journals

Yes/No

3.WhetherYourLordshipswishtoseethefair

copyoftheJudgment?

Yes/No

_______________________

RAVINATHTILHARI,J

____________________________

MAHESWARARAOKUNCHEAM,J

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

2

*THEHON'BLESRIJUSTICERAVINATHTILHARI

&

THEHON'BLESRIJUSTICEMAHESWARARAOKUNCHEAM

+COMMERCIALCOURTAPPEALNo.21of2025

%27.02.2026

Between:

M/s.JPRProjects,Gajuwaka,

Visakhapatnamrep.throughits

PartnersMr.ManthenaVivekVarmaandanother

.....APPELLANT

AND

AxisBank,MVPColonyBranch,

Rep.byitsAuthorizedOfficer,

and2others

.....RESPONDENTS

!CounselfortheAppellant :SriPatanjaliPamidighantram

CounselfortheRespondents :SriV.V.N.Narasimham

<Gist:

>HeadNote:

?CasesReferred:

1.2016SCCOnLineCal6251

2.2004SCCOnLineAll175

3.(2017)8SCC603

4.2024SCCOnLineSC2632

5.(1999)2SCC479

6.2017SCCOnLineHyd469

7.ILR2017Kar3016

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COMCANo.21of2025

3

THEHON’BLESRIJUSTICERAVINATHTILHARI

&

THEHON’BLSRIJUSTICEMAHESWARARAOKUNCHEAM

COMMERCIALCOURTAPPEALNo.21of2025

JUDGMENT:(perHon’bleSriJusticeRaviNathTilhari)

HeardSriPatanjaliPamidighantam,learnedcounselfortheappellantand

SriV.V.N.Narasimham,learnedcounselfortherespondents.

2.ThepresentappealhasbeenfiledunderSection13(1)ofthe

CommercialCourtsAct,2015(inshort‘Act2015’)readwithSection37(1)(c)

oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct,1996(inshort‘Act1996’),challenging

theJudgment/Order,dated31.07.2025passedinCAOPNo.49of2024(in

short‘CAOP’),bytheSpecialJudgeForTrialandDisposalofCommercial

Disputes,Visakhapatnam(inshort‘SpecialJudge’).

3.TheappellantsarethepetitionersinCAOPNo.49of2024.Itfiledthe

applicationunderSection9oftheAct1996seekinginjunctionrestrainingthe

respondentsandthoseactingontheirinstructionsfromcontinuingthefreeze

oncurrentaccountNo.915020032315999withAxisBank,M.V.P.ColonyBranch,

Visakhapatnam,belongingtothepetitionerfirmandtodirectthe

respondent/AxisBanktorestoretheoperationalaccesstothepetitionerbyde-

freezingthesaidcurrentbankaccount.

4.ThelearnedSpecialJudge,bytheimpugnedOrderdated31.07.2025,

allowedtheapplication,partly,withcostsandfreezingofthebankaccountwith

theAxisBankwasrevokedonlyforthelimitedpurposeofpayingtaxesand

statutoryduestotheCentralGovernment,theStateGovernmentandthelocal

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COMCANo.21of2025

4

bodies.ThelearnedSpecialJudge,however,directedthatnopaymentshallbe

madetothepartnersofthefirmintheirindividualcapacity,vendors,third

parties.Italsoprovidedthatthebankaccountshallbeoperatedasperterms

ofClause14ofthereconstitutedpartnershipdeeddated10.02.2024andthat

thesaidordershallremaininforcefornotmorethan90daysfromthedateof

theorder.ThelearnedSpecialJudgefurtherprovidedthatontheArbitral

Tribunalbeingconstituted,thefurthercontinuation,modificationorvariationof

theordershallbedealtbytheArbitralTribunalontheapplicationfiledbyeither

party.

A.Facts:

I.Petitioner/Appellants’case:

5.Thebrieffactsofthecasearethat,M/s.JPRProjects,apartnership

firmwasconstitutedintheyear2015andisinvolvedinconstructionrelated

activities.Thepetitionersandtherespondents2and3areitspartners.Late

SriJangaPunnaReddy,thehusbandofthe2

nd

respondentandfatherofthe3

rd

respondentwastheManagingPartner.Thepetitioner’scaseisthatSriJanga

PunnaReddyandthe2

nd

respondentwithdrewasumofRs.1,59,28,200/-in

excessoftheamountswithdrawnbythepartnersuntil2022.LateJangaPunna

ReddywithdrewanadditionalamountofRs.92,00,000/-andfurtherfunds

amountingtoRs.1,22,00,000/-alongwiththe2

nd

respondentwithoutproper

documentation.LateJangaPunnaReddysufferedfromill-healthresultingin

unsuccessfulattemptsatcomprehensivesettlementofaccounts.Sufficient

fundshadbeendivertedforpurchaseoffixedassetsinhisnameandinthe

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COMCANo.21of2025

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nameof2

nd

respondentasaresultofwhichtheliquidcapitalrequiredfor

ongoingprojectswasdepleted.Inordertomaintainoperationalcontinuity,a

MemorandumofUnderstandingwasexecutedon31.10.2023whereunderlate

SriJangaPunnaReddyandhiswifethe2

nd

respondentagreedtoretirefrom

thefirmandthepetitionersweretocontinuethefirm’soperations.SriJanga

PunnaReddyexpiredon13.12.2023andtherespondents2and3madefresh

demandsandraiseddisputes.Thefirmwasunderliabilitiestothirdpartiestoa

tuneofRs.1,45,27,439/-.

6.Thepetitioner’sbankaccountwasfrozenon18.12.2023.Afresh

MemorandumofUnderstandingwassignedunderwhichtherespondentswere

toreceiveRs.1,30,00,000/-alongwithothermovableassetsinexchangefor

revokingthefreezeonthebankaccount.Thepartnershipwasagain

reconstitutedon10.02.2024afterthesaidMemorandumofUnderstandingwas

executedandthepetitionerswereconferredwiththeexclusiveauthorityin

respectoffinancesofthefirmandthebankaccounts.Theroleofthe

respondentsNo.2and3wasconfinedonlytospecificpercentageofshares

withoutanyremunerationorrightsofmanagement.Thepetitionerfirmowed

approximatelyRs.6,20,00,000/-asonMarch,2023excludingthestatutorydues,

suchasGST,TDS,PFandESI.Thepetitionershadspentabout

Rs.1,45,27,439/-oftheirpersonalfundstowardsdischargingliabilityofthefirm

toitssub-contractorsandsuppliers.Thefirm’scurrentaccount,whichwas

initiallyfrozeninDecember,2023wasrevokedinJanuary/February,2024.

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

6

7.However,the1

st

respondent,theAxisBankagainresortedtofreezing

oftheaccounton24.05.2024basingonunilateralinstructionsfromthe2

nd

and

3

rd

respondents,asaresultofwhichthefirm’sfinancialactivitieswere

adverselyaffected.Theappellants/petitioners’furthercaseisthatinMay,2024

theywithdrewasumofRs.1,55,00,000/-fromthefirm’saccount.Their

requesttothebanktorevokethefreezeimposedontheaccountevenafter

furnishingcopiesofreconstitutedpartnershipdeedandothersupporting

documentsdidnotyieldanyresult,andanamountofRs.2,51,64,791.58pswas

lyinginthefirm’sbankaccountanditsfinancialoperationswereadversely

affected.Thepartnersalsofurnishedparticularsofthepaymentsmadeon

behalfofthefirmfromtheirpersonalresourcesandthepetitionersalso

furnishedtheparticularsofthesumsandamountsrequiredtomeetstatutory

aswellasvendorobligations.

8.Theappellants/petitionersfiledapplicationunderSection9oftheAct

1996,alsosubmittingthatifthestatutorydueswerenotpaidpromptly,the

samewouldattractpenalconsequencesandtheongoingprojectsofthefirm

weretobejeopardizedandthelivelihoodofitsemployeeswouldbeindanger

onaccountofthefreezingofbankaccount.Theystatedthatthepetitioners

hadprimafaciecaseaswellasbalanceofconvenienceintheirfavourand

unlessthefreezingofthebankaccountwaslifted,theywillsufferirreparable

loss.Thepetitionersalsostatedthattheyintendtoinstitutethearbitration

proceedingsandsoughtforthereliefsstatedinthepetitionunderSection9of

theAct1996,priortothecommencementofthearbitrationproceedings.

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COMCANo.21of2025

7

II.Respondents’case:

9.The1

st

respondentbankdidnotfileanycounteranditwassetex

parteon21.01.2025.

10.The2

nd

respondentfiledcounter,denyingthepetitionaverments.

The3

rd

respondentfiledaMemoadoptingthecounterofthe2

nd

respondent.

11.ThestandoftherespondentsNo.2and3intheircounterwasthat

lateSriJangaPunnaReddywasdiagnosedwithPancreaticCancerandhad

withdrawnRs.80,000/-fromitscapitalaccountduring2023-24withtheconsent

ofthepetitionersinordertomeethismedicalexpenditure.The2

nd

respondent

alsowithdrewRs.30,00,000/-fromhercapitalaccountforfurtherrequirements

withtheconsentofthepetitioners.AccordingtotherespondentsNo.2and3,

lateSriJangaPunnaReddydepositedRs.53,00,000/-backintothecapital

accountpriortohisdeath.Theyhadwithdrawnsomefurtheramountwhich

wassaidtobetowardsmeetingthemedicalexpenditurewiththeconsentof

thepartnersofthepetitionerfirm.Itwasthefurthercaseoftherespondents

No.2and3thatthepetitionerssuppressedthefactthattheyhadalso

withdrawnRs.74,50,000/-fromtheircapitalaccount.

12.WithrespecttotheMemorandumofUnderstanding,theirstandwas

that,thatwasnotavaliddocumentastheirsignatureswereobtainedwhen

theywerenotinaproperstateofmind,aslateJangaPunnaReddywas

sufferingfromchronicpancreatitisandwastreatedasaninpatientindifferent

hospitalsduringtheperiodfrom19.06.2023to18.07.2023andafterthe

surgery,hewasalsotreatedasaninpatientfrom28.10.2023to03.11.2023in

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

8

anotherhospitalatVisakhapatnam.Duringthatperiod,thepetitionersbrought

areadymadeMemorandumofUnderstandingon31.10.2023tothehospitaland

ontherefusaloftherespondents,theyweremetwiththreatsandconsequently

asaresultofthreatsandcoerciontheysignedtheMemorandumof

Understandingandalsoallowedthepetitionerstoobtainfingerprintsoflate

JangaPunnaReddyontheMemorandumofUnderstanding.Thefurthercase

oftherespondents2and3isthattwochequeseachforRs.65,00,000/-were

issuedbythepetitionersandanotherchequeforasumofRs.95,22,999/-was

issuedinlieuofthevalueofthemovableassetsasperthetermsofthe

MemorandumofUnderstanding,butthepetitionersissued‘stoppayment’

instructionsinrespectofthosechequesandsothepetitionersthemselvesdid

notactuponthetermsoftheMemorandumofUnderstanding,andassuch,the

respondentsNo.2and3cannotbesaidtohaveretiredfromthebusinessofthe

firm.Theyalsostatedthatthereconstitutedpartnershipdeeddated

10.02.2024wasnotvalidandtheMemorandumofUnderstandingdated

10.02.2024wasalsonotvalid.Thosewereobtainedbyfraudplayedonthe

respondentswhiledenyingthatthepetitionersinfusedtheirownpersonalfunds

toatuneofRs.1,45,27,439/-intothefirm.

13.The2

nd

and3

rd

respondentsfurthersubmittedthattheinitialfreezing

oftheaccountofthefirmwasinDecember2023bythebankwhichwason

accountofdeathofJangaPunnaReddywhowasthemanagingpartnerofthe

firm.Thatwasrevokedbythebankitself.Thepetitionersunilaterally

transferredRs.1,55,00,000/-totheirpersonalaccountsandafterthesaidfact

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

9

cametotheknowledgeoftherespondents,theyinstructedthebanktofreeze

theaccounton24.05.2024inordertopreventfurtherunlawfultransactions.It

wastheirfurthercasethatthe2

nd

petitioneristhemanagingpartnerof

M/s.V.V.Constructions(anothercompany)andfabricatedthedocument

showingthatthefirmisdueasumofRs.55,05,230/-toM/s.V.V.Constructions

onlytodivertthefundsofthefirmtosuchotherfirm/company.Theypleaded

thatthepetitionershadnocaseforgrantofinterimmeasureunderSection9of

theAct1996.

B.JudgmentofthelearnedSpecialJudge:

14.ThelearnedSpecialJudgeframedthefollowingpointsfor

determination:

“1.WhetherthefreezingofbankaccountNo.915020032315999with

AxisBank,M.V.P.ColonyBranch,Visakhapatnambelongingtothepartnership

firmcanberevoked?

2.Towhatrelief?”

15.OnpointNo.1,thelearnedSpecialJudgerecordedthefinding,thatit

wouldbeintheinterestsofboththepartiesthatthefreezingofbankaccount

berevokedforalimitedperiodof90dayspendinginitiationofarbitration

proceedingscontemplatedunderclause18ofthereconstitutedpartnershipfirm

andthebankaccountbeoperatedforthelimitedpurposeofpayingtaxesand

otherstatutoryliabilitiespayabletotheCentralGovernment,theState

Governmentandthelocalbodiesbythepartnershipfirm.Itfurtherheldthat

thebankaccountofthepartnershipfirmwiththe1

st

respondentbankshallbe

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

10

operatedasperClause14ofthereconstitutedpartnershipdeeddated

10.02.2024onlyforthementionedpurposesandnopaymentshallbemadeto

thepartnersorvendorsorthirdpartiesfromthesaidaccount.

16.OnpointNo.2,thelearnedSpecialJudgepassedthefollowingOrder:

“57.Intheresult,thisapplicationisallowedwithoutcostsandfreezing

ofbankaccountNo.915020032315999withrespondentNo.1/AxisBank,

M.V.P.ColonyBranch,Visakhapatnamisrevokedonlyforthelimitedpurpose

ofpayingtaxesandstatutoryduestoCentralGovernment,StateGovernment

andlocalbodies.Nopaymentshallbemadetothepartnersofthefirmintheir

individualcapacity,vendors,thirdparties.Thebankaccountshallbeoperated

asperthetermsofClause14ofthereconstitutedpartnershipdeeddated

10.02.2024.Thisordershallremaininforcefornotmorethan90daysfromthe

dateoforder.OntheLearnedArbitralTribunalbeingconstituted,thefurther

continuation,modificationorvariationofthisOrdershallbedealtbyLearned

ArbitralTribunalonapplicationfiledbyeitherparty.”

C.Submissionsofthelearnedcounsels:

I.Fortheappellants:

17.LearnedcounselfortheappellantssubmittedthatthelearnedSpecial

Judgeshouldhaveallowedtheapplicationintoto,inviewofthe

observations/findingsofthelearnedSpecialJudgeasinpara-52intheOrder

that“thepetitionershaveshownthatthefreezingofthebankaccountwas

donewithoutconsultingthem”.Hefurthersubmittedthattherespondents

No.2and3hadnorighttoinstructthe1

st

respondentbanktofreezefirm’s

accounton24.05.2024affectingthefinancesofthefirm.Theyhadnolegal

righttodosointermsofMemorandumofUnderstandingdated10.02.2024.

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

11

18.Learnedcounselfortheappellantsfurthersubmittedthatthelearned

SpecialJudgefailedtoseethattheactionoftherespondentsNo.2and3to

acquireassetsintheirpersonalnamewiththecapitalofthefirmwascontrary

toSections9and12ofthePartnershipAct.

19.LearnedcounselfortheappellantssubmittedthatrespondentsNo.2

and3withoutfollowingtheprocedure,accordingtoMemorandumof

Understandingdated31.10.2023arbitrarilyinitiatedtheactionoffreezingthe

accountofthepetitioners.HesubmittedthatthelearnedSpecialJudgeought

tohaveallowedtheapplicationunderSection9oftheAct1996intototo

completedefreezethebankaccountofthefirmandnotonlyforthelimited

purposes.Theactionoffreezingthebankaccountisbeyondthecontractual

andstatutoryrightsandthesaidactionofthebankcannotbesustained.So,

theimpugnedOrderisunsustainableintheeyesoflaw.

20.Learnedcounselfortheappellantsfurthersubmittedthatthe

appellantshaveinitiatedthearbitrationproceedingsbyissuingnoticeunder

Section21oftheAct1996,dated07.11.2025senttotherespondentsNo.2and

3,proposingtoappointasolearbitratortoadjudicatethedisputethatarose

betweentheparties.Copyofthelegalnoticedated07.11.2025alongwiththe

copyofpostalreceipthasbeenfiledalongwithmemodated26.11.2025.

21.Learnedcounselfortheappellantsplacedrelianceonthefollowing

judgmentsinsupportofhiscontentions:

1)Smt.ShantiDey@SantiDeyv.SriSuvodeepSaha

1

1

2016SCCOnLineCal6251

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

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2)ModernMetalIndustriesv.Smt.ShantiParolla

2

3)NavnirmanDevelopmentConsultants(I)Pvt.Ltd.

3

4)PunjabStateCivilSuppliesCorporationLimitedv.M/s.

SanmanRiceMills

4

II.FortheRespondents:

22.RespondentsNo.2and3havefiledcounteraffidavitinthepresent

appeal,takingthesamestandaswastakenbeforethelearnedSpecialJudge.

23.Learnedcounselfortherespondents1&2submittedthatthereisno

illegalityintheOrderofthelearnedSpecialJudge.Theyhavetakenthestand

thatthereconstitutedpartnershipdeeddated10.02.2024wasexecuted,asper

theowncaseofthepetitionersinconsequencetothefulfillingofthetermsand

conditionsofMemorandumsofUnderstandingdated31.03.2023anddated

10.02.2024,butthepetitionersthemselvesfailedtocomplywiththetermsand

conditionsthereofandsothereconstitutedpartnershipdeeddated10.02.2024

thoughnotvalid,butstillwouldnothaveanysanctityanditdidnotconferany

managerialpowersonthepetitionersandbasedthereonthepetitionerswillnot

getanyrightandtheycannotoperatethefirm’sbankaccountandrepresent

thefirm.Therewasnoprimefaciecaseinfavourofthepetitionerssoastolift

thefreezingofthefirm’sbankaccount.Thepetitionersalready

misappropriatedasubstantialsumofRs.1,55,00,000/-fortheirpersonalbenefit

andconsequently,therewasnobalanceofconvenienceintheirfavour.The

Orderdidnotcallforanyinterferenceotherwisethepetitionerswoulddivertthe

2

2004SCCOnLineAll175

3

(2017)8SCC603

4

2024SCCOnLineSC2632

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COMCANo.21of2025

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entireamountandnothingwouldremainintheaccounttothegreatprejudice

oftherespondents1and2.

III.ReplybyAppellants’Counsel:

24.Inreply,learnedcounselforthepetitionerssubmittedthatifitisthe

caseoftherespondentsNo.2and3thatthepetitionersmisappropriatedthe

fundsofthefirmbydivertingthesametoM/s.V.V.Constructions,thenthesaid

respondentsoughttohavetakenrecoursetosomelegalprovisionsforrecovery

ofthatamountortosuchotherreliefs,butnostepshavebeentakenbythe

respondentsandsothesaidallegationsofmisappropriationoffundsis

unfoundedandunsustainable.

D.PointsforDetermination:

25.Thefollowingpointsariseforourconsiderationanddetermination:

1)WhethertheimpugnedOrderdated31.07.2025passedby

thelearnedSpecialJudge,deservestobeinterfered?

2)Whethertheappellants’applicationunderSection9ofthe

ArbitrationandConciliationAct1996deservestobe

allowedasawhole?”

E.Consideration/Analysis:

26.Wehaveconsideredtheaforesaidsubmissionsofthelearned

counselsandperusedthematerialonrecord.

27.Boththepointsareconnectedandastakentogether.

28.Section9oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct,1996readsasunder:

“Section9:Interimmeasures,etc.,byCourt.

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(1)Apartymay,beforeorduringarbitralproceedingsoratanytimeafterthe

makingofthearbitralawardbutbeforeitisenforcedinaccordancewithsection

36,applytoacourt—

(i)fortheappointmentofaguardianforaminororpersonofunsoundmind

forthepurposesofarbitralproceedings;or

(ii)foraninterimmeasureofprotectioninrespectofanyofthefollowing

matters,namely:—

(a)thepreservation,interimcustodyorsaleofanygoodswhicharethe

subject-matterofthearbitrationagreement;

(b)securingtheamountindisputeinthearbitration;

(c)thedetention,preservationorinspectionofanypropertyorthingwhich

isthesubject-matterofthedisputeinarbitration,orastowhichanyquestion

mayarisethereinandauthorisingforanyoftheaforesaidpurposesanyperson

toenteruponanylandorbuildinginthepossessionofanyparty,orauthorising

anysamplestobetakenoranyobservationtobemade,orexperimenttobe

tried,whichmaybenecessaryorexpedientforthepurposeofobtainingfull

informationorevidence;

(d)interiminjunctionortheappointmentofareceiver;

(e)suchotherinterimmeasureofprotectionasmayappeartotheCourtto

bejustandconvenient,andtheCourtshallhavethesamepowerformaking

ordersasithasforthepurposeof,andinrelationto,anyproceedingsbeforeit.

(2)Where,beforethecommencementofthearbitralproceedings,aCourt

passesanorderforanyinterimmeasureofprotectionundersub-section(1),the

arbitralproceedingsshallbecommencedwithinaperiodofninetydaysfrom

thedateofsuchorderorwithinsuchfurthertimeastheCourtmaydetermine.

(3)Oncethearbitraltribunalhasbeenconstituted,theCourtshallnot

entertainanapplicationundersub-section(1),unlesstheCourtfindsthat

circumstancesexistwhichmaynotrendertheremedyprovidedundersection

17efficacious.

29.ItisevidentfromSection9oftheAct1996thatapartymay,before

orduringarbitralproceedingsoratanytimeafterthemakingofthearbitral

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COMCANo.21of2025

15

award,butbeforeitisenforcedinaccordancewithsection36,applytoaCourt,

interalia,forgrantoftheinterimmeasureasmentionedthereininclauses(ii)

(a)to(e).Sub-section2alsoprovidesthatbeforethecommencementofthe

arbitralproceedingswhereaCourtpassestheOrderforanyinterimmeasureof

protectionundersub-section(1),thearbitralproceedingsshallbecommenced

withinaperiodof90daysfromthedateofsuchorderorwithinsuchfurther

timeastheCourtmaydetermine.So,undersub-section(2)thearbitral

proceedingsshallbecommencedwithinaperiodof90daysfromthedateof

orderofinterimmeasureofprotectionorwithinsuchfurthertimeastheCourt

maydetermine.

30.LearnedcounselfortheappellantsplacingrelianceonModern

MetalIndustries(supra)judgmentcontendedthatthefirm’sbankaccount

shouldhavebeenpermittedtobeoperatedforbusinesspurposesaswell

otherwiseagravesituationwouldariseforcontinuanceofthefirmbusiness.

LearnedcounselfortheappellantsubmittedthatthelearnedSpecialJudgehas

takenintoconsiderationtheaforesaidjudgmentoftheAllahabadHighCourt

andreferringthesame,italsorecordedinpara-51oftheimpugnedjudgment

thatbeforeoperationofthebankaccountcanbestoppedthefollowing

conditionsmustbefulfilledreferringtopara-68ofthejudgmentinModern

MetalIndustries(supra)whichreadsasunder:

“68.Thusthelawiswell-settledthatbeforethemajoritycantakeadecision

bindingontheminoritycertainconditionshavetobefulfilledwhichareas

follows:

(1)Theminoritymustbeconsulted.

(2)Themajoritymustactingoodfaith

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COMCANo.21of2025

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(3)Themajoritymustactforthewelfareofthefirmandnotforapurpose

whichisdetrimentaltothewelfareofthefirm.”

31.InModernMetalIndustries(supra),theapplicationofthe

appellantsthereinunderSection9oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct,1996

wasrejected.TheappealwasallowedbytheDivisionBenchoftheAllahabad

HighCourtandthesecondappellantthereinwasprotectedtooperatethefirm’s

bankaccount.TheAllahabadHighCourtopinedthatthesolebankaccountof

thefirmwastheverylifelineofthefirmandunlessthemoneysdeposited

thereinwereallowedtobewithdrawn,atleast,forbusinessexpenditure

purposes,itwouldbeimpossibletorunandmanagethebusinessofthefirm

andtokeepitscontractualcommitmentswiththecustomerswithinthe

stipulatedperiodsoftime.Consequently,consideringontheuncontroverted

factsofthecase,thataverygraveandsuddensituationhadarisenwhenthe

businessofthefirmitselfwasfacingimminentdangerofbeingparalyzed,it

wasobservedandheldthataninteriminjunctionunderSection9oftheAct

shouldbegrantedforprotectionofthefirmfromseverecrisesandimminent

dangerofitsbusinesscomingtoagrindinghaltresultinginhugeand

irreparableloss.

32.Fromtheaforesaidjudgment,inparagraphs51and52ofModern

MetalIndustries(supra),whicharealsoreproducedasunder,itbecomes

evidentthatinthatcasetherewasagraveandsuddensituationforimminent

dangerofthefirmbeingparalyzedontheuncontrovertedfactsofthatcase.

“51.InouropiniontheCourtbelowhasfailedtoappreciatethatthesole

bankaccountofthefirmistheverylifelineofthefirmandunlessthemoneys

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COMCANo.21of2025

17

depositedthereinareallowedtobewithdrawn,atleast,forbusinessexpenditure

purposes,itwouldbeimpossibletorunandmanagethebusinessofthefirm

andtokeepitscontractualcommitmentswiththecustomerswithinthe

stipulatedperiodsoftime.

52.Ontheuncontrovertedfactsofthecase,averygraveand

suddensituationhasarisenwhenthebusinessofthefirmitselfisfacing

imminentdangerofbeingparalysedand,henceweareoftheopinionthatan

interiminjunctionunderS.9oftheActshouldbegrantedforprotectionofthe

firmfromseverecrisesandimminentdangerofitsbusinesscomingtoa

grindinghaltresultinginhugeandirreparableloss.”

33.Inthepresentcase,thefactsarecontrovertedwithrespecttothe

situationofthebusinessofthefirm.Itcannotbesaidonuncontrovertedfacts

thatthefirmisfacingimminentdangerasweretheuncontrovertedfactsin

ModernMetalIndustries(supra).Onsuchaspectfactsareincontraversein

thepresentcase.

34.LearnedcounselfortheappellantsubmittedthatthelearnedSpecial

Judgethereafterinpara-52ofitsjudgmentrecordedthatthepetitionershave

shownthatthefreezingofthebankaccountwasdonewithoutconsultingthem.

So,thelearnedSpecialJudgebeingsatisfiedthatalltheconditionsaslaiddown

inpara-68oftheModernMetalIndustries(supra)werenotsatisfiedandas

thefreezingwaswithoutconsultingthepetitioners,thefirmshouldhavebeen

permittedtomeetitsstatutoryfiscalresponsibilities,butinnotallowingthe

same,exceptforthelimitedpurposes,evenafterrecordingthatthepetitioners

hadprimafacieshownthatthefreezingofbankaccountwasdetrimentaltothe

functionofthepartnershipfirm,andpassingtheOrderasstands,thesame

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

18

cannotbesustainedtotheextentofnon-grantoftherestofthepetitioners’

prayers.

35.WeareoftheviewthatwhatthelearnedSpecialJudgerecorded

beingdetrimentaltothefunctioningofthepartnershipfirmwasforthe

dischargeofitsstatutorydutiesandstatutoryfiscalresponsibilities.So,the

learnedSpecialJudgeallowedtheapplicationtothatextentandrevokingthe

orderoffreezingoftheaccountofthebankonlyforthelimitedpurpose.But,

sofarastoliftthefreezingofthebankaccountforotherpurposesisconcerned,

thefactsnotbeinguncontrovertedandtherebeingcontroversywithrespectto

theMemorandumofUnderstandings,thereconstitutedpartnershipdeed,the

petitionersthemselvesnotfollowingtheconditionsandthetermsofthe

reconstitutedpartnershipdeedandMemorandumofUnderstandingsand

consequentthereto,therespondentsNo.2&3ceasingtobethepartnersornot,

asalsomisappropriationofthefundsandtransferoffundstoother

company/firmofthepetitioners,andallthosequestionswhichrequired

adjudicationbeforetheArbitralTribunalinarbitralproceedingsifsoraised,the

learnedSpecialJudgekeptpendingthepaymentstothirdparties,andrevoked

freezingonlyforpaymentofstatutoryduestotheCentralGovernment,State

Governmentandlocalbodies.Consequentially,wedonotfindanyfaultinthe

OrderofthelearnedSpecialJudgecallingforourinterferenceonthesaidcount.

36.Further,fromtheadmittedfactsonrecorditisevidentthatwithina

periodof90daysthearbitralproceedingswerenotcommencedintermsof

Sub-section(2)ofSection9oftheAct1996.NoticeunderSection21,sentto

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

19

therespondents,copyofwhichhasbeenfiledalongwithMemo,isdated

07.11.2025whichisaftertheexpiryoftheperiodof90daysfromthedateof

theimpugnedOrder.Sub-section(2)ofSection9oftheAct1996specifically

providesforthetimetocommencethearbitralproceedings.Thestatutory

periodis90daysfromthedateoftheOrderofinterimmeasureofprotectionor

withinsuchfurthertimeastheCourtmayprovide.TheOrderinthepresent

caseisdated31.07.2025.TheSpecialJudgealsoprovided90dayfromthe

dateoftheOrderforcommencementofthearbitralproceedings.So,within90

daysfrom31.07.2025thearbitralproceedingsmusthavebeencommenced.

37.Thecommencementofthearbitralproceedingsisbymovingan

applicationunderSection21oftheAct1996,whichreadsasunder:

“Section21:Commencementofarbitralproceedings:-Unlessotherwise

agreedbytheparties,thearbitralproceedingsinrespectofaparticulardispute

commenceonthedateonwhicharequestforthatdisputetobereferredto

arbitrationisreceivedbytherespondent.”

38.InSundaramFinanceLtd.v.NEPCIndiaLtd.

5

theHon’bleApex

Courtheldthatthearbitralproceedingswerecommencedonthedateonwhilch

therequesttoreferthedisputetoarbitrationisreceivedbytherespondent.It

isrelevanttoreproduceparagraphs11and13asunder:

“11.ThereadingofSection21clearlyshowsthatthearbitralproceedings

commenceonthedateonwhicharequestforadisputetobereferredto

arbitrationisreceivedbytherespondent.Itisinthiscontextthatwehaveto

examineandinterprettheexpression“beforeorduringarbitralproceedings”

occurringinSection9ofthe1996Act.Wemayhereobservethatthough

5

(1999)2SCC479

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

20

Section17givestheArbitralTribunalthepowertopassorders,thesamecannot

beenforcedasordersofacourt.ItisforthisreasonthatSection9admittedly

givesthecourtpowertopassinterimordersduringthearbitrationproceedings.

13.Underthe1996Act,thecourtcanpassinterimordersunderSection9.

Arbitralproceedings,aswehaveseen,commenceonlywhentherequestto

referthedisputeisreceivedbytherespondentasperSection21oftheAct.The

materialwordsoccurringinSection9are“beforeorduringthearbitral

proceedings”.Thisclearlycontemplatestwostageswhenthecourtcanpass

interimorders,i.e.,duringthearbitralproceedingsorbeforethearbitral

proceedings.ThereisnoreasonastowhySection9ofthe1996Actshouldnot

beliterallyconstrued.Meaninghastobegiventotheword“before”occurring

inthesaidsection.Theonlyinterpretationthatcanbegivenisthatthecourtcan

passinterimordersbeforethecommencementofarbitralproceedings.Any

otherinterpretation,liketheonegivenbytheHighCourt,willhavetheeffectof

renderingtheword“before”inSection9asredundant.Thisisclearlynot

permissible.Notonlydoesthelanguagewarrantssuchaninterpretationbutit

wasnecessarytohavesuchaprovisionintheinterestofjustice.Butforsucha

provision,nopartywouldhavearighttoapplyforinterimmeasurebefore

noticeunderSection21isreceivedbytherespondent.Itisnotunknownwhen

itbecomesdifficulttoservetherespondents.Itwas,therefore,necessarythat

provisionwasmadeintheActwhichcouldenableapartytogetinterimrelief

urgentlyinordertoprotectitsinterest.Readingthesectionasawholeit

appearstousthatthecourthasjurisdictiontoentertainanapplicationunder

Section9eitherbeforearbitralproceedingsorduringarbitralproceedingsor

afterthemakingofthearbitralawardbutbeforeitisenforcedinaccordance

withSection36oftheAct.”

39.InVelugubantiHariBabuv.ParvathiniNarasimhaRao

6

the

HighCourtofHyderabadatHyderabad,heldthatthephrase‘arbitral

proceedingsshallbecommenced’insub-section(2)ofSection9oftheActshall

6

2017SCCOnLineHyd469

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

21

beunderstoodinthelightofSection21oftheAct,andonatrueunderstanding

ofthesaidprovision,thearbitralproceedingswouldcommencethemomentthe

respondentreceivetherequestforthedisputetobereferredtoarbitration.

40.TherequestapplicationforappointmentoftheArbitratorinthiscase

underSection21oftheAct1996isdated07.11.2025,i.e.,beyondthe

statutoryperiodof90days.So,thearbitralproceedingshavenotbeen

commencedwithinthestatutoryperiodunderSection9(2)oftheAct1996.

41.InSmt.ShantiDey@SantiDey(supra),uponwhichthelearned

counselforthepetitionersplacedreliance,theappealwasfiledbeforethe

CalcuttaHighCourtagainsttheOrderpassedunderSection9oftheAct1996

wherebythelearnedSpecialJudgerefusedtheprayerforextensionofthe

interimorderonthegroundofnon-complianceofSection11ofthe1996Act.

ThelearnedSpecialJudge,inthesaidcase,hadrefusedtheextensiononthe

groundthatthearbitralproceedingsshouldhavebeencommencedwithinthe

periodof90days.TheDivisionBenchoftheCalcuttaHighCourtobservedthat

Section9(2)wasamended.Thearbitralproceedingsshouldhavebeen

commencedwithinaperiodof90daysorwithinsuchfurthertimeastheCourt

maydetermine.Theuseofthewords“orwithinsuchfurthertimeasthe

Courtmaydetermine”makesitpatentlyclearthatthetimestipulationof90

daysisdirectoryandtheCourtmightextendthetimeforcommencementof

thearbitralproceedings.Moreover,thereisnopenaltyprescribedin1996Act

asamendedbyArbitrationandConciliation(Amendment)Actof2015for

defaultincommencementofarbitralproceedingswithin90days.Inthesaid

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

22

case,thelearnedSpecialJudgehadrejectedtheextensionwithoutconsidering

thequestionofextendingthetime.Theorderwassetasidewiththedirection

tothetrialCourttoconsidertheprayerforinterimreliefafreshandtillthenthe

interimdirectionwasissuedtomaintainstatusquooftheschedulepropertyas

alsothebankaccountstandinginthenameofthepartnershipfirm.

42.Theaforesaidjudgmentisofnohelptotheappellants.

43.Here,anyapplicationseekingextensionoftimeforcommencement

ofthearbitralproceedings,hasnotbeenfiledbeforethelearnedSpecialJudge.

44.Inthepresentappealalsothereisnoapplicationseekingextension

oftimeforcommencementofthearbitralproceedingsbeyondthestatutory

periodof90days.

45.Wearenotobservingthatwithoutanysuchapplicationasaforesaid,

thearbitralproceedingscannotbecommenced.Thosecanbecommencedat

anytime.But,intheabsenceofanysuchapplicationthequestionoftheCourt

‘grantingsuchfurthertimeforcommencementofthearbitralproceedings

wouldnotariseandsoalsothequestionofextensionoftheinterimmeasureas

grantedbytheSpecialJudge,beyondtheperiodof90daysdoesnotarise.

46.Thelearnedcounselforthepetitionersplacedreliancein

NavnirmanDevelopmentConsultants(I)Pvt.Ltd.(supra)tocontend

thatthisCourtcanextendthetimebyinvokingthepowersasunderthe

provisionsoftheCodeofCivilProcedure.Hesubmittedthatanappealis

continuationofsuit.So,thepresentappellateproceedingsunderSection37of

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

23

theAct1996arealsocontinuationoftheoriginalproceedingsunderSection9

oftheAct1996.

47.LearnedcounselfortheappellantsubmittedthatinNavnirman

DevelopmentConsultants(I)Pvt.Ltd.(supra),theHighCourtobserved

thatinsuchasituationastherein,Order41Rule17CPCgotattracted,and

therefore,theHighCourtshouldhavetakenrecoursetothepowersunder

Order41Rule17CPCforpassingappropriateordersanditwasnotempowered

todismisstheappealonmerits.Intheeventofdismissaloftheappealunder

Order41Rule17CPC,theappellantsthereinshouldhavetakenrecoursetothe

remedyavailableunderOrder41Rule19CPC.

48.BasedontheaforesaidobservationsinNavnirmanDevelopment

Consultants(I)Pvt.Ltd.(supra),thelearnedcounselfortheappellant

submittedthattheprovisionsoftheCodeofCivilProcedurecanbemade

applicableinanappealundertheArbitrationActunderSection37aswell.He

submittedthattheHon’bleApexCourthasreferredtotheprovisionsofOrder

41Rules17and19CPC.Consequently,theinterimmeasureunderthe

impugnedorderasgrantedbythelearnedSpecialJudgecanbeextendedby

thisCourt,intheexerciseoftheappellatepowers.

49.Intheaforesaidcase,theawardofthearbitraltribunalwas

challengedunderSection34whichwasallowedandchallengingthesame,the

appealwasfiledunderSection37oftheAct1996beforetheHighCourt.The

HighCourtdismissedtheappealgivinglibertytofilereviewpetition,andon

dismissalofthereviewpetitiontheappellants’approachedtheHon’bleApex

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

24

Court.TheappealwasallowedonthegroundthattheHighCourtwhile

dismissingtheappealdidnotsetouteventhefactualcontroversyproperly

muchlessindetailnordealtwithanyofthegroundsnorpleadinginappealin

supportoftherespectivecontentionsoftheparties.

50.Further,inNavnirmanDevelopmentConsultants(I)Pvt.Ltd.

(supra)theHon’bleApexCourtrecordedthattheHighCourtdecidedtheappeal

intheabsenceofbothparties.Insuchasituation,theprovisionsofOrder41

Rule17CPCgotattractedandtherefore,theHighCourtshouldhavetaken

recoursetothepowersunderOrder41Rule17CPCforpassingappropriate

OrdersascontemplatedinRule17,underwhichtheappealcouldnotbe

dismissedonmerits.However,theappealhavingbeendismissedessentially

underOrder41Rule17CPC,itwasheldthattheappellantthereinshouldhave

takenrecoursetotheremedyavailableunderOrder41Rule19CPCbyfiling

applicationtotheHighCourtprayingthereinforreadmissionoftheirappealby

makingoutsufficientcausefortheirnon-appearanceonthedatewhenthe

appealwaslistedforhearinginsteadoffilingtheappealbeforetheHon’ble

ApexCourt.Intheaforesaidjudgment,theremedyopentothepartyagainst

thedismissaloftheappealonmerits,thoughthedismissaloughttohavebeen

fordefault,hasbeenmentioned.Thesaidjudgmentisnotonthescopeofthe

appellatepowersforinterferenceonthemeritsofthematter.Iftheappealis

dismissedonmeritsintheabsenceoftheappellantcontrarytoRule17of

Order41CPC,theremedywouldbeunderOrder41Rule19CPCtoapproach

thesameCourt.Thesaidjudgmentisonthataspect.Further,asperthis

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

25

judgmentitcanbesaidthatOrderunderRule17and19CPCappliestothe

appealsfiledunderSection37oftheArbitrationandConciliationAct1996.The

sameisnotthecasehere.Theargumentthatdrawingtheanalogyandtaking

cluefromthesaidjudgmentallotherprovisionsandpowerofappealasunder

theCodeofCivilProcedureshallalsoapplytotheappealsundertheArbitration

andConciliationAct1996cannotbeaccepted.

51.Onthescopeoftheinterferencewiththejudgmentintheexerciseof

theappellatejurisdictionunderSection37oftheArbitrationandConciliation

Act,inPunjabStateCivilSuppliesCorporationLimited(supra)the

Hon’bleApexCourtheldthattheappellatepowerunderSection37oftheActis

notakintothenormalappellatejurisdictionvestedintheCivilCourtsforthe

reasonthatthescopeofinterferenceoftheCourtswitharbitralproceedingsor

awardisverylimited,confinedtotheambitofSection34oftheActonly(as

thatwasacasearisingfromSection34proceedings),andeventhatpower

cannotbeexercisedinacasualandacavaliermanner.TheHon’bleApexCourt,

referringtovariouspronouncementsonthescopeofinterventioninanappeal

underSection37oftheAct,restricteditandsubjectedittothesamegrounds,

onwhichanawardcanbechallengedunderSection34oftheAct.Inother

words,powersunderSection37vestedintheCourtofAppealarenotbeyond

thescopeofinterferenceprovidedunderSection34oftheAct.TheHon’ble

ApexCourtfinallyconcludedthatthescopeoftheinterventionoftheCourtin

arbitralmattersisvirtuallyprohibited,ifnotabsolutelybarredandthat

interferenceisconfinedonlytotheextentenvisagedunderSection34ofthe

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

26

Act.ItwasfurtherheldthattheappellateCourthasnoauthorityoflawto

considerthematterindisputebeforethearbitraltribunalonmeritssoastofind

outastowhetherthedecisionofthearbitraltribunalisrightorwrongupon

reappraisalofevidenceasifitissittinginanordinaryCourtofAppeal.Its

powerismoreakintothatofsuperintendenceasisvestedincivilcourtswhile

exercisingrevisionarypowers.Inthecontextoftheappealarisingoutofthe

proceedingsunderSection34oftheAct1996theHon’bleApexCourtheldthat

theproceedingsunderSection34oftheActaresummaryinnatureandarenot

likeafullfledgedregularcivilsuit.Therefore,thescopeoftheSection37ofthe

Actismuchmoresummaryinnatureandnotlikeanordinarycivilappeal.

52.Consequently,inviewofthejudgmentoftheHon’bleApexCourtin

PunjabStateCivilSuppliesCorporationLimited(supra),weareofthe

viewthatthescopeofSection37oftheActarisingoutoftheproceedings

underSection9oftheAct1996isalsoconfinedtothescopeofSection9ofthe

ActandisnotlikeanordinarycivilappealundertheCodeofCivilProcedure.

Theinterference,ifrequired,withtheOrderunderSection9oftheAct,canbe

onlywithinthescopeofSection9oftheActandnotasexercisingthewider

appellatepowersunderCPC.

53.TheKarnatakaHighCourtinM/s.PatonConstructionsPrivate

Ltd.,v.M/s.LorvenProjectsLtd.

7

heldthataspersub-section(2)of

Section9,becauseoftheuseoftheexpression‘shallbecommenced’,

commencementofthearbitralproceedingswithintheperiodstatedinSub-

7

ILR2017Kar3016

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

27

section(2)ofSection9isarequirementforthelegaleffectivenessoftheorder

passedforanyinterimmeasureunderSub-section(1)ofSection9oftheAct.

Hence,ifthearbitralproceedingsinrespectofthedisputewerenot

commencedwithintheperiodstatedinSection9(2)oftheAct1996,theorder

grantinganyinterimmeasureunderSection9(1)oftheAct1996automatically

standvacatedontheexpiryofthesaidperiod,thoughthatwasnotexpressly

statedinsub-section,butwasclearlyimpliedandanyotherinterpretationof

sub-section(2)woulddefeattheintentionofParliamentinmaking

commencementofthearbitralproceedingswithintheperiodstatedinthesub-

sectionasmandatory.

54.Here,wemaythereforementionthatinM/s.PatonConstructions

PrivateLtd.(supra)theKarnatakaHighCourtfurtherheldthatifthearbitral

proceedingsinrespectofthedisputewerenotinitiatedwithinthreemonths

fromthedateofpresentationoftheapplicationunderSection9oftheAct,any

interimordergrantedshallstandvacatedwithoutanyspecificordertothat

effectbytheCourtwhichpassedtheorder.However,wefindthatinRule9(4)

oftheHighCourtofKarnatakaArbitration(ProceedingsbeforetheCourts)

Rules,2001,therewasspecificprovision,providingthat“inthecaseofan

applicationforanyinterimmeasuremadebeforeinitiatingarbitralproceedings,

ifthearbitralproceedingswerenotinitiatedwithinthreemonthsfromthedate

ofpresentationoftheapplicationunderSection9oftheAct,anyinterimorder

grantedshallstandvacatedwithoutanyspecificorderbeingpassedbythe

Courttothateffect”.

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

28

55.WefindthatthereisnosuchruleasRule9(4)oftheKarnataka

ArbitrationRulesneitherintheAct1996norintheRulesframedthereunder.

56.Butstillinthepresentcase,theinterimmeasuregrantedbythe

SpecialJudgecametoanendonexpiryof90daysfromthedateoftheOrder

ofinterimmeasure,intermsoftheOrderitself.

F.Conclusions:

57.Inviewoftheconsiderationsmadehereinabove,ourconclusionsare

that,

1)Section9(1)oftheAct1996providesfortheinterimmeasurebeforeor

duringarbitralproceedingsoratanytimeaftermakingofthearbitral

awardbutbeforeinvokingSection36oftheAct1996,ifthearbitral

proceedingshavenotbeencommencedwithinthestatutoryperiod.

2)TheinterimmeasuregrantedbytheSpecialJudgewasforalimitedperiod

of90daysfromthedateoftheOrder.Theappellanthadtoinitiatethe

arbitralproceedingswithintheperiodof90daysasperSection9(2)of

theAct1996fromthedateoftheOrderofinterimmeasuredated

31.07.2025.Thearbitralproceedingscouldalsobecommencedwithin

suchfurthertimei.e.,beyond90daysastheSpecialCourtmighthave

determined,butitwasnotsodetermined.Consequently,thearbitral

proceedingsmusthavebeencommencedwithintheperiodof90days

fromthedateoftheorder,whichperiodof90dayscametoendon

29.10.2025.

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

29

3)TheapplicationunderSection21oftheAct1996forinitiationofarbitral

proceedingshasbeenfiledbytheappellantonlyon07.11.2025byissuing

thenotice,beyondtheperiodof90days.So,thearbitralproceedings

havenotbeencommencedwithinthestatutoryperiodcontemplatedunder

Section9(2)oftheAct1996.

4)Theconsequencesfornotcommencingthearbitralproceedings,withinthe

statutoryperiodhavenotbeenprovidedunderSection9oftheAct1996.

Insuchacase,theinterimmeasuregranted,wouldbegovernedbythe

termsoftheOrdergrantinginterimmeasure,asprovidedbytheSpecial

Courtitself,thatis,thatitshalloperateforthespecifiedperiodof90days.

Onexpiryof90daysfromtheOrder,theinterimmeasurecametoanend.

5)TheappellatepowersunderSection37oftheAct1996,applyingthesame

principleasinPunjabStateCivilSuppliedCorporationLimited

(supra),cannotbebeyondthescopeofSection9(1)and(2)ofthe

ArbitrationandConciliationAct1996.

6)Theappealnodoubtiscontinuationofthesuit,andsointhatwayitcan

besaidthat,anappealunderSection37,isthecontinuationofthe

proceedings,underSection9,asinthepresentcase,butthatwouldnot

beforallthepurposes.Intheexerciseoftheappellatejurisdiction,this

CourtcannotgobeyondthepowersthatcanbeexercisedunderSection9

andshallnothavesuchwidepowersasundertheCodeofCivilProcedure.

Theappellatepowershallbelikethepowerofsuperintendencewhile

exercisingrevisionarypowers.

RNT,J&MRK,J

COMCANo.21of2025

30

7)WedonotfindanyerrorofsuchanaturewiththeimpugnedOrdersoas

toinvokethesupervisorypowers.

8)OnPointNos.1&2,wethereforeholdthatthereisnoillegalityinthe

orderimpugnedtotheextentthelearnedCourthasgrantedtheprotection

toliftfreezingofbankaccountforalimitedpurposeofdischargingthe

statutorydutiesforthespecifiedperiodnorinrejectionoftherestofthe

prayersforinterimmeasure.

G.Result:

58.Intheresult,theappealisdismissed.Noorderastocosts.

Pendingmiscellaneouspetitions,ifany,shallstandclosedin

consequence.

_______________________

RAVINATHTILHARI,J

______________________________

MAHESWARARAOKUNCHEAM,J

Date:27.02.2026

Dsr

Note:

LRcopytobemarked

B/o

Dsr