REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010

(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.20428 of 2007)

M/s. Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ..Appellant(s)

Versus

Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan & Others ..Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO._____ OF 2010

(Arising out of SLP (C) NO.12766 OF 2008)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These two appeals, one at the instance of the

builder and the other at the instance of the

Corporation Bank, have been filed impugning the

Order of National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission (hereinafter, the said Commission).

1

3. In the case of the builder, the said Commission has

not given any reason and dismissed the revision

petition by passing a cryptic order dated 31.8.2007

which reads as under:

“Heard.

In view of the concurrent findings of the

State Commission, we do not find any

force in this revision petition.

The revision Petition is dismissed.”

4. In so far as the case of the builder is concerned,

this Court is of the opinion that the said

Commission cannot, considering the way it is

structured, dismiss the revision petition by

refusing to give any reasons and by just affirming

the order of the State Commission.

5. The said Commission has been defined under Section

2(k) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986

(hereinafter CP Act) as follows:

“2(k) “National Commission” means the

National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission established under clause (c)

of Section 9;”

6. Under section 9(c) of CP Act, the said Commission

has been established by the Central Government by a

notification.

2

7. The composition of the said Commission has been

provided under Section 20 of the CP Act and

wherefrom it is clear that the said Commission is a

high-powered adjudicating forum headed by a sitting

or a retired judge of the Supreme Court.

8. Section 21 of the CP Act provides for the

jurisdiction of the said Commission.

9. In order to appreciate the questions involved in

this case, the provision relating to jurisdiction of

the said Commission is set out hereunder:

“21. Jurisdiction of the National

Commission.- Subject to the other

provisions of this Act, the National

Commission shall have jurisdiction-

(a) to entertain-

(i) complaints where the value

of the goods or services

and compensation, if any,

claimed exceeds [rupees one

crore]; and

(ii) appeals against the orders

of any State Commission;

and

(b) to call for the records and pass

appropriate orders in any consumer

dispute which is pending before or

has been decided by any State

Commission where it appears to the

National Commission that such State

Commission has exercised a

jurisdiction not vested in it by

law, or has failed to exercise a

3

jurisdiction so vested, or has acted

in the exercise of its jurisdiction

illegally or with material

irregularity.”

10.Under Section 23 of the CP Act, an appeal would lie

against the order of the said Commission passed in

exercise of its powers under Section 21(1)(a), to

this Court, within 30 days, subject to extension of

time by this Court on sufficient cause being shown.

Under Section 21(1)(b), the said Commission

exercises revisional power over orders of State

Commission.

11.The power and procedure applicable to the said

Commission has been provided under Section 22 of the

CP Act. A perusal of Section 22(1) would show that

Sections 12, 13 and 14 of CP Act, with necessary

modification, are applicable to the decision making

process by the said Commission. Under Section 13 of

the CP Act, the District Forum has been vested, in

certain matters, with the powers of a Civil Court

while trying a suit. Section 13(4) of CP Act is

applicable to the said Commission in view of Section

22(1) thereof. Similarly, Sections 13(5), (6) and

4

(7) will also apply to the said Commission in view

of Section 22(1).

12.On a perusal of Sections 13(4), (5), (6) and (7) of

the CP Act, it is clear that the said Commission has

been vested with some of the powers of a Civil

Court. The following powers have been vested on the

said Commission:

“13(4) For the purposes of this section,

the District Forum shall have the same

powers as are vested in a civil court

under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of

1908) while trying a suit in respect of

the following matters, namely:-

(i) the summoning and enforcing

the attendance of any

defendant or witness and

examining the witness on

oath,

(ii) the discovery and production

of any document or other

material object producible as

evidence,

(iii)the reception of evidence on

affidavits,

(iv) the requisitioning of the

report of the concerned

analysis or test from the

appropriate laboratory or

from any other relevant

source,

(v) issuing of any commission for

the examination of any

witness, and

(vi) any other matter which may be

prescribed.

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13.Under Section 13(5) of CP Act, every proceeding of

the said Commission will be deemed to be a judicial

proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and

228 of the Indian Penal Code, and the said

Commission shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for

the purpose of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the

Code of Criminal Procedure.

14.The above provisions make it clear that the said

Commission has the trappings of a Civil Court and is

a high-powered quasi-judicial forum for deciding lis

between the parties.

15.The necessity of giving reason by a body or

authority in support of its decision came up for

consideration before this Court in several cases.

Initially this Court recognized a sort of

demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-

judicial orders but with the passage of time the

distinction between the two got blurred and thinned

out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the

judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak and others

vs. Union of India and others reported in AIR 1970

SC 150.

6

16.In Kesava Mills Co. Ltd. and another vs. Union of

India and others reported in AIR 1973 SC 389, this

Court approvingly referred to the opinion of Lord

Denning in Rigina vs. Gaming Board Ex parte Benaim

[(1970) 2 WLR 1009] and quoted him as saying “that

heresy was scotched in Ridge and Boldwin, 1964 AC

40”.

17.The expression ‘speaking order’ was first coined by

Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange

context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the

ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with

errors on the face of the record and pointed out

that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking

order. (See 1878-97 Vol. 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of

the report)

18.This Court always opined that the face of an order

passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an

administrative authority affecting the rights of

parties, must speak. It must not be like the

‘inscrutable face of a Sphinx’.

7

19.In the case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. Shyam

Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others, AIR 1961 SC 1669,

the question of recording reasons came up for

consideration in the context of a refusal by

Harinagar to transfer, without giving reasons,

shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such

refusal, the transferee moved the High Court

contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala

fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court

rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to

file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the

Central Government under Section 111 Clause (3) of

Indian Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed.

Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed

another application for transfer of his shares which

was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the

Central Government quashed the resolution passed by

the Company and directed the Company to register the

transfer. However, in passing the said order,

Government did not give any reason. The company

challenged the said decision before this Court.

20.The other question which arose in Harinagar (supra)

was whether the Central Government, in passing the

8

appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable

to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.

21.Even though in Harinagar (supra) the decision was

administrative, this Court insisted on the

requirement of recording reason and further held

that in exercising appellate powers, the Central

Government acted as a tribunal in exercising

judicial powers of the State and such exercise is

subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court.

Such powers, this Court held, cannot be effectively

exercised if reasons are not given by the Central

Government in support of the order (Para 23, page

1678-79).

22.Again in the case of Bhagat Raja vs. Union of India

and others, AIR 1967 SC 1606, the Constitution Bench

of this Court examined the question whether the

Central Government was bound to pass a speaking

order while dismissing a revision and confirming the

order of the State Government in the context of

Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,

1957, and having regard to the provision of Rule 55

of Mineral and Concessions Rules. The Constitution

9

Bench held that in exercising its power of revision

under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts

in a quasi-judicial capacity (See para 8 page 1610).

Where the State Government gives a number of reasons

some of which are good and some are not, and the

Central Government merely endorses the order of the

State Government without specifying any reason, this

Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article

136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are

the grounds on which Central Government upheld the

order of the State Government (See para 9 page

1610). Therefore, this Court insisted on reasons

being given for the order.

23.In M/s. Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of

U.P and others, AIR 1970 SC 1302, while dealing with

U.P. Sugar Dealers License Order under which the

license was cancelled, this Court held that such an

order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be

a speaking one. This Court further held that merely

giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and

further pointed out where the order is subject to

appeal, the necessity to record reason is even

greater. The learned Judges held that the recording

10

of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed

claim ensures that the decision is not a result of

caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after

considering the relevant law and that the decision

was just. (See para 7 page 1304).

24.In the case of M/s. Travancore Rayons Ltd. vs. The

Union of India and others, AIR 1971 SC 862, the

Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of

the Central Government under the then Section 36 of

the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944, held that the

Central Government was actually exercising judicial

power of the State and in exercising judicial power

reasons in support of the order must be disclosed on

two grounds. The first is that the person aggrieved

gets an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons

are erroneous and secondly, the obligation to record

reasons operates as a deterrent against possible

arbitrary action by the executive authority invested

with the judicial power (See para 11 page 865-866).

25.In M/s. Woolcombers of India Ltd. vs. Woolcombers

Workers Union and another, AIR 1973 SC 2758, this

Court while considering an award under Section 11 of

11

Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of

giving reasons in support of conclusions in the

Award. The Court held that the very requirement of

giving reason is to prevent unfairness or

arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second

principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine

that justice should not only be done, it should also

appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said

that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not

appear to be just to those who read the same.

Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will

also have the appearance of justice. The third

ground is that such awards are subject to Article

136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of

reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain

whether the decision is right or wrong (See para 5

page 2761).

26.In Union of India vs. Mohan Lal Capoor and others,

AIR 1974 SC 87, this Court while dealing with the

question of selection under Indian Administrative

Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by

Promotion Regulation) held that the expression

“reasons for the proposed supersession” should not

12

be mere rubber stamp reasons. Such reasons must

disclose how mind was applied to the subject matter

for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a

decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial.

This Court held that the reasons in such context

would mean the link between materials which are

considered and the conclusions which are reached.

Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two

(See para 28 page 98).

27.In Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing Co. of

India Ltd. vs. The Union of India and another, AIR

1976 SC 1785, this Court held that it is far too

well settled that an authority in making an order in

exercise of its quasi-judicial function, must record

reasons in support of the order it makes. The

learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi-

judicial order must be supported by reasons. The

rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi-

judicial order is, this Court held, as basic as

following the principles of natural justice. And the

rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere

pretence of compliance would not satisfy the

requirement of law (See para 6 page 1789).

13

28.In Smt. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and Anr.,

AIR 1978 SC 597, which is a decision of great

jurisprudence significance in our Constitutional

law, Chief Justice Beg, in a concurring but

different opinion held that an order impounding a

passport is a quasi-judicial decision (Para 34, page

612). The learned Chief Justice also held when an

administrative action involving any deprivation of

or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the

authorities must see that justice is not only done

but manifestly appears to be done as well. This

principle would obviously demand disclosure of

reasons for the decision.

29.Justice Y.V. Chandrachud (as His Lordship then was)

in a concurring but a separate opinion also held

that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a

passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and

is to be done very sparingly and only when it is

fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon

situation.

14

30.The learned Judge further held that law cannot

permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep

the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing

so is to keep the reasons away from judicial

scrutiny. (See para 39 page 613).

31.In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran vs. State of

Kerala and Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1918, Justice V.R.

Krishna Iyer speaking for a three-Judge Bench held

that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial

in character. One of the attributes of quasi-

judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in

support of decisions taken and the other requirement

is following the principles of natural justice.

Learned Judge held that natural justice requires

reasons to be written for the conclusions made (See

para 14 page 1922).

32.In Gurdial Singh Fijji vs. State of Punjab and Ors.,

(1979) 2 SCC 368, this Court, dealing with a service

matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held

that “rubber-stamp reason” is not enough and

virtually quoted the observation in Capoor (supra)

to the extent that reasons “are the links between

15

the materials on which certain conclusions are based

and the actual conclusions.” (See para 18 page 377).

33.In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in

Shri Swamiji of Shri Admar Mutt etc. etc. vs. The

Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable

Endowments Dept. and Ors., AIR 1980 SC 1, while

giving the majority judgment Chief Justice Y.V.

Chandrachud referred to Broom’s Legal Maxims (1939

Edition, page 97) where the principle in Latin runs

as follows:

“Ces-sante Ratione Legis Cessat Ipsa Lex”

34.The English version of the said principle given by

the Chief Justice is that:

“Reason is the soul of the law, and when the

reason of any particular law ceases, so does

the law itself.” (See para 29 page 11)

35.In M/s. Bombay Oil Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of

India and Others, AIR 1984 SC 160, this Court held

that while disposing of applications under

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the

duty of the Government is to give reasons for its

order. This court made it very clear that the faith

16

of the people in administrative tribunals can be

sustained only if the tribunals act fairly and

dispose of the matters before them by well

considered orders. In saying so, this Court relied

on its previous decisions in Capoor (supra) and

Siemens Engineering (supra), discussed above.

36.In Ram Chander vs. Union of India and others, AIR

1986 SC 1173, this Court was dealing with the

appellate provisions under the Railway Servants

(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 condemned the

mechanical way of dismissal of appeal in the context

of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the aforesaid Rule.

This Court held that the word “consider” occurring

to the Rule 22(2) must mean the Railway Board shall

duly apply its mind and give reasons for its

decision. The learned Judges held that the duty to

give reason is an incident of the judicial process

and emphasized that in discharging quasi-judicial

functions the appellate authority must act in

accordance with natural justice and give reasons for

its decision (Para 4, page 1176).

17

37.In M/s. Star Enterprises and others vs. City and

Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra

Ltd. and others, (1990) 3 SCC 280, a three-Judge

Bench of this Court held that in the present day set

up judicial review of administrative action has

become expansive and is becoming wider day by day

and the State has to justify its action in various

field of public law. All these necessitate

recording of reason for executive actions including

the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held

that disclosure of reasons in matters of such

rejection provides an opportunity for an objective

review both by superior administrative heads and for

judicial process and opined that such reasons should

be communicated unless there are specific

justification for not doing so (see Para 10, page

284-285).

38.In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher

Secondary Education vs. K.S. Gandhi and others,

(1991) 2 SCC 716, this Court held that even in

domestic enquiry if the facts are not in dispute

non-recording of reason may not be violative of the

principles of natural justice but where facts are

18

disputed necessarily the authority or the enquiry

officer, on consideration of the materials on

record, should record reasons in support of the

conclusion reached (see para 22, pages 738-739)

39.In the case of M.L. Jaggi vs. Mahanagar Telephones

Nigam Limited and others, (1996) 3 SCC 119, this

Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of the

Telegraph Act and held that since the said award

affects public interest, reasons must be recorded in

the award. It was also held that such reasons are to

be recorded so that it enables the High Court to

exercise its power of judicial review on the

validity of the award. (see para 8, page 123).

40.In Charan Singh vs. Healing Touch Hospital and

others, AIR 2000 SC 3138, a three-Judge Bench of

this Court, dealing with a grievance under CP Act,

held that the authorities under the Act exercise

quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer

disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such

a body should arrive at conclusions based on

reasons. This Court held that the said Act, being

one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is

19

intended to protect a large body of consumers from

exploitation as the said Act provides for an

alternative mode for consumer justice by the process

of a summary trial. The powers which are exercised

are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and in such

a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons

and held that requirement of recording reasons is

“too obvious to be reiterated and needs no

emphasizing”. (See Para 11, page 3141 of the report)

41.Only in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a

different note in two of its Constitution Bench

decisions, the first of which was rendered in the

case of Som Datt Datta vs. Union of India and

others, AIR 1969 SC 414, Mr. Justice Ramaswami

delivering the judgment for the unanimous

Constitution Bench held that provisions of Sections

164 and 165 of the Army Act do not require an order

confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be

supported by reasons. The Court held that an order

confirming such proceedings does not become illegal

if it does not record reasons. (Para 10, page 421-

422 of the report).

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42.About two decades thereafter, a similar question

cropped up before this Court in the case of S.N.

Mukherjee vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984. A

unanimous Constitution Bench speaking through

Justice S.C. Agrawal confirmed its earlier decision

in Som Datt (supra) in para 47 at page 2000 of the

report and held reasons are not required to be

recorded for an order confirming the finding and

sentence recorded by the Court Martial.

43.It must be remembered in this connection that the

Court Martial as a proceeding is sui generis in

nature and the Court of Court Martial is different,

being called a Court of Honour and the proceeding

therein are slightly different from other

proceedings. About the nature of Court Martial and

its proceedings the observations of Winthrop in

Military Law and Precedents are very pertinent and

are extracted herein below:

“Not belonging to the judicial branch of the

Government, it follows that courts-martial

must pertain to the executive department; and

they are in fact simply instrumentalities of

the executive power, provided by Congress for

the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid

him in properly commanding the Army and Navy

and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized

under his orders or those of his authorized

military representatives.”

21

44.Our Constitution also deals with Court Martial

proceedings differently as is clear from Articles

33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution.

45.In England there was no common law duty of recording

of reasons. In Marta Stefan vs. General Medical

Council, (1999) 1 WLR 1293, it has been held, “the

established position of the common law is that there

is no general duty imposed on our decision makers to

record reasons”. It has been acknowledged in the

Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at

page 23 that “No single factor has inhibited the

development of English administrative law as

seriously as the absence of any general obligation

upon public authorities to give reasons for their

decisions”.

46.Even then in the case of R vs. Civil Service Appeal

Board, ex parte Cunningham reported in (1991) 4 All

ER 310, Lord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very

strongly in favour of disclosing of reasons in a

case where the Court is acting in its discretion.

The learned Master of Rolls said:

22

“..It is a corollary of the discretion

conferred upon the board that it is their duty

to set out their reasoning in sufficient form

to show the principles on which they have

proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane CJ’s

observations (in R vs. Immigration Appeal

Tribunal, ex p Khan (Mahmud) [1983] 2 All ER

420 at 423, (1983) QB 790 at 794-795), the

reasons for the lower amount is not obvious.

Mr. Cunningham is entitled to know, either

expressly or inferentially stated, what it was

to which the board were addressing their mind

in arriving at their conclusion. It must be

obvious to the board that Mr. Cunningham is

left with a burning sense of grievance. They

should be sensitive to the fact that he is

left with a real feeling of injustice, that

having been found to have been unfairly

dismissed, he has been deprived of his just

desserts (as he sees them) ”.

47.The learned Master of Rolls further clarified by

saying:

“..thus, in the particular circumstances

of this case, and without wishing to establish

any precedent whatsoever, I am prepared to

spell out an obligation on this board to give

succinct reasons, if only to put the mind of

Mr. Cunningham at rest. I would therefore

allow this application.”

48.But, however, the present trend of the law has been

towards an increasing recognition of the duty of

Court to give reasons (See North Range Shipping

Limited vs. Seatrans Shipping Corporation, (2002) 1

WLR 2397). It has been acknowledged that this trend

is consistent with the development towards openness

in Government and judicial administration.

23

49.In English vs. Emery Reimbold and Strick Limited,

(2002) 1 WLR 2409, it has been held that justice

will not be done if it is not apparent to the

parties why one has won and the other has lost. The

House of Lords in Cullen vs. Chief Constable of the

Royal Ulster Constabulary, (2003) 1 WLR 1763, Lord

Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the

requirement of reason held, “First, they impose a

discipline … which may contribute to such decisions

being considered with care. Secondly, reasons

encourage transparency … Thirdly, they assist the

Courts in performing their supervisory function if

judicial review proceedings are launched.” (Para 7,

page 1769 of the report)

50.The position in the United States has been indicated

by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in paragraph

11 at page 1988 of the judgment. This Court held

that in the United States the Courts have always

insisted on the recording of reasons by

administrative authorities in exercise of their

powers. It was further held that such recording of

reasons is required as “the Court cannot exercise

their duty of review unless they are advised of the

24

considerations underlying the action under review”.

In S.N. Mukherjee (supra) this court relied on the

decisions of the U.S. Court in Securities and

Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corporation, (1942)

87 Law Ed 626 and John T. Dunlop vs. Walter

Bachowski, (1975) 44 Law Ed 377 in support of its

opinion discussed above.

51.Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds:

a.In India the judicial trend has always been to

record reasons, even in administrative decisions,

if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

b.A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in

support of its conclusions.

c.Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to

serve the wider principle of justice that justice

must not only be done it must also appear to be

done as well.

d.Recording of reasons also operates as a valid

restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of

judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative

power.

25

e.Reasons reassure that discretion has been

exercised by the decision maker on relevant

grounds and by disregarding extraneous

considerations.

f.Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a

component of a decision making process as

observing principles of natural justice by

judicial, quasi-judicial and even by

administrative bodies.

g.Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review

by superior Courts.

h.The ongoing judicial trend in all countries

committed to rule of law and constitutional

governance is in favour of reasoned decisions

based on relevant facts. This is virtually the

life blood of judicial decision making justifying

the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

i.Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these

days can be as different as the judges and

authorities who deliver them. All these decisions

serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate

by reason that the relevant factors have been

objectively considered. This is important for

26

sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice

delivery system.

j.Insistence on reason is a requirement for both

judicial accountability and transparency.

k.If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not

candid enough about his/her decision making

process then it is impossible to know whether the

person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of

precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

l.Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,

clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or

‘rubber-stamp reasons’ is not to be equated with a

valid decision making process.

m.It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine

qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers.

Transparency in decision making not only makes the

judges and decision makers less prone to errors

but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.

(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor

(1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737).

n.Since the requirement to record reasons emanates

from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision

making, the said requirement is now virtually a

component of human rights and was considered part

27

of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR

553, at 562 para 29 and Anya vs. University of

Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court

referred to Article 6 of European Convention of

Human Rights which requires, “adequate and

intelligent reasons must be given for judicial

decisions”.

o.In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a

vital role in setting up precedents for the

future. Therefore, for development of law,

requirement of giving reasons for the decision is

of the essence and is virtually a part of “Due

Process”.

52.For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the order of

the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission

and remand the matter to the said forum for deciding

the matter by passing a reasoned order in the light

of the observations made above. Since some time has

elapsed, this Court requests the forum to decide the

matter as early as possible, preferably within a

period of six weeks from the date of service of this

order upon it.

28

53.In so far as the appeal filed by the Bank is

concerned, this Court finds that the National

Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in its order

dated 4

th

April 2008 has given some reasons in its

finding. The reasons, inter alia, are as under:

“We have gone through the orders of the

District Forum and the State Commission,

perused the record placed before us and

heard the parties at length. The State

Commission has rightly confirmed the order

of the District Forum after coming to the

conclusion that the Petitioner and the

Builder – Respondents No.3 and 4 have

colluded with each other and hence,

directed them to compensate the complainant

for the harassment caused to them.”

54.From the order of the State Commission dated 26.7.07

in connection with the appeal filed by the Bank, we

do not find that the State Commission has

independently considered Bank’s appeal. The State

Commission dismissed the Bank’s appeal for the

reasons given in its order dated 6.7.07 in

connection with the appeal of the builders.

55.This Court is of the view that since the Bank has

filed a separate appeal, it has a right to be heard

independently in support of its appeal. That right

has been denied by the State Commission. In that

view of the matter, this Court quashes the order

29

dated 26.7.07 passed by the State Commission as also

the order of the National Commission dated 4

th

April

2008 which has affirmed the order of the State

Commission.

56.This case is remanded to the State Commission for

hearing on merits as early as possible, preferably

within a period of six weeks from the date of

service of this order to the State Commission.

57.It is expected that the State Commission will hear

out the matter independently and give adequate

reasons for its conclusions. We, however, do not

make any observations on the merits of the case.

58.Both these appeals are allowed. No order as to

costs.

.....................J.

(G.S. SINGHVI)

.....................J.

(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

30

New Delhi

September 08, 2010

31