2026 INSC 756 1

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4081 OF 2014

M/S OTIS ELEVATOR CO. (INDIA) LTD. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

RASHMI HANDA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1602 OF 2020

J U D G M E N T

1. Due to the limited availability of urban space, cities are growing

vertically rather than horizontally. Elevators have become essential part of

modern urban life. Strangers step into a small steel chamber, the doors

close, and for a few moments they place their safety entirely in the hands

of a mechanical system over which they have no control. In a crowded

elevator, particularly at public spaces, the sense of confinement is real.

The air feels heavy, personal space disappears, and the awareness of

being suspended between floors naturally creates unease. The slightest

jerk, an unexpected stop, or an unusual mechanical sound can quickly

turn discomfort into fear, reminding every passenger that safety is not

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merely expected but is a fundamental assurance that every elevator must

provide.

2. Given the ever-increasing usage of passenger elevators in the

modern-day urbanising societies, recognising them as a mode of vertical

transportation is imperative. In this transportation, passengers have no

control over the conveyance and they have to entirely rely on automation

or the operator as the case may be.

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It is not merely reasonable, but a

legal necessity to impose a heightened duty to care, akin to that of

common carriers in view of the intrinsic passenger vulnerability. An

elevator must be construed and deemed to be a common carrier

2

and the

operator, in the wider sense must undertake greater responsibility to

transport passengers from floor to floor and exit safely.

3. A contract of carriage is fundamentally between the carrier and the

passenger. The carrier, in the context of user of an elevator at public

places will take within its sweep the manufacturer, the operator and owner

of the premises provisioning its services for the users. Therefore, from the

perspective of a public law identifying and provisioning effective and

1

Such a public safety rationale is well expressed in the decision of the Supreme Court of California in

Treadwell v. Whittier 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266 (1889) way back in 1889 -

“The aged, the helpless, and the infirm daily using these elevators. The owners make profit by

these elevators, or use them for the profit they bring to them. The cruelty from a careless use of such

contrivances is likely to fall on the weakest of the community. The law, therefore, throws around such

persons its protection, by requiring the highest care and diligence.”

2

Michael D. Marrs, Carriers - Personal Injuries - Escalators and Elevators - Escalators are Not Common

Carriers in Illinois, 45 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 111 (1968), Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, 170 Eng. Rpt. 1088

(1809); Galena and Chicago Union Ry. Co. v. Yarwood, 15 Ill. 468 (1854) and Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill.

430, 59 N. E. 953 (1901).

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efficacious restitutionary remedies, it is appropriate to hold the

manufacturer, the operator and owner of the premises as the duty bearers

and shall jointly and severally be liable to safeguard the user. The principle

arising out of composite negligence is well articulated in many decisions

of this Court

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entitling a plaintiff/claimant to sue joint tortfeasors and

recover damages. The burden of identifying the inter se liabilities of joint

tortfeasors should not rest on the shoulders of the consumers seeking

compensation for injury caused due to transportation through an elevator.

For immediate relief, it is necessary for the Court to recognise the injury

and assess the compensation payable at the first instance. In so far as

the apportionment of the liability of the joint tortfeasors, the Courts will

examine the inter se contractual relationship and other circumstances

before passing orders apportioning the liability and compensation.

4. M/s. OTIS Elevator Company (India) Ltd. (“OTIS”) is in appeal

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assailing the order passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission (“NCDRC”) whereby OTIS, Research and Analysis Wing

(“RAW”) and the Military Engineering Service (“MES”) were held jointly

and severally liable to pay compensation to the family of the deceased,

who was crushed to death due to the malfunctioning of the elevator

installed and operated by OTIS for the offices like RAW, maintained by

3

Khenyei v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. 2015 (9) SCC 273.

4

Civil Appeal No. 4081 of 2014 before the Supreme Court of India against the order dated 21.01.2014

of NCDRC in OP 25 of 2005.

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MES. The connected appeal

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by the wife of the deceased is against the

order of the executing court not proceeding further, awaiting the final

outcome of the civil appeal filed by OTIS. The appeals filed by MES and

RAW were dismissed by this Court at the admission stage without detailed

consideration. OTIS being the main contestant, we have considered its

appeal in detail.

Factual Overview

5. OTIS, a lift manufacturer, installed the lift in question (“the lift”) in the

RAW office complex at Lodhi Road, New Delhi, in December 2001. The

lift was reserved for the use of officers of the rank of Joint Secretary and

above. On 24.05.2002, MES had entered into a M aintenance and Repair

contract (“Maintenance Contract”) with OTIS for the upkeep of the lift.

6. On 20.03.2003, at about 10.40 a.m., a meeting of senior RAW

officers concluded on the 11

th

floor of the RAW complex. During the

descent, the lift, carrying 13 occupants including the deceased, abruptly

stopped between the 6

th

and 7

th

floors. Staff from the control room opened

the lift door manually on the 7

th

floor, switched off the main supply

Miniature Circuit Breaker (“MCB”) in the Machine Room on the 11

th

floor,

and began rescuing the stranded occupants one by one. The first officer

was rescued successfully.

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Order dated 02.05.2019 of NCDRC in EP No. 41 of 2019 in OP No. 25 of 2005.

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7. While the deceased, the second officer being rescued, was half

inside and half outside the lift cabin, the lift suddenly moved downward for

about 5–7 seconds, crushing his neck between the cabin roof panel and

the floor and causing his death. The lift came to rest near the 6

th

floor, and

the remaining eleven occupants were rescued without any further issue.

The death resulted in the filing of an FIR at Lodhi Colony Police Station

under Section 304-A IPC. Subsequently, upon Delhi Police’s request for a

technical assessment of cause of failure, Prof. C.M. Bhatia was deputed

for the task by Director, IIT Delhi. He submitted his Technical Investigation

Report on 27.04.2003. Pursuant to the report and further investigation, a

chargesheet was drawn against certain MES officers on 15.07.2003.

8. On 18.03.2005, the deceased’s widow, Ms. Rashmi Handa, and

their two children filed Original Petition No. 25 of 2005 before the NCDRC

against OTIS, RAW and MES, claiming compensation of Rs. 1.89 crores

along with interest at 20% per annum from the date of the claim.

9. OTIS resisted the complaint principally on the ground that the

accident was caused by voltage fluctuation, of which it had duly informed

MES, and that responsibility for the accident lay with MES’s personnel,

who had allegedly tampered with the Brake Release Key in the Machine

Room without OTIS’s knowledge, in violation of Rule 6(xiii) of the Bombay

Lift Rules, 1958 (extended to Delhi) and of stickers posted by OTIS inside

the lift prohibiting interference with its mechanism. RAW contended that it

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was itself a “consumer” of the services of OTIS and MES, that the

Commission had no jurisdiction over it, and that responsibility for

maintenance vested in MES and OTIS. MES denied any negligence,

relying on Clause 6.1 of Maintenance Contract with OTIS, which placed

liability for accidents during the operation of the lift on OTIS as the

maintenance service provider.

Impugned Order

10. By order dated 21.01.2014, the NCDRC allowed the complaint. It

rejected OTIS’s objections to maintainability (founded on the absence of

one complainant’s signature) and to jurisdiction (founded on the

contention that the matter involved complex questions of fact), holding that

the National Commission was competent to adjudicate such questions.

On merits, it held OTIS deficient in service for having installed and

operated the lift without a Voltage Stabiliser despite being aware of the

risk, for its failure to depute site personnel or maintain attendance records,

and for want of evidence of any site assessment or emergency training

provided to RAW and MES. RAW and MES were held jointly and severally

deficient for having failed to install the recommended stabiliser and to

monitor and enforce OTIS’s compliance with the maintenance contract.

MES was held liable for its failure to maintain attendance records

evidencing the presence of OTIS’s site engineer.

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11. The NCDRC awarded the complainants a compensation of Rs.

3,01,48,195/- with interest at 9% per annum from 20.03.2003, the date of

death, payable within 90 days, failing which interest at 12% per annum

would apply until realisation. Liability was apportioned such that RAW was

made liable for 5% and MES for 25% of the decretal amount, with the

residuary liability, i.e. 70%, cast upon OTIS.

Subsequent Proceedings

12. OTIS, MES and RAW filed separate appeals against the order dated

21.01.2014. On 16.02.2015, this Court dismissed RAW’s appeal, and

later, on 06.07.2017, this Court also dismissed MES’s appeal for default,

leaving MES’s and RAW’s liability under the NCDRC’ s order undisturbed.

13. On 19.02.2019, the complainant filed Execution Petition No. 41 of

2019 before the NCDRC seeking recovery of the decretal amount. By

order dated 02.05.2019, the NCDRC dismissed the execution petition as

premature, recording that RAW had complied with the order dated

21.01.2014, that OTIS’s challenge to that order was pending before the

Supreme Court, and that the complainant would be at liberty to file

execution proceedings afresh after the appeal was decided.

14. The complainant assailed the order dated 02.05.2019 by way of a

further appeal, principally on the grounds that the executing court could

not go behind a decree and was bound to execute it as it stood, that the

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pendency of OTIS’s appeal was immaterial to the execution proceedings,

and that, MES’s own appeal having already been dismissed for default on

06.07.2017, MES’s liability stood crystallised and could not be held in

abeyance on account of OTIS’s pending appeal.

Arguments

15. We heard Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel

appearing for OTIS, Mr. Saurabh Suman Sinha, learned counsel

appearing for Mrs. Rashmi Handa, and Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned

Additional Solicitor General appearing for MES.

16. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan fairly stated that the sole issue

involved in this matter is the determination of liability of the concerned

defendant and if that question is decided, the incidental issue relating to

legality and validity of the quantum of damages need not be gone into. As

regards liability he submitted that -

16.1. First, the Technical Report of Prof. C.M. Bhatia unambiguously

attributes the sudden downward movement of the lift, and consequently

the death of the deceased, to the manual release of the mechanical

brakes through the Brake Release Key in the Machine Room, a room in

the exclusive occupation and control of MES, to which no OTIS personnel

had access at the relevant time.

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16.2 Second, OTIS had, as early as 04.07.2002, identified voltage

fluctuation as the underlying cause of the lift’s persistent malfunctioning

and had specifically recommended installation of a Voltage Stabiliser to

MES; MES’s failure to install the stabiliser despite this warning could not

be visited upon OTIS.

16.3 Third, no OTIS mechanic was required to be present at the site at

the time of the accident, since, under Clause 3.2 of the Maintenance

Contract, the duty hours of OTIS’s mechanic were 0700–1000 hours,

1230–1430 hours and 1630–1900 hours, whereas the accident occurred

at approximately 1045 hours, outside these hours.

16.4 Fourth, he drew attention to the charge-sheet filed by the Delhi

Police, which fixed responsibility for the accident on the employees of

MES and not on OTIS. He accordingly submitted that the NCDRC erred

in casting the principal share of liability, i.e. 70%, upon OTIS, and that this

liability ought properly to fall on MES, in whose custody and control the

Machine Room and the Brake Release Key remained at all relevant times.

17. Mr. Saurabh Suman Sinha, learned counsel for the Respondent-

Consumers, drew the attention of this Court to the various clauses of the

Maintenance Contract between MES and OTIS, and submitted the

following –

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17.1 The provisions of the Maintenance Contract cast a comprehensive

and non-delegable duty on OTIS, as both the manufacturer and the

maintenance contractor of the lift, to keep the lift “in sound condition to

avoid risk of accident” under Clause 3.1, to depute a qualified mechanic

on site during fixed hours daily under Clause 3.2, and to maintain

attendance and complaint registers verifying discharge of these

obligations under Clauses 3.3 to 3.5.

17.2 OTIS produced no attendance register, duty chart or log book to

show that its mechanic discharged these obligations on the date of the

accident or on any date proximate to it, notwithstanding that record shows

no fewer than six formal communications between April and August 2002,

and a total of nine recorded breakdowns of Lift No. 6 alone in July and

August 2002, putting OTIS on repeated and continuing notice of the lift’s

persistent malfunctioning.

17.3 OTIS’s own letter dated 04.07.2002 demonstrates that OTIS itself

appreciated the danger posed by voltage fluctuation, yet OTIS took no

further steps to ensure that the stabiliser it had itself recommended was

installed, nor did it decline to certify the lift as safe for continued use in the

interim, nor communicate any further reminder to MES after 04.07.2002

despite the breakdowns continuing unabated through the following two

months. He accordingly submitted that Clause 6.1 of the Contract, which

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places liability to pay compensation for any accident during the operation

of the lift squarely on OTIS “as the contractor, ” only reinforces the

correctness of the NCDRC’ s apportionment of 70% of the liability upon

OTIS.

Analysis

18. In the present appeal, the sole issue that needs to be adjudicated is

the apportionment of liability between OTIS, RAW and MES. In this

context, it would be relevant to understand the contractual provisions

which govern the relationship between the parties, the communications

regarding the upkeep of the relevant lift, and the report prepared by Prof.

Bhatia.

19. The maintenance of the building in which the lift was installed was

under the overall charge and management of MES. MES contracted the

repair and maintenance of all the lifts in the building to OTIS through a

tender, and entered into a Repair and Maintenance Contract on

24.05.2002. The scope of the contract is detailed in Clause 1.1—

“1.1 The work under this contract covers comprehensive maintenance

and repair of existing lifts regularly and systematically examining,

adjusting, lubricating as required and repair including

renewals/replacement of any electrical/mechanical parts for smooth

and efficient functioning of lifts using only genuine parts of ‘OTIS’

Maker. All the parts which warrants repair/replacement except rubber

astragals of doors safety shoes/hoist ropes sheaves shall be repaired

or replaced accordingly. Replacement of Batteries and

repair/maintenance of electrical fittings i.e. emergency call alarm, bell/buzor indicator, cabin fan including grills and the accessories are

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covered under the contract. The necessary T & P required shall also

be claimed to be included in the rate quoted by the contractor.”

20. Clauses 3.1 and 3.2 of the Contract lay down the contractor’s broad

responsibility -

“3.1 The contractor shall be responsible for the electrical and

mechanical fittings of the lifts and maintenance of the same to keep

them in sound condition to avoid risk of accident. The contractor shall

stock sufficient parts/major assembly to ensure putting the lifts in working condition in shortest possible time, to avoid inconvenience to the users. The tendered rates shall be deemed to include for the above contingencies.

3.2 Maintenance and supervision shall be done by trained men

for the safe operation of the lifts. The contractor shall carry out

fortnightly servicing of each lift including adjustment, lubrication, repair

or replacement of parts if necessary. The work of servicing shall

preferably be executed on Saturday or any working day during week hours with prior written permission of the Engineer-in-Charge and

record be maintained for the same so that no inconveniences is

caused to the users. Shut down given for this purpose will not be exceeding 04 hours failing which GE may at his absolute discretion

impose on the contractor to pay the department penalty of a sum of

Rs. 1000/- per day or part of it per lift. In addition to fortnightly servicing,

contractor’s senior mechanic or foreman shall carry out the inspection

as per maintenance schedule and make necessary (Illegible) entries

in the Proforma No.1, 2 and 3 as applicable, kept in MES complaint

office for this purpose. The qualified lift mechanic (One No.) is to be

detailed solely for cabinet sect. building from 0700 hours to 1000

hours, 1230 hours to 1430 hours and 1630 hours to 1900 hours daily

except Sunday and Gazetted holidays to attend the complaints and to

check all the lifts as indicated in Sch ‘ A’ on Ser. Page 12. In case

mechanic does not attend the complaints or is not found present, a

sum of Rs. 150/- per hour if mechanic left the building between 0700

hours to 1000 hours, 1230 hours to 1430 hours and 1630 hours to

1900 hours or maximum Rs.1000/- per day will be deducted from

Contractor’s dues as penalty.”

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These provisions obligate OTIS to provide comprehensive repair and

maintenance services including renewal/replacement of electrical and

mechanical parts for the smooth functioning of the lifts. A qualified

mechanic was to be deployed on a daily basis during the intervals of

0700–1000 hours, 1230–1430 hours and 1630–1900 hours.

21. The contract also obligates OTIS to maintain attendance registers

for each shift and a complaint register for each lift, to be certified every

morning. The relevant provisions are extracted hereunder—

“3.3 The contractor shall have to maintain attendance register for each

shift as per the proforma attached as Appendix ‘ A’ to this tender

documents. The register is to be checked every day by the Engineer-

in-Charge and also by GE as and when visit demand for the same.

3.4 After checking each of the passenger lift, starting with the VIP lift,

every morning the OTIS lift mechanic will certify in the complaint

register so being maintained for each lift every morning as under:-

“Certified that lift checked at time and found fully functional in every

respect” failure of which penalty as described will be applied.

3.5 It will be responsibility of the contractor to see that maintenance

schedule Book is maintained properly by their senior mechanic or

foreman. Register to be maintained for each lift and the same shall be

produced to Engineer-in-Charge daily and get signed. Certificate in

respect of functionability to give as described hereinbefore. The

contractor shall attend 24 hours call book services. They shall be

promptly attended and call shall not be kept pending for more than 04

hours unless it has the prior approval of the GE....”

22. The contract also contains a provision for precautions to be taken

by the contractor —

“6.1 All the precautions against loss/damages shall be taken by the

contractor. In case of accident during operation of lift, the contractor is

liable to pay compensation as applicable... ”

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23. Having noted these contractual provisions, it is now necessary to

examine in detail the events that have transpired about the operation of

the lift, as evidenced by the correspondence between OTIS and MES in

the months leading up to the incident. Between April and August 2002,

OTIS was placed on repeated notice, through a series of letters and

telegrams, of the persistent malfunctioning of Lift No. 6, the very lift

involved in the accident. A brief description of these communications is

summarised hereunder –

23.1 While OTIS started operating the lift with effect from December

2001, within 4 months of its installation, MES sent a telegram to OTIS on

03.04.2002 that the newly installed lift had been “ off road” since 1220

hours that day, that OTIS’s site engineer had been absent from the

premises since 02.04.2002, and that there was “heavy criticism from

users” and called upon OTIS to “rectify defect urgently.” Relevant portion

is extracted hereunder -

“CA NO. CEDZ-31/99- 2002 AAA PROVEN OF ONE LIFT AND

MODERNISATION LIFTS CABINET SECTT AAA LIFT NO. 06 (NEW

INSTALLED) IS. OFF ROAD SINCE 1220 DATED 03 APRIL 2002 AAA

SITE ENGINEER ROUND ABSENT SINCE 02 APR 2002 AAA HEAVY

CRITISIM FROM USERS AAA RECTIFY DEFE CT URGENTY

GARRENGER (PROJECT) WEST

Sd/-

(BV Venkatesh)

Capt”

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23.2 On 14.06.2002, a further telegram to OTIS records that Lift No. 6

had again been off road since 1000 hours that day, reiterated the “heavy

criticism from users,” and once more called upon OTIS to rectify the defect

urgently. Relevant portion is extracted hereunder -

“CA NO. CEDZ-31/99- 2000 AAA PROVEN OF ONE LIFT AND

MODERNISATION LIFT AT CABINET SECTT AAA LIFT NO. 06 (NEW

INSTALLED) IS OFF ROAD SINCE 1000 HRS DATED 14 JUN 2002

AAA HEAVY CRITISIM FROM USERS AAA RECTIFY DEFECT

URGENTY

GARRENGER (PROJECT) WEST

Sd/-

(BV Venkatesh)

Capt”

23.3 On 21.06.2002, a third telegram recorded that a separate lift had

been out of order since 03.06.2002 and that OTIS’s own site mechanic

had stated it was “not possible to repair the same” and that “it will remain

in the same state,” while Lift No. 6 had independently been off road since

20.06.2002. The telegram recorded that “all are annoyed with the frequent

break down of these lift” and requested “permanent fault rectification,”

marking the matter “urgent.” Relevant portion is extracted –

CA NO. CEDZ-31/99-2000 AAA PROVEN OF ONE LIFT AND

MODERNISATION OF TWO LIFTS IN CABINET SECTT AAA AND

SYSTEM OF LIFT MORDERNISED IN 'D' BLOCK OUT OF ORDER

SINCE 03 JUN 2002 AAA ON COMPLAINT YOUR SITE MECHANIC

TOLD THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO REPAIR THE SAME AAA HE

FURTHER TOLD IT WILL BE REMAIN IN SAME STATE AAA

REQUEST TO REPLACE THE SAME IMMEDIATELY AAA LIFT NO.

06 NEWLY INSTALLED OFF ROAD SINCE 20 JUN 2002 AT 0900 H

AAA (ILLEGIBLE) IN THE LIFT AAA ALL ARE ANNOYED WITH THE

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FREQUENT BREAK DOWN OF THESE LIFT AAA REQUEST FOR

PERMANENT FAULT RECTIFICATION AAA MATTER URGENT.

GARRENGER (PROJECT) WEST

Sd/-

(BV Venkatesh)

Capt”

23.4 On 04.07.2002, MES internally forwarded to the Garrison Engineer

(Project) West a list of breakdowns of Lift No. 6 recorded during June

2002. On the very same date, OTIS itself addressed a letter to the MES

recording that its “Route Examiner” had found the voltage at the site to be

“sometimes...unbalanced which causes frequent breakdown on new lifts,”

and formally requesting installation of a “Service Line Voltage Corrector

Stabilizer of 50 KVA on each phase for the protection & safe operation of

our equipments,” together with detailed technical specifications for the

stabiliser. Relevant portion of OTIS’ letter is extracted –

“Dear Sir,

We were informed by our Route Examiner, that the voltage available

at the site sometimes found to be unbalanced which cause frequent

breakdown on new lifts & this also affect the life of the lift in long run.

We would therefore request your good self, to arrange to install

Service Line voltage : Corrector Stabilizer of 50 KVA on each phase

for the protection & safe operation of our equipments….

Thanking you;

Yours Sincerely

OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY (INDIA) LIMITED”

23.5 On 05.07.2002, MES wrote to OTIS enclosing the list of breakdowns

of Lift No. 6 for June 2002 and requesting that OTIS “detail suitable

Engineer to rectify the defects at the earliest.”

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23.6 On 29.08.2002, MES forwarded to HQ CWE (Project), with a copy

to OTIS “for info and necessary action,” a consolidated list of breakdowns

of Lifts No. 5 and No. 6 for the months of July and August 2002. This

document records no fewer than nine separate breakdowns of Lift No. 6

alone within this two-month period. This includes stoppages between

floors, doors failing to shut, and lifts becoming stuck in addition to the

malfunctions already recorded in April and June 2002.

23.7 The record also discloses a further letter dated 17.02.2003, barely

a month before the accident, in which the MES complained that, despite

“repeated requests” made to named OTIS personnel regarding

rectification of a noise defect in Lift No. 6, “no action has been taken so

far to rectify the same,” and once again called upon OTIS to “rectify the

defects immediately” and to “treat the matter (as) urgent.” This

correspondence establishes that Lift No. 6 was the subject of continuing,

unresolved complaints from the month following its installation until

virtually the eve of the fatal accident.

24. Apart from the direct correspondence that has been brought on

record, there is also the Technical Report of Lift Accident Investigation

prepared by Prof. C.M. Bhatia, which concluded that the downward

movement of the lift was caused by the manual release of the mechanical

brakes through the Brake Release Key in the Machine Room, which had

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been left accessible, and that this constituted human error. The report also

noted that the lift’s manual controls superseded its automatic control and

interlocking systems, such that the interlocking mechanism did not

register the manual release of the brakes. The relevant portion of the

report reads -

“...The answer to the (*) mark points is that while the second officer

was being rescued, the Machine Room door on the 11th floor was

opened, or possibly it was left open. Somebody entered the Machine

Room and released the lift brakes, through the Brake Release Key,

moving it down and hence causing the accident. There is enough

evidence at the site that the Brake Release Key has been used. ”

“...Since the power supply was switched off, the lift was dead and could

not move through the electrical circuit, either downwards or upwards... Even if the power was switched on by somebody through turning- on

the MCB, on 11th floor, the interlock control will prevent the lift from

moving. Because the lift door was open and the diplomat was in the process of rescue with half of his body in and half out. It may be

mentioned that all manual controls in such lifts supersede the

automatic control and interlocking. Further, since the power was

switched off when the brakes were released, the interlocking did not

work. The lift control interlocks therefore did not recognize the release

of brakes, because this action was done manually, by passing the

controls. Releasing the brakes through the Brake Release Key is the

only cause of accident and is due to the human error/factor beyond

any element of doubt.”

25. Though the Technical Report of Prof. Bhatia concludes that

releasing the brake release key is the only cause of accident, we are of

the opinion that the said conclusion must be seen in the context of the

Report. For the purpose of determining deficiency of service and the

consequential relief of compensation, it is necessary to take note of a

number of incidents giving rise to the cause of action which is very

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different from cause of accident . That crucial distinction is lost in the

submission advanced by OTIS. The correspondence extracted above

demonstrates that the malfunctioning of Lift No. 6 was neither a passing

nor an isolated occurrence, but a well-documented and continuing failure

that persisted from the month following the lift’s installation until shortly

before the accident. At least three separate stoppages of Lift No. 6 were

specifically brought to OTIS’s notice between April and June 2002, and a

further nine breakdowns of the same lift were recorded in July and August

2002 alone. OTIS, as the exclusive maintenance contractor under the

Repair and Maintenance Contract, was directly and repeatedly notified of

each of these failures.

26. Under Clause 3.1 of the Contract, OTIS, as the contractor, was

“responsible for the electrical and mechanical fittings of the lifts and

maintenance of the same to keep them in sound condition to avoid risk of

accident.” This clause clearly casts a continuing and affirmative duty on

OTIS, as both the manufacturer and the comprehensive maintenance

contractor of the lift, to ensure that a lift reserved for the use of the senior-

most officers of a sensitive government establishment did not pose a risk

to the life of its users. The repair and maintenance contract is

comprehensive inasmuch as under Clause 1.1 parties have contracted to

ensure that OTIS’ duties, covers “comprehensive maintenance and repair

of existing lifts regularly and systematically examining, adjusting,

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lubricating as required and repair including renewals/replacement of any

electrical/mechanical parts for smooth and efficient functioning of lifts

using only genuine parts of ‘ OTIS’ Maker.” That OTIS was simultaneously

the manufacturer of the lift and its comprehensive maintenance contractor

placed it in a position of unique knowledge and control over features such

as the safety interlocks, the brake mechanism, and the electrical circuitry

whose malfunction caused the fatal accident. This position is materially

different from that of either RAW or MES, neither of whom possessed the

technical means independently to assess or rectify the defects that were

being reported to them.

27. It is significant to note that OTIS’s own conduct establishes that it

was conscious, at least since 04.07.2002, over eight months before the

accident, that the persistent stoppages were also attributable to voltage

fluctuation, and that a Service Line Voltage Corrector Stabiliser was

necessary, “for the protection & safe operation of our equipments”. Having

itself identified the remedy, it was incumbent upon OTIS, as the party

responsible under Clause 3.1 for the safe functioning of the lift, to have

followed up on this recommendation, to have declined to certify the lift as

fit for continued use pending installation of the stabiliser, or, at the very

least, to have escalated the matter given that the breakdowns continued

unabated through July and August of 2002, as recorded in the letters of

05.07.2002 and 29.08.2002. Instead of following such course of action,

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the lift continued to be operated on a daily basis, carrying senior officers

of RAW, without any of the safeguards that OTIS itself had identified as

necessary.

28. We are unable to accept the submission on behalf of the Appellant

that responsibility for the accident rests solely with MES on the ground

that its personnel manually released the brakes through the Brake

Release Key. While the Technical Report may attribute cause of the

accident to manual release of the brakes, this finding does not, in our view,

absolve OTIS of liability, for various reasons as the said manual release

is not a standalone incident. This event has to be seen in the context of

various factors that have been articulated.

29. First, Clause 3.2 of the Contract required OTIS’s own trained

mechanic to be present at the site during fixed hours daily and to attend

to complaints within a stipulated period; OTIS produced no attendance

register, duty chart, log book, or other contemporaneous record to

establish the presence, or otherwise, of its mechanic on the date of the

accident, notwithstanding that such records were required to be

maintained under Clauses 3.3 to 3.5 of the very Contract on which OTIS

relies. The absence of such records, which lay peculiarly within OTIS’s

own knowledge and custody, does not assist its case.

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30. Second, and more fundamentally, the very occasion for anyone to

manually operate the Brake Release Key arose because the lift, on

account of a persistent and unrectified electrical malfunction, had stopped

mid-operation. This vulnerability also directly flow s from OTIS’s failure to

rectify the defects of which it stood repeatedly informed, and for which it

had itself proposed a remedy.

31. Third, the stickers posted by OTIS inside the lift cautioning against

interference with its mechanism, while relevant to show that manual

intervention was unauthorised, cannot substitute for the affirmative steps

that OTIS, as comprehensive maintenance contractor, was required to

take to train RAW’s and MES’s personnel in the correct rescue procedure

to be followed in the event of a stoppage. T he NCDRC correctly found that

there is no evidence OTIS ever imparted such training.

32. We find no reason to interfere with the finding of the NCDRC that

OTIS was the party principally deficient in service. A party that undertakes

the comprehensive maintenance of a machine, which is in the nature of a

vehicle, owes a heightened duty of care towards its users. OTIS was not

a stranger to the defect that culminated in the accident. It was cognizant

of the problem, and it had itself proposed the remedy. Having done so, its

failure to ensure that the remedy was implemented, or, alternatively, to

render the lift safe by other means pending its installation constitutes

deficiency of service.

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33. As regards RAW and MES, we agree with the NCDRC that their

liability is appropriately more limited than that of OTIS. RAW, as the

ultimate occupier of the premises and consumer of both OTIS’s and

MES’s services, bore a residual duty to ensure that the contracts it had

sanctioned were properly performed and that reports of persistent defects

were acted upon. RAW did not, however, possess the technical

competence that OTIS possessed. Its deficiency accordingly relates more

to a failure of oversight than to any direct role in causing the accident.

34. MES, for its part, failed to maintain the attendance registers required

under Clause 3.3 to verify that OTIS’s mechanic attended the site as

contractually required, and it was MES’s own Machine Room that was left

accessible during the rescue operation a lapse of a different order from,

and subordinate to, OTIS’s primary responsibility for the underlying defect

that necessitated the rescue in the first place. The apportionment of 70%

of the liability to OTIS, 25% to MES and 5% to RAW, in our view, properly

reflects the differential degree of knowledge, control and responsibility that

each party bore for the accident, and calls for no interference by this Court.

Conclusion

35. For the foregoing reasons, we find no infirmity in the order of the

NCDRC dated 21.01.2014 apportioning liability in the manner it did.

OTIS’s Civil Appeal No. 4081 of 2014 is accordingly dismissed.

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36. In view of the dismissal of OTIS’s appeal, the sole reason for which

the NCDRC had declined to proceed with execution no longer survives.

Civil Appeal No. 1602 of 2020 against the order dated 02.05.2019 is

accordingly allowed, and the NCDRC is directed to proceed with her

Execution Petition in accordance with law.

37. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. No order as to costs.

………………………………....J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA ]

………………………………....J.

[ALOK ARADHE ]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 29, 2026.