IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

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BEFORE

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HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI

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ARBITRATION CASE No. 88 of 2025

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M/S. PREMCO RAIL ENGINEERING LIMITED A COMPANY

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INCORPORATED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF COMPANIES ACT A

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Versus

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY INDORE

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Appearance:

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Shri Aditya Garg, learned counsel for the applicant.

Shri Abhishek Malviya and Shri Rishi Paliwal, learned counsel for the

respondent [R-1].

Reserved on : 22.09.2025

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Pronounced on : 05.01.2026

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ORDER

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This application has been filed under Section 29A of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996 (for brevity "Act of 1996") by the claimant for extension

of time for conclusion of arbitration proceedings.

2.The relevant facts of the case are that the applicant is a private company

incorporated under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956 having its registered

office at Kolkata. It is engaged in the business of construction for railways and

other governmental organizations, civil works related thereto and other various

tenders throughout India.

3.The respondent is an educational institution and one of the sixth IITs which

were established in the academic year of 2008-2009. Earlier, vide an order dated

08.09.2023, this Court appointed sole arbitrator by invoking provisions of Section

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11 of the Act of 1996 on an application filed by the present applicant/claimant.

Pursuant to the appointment of arbitrator, proceedings were initiated. The

applicant filed its statement of claim on 29.11.2023. The respondent filed its

statement of defence on 26.02.2024. The last meeting was held on 28.06.2025 on

which date the final arguments stood concluded. Parties were granted two months'

time to file written submissions and thus, now only passing of final award is

remaining. As the time for concluding the arbitral proceedings was going to expire

on 25.08.2025, the present application for extension of time has been filed.

4.Before adverting to the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it

would be profitable to record at this stage that on the merits of the proceedings i.e.

the manner and mandate of the arbitrator is not under dispute. Both the parties

have advanced their arguments only on the question of jurisdiction of this Court to

extend the time in terms of the provisions of Section 29A of the Act of 1996.

5.Learned counsel for the applicant argued that as it is this Court who

appointed the arbitrator by invoking the provisions of Section 11 (6) of the Act,

1996, thus, the application would lie before this Court only as Section 29A also

included power to substitute the arbitrator(s). He submits that the extension of

time which is being sought has no relation with the adjudication of dispute on

merits and as the arbitrator is appointed by this Court as such power to extend

time would lie before this Court. He points out that any other interpretation of

provision Section 29A would lead to an anomaly inasmuch as if either of the

parties seeks extension of time along with substitution of arbitrator then it has to

approach this Court and in case extension of time simplicitor is sought then

principal civil court has to be approached which will create uncertainty and

unnecessary hardship for smooth resolution of the dispute which is contrary to the

very objective of mechanism under arbitration. He further submits that in fact the

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provision of Section 29A will have to be considered in the context of the fact of a

given case. He points out that there can be two situations, one where the arbitrator

is appointed by mutual consent and the other where the arbitrator is appointed by

this Court. According to the learned counsel, in first situation the principal civil

court can extend the time, however, it can still not substitute the arbitrator for the

reason that the intention of the legislature is clear that it is only this Court that has

been given power in terms of Section 11 of the Act of 1996 to appoint arbitrator

and in the second situation, where arbitrator has been appointed by this Court it is

this Court only which can extend the time and also can substitute the arbitrator.

6.Controverting the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicant,

learned counsel for the respondent submits that in fact Section 29A of the Act was

added by way of an amendment in the year 2016 whereby time limit was

prescribed for making an arbitral award. He submits that Sub-section 4 of Section

29A provides for termination of mandate of the arbitrator on the expiry of the time

limit unless extended by the Court with a further stipulation in terms of Sub-

section 6 to substitute one or all of the arbitrators while considering extension of

time. He further submits that the definition of word "Court" is given in Section

2(1)(e) of the Act, which provides that "Court" means "Principal Civil Court" or

"High Court" having original civil jurisdiction. As such, this Court being not a

court exercising original civil jurisdiction, Section 29A application would not lie

before this Court. He further submits that the phrase 'unless the context otherwise

requires' can be put to use only when the otherwise context is discernible from the

intention of the legislature otherwise in all cases the definition as provided has to

be adhered to. He points out that the definition of the "Court" has been inserted by

way of same amendment Act whereby provision of Section 29A were inserted.

Thus, it is clear that the legislature intentionally and consciously while making

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distinction between the Court under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act with respect to

international commercial arbitration viz-a-viz domestic arbitration did not make

any such distinction for the purposes of Section 29A of the Act. It is thus clear that

the legislature intended that Section 29A application has to be placed before this

principal civil court having jurisdiction and not before this Court. He also submits

that explanation of Section 47 of the Act was also amended by very same

amendment Act of 2016 whereby the meaning of Court was amended to exclude

the principle civil court and to include only High Court, however, no such

explanation was incorporated in Section 29A of the Act. Even though, Section 47

of the Act relates to foreign award. It is thus clear that the intention of the

legislature was to make the definition of Court as is appearing in Section 2(1)(e)

of the Act to be applicable to Section 29A of the Act.

7.Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that by the very same

amendment Act, Section 11 was also amended and the word "Chief Justice" for

any person or institution designated by him were substituted by "Supreme Court

or as the case may be the High Court" or any person or institution designated by

such Court". Thus, while legislature specifically used the word "High Court" in

Section 11 of the Act however it did not do so in Section 29A of the Act. Thus,

this further shows the intention of the legislature that the application under Section

29A should lie before the principal civil court. He would further contend that there

is no absurdity or inconsistency, if by the same statute High Court was conferred

power to appoint arbitrator and the principal civil court was given power to extend

time and substitute the said arbitrator. In fact, this brings consistency to the

arbitration proceedings. In his submission in fact anomaly would arise in a

situation where an arbitrator appointed by the parties or a person or an institution

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while powers under Section 29A of the Act exercised by the High Court. The

jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator is different from jurisdiction to substitute an

arbitrator as both operate in separate fields while an arbitrator is required to be

appointed by the High Courts under Section 11, the power to substitute an

arbitrator under Section 29A comes into picture only when the time limit for

making an arbitral award expires, he further submits, while exercising this power

the Court is not examining the legality of the initial appointment but the conduct

of the arbitrator in the arbitral proceedings and the fact that whether the

continuation of such arbitrator would further delay the proceedings. As such, the

enquiry entailed under Section 29A of the Act is completely different from that

under Section 11(5) or 11(6) of the Act. Thus, there is no infirmity in the two

provisions.

8.Learned counsel would further argue that once the arbitrator is appointed

and proceedings commenced the procedure remains same irrespective of the fact

that whether the arbitrator has been appointed by mutual consent of the parties or

by the High Court or even Supreme Court. In all three cases, the arbitrator is

subject to the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Act and its mandate can

always be terminated in terms of Section 14 and 15 of the Act in the same manner.

He would also submit that even the time limit and procedure contemplated under

Section 29A is also same for arbitrators appointed by any mode. The High Court

does no exercise any supervisory or other control over the arbitrator appointed by

it. As such, both the arbitrators i.e arbitrator appointed by the Court or arbitrator

appointed through mutual consent of the parties have same status.

9.Learned counsel would also contend that the High Court or even the

Supreme Court does not retain any jurisdiction over the arbitrator appointed /

nominated by it and it becomes functious officio after the appointment of the

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arbitrator. As such, if the powers under Section 29A are held to be exercised by

the High Court it would amount to judicial legislation and adding something

which is neither in the statue nor in conformity with the intention of the

legislation. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the respondent has

placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case

of Nimet Resources Inc. & Inr. Vs. S.R. Steel Ltd., 2009 (17) SCC, 313 ; Garhwal

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Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vs. M/s. Krishna Travel Agency, 2008 (6) SCC

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741

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and Chief Engineer (NH PWD) Vs. BSC & C and CJV, 2024 SCC OnLine,

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SC 1801

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and the order dated 22.07.2024 passed in AC No.103/2021 (

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Excel Agri

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Business Private Limited Thr. Director Shri Shantilal Vaid Vs. Resonance

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Eduventures Ltd. and others).

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10.Responding to the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondents,

learned counsel for the applicant in his rejoinder submissions submits that in fact

the definition in Section 2 (e) of the Act has to be construed keeping in mind

opening line of Sub-section 1 which provides 'unless the context otherwise

requires'. He submits that the definition of the Court has to be considered in the

context in which the word being used. In view of the clear mandate of the

legislature that the arbitrator in terms of Section 11 has to be appointed either by

High Court (for domestic arbitration) or by Supreme Court (for international

arbitration). Thus, there is complete absence of any power in the district court to

appoint arbitrator and once original power of appointment of arbitrator is not there

it cannot be presumed that by way of substitution this power can be conferred

upon the district court to appoint arbitrator as it would militate against the

intention of the legislature. He thus submits that the application in the present case

would lie to this Court only because while considering the application the Court

has also to consider that whether substitution of the arbitrator is required or not.

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As such, in all cases the extension of time has to be granted by this Court only and

not by the principal civil court.

11.Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

12.Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 provides as under:-

"2. Definitions. - (1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, -

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(e) "Court" means -

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(i) in the case of an arbitration other than international commercial

arbitration, the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district,

and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil

jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the

subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter

of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to

such principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;

(ii) in the case of international commercial arbitration, the High

Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having

jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the

arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, and in other

cases, a High Court having jurisdiction to hear appeals from decrees of

courts subordinate to that High Court;]

13.As such, as per the definition in ordinary course, a court would mean

"principal civil court" of original jurisdiction having jurisdiction to decide the

question forming the subject matter of the arbitration, had it been a civil suit.

However, this definition is qualified by the words 'unless the context otherwise

requires'. The context in the present case is the appointment of arbitrator which

has been provided in Section 11. The said section provides that a person of any

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nationality may be an arbitrator unless otherwise agreed by the parties and in

terms of Sections 2 and 3, it is the parties who can appoint an arbitrator by a

procedure mutually agreed by them failing which it is either by the Supreme

Court in case of international arbitration or by the High Court in case of domestic

arbitration, who can appoint the arbitrator. It is thus clear that the legislature

intended that in case, the parties fail to appoint arbitrator by mutual consent it is

only High Court or the Supreme Court who can appoint arbitrator. This intention

of the legislature is not only forthcoming from a bare reading of provision of

Section 11 but it is strongly communicated by the express words in the

provisions.

14.After several years of experience the legislature was confronted with the

several aspects of proceedings in the process of resolution by the arbitrator, thus,

it brought the Act No.3 of 2016 for amendment in the provisions of Arbitration

and Conciliation Act, 1996. One of such provision was the time limit for

conclusion of arbitral proceedings which was inserted by way of Section 29A of

the said Amendment Act. While fixing the time limit, the legislature provided that

if within the prescribed time limit, the proceedings by the arbitrator are not

completed then it can be extended. It is at this stage this entire confusion crept in

because the legislature while conferring the power of extension used the word

"Court" in Sub-section 4, 5 and 6. However, it has not been clarified by the

legislature whether the Court would mean principal civil court or High Court who

originally appointed the arbitrator. However, it has to be seen that the mandate in

Sub-section 4 is that if the Court finds that the proceedings have been delayed by

the reasons attributable to the arbitral tribunal then it may order reduction of fees

of arbitrator and also that the arbitrator be given an opportunity of being heard

before the fees is reduced. Sub-section 6 then provides that while extending the

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period referred to in Sub-section 4, it shall be open to the Court to substitute one

or all of the arbitrators. It is thus clear that it is not an act of simply extending time

but the conduct of arbitrator has also to be examined by the Court while extending

time and if in the opinion of the Court, the conduct is such that it requires a

substitution then it can substitute the arbitrator. As such, Section 29A by

implication provides a power to appoint by way of substitution of arbitrator. If we

see the intention of the legislature as stated above it is clear that legislature

intended to confer power of appointing an arbitrator only upon the High Court or

Supreme Court, as the case may be. As such, the phrase "unless the context

otherwise requires" comes into play with all of its vigor. If we hold that Section

29A confers powers upon the principal civil court then it will militate against the

express intention of the legislature in as much as it only intended to confer power

upon the High Court or the Supreme Court to appoint arbitrator.

15.The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the respondents on the case

of Chief Engineer (supra)

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is misplaced for the reason that in fact, the Court was

not considering the interplay between Section 29A and Section 11 of the Act. In

fact, in the said case the facts were completely different. In the said case, the

parties to the agreement by mutual consent appointed an arbitrator. When the

proceedings could not be concluded within the prescribed time an application was

filed before the principal civil court for extension of time which was allowed.

Against this order of extension of time, challenge was raised before the

Meghalaya High Court which upheld the order of principal civil court extending

time. Thus, the matter came before the Hon'ble Apex Court where it was held that

High Court did not commit any error in rejecting the application. As such, the

issue was completely different for the context involved in the said case. It was not

a case where the arbitrator was appointed by High Court and not even the issue of

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substitution of arbitrator. However, in the present case, the facts are markedly

different as the arbitrator has been appointed by this Court.

16.As regards the judgment in the case of Nimet Resources Inc. & Inr.

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(supra),

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the subject matter of the said dispute was not only different, but also it

has also to be kept in mind that this order was passed on 11.05.2007 i.e. well

before the amendment in the provisions of the Act of 1996. The Hon'ble Apex

Court was considering unamended provisions of Section 14 which provided that

"the mandate of an arbitrator shall terminate if". Unamended provisions of Section

14 provided for termination of mandate without any power to substitute arbitrator.

This provision was subsequently amended in the year 2016. As such, the issue

before the Court was not regarding substitution of arbitrator as the same was to be

done by the High Court on an application filed under Section 11 in case the

mandate is terminated. As such, even if mandate was allowed to be terminated in

the said case then also ultimately appointment could have been done afresh only

by the High Court on an application under Section 11. However, in the present

case, the scenario is completely different where not only extension of time but as

per the mandate of Section 29A consideration of substitution of arbitrator while

extending time has also to be done. Significantly, the mandate of section 29A is

not limited to the request of the parties for substitution of Arbitrator but it is, in

fact, duty of the Court while extending time to examine whether substitution is

required or not. As such, the facts of the said case are also different from the facts

of the present case.

17.As regards the issue of

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Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. (supra),

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the facts

of the case are completely different. The issue before the Court was with respect to

setting aside of the arbitral award. As such, the issue of appointment or

10 AC-88-2025NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:37969

substitution of arbitrator was not at all under consideration and as the scheme of

the Act would suggest that the arbitral award has to be set tested by the principal

civil court in terms of Section 34. As such, the said case would also not come to

the rescue of the respondent and has a completely different set of facts.

18.As regards the order passed by this Court in the case of Excel Agri

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Business Private Limited (supra)

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, though this Court rejected the application vide

order dated 22.07.2024, however, later on same Court in the case of M/s Pappu

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Construction Vs. M.P. State Mining Corporation (AC No. 4/2016)

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vide order

dated 25.11.2024 has expressed a contrary view and after considering the case

of Chief Engineer (supra)

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, the Court held that the application under Section 29A is

maintainable before this Court.

19.The Bombay High Court while considering identical issue in the case

of Sheela Chowgule Vs. Vijay

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V. Chowgule 2024 Supreme (Bom)

857 held, after considering the case of Chief Engineer (supra), an application

before the High Court under Section 29A would be maintainable. The Division

Bench in the said case observed thus:

5. Shri Pawan Jhabakh, learned Counsel for the petitioners, insisted that the facts

in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) (supra) be carefully looked into before

forming any opinion. Our attention was invited to the order passed by the learned

Single Judge of the High Court of Meghalaya at Shillong in Chief Engineer (NH)

PWD (Roads) vs. M/s. BSC & C & C JV, 2024 SCC OnLine Megh 284, which

decision was challenged bef0re the Supreme Court in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD

(Roads) (supra). Reference to paragraphs 19 and 20 of the decision of High Court of

Meghalaya in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) (supra) is necessary to understand

the facts. In the case before the Meghalaya High Court, the Arbitrators were not

appointed under Section 11 by the High Court. In that context, the learned Judge

observed that a distinction can be drawn to hold that, if the appointment of the

arbitrator is not by the High Court under Section 11, the Principal Civil Court of

original jurisdiction, which is the Commercial Court at Shillong, East Khasi Hills,

will have the power to entertain an application under Section 29-A for extension of

the terms, as no anomalous situation would arise therefrom. The learned Judge held

that as such, by making use of the expression of Section 2 of the Act, “unless the

context otherwise requires” the textual interpretation will be in tune with the

contextual one. It was then held by the learned Judge that keeping in mind the fact

that the High Court of Meghalaya does not possess original Civil Jurisdiction,

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coupled with the fact that Section 11 nor Section 29-A(6) do not come into play in

the present case, as the arbitrators were not appointed by the High Court, the

Commercial Court, East Khasi Hills, Shillong being the Principal Court or original

jurisdiction will have the jurisdiction to extend the mandate as prescribed under

Section 29-A of the Act.

11. Keeping the aforesaid principles relating to ratio decidendi and law of

binding precedents in mind, we are of the considered opinion that though there is a

discernible ratio decidendi in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs. M/s. BSC & C

and C JV (supra), however, the decision is applicable in the facts of that case and

cannot be treated as binding precedent for the present case. While carefully reading

the order of the Supreme Court in Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs. M/s. BSC

& C and C JV (supra), in the light of the facts that have been narrated in the judgment

of the Meghalaya High Court which we have already referred to herein before, we are

of the humble view that the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be treated as a

binding precedent in the facts of the present case as the Arbitrator was appointed by

the High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act.

21. Chapter III of the Arbitration Act contains provisions relating to composition

of Arbitral Tribunal. Section 11 therein provides for appointment of arbitrators. Sub-

section (2) of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act provides that subject to sub-section

(6), the parties are free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator or

arbitrators. Sub-section (3) deals with the situation where failing any agreement

referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration with three arbitrators, each party shall

appoint one arbitrator and the two appointed arbitrators shall appoint the third

arbitrator who shall act as the Presiding Arbitrator. Sub-section (4) says that if the

appointment procedure in sub-section (3) applies and, (a) a party fails to appoint an

arbitrator within thirty days from the receipt of a request to do so from the other

party; or (b) the two appointed arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within

thirty days from the date of their appointment, the appointment shall be made on an

application of the party, by the High Court, in case of arbitrations other than the

international commercial arbitration, that is for domestic arbitrations. Sub-section (5)

provides that failing any agreement referred to in sub-section (2), in an arbitration

with a sole arbitrator, if the parties fail to agree on the arbitrator within thirty days

from receipt of a request by one party from the other party to so agree, the

appointment shall be made on an application of the party in accordance with the

provisions contained in sub-section(4). It is now significant to notice sub-section (6)

of Section 11 of the Arbitration Act, which provides that where, under an

appointment procedure agreed upon by the parties,- (a) a party fails to act as required

under that procedure; or (b) the parties, or the two appointed arbitrators, fail to reach

an agreement expected of them under that procedure; or (c) a person, including an

institution, fails to perform any function entrusted to him or it under that procedure,

the appointment shall be made, on an application of the party, by the High Court, in

case the arbitrations other than international commercial arbitration to take the

necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides

other means for securing the appointment.

22. Chapter VI of the Arbitration Act, deals with making of arbitral award and

termination of proceedings. Significant in the context of the present case is Section

29-A which provides for time-limit for arbitral award. Sub-section (4) of Section 29-

A stipulates that if the award is not made within the period specified in sub-section

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(1) or the extended period specified under sub-section (3), the mandate of the

arbitrator(s) shall terminate unless the Court has, either prior to or after the expiry of

the period so specified, extended the period. It is also pertinent to note that sub-

section (6) of Section 29-A stipulates that while extending the period referred to in

sub-section (4) it shall be open to the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators

and if one or all of the arbitrators are substituted, the arbitral proceedings shall

continue from the stage already reached and on the basis of the evidence and material

already on record, and the arbitrator(s) appointed under this section shall be deemed

to have received the said evidence and material.

23. If the strictly textual interpretation of Section 2(e)(i) is applied, there would

be no difficulty for us to hold that the Court for the purpose of Section 29-A(4) and

sub-section (6) of the Arbitration Act, would be the principal Civil Court of original

jurisdiction in a district which includes a High Court in exercise of its ordinary

original civil jurisdiction even when the Arbitrator is appointed under Section 11(6)

of the Act. However, we have to consider whether the “Court” means District Court

or the High Court which would mean the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction

or the High Court in the context of the appointment of an Arbitrator made by the

High Court under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act. Section 2(1)(e) of the

Arbitration Act defines “Court”. However, having regard to the purport of Section

2(1) which provides that in this part, unless the context requires, the same will have

to be read in a contextual sense.

28. Section 29-A was inserted in the Act w.e.f. 23.10.2015. Provisions were

thereby made prescribing time limit for arbitral award. The object obviously was to

ensure that the arbitration proceedings are decided expeditiously and within the time

frame prescribed. Sub-section (2) of Section 29A provides for an incentive if the

award is made within the time prescribed. The proviso to sub-section (4) of Section

29A says that while extending the period under this sub-section, if the Court finds

that the proceedings are delayed for reasons attributed to the arbitral tribunal, then it

may order reduction of fees. Sub-section (4) will have to be read together with sub-

section (5) and sub-section (6). As per sub-section (5), the extension under Section

29-A(4) can be granted by the Court on an application by one of the parties and may

be granted only for sufficient cause and on such terms and conditions as may be

imposed by the Court.

29. In the context of sub-section (6) Their Lordships held that the power under

sub-section (6) of Section 29A is only a consequential power vested in the Court

which is empowered to extend the time. If the Court finds that the cause of delay is

one or all of the arbitrators, while extending the time, the Court has power to replace

and substitute the Arbitrator(s). The said power obvi0usly has to be exercised by the

Court which is empowered to extend the time. At this juncture, it is significant to

notice Section 11(2) which provides that subject to sub-section (6), the parties are

free to agree on a procedure for appointing the arbitrator(s). As a result, under sub-

section (6) of Section 11, the appointment shall be made, on an application of the

parties, by the High Court, in case of arbitrations other than international commercial

arbitrations. Even in sub-section (6) it is significant to note that parties’ autonomy is

seen, in that the appointment of arbitrator shall be made by the High Court to take

necessary measure, unless the agreement on the appointment procedure provides

other means for securing the appointment. We need to bear in mind that the parties

are permitted to raise objections/defences before appointment of an arbitrator under

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Section 11(6) and upon considering all relevant factors, the High Court appoints an

Arbitrator(s) under Section 11(6) of the Act. Now in this context if sub-sections (4),

(5) & (6) of Section 29A are read, it would be clear that extension of period is not just

an empty formality. Even when application for extension of period is made, several

consequences may flow while considering the application as it shall even be open to

the Court to substitute one or all of the arbitrators. When the Act provides for a

procedure in Section 11(6) as to how appointment of an Arbitrator shall be made and

as sub-section (2) of Section 11 provides that parties are free to agree on a procedure

for appointing the arbitrator/s, we find it difficult to comprehend as how the power to

substitute an arbitrator would lie with any Court other than the one empowered to

appoint arbitrator/s under Section11(6). It is for this reason that the definition of

‘Court’ cannot be taken strictly in the textual sense but as the provisions of Section 2

ordain, the definition of ‘Court’ will have to be seen in a contextual sense. Thus the

Court empowered under Section 11(6) for an appointment of an arbitrator is the High

Court, we find it inconceivable that for the purpose of sub-section (4) of Section 29A,

when the appointment of the Arbitrator is made by the High Court, the Court would

be any other Court than the one empowered under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration

Act.

30. Having put a mechanism in place by providing a timeline for arbitral award

in the form of Section 29-A, there are several factors to be considered by the Court

before extending the period under sub-section (4) of Section 29A which fall within

the realm of discretionary power of the Court. For one, the extension of the period

may be granted only for sufficient cause and second, on such terms and conditions as

may be imposed by the Court. Then again it shall be open for the Court to substitute

an arbitrator and as the sub-section (6) says that the arbitrator appointed under this

Section shall be deemed to have received the said evidence and material for the

purpose of continuation of the arbitral proceedings from the stage already reached.

The extension of time is therefore not a mere ritual or an empty formality.

Considering the nature of application of mind and the extent of the discretionary

powers conferred on the Court, we have no hesitation in forming an opinion that it

can only be the Court empowered under Section 11(6) which will be the Court for the

purpose of sub-section (4) of Section 29-A in the present case.

20.In the considered view of this Court, it is the context which has to be kept

in mind while interpreting a particular provision of an Act and that is the reason

that the legislature in order to obviate any anomaly while defining the term

"Court" has put the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires". In the present

case, the context in which the term "Court" in Section 29A has been used by the

legislature, requires that it shall be construed as High Court considering the fact

that exercise of powers of extension of time includes examination of conduct of

arbitrator and consequential substitution, if the court is so satisfied and this

substitution is nothing but appointment of an arbitrator and the appointment of

14 AC-88-2025NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:37969

(PAVAN KUMAR DWIVEDI)

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JUDGE

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arbitrator is mandated to be done by the High Court or the Supreme Court as the

case may be. As such, in the considered view of this Court, the application for

extension of time is maintainable.

21. Having held so, now the Court has to advert to the facts of the present case

as already recorded hereinabove. The respondent is not contesting this case on the

conduct of the arbitrator but only a technical objection in view of the term "Court"

used in Section 29A, the objection against maintainability has been raised. As the

Court has held that the application is maintainable and in view of the fact that the

proceedings of arbitration are complete before the arbitrator and only final award

has to be pronounced, this Court is of the considered view that the time of

arbitration proceedings be extended. Thus, the same is hereby extended upto

15.02.2026.

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22. In the above terms, the present application is allowed.

N.R.

15 AC-88-2025NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:37969