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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.2555 OF 2017

(Arising out of SLP(C)No.25760 of 2015)

M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY ........APPELLANT

VERSUS

KHATOONBEE AND ANR. .......RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, CJI

1. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties.

2. The daughter of the respondents died in a motor accident

on 02.02.1977. A claim petition was filed, under Section 166 of

the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as `the 1988

Act'), seeking compensation on account of the motor accident,

wherein the respondents' daughter had died, on 23.02.2005 i.e.,

after a period of more than 28 years. The Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as `the Tribunal') entertained

the above claim. A prayer made to reject the claim petition, for

the reason, that the said claim had been raised 28 years after the

accident in question, was rejected. It is in these circumstances,

that M/s Purohit and Company (the petitioner herein) approached the

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High Court, wherein, the matter was re-adjudicated. Again, a

prayer was made at the hands of the petitioner, that the claim had

been made belatedly, and was not a surviving claim. The High

Court, upheld the justiciability of the claim petition, on the

short ground, that no period of limitation had been provided for

raising a claim for compensation, under the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988. The judgment rendered by the High Court on 07.07.2015, has

been assailed by M/s Purohit & Company through the instant petition

for special leave to appeal.

3. Leave granted.

4. While raising a challenge to the impugned judgment, in

the first instance, a reference was made to Section 110-

A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as `the

1939 Act'), in order to demonstrate, that a period of limitation,

at the time, was provided for, referable to the date when the

accident had taken place. Section 110A aforementioned is being

extracted hereunder:

“110-A. Application for compensation.- (1) An

application for compensation arising out of an

accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1)

of Section 110 may be made-

(a)by the person who has sustained the

injury; or

(aa) by the owner of the property; or

(b) where death has resulted from the

accident, by all or any of the legal

representatives of the deceased; or

(c) by any agent duly authorised by the person

injured or all or any of the legal

representatives of the deceased, as the

case may be:

Provided that where all the legal

representatives of the deceased have not joined in

any such application for compensation, the

application shall be made on behalf of or for the

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benefit of all the legal representatives of the

deceased and the legal representatives who have not

so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the

application.

(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall

be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction

over the area in which the accident occurred, and

shall be in such form and shall contain such

particulars as may be prescribed.

Provided that where any claim for compensation

under Section 92-A is made in such application, the

application shall contain a separate statement to

that effect immediately before the signature of the

applicant;

(3) No application for such compensation shall be

entertained unless it is made within six months of

the occurrence of the accident :

Provided that the Claims Tribunal may

entertain the application after the expiry of the

said period of six months if it is satisfied that the

applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from

making the application in time.”

(emphasis is ours)

A perusal of the provision of Section 110A of the 1939 Act,

extracted above, reveals, that a period of limitation of six

months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was provided

for, to raise a claim for compensation.

5. In the successor legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles

Act, 1988, Section 166(3), as originally enacted, also provided for

limitation of a period of six months for filing a claim petition.

Section 166 aforementioned is extracted hereunder:

“166.Application for compensation.— (1) An application

for compensation arising out of an accident of the

nature specified in sub-section (1) of section 165 may

be made—

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or

(b) by the owner of the property; or

(c) where death has resulted from the accident,

by all or any of the legal representatives of the

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deceased; or

(d) by any agent duly authorised by the person

injured or all or any of the legal

representatives of the deceased, as the case may

be:

Provided that where all the legal

representatives of the deceased have not joined

in any such application for compensation, the

application shall be made on behalf of or for the

benefit of all the legal representatives of the

deceased and the legal representatives who have

not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents

to the application.

(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall

be made, at the option of the claimant, either to

the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the

area in which the accident occurred, or to the

Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose

jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on

business or within the local limits of whose

jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be

in such form and contain such particulars as may

be prescribed:

Provided that where no claim for compensation

under section 140 is made in such application, the

application shall contain a separate statement to

that effect immediately before the signature of

the applicant.

(3)No application for such compensation shall be

entertained unless it is made within six months of

the occurrence of the accident :

Provided that the Claims Tribunal may

entertain the application after the expiry of the

said period of six months but not later than twelve

months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was

prevented by sufficient cause from making the

application in time.

(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of

accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of

section 158 as an application for compensation under

this Act.

(emphasis is ours)

A perusal of the original provision of Section 166 of the 1988 Act,

extracted above reveals, that once again a period of limitation of

six months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was

provided for. However, on this occasion, a bar was introduced for

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entertaining a claim petition, arising out of a motor accident

after twelve months (from the date of occurrence of the accident).

Obviously, the period of limitation provided for through Section

166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be relaxed upto twelve months, by

demonstrating that there was sufficient cause for such delay.

6. It would however, be pertinent to mention, that the

period of limitation provided under Section 166(3) aforementioned

was completely done away with, with effect from 14.11.1994, as

Section 166(3) came to be deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act,

1988. The question which has arisen for consideration, in the

instant appeal, is the consequence of the omission of sub-Section

(3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act. Does the above omission have

the effect of allowing a claimant, to file a claim application, at

any time, and whenever he chooses? Even after a decade!

7. The contention of the respondents-claimants to overcome

the period of limitation was based on two judgments. Firstly, it is

based on the judgment in Dhannalal vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya, (1996) 4

SCC 652, wherein, this Court had held as under:

“7.In this background, now it has to be examined

as to what is the effect of omission of sub-section

(3) of Section 166 of the Act. From the

Amending Act it does not appear that the said

sub-section (3)has been deleted

retrospectively. But at the sametime, there is

nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit

of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is

not to be extended to pending claim petitions where

a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect

of deletion of sub-section (3) from Section 166

of the Act can be tested by an illustration.

Suppose an accident had taken place two years

before 14.11.1994 when sub-section (3) was omitted

from Section 166. For one reason or the other no

claim petition had been filed by the victim or the

heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim

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petition be not filed after 14.11.1994 in

respect of such accident? Whether a claim

petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by

the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying

that the period of twelve months which had

been prescribed when sub-section (3) of Section

166 was in force having expired the right to

prefer the claim petition had been extinguished

and shall not be revived after deletion of

sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f.

14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be

in negative. When sub-section (3) of Section 166

has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to

entertain a claim petition without taking note

of the date on which such accident had taken

place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out

on the ground that such claim petitions were barred

by time when sub-section (3) of Section 166

was in force. It need not be impressed that

Parliament from time to time has introduced

amendments in the old Act as well as in the

new Act in order to protect the interests of the

victims of the accidents and their heirs if the

victims die. One such amendment has been introduced

in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act

54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of

Section 158 which provides:

"158. (6)As soon as any information

regarding any accident involving

death or bodily injury to any

person is recorded or report under

this section is completed by a

police officer, the officer in

charge of the police station

shall forward a copy of the same

within thirty days from the date of

recording of information or, as the

case may be, on completion of such

report to the Claims Tribunal

having jurisdiction and a copy

thereof to the concerned insurer

and where a copy is made available

to the owner, he shall also within

thirty days of receipt of such

report, forward the same to such

Claims Tribunal and Insurer."

In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of

the Act the officer in-charge of the police

station is enjoined to forward a copy of

information/report regarding the accident to the

Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has

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also to be forwarded to the insurer concerned. it

also requires that where a copy is made

available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall

within thirty days of receipt of such copy forward

the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer. In

this background, the deletion of sub-section (3)

from Section 166 should be given full effect so

that the object of deletion of the said section by

Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the

accident or heirs of the deceased victim can

prefer claim for compensation although not

being preferred earlier because of the expiry

of the period of limitation prescribed, how the

victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be

in a worse position if the question of condonation

of delay in filing the claim petition is

pending either before the Tribunal, the High

Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is

one such case. The appellant has been

pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court.

His right to get compensation in connection

with the accident in question is being resisted by

the respondents on the ground of delay in filling

the same. If he had not filed any petition for

claim till 14.11.1994 in respect of the accident

which took place on 4.12.1990, view of the

Amending Act he became entitled to file such

claim petition, the period of limitation having

been deleted, the claim petition which has been

filed and is being pursued upto this Court

cannot be thrown out on the ground of limitation.”

(emphasis is ours)

The second judgment on which reliance was placed, was The New India

Assurance Co.Ltd. vs. C.Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713, wherein also, the

matter was adjudicated on the same lines by observing as under:

“10.The ratio laid down in Dhannalal's case

(supra) applies with full force to the facts of the

present case. When the claim petition was filed

sub-section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted.

Thus, the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim

petition without taking note of the date on which

the accident took place . Faced with this situation,

Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal's case does not

consider Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act and

therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable

to accept the submission. Section 6-A of the General

Clauses Act, undoubtedly, provides that the repeal

of a provision will not affect the continuance of

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the enactment so repealed and in operation at the

time of repeal. However, this is subject to "unless

a different intention appears" . In Dhannalal's case

the reason for the deletion of sub-section (3) of

Section 166 has been set out. It is noted that

Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury

caused to heirs and legal representatives of the

victims of accidents if the claim petition was

rejected only on the ground of limitation. Thus

"the different intention" clearly appears and

Section 6A of the General Clauses Act would not

apply.

11.Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant,

has placed reliance on the decision rendered by this

Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. National Insurance

Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156. The facts of that case

were that the appellant was injured in an accident,

which took place on 22.1.1989. The claim petition

of the appellant was filed on 15.3.1990 with a

prayer for condonation of delay. The Tribunal held

that in view of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of

the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into force on

1.7.1989, the delay of more than six months could

not be condoned. In the facts and circumstances of

that case this Court held that the case of the

appellant was covered by the new Act and the delay

for a longer period than six months could not be

condoned. In our view, the facts of the case in

Vinod Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts

of the present case, as noticed above.

12. The learned counsel for the appellant, next

contended that since no period of limitation has

been prescribed by the legislature, Article 137 of

the Limitation Act may be invoked, otherwise,

according to him, stale claims would be encouraged

leading to multiplicity of litigation for

non-prescribing the period of limitation. We are

unable to countenance the contention of the

appellant for more than one reason. Firstly, such

an Act like the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial

legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims

or their families, if otherwise the claim is found

genuine. Secondly, it is a self contained Act which

prescribes the mode of filing the application,

procedure to be followed and award to be made. The

Parliament, in its wisdom, realised the grave

injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and

legal representatives of the victims who suffer

bodily injuries/die in accidents, by rejecting their

claim petitions at the threshold on the ground of

limitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of

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Section 166, which provided the period of limitation

for filing the claim petitions and this being the

intendment of the legislature to give effective

relief to the victims and the families of the motor

accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the

limitation, invoking of Article 137 of the

Limitation Act would defeat the intendment of the

Legislature.”

(emphasis is ours)

Based on the aforesaid determination rendered by this Court, the

High Court, by its impugned order dated 07.07.2015, arrived at the

conclusion, that there being no period of limitation at the

juncture, when the claim petition was filed on 23.02.2005, the same

could not have been rejected, merely for reason of delay.

8. Dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the High

Court on 07.07.2015, M/s Purohit and Company has approached this

Court, by filing the instant appeal.

9. The solitary contention advanced at the hands of the

learned counsel for the appellant was, that even though there may

no longer be a defined period of limitation, for approaching the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation

(under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), yet a

claimant must approach a Court, for raising such a claim within a

reasonable time. It was submitted, that after a period of time, the

claim would be stale and will have to be treated as a dead claim.

Such a claim, it was submitted, could not be treated as a surviving

claim. To demonstrate situations when an accident's claim would no

longer be considered to be a surviving claim, illustratively it was

submitted, that in a given case when the evidence to establish the

rival claims, would not be available, for the mere reason of lapse

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of time. Either, the witnesses would not be available, or

accessible, on account of lapse of time, resulting in lapse of

memory and a situation in which truthful evidence can no longer be

recorded. The contention was, that in such background, it was

imperative for the concerned Court, to determine whether, in the

facts and circumstances of a particular case, the claim could be

considered as a surviving claim, on the date when the claim

petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.

10. In support of the contention advanced at the hands of the

learned counsel for the appellant, as has been noticed in the

foregoing paragraph, learned counsel invited our attention to

Corporation Bank vs. Navin J.Shah, (2000) 2 SCC 628, wherein a

claim for compensation had been raised under the Consumer

Protection Act, 1986, wherein also, there was no period of

limitation prescribed (at the time, when the claim was raised).

Dealing with the question in hand, this Court had recorded the

following observations:

“12.We may further notice that there is

another strong reason as to why the claim made by

the respondent should not have been granted. The

transactions in question took place in the years

1979 and 1981. The difficulties in realisation

of the amounts due from the consignee also became

clear at the time when the claim was made before

the Corporation and the claim had been made as

early as on 19-12-1982. The petition before the

Commission was filed on 25-9-1992 that is clearly

a decade after a claim had been made before the

Corporation. A claim could not have been filed by

the respondent at this distance of time. Indeed at

the relevant time there was no period of

limitation under the Consumer Protection Act to

prefer a claim before the Commission but

that does not mean that the claim could be made

even after an unreasonably long delay. The

Commission has rejected this contention by a

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wholly wrong approach in taking into

consideration that the foreign exchange payable

to ReserveBank of India was still due and,

therefore, the claim is alive. The claim of the

respondent is from the Bank. At any rate, as

stated earlier, when the claim was made for

indemnifying the losses suffered from the

Corporation, it was clear to the parties about the

futility of awaiting any longer for collecting

such amounts from the foreign bank. In those

circumstances, the claim, if at all was to be

made, ought to have been made within a reasonable

time thereafter. What is reasonable time to lay

a claim depends upon the facts of each case. In

the legislative wisdom, three years' period has

been prescribed as the reasonable time under the

Limitation Act to lay a claim for money. We

think,that period should be the appropriate

standard adopted for computing reasonable time

to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. For

this reason also we find that the claim made by

the respondent ought to have been rejected by the

Commission.”

(emphasis is ours)

It would be pertinent to mention, that the claim raised under the

Consumer Protection Act, in the above judgment, was delayed by a

period of 10 years, and even though, no period of limitation was

prescribed, this Court held, that the same was not maintainable.

11. Reliance was also placed on Haryana State Coop. Land

Development Bank Vs. Neelam (2005) 5 SCC 91, wherein, this Court

held as under:

“17.In Nedungadi Bank Ltd.(2001) 6 SCC 222, a

Bench of this Court, where S.Saghir Ahmad was a

member [His Lordship was also a member in Ajaib

Singh (supra), opined : (SCC pp.459-60, para 6)

"6. Law does not prescribe any

time-limit for the appropriate

Government to exercise its powers

under Section 10 of the Act. It is not

that this power can be exercised at

any point of time and to revive

matters which had since been settled.

Power is to be exercised reasonably

and in a rational manner. There

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appears to us to be no rational basis

on which the Central Government has

exercised powers in this case after a

lapse of about seven years of the

order dismissing the respondent from

service. At the time reference was

made no industrial dispute existed or

could be even said to have been

apprehended. A dispute which is stale

could not be the subject-matter of

reference under Section 10 of the Act.

As to when a dispute can be said to be

stale would depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. When the

matter has become final, it appears to

us to be rather incongruous that the

reference be made under Section 10 of

the Act in the circumstances like the

present one. In fact it could be said

that there was no dispute pending at

the time when the reference in

question was made."

18.It is trite that the courts and tribunals

having plenary jurisdiction have discretionary

power to grant an appropriate relief to the

parties. The aim and object of the Industrial

Disputes Act may be to impart social justice to the

workman but the same by itself would not mean that

irrespective of his conduct a workman would

automatically be entitled to relief. The

procedural laws like estoppel, waiver and

acquiescence are equally applicable to the

industrial proceedings. A person in certain

situation may even be held to be bound by the

doctrine of acceptance sub silentio. The respondent

herein did not raise any industrial dispute

questioning the termination of her services within

a reasonable time. She even accepted an alternative

employment and has been continuing therein from

10.8.1988. In her replication filed before the

Presiding Officer of the Labour Court while

traversing the plea raised by the appellant herein

that she is gainfully employed in HUDA with effect

from 10.8.1988 and her services had been

regularized therein, it was averred :

"6. The applicant workman had already

given replication to the A.L.C.-cum-

Conciliation Officer, stating therein

that she was engaged by HUDA from

10.8.1988 as clerk-cum-typist on daily

wage basis. The applicant workman has

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the right to come to the service of the

management and she is interested to join

them."

19.She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that

she had been regularly employed or her services had

been regularized. She merely exercised her right

to join the service of the appellant.

20.It is true that the respondent had filed a

writ petition within a period of three years but

indisputably the same was filed only after the

other workmen obtained the same relief from the

Labour Court in a reference made in that behalf by

the State. Evidently in the writ petition she was

not in a position to establish her legal right so

as to obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus

directing the appellant herein to reinstate her in

service. She was advised to withdraw the writ

petition presumably because she would not have

obtained any relief in the said proceeding. Even

the High Court could have dismissed the writ

petition on the ground of delay or could have

otherwise refused to exercise its discretionary

jurisdiction. The conduct of the respondent in

approaching the Labour Court after more than seven

years had, therefore, been considered to be a

relevant factor by the Labour Court for refusing to

grant any relief to her. Such a consideration on

the part of the Labour Court cannot be said to be

an irrelevant one. The Labour Court in the

aforementioned situation cannot be said to have

exercised its discretionary jurisdiction

injudiciously, arbitrarily and capriciously

warranting interference at the hands of the High

Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution.

21.The matter might have been different had the

respondent been appointed by the appellant in a

permanent vacancy.

22.Both HUDA and the appellant are statutory

organizations. The service of the respondent with

the Appellant was an ad hoc one. She served the

appellant only for a period of one year three

months; whereas she had been serving HUDA for more

than sixteen years. Even if she is directed to be

reinstated in the services of the appellant without

back wages as was directed by the High Court, the

same would remain an ad hoc one and, thus, her

services can be terminated upon compliance of the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is

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also relevant to note that there may or may not now

be any regular vacancy with the appellant-Bank. We

have noticed hereinbefore that in the year 1996,

the vacancies had been filled up and a third party

right had been created. It has not been pointed

out to us that there exists a vacancy. Having

considered the equities between the parties, we are

of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the

High Court should have interfered with the

discretionary jurisdiction exercised by the Labour

Court.

23.For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned

judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside

accordingly. This appeal is allowed. However, in

the facts and circumstances of the case, there

shall be no order as to costs.”

(emphasis is ours)

It would be relevant to mention, that the above judgment was

rendered in a matter, where the challenge was raised under the

provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wherein also no

period of limitation is prescribed to approach the Industrial

Tribunal. Despite the above, this Court arrived at the conclusion,

that a claim raised after a period of 7 years, was not a surviving

claim. And therefore, the claim petition was held to be not

maintainable.

12. Drawing an analogy to the judgments rendered under the

Consumer Protection Act, 1986, as also, under the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947, it was the submission of the learned counsel

for the appellant, that even though no period of limitation remains

prescribed, after the amendment of Section 166 of the Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988, whereby sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to

be deleted (with effect from 14.11.1994), yet it would be

imperative to determine, whether at the juncture when the claimant

approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, the claim was a live

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and surviving claim.

13. We are satisfied, that the submission advanced at the

hands of the learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance.

The judgments on which the High Court had relied, and on which the

respondents have emphasised, in our considered view, are not an

impediment, to the acceptance of the submission canvassed on behalf

of the appellant. We say so, because in Dhannalal's case (supra)

the question of inordinate delay in approaching the Motor Accident

Claims Tribunal, was not considered. In the second judgment in

C.Padma's case (supra), it was considered. And in the C.Padma's

case, the first conclusion drawn in paragraph 12 was “... if

otherwise the claim is found genuine...”. We are of the considered

view, that a claim raised before the Motor Accident Claims

Tribunal, can be considered to be genuine, so long as it is a live

and surviving claim. We are satisfied in accepting the declared

position of law, expressed in the judgments relied upon by the

learned counsel for the appellant. It is not as if, it can be open

to all and sundry, to approach a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, to

raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture, after the accident

had taken place. The individual concerned, must approach the

Tribunal within a reasonable time.

14. The question of reasonability would naturally depend on

the facts and circumstances of each case. We are however,

satisfied, that a delay of 28 years, even without reference to any

other fact, cannot be considered as a prima facie reasonable

period, for approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The

only justification indicated by the respondents, for initiating

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proceedings after a lapse of 28 years, emerges from paragraph 4,

contained in the application for condonation of delay, filed by the

claimants, before the Tribunal. Paragraph 4 aforementioned is

extracted hereunder:

“4.That the Petitioners are poor person and

they have no knowledge about the Law. Also the

Respondent has not pay the single pie towards any

compensation.”

15. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the

justification expressed at the behest of the respondents, for

approaching the Tribunal, after a period of 28 years, we are of the

view, that the explanation tendered, cannot be accepted.

Undoubtedly, the claim (pertaining to an accident which had

occurred on 02.02.1977), in the facts and circumstances of the

instant case, was stale, and ought to have been treated as a dead

claim, at the point of time, when the respondents approached the

Tribunal by filing a claim petition, on 23.02.2005.

16. In view of the reasons recorded hereinabove, we hereby

set aside the impugned order dated 07.07.2015, and allow the

instant appeal, by holding, that the claim raised by the

respondents before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, was not a

surviving claim, when the respondents approached the said Tribunal.

17. Before concluding this order, it is relevant to notice,

that by a motion bench order dated 14.09.2015, the appellant herein

was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation

expenses, payable to the respondents. The aforesaid deposit was

actually made (as has been noticed, in the motion bench order,

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dated 12.07.2016). Since the deposit was made, and was payable to

the respondents, we consider it just and appropriate, in the facts

and circumstances of this case, to direct the Registry of this

Court, to transmit the aforesaid amount of Rs.25,000/- to the

respondents, by way of a cheque, drawn in the name of respondent

No.1.

.........................CJI.

(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)

.........................J.

(N.V.RAMANA)

..........................J.

(Dr.D.Y.CHANDRACHUD)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 9, 2017.