Tender evaluation, Judicial review, Contractual matters, Quality and Cost Building System, Arbitrariness, Article 14, Supreme Court, High Court, Letter of Award, Bid evaluation
 25 Mar, 2026
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M/s. Steag Energy Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Gspc Pipavav Power Company Ltd. & Ors.

  Supreme Court Of India 2026 INSC 295
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Case Background

As per case facts, GPPC floated a tender for a power plant's operation and maintenance based on a Quality and Cost Building System. The appellant was initially declared the successful ...

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Document Text Version

2026 INSC 295 Page 1 of 17

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2026 ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO(S). 30209-30210 OF 2025

M/S. STEAG ENERGY SERVICES

(INDIA) PVT. LTD. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GSPC PIPAVAV POWER COMPANY LTD.

(GPPC) & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of the judgment and order passed by the

High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Special Civil Application No. 7289

of 2025 and Special Civil Application No. 12328 of 2025.

3. Facts leading to filing of these appeals lie in a narrow compass. The

first respondent GSPC PIPV AV Power Company Limited, (hereinafter

referred to as GPPC) commissioned in the year 2013-2014 a gas based

combined cycle power plant of 702.86 MW. In January 2025, GPPC

floated a public tender inviting bids for operation and maintenance of the

combined cycle power plants for an initial period of 5 years.

Page 2 of 17

4. The tender was based on Quality and C ost Building System (QCBS)

in which weightage is given to quality as well as cost for the purpose of

evaluation and grant of tender. Quality quotient would consider the

technical strength/evaluation of the bidders wherein the financial

capability of the bidder is taken into account as per the tender terms. The

cost quotient considers the cost of the owner for hiring i.e. the financial bid

submitted by the bidder. The weightage is 70% to the technical evaluation

and 30% to the cost evaluation. The terms of the tender relating to

evaluation of bids and award of contract is contained in clause 20.2 of the

tender document.

5. It is necessary to reproduce clause 20 to the extent that it is relevant

for our consideration:

“20.0 EVALUATION OF BIDS AND AWARD OF CONTRACT

20.1 The Contract will be awarded to the competitive responsive

Bidder, with most optimized evaluated price, for five years,

offering the technically acceptable Bid in conformity with the

requirements of this enquiry specification. A responsive Bid is

one which accepts all terms and conditions of these

specifications and documents without any modifications. A

modification is one which affects in any way the prices, quality,

quantity of the Works or which limits in any way the

responsibilities or liabilities of the Bidder or any rights of the

Owner as required in these specifications. The decision of Owner

is final in this regard.

20.2. i) Evaluation of offer/ proposal shall be done on Quality and

Cost Based System (QCBS) wherein the Technical Score i.e.

Marks Given During Unpriced Technical Bid Evaluation will be

allotted weightage of 70 % and the price proposal will be allotted

weightage of 30% as Mentioned below:

Page 3 of 17

A combined "Score (S)" will be arrived at after considering

weightages 30% for price bid and 70% for technical scores,

according to the following methodology.

S= (St X Tw) + (Sf X Fw)

Where S = Total Score

St = combined technical score (Total marks scored as per

evaluation methodology)

Sf = Combined financial score = 100 x Fm/F

Fm = Lowest Cost

F = Price Bid of the bidder of whom Sf is to be calculated

Tw = W eight assigned to technical score i.e. 70% or 0.70

Fw = Weight assigned to financial score i.e. 30% or 0.30

The successful bidder will be the one who has highest score (S).

ii) Evaluation Technical scores (St): (Allocation of marks against

each parameter shall be as per the marks defined for each

parameter and Pro- Rata calculation wherever mentioned in the

table given below.

S.No. Parameter Maximum

Marks allotted

Documents to be attached

as an evidence to

substantiate the claim

B Technical Experience of

the bidder

3 Experience of planning

and supervising of

Major Overhaul, HGPI

and CI of 1 (one) GT

(GAS Turbine of ISO

rating more than 100

MW.

Major Overhaul =

maximum 5 marks

individual

HGPI = maximum 3

marks individual

CI = maximum 2 marks

individual

10 Bidder shall submit copy of

work orders/execution

orders and relevant

completion/execution

certificate and complete

details of work issued by the client duly certified by

notary public. Bidder has

to submit the details of

orders executed in last

seven years duly certified

by notary public.

4 Operation and

Maintenance of Sea

water system

experience for any one

plant for a period of 3

5 Bidder shall submit copy of

work orders/execution

orders and relevant

completion/execution

certificate and complete

Page 4 of 17

years during the last 7

years.

details of work issued by

the client duly certified by

notary public. Bidder has

to submit the details of

orders executed in last

seven years duly certified

by notary public

iii. Bids from all the bidders shall be evaluated and point/mark

shall be allocated based on the documents submitted by the

bidders. Individual points/marks given for each criteria shall be

summed up to arrive at the total score/mark of each bidder.

iv. Proposals from bidders who meet the techno- commercial

qualification criteria (based on the Bid Evaluation Criteria) as

defined in the tender documents and achieve as minimum

technical score (St) of 60 marks in the quality technical

parameters will be considered for further evaluation. The price

bids will only be opened for those bidders who meet the above

criteria.

v. After opening of priced bids of all qualified bidders, the bidder

with the lowest cost (Fm) shall be given financial score (Sf) of

100 points. The relative financial score of other bidders shall be

computed as per the formulae given above.

vi. The total score of the bidder shall be obtained by weighting

the combined quality/technical scores and cost scores and

adding them as follows.

S = (St x Tw) + (Sf x Fw)

22.0 Award Criteria

22.1 GPPC will award the Contract to the Bidder whose Bid has

been determined to be fully responsive to the bidding documents

and evaluated as per the Bid evaluation criteria specified in this

tender”

6. On 23.01.2025 a pre-bid meeting was held. The writ petitioner did

not participate in the same. Subsequently, we are informed that the writ

petitioner neither raised any pre-bid queries nor expressed any concern

Page 5 of 17

about the evaluation method and proceeded to issue the Declaration of

Unconditional Offer (DUO) dated 04.04.2025.

7. The bid document contemplated a three-stage bid evaluation

namely (i) Preliminary Evaluation of Bid (ii) Evaluation of Technical Bid

and (iii) Pre-Bid . Out of 4 bids that were submitted, 3 bidders qualified.

They are the appellant, O&M Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to

as the writ petitioner ) and another party. On evaluation while the writ

petitioner got a score of 8 out of 10 marks with respect to technical

experience, the appellant scored 10 out of 10 on this count. Finally, while

the writ petitioner got a total score of 93 out of 100 in the technical

evaluation, the appellant scored 95 of 100. the consultant Fichtner

Consulting Engineers India Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as

Fichtner) also, evaluated the price bid of all 3 technically qualified bidders

as per the price bid evaluation report, in which the writ petitioner got a

score of 95.09989831 and the appellant scored 95.4978453. After

following the evaluation, the appellant was declared as the successful

bidder.

8. The GPPC was anxious to execute the contract as the existing

terms of contract was coming to an end in June. They felt it was necessary

to award the contract to the successful bidder in a timely manner so that

the necessary handover/takeover can take place before 30

th

of June 2025.

Page 6 of 17

The tender document itself provided the schedule of mobilisation in

Schedule D so that there could be a gradual and smooth take over and

the new contractor deploys its staff and get acquainted with operation of

plant and machinery for its maintenance. It was felt that for proper

operation and maintenance of the plant and machinery, skilled personnel

must be posted expeditiously so that they acquaint themselves before the

operations commence.

9. The Board of Directors of GPPC in their 81

st

Board meeting dated

05.05.2025 resolved to award the contract to the successful bidder, the

appellant herein. GPPC thus issued the LOA on 09.06.2025 to the

appellant. The appellant is also said to have accepted the offer.

10. At this stage, it may be relevant to refer to clause 20.04 and 20.05

of the tender document which relates to grant of LOA which is as under:

“ 20.4 Once the contract is awarded, the manpower requirement

as agreed shall be considered fixed as proposed in Form AA and

considered a guarantee by O&M Contractor that he will fulfil his

obligations fully under the contract. No reduction in manpower

shall be subsequently allowed any increase manpower becoming

necessary by the O&M Contractor to fulfil his obligations shall be

at his cost and risk.

20.5. After selection, a Letter of Intent (“LOl") shall be released

by the Owner to the selected Bidders. And one wee k time shall

be given for acceptance. Letter of Acceptance ( "LOA") by the

Bidder must be submitted within the stipulated period. No delay

shall be permitted, and in the event acceptance is not received

by stipulated date, the Bid Security of such Bidder shall be

appropriated by the Owner as mutually agreed genuine pre-

estimated compensation of damage suffered by the Owner on

Page 7 of 17

account thereof, and the next eligible lowest Bidder may be

considered. ”

11. We are also informed that pursuant to the grant of LOA, the

appellant mobilised its manpower and machinery and took over the plant

and commenced work. Further, on 01.07.2025, even the formal contract

is said to have been executed between GPPC and the appellant.

12. In the meanwhile, the writ petitioner approached the High Court by

filing a writ petition initially challenging the tender evaluation process as

arbitrary

1

and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. After GPPC issued

LOA in favour of the appellant, the writ petitioner sought amendment of

the original Prayer by substituting prayer ‘C’ for quashing of the LOA

2

.

1

The petitioner, therefore, prays that –

A) Your Lordships be pleased to admit and allow petition;

B) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and

setting aside the tender evaluation process as being arbitrary, unreasonable, against the Tender

and CVC Guidelines as well as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

C) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to Respondent

NO. 1 to call for a fresh tender removing the financial price restriction and conduct a fresh, fair,

and transparent evaluation process as per the Tender and CVC Guidelines.

D) In the alternative, issue an appropriate writ, order or direction, to call the evaluation records to

ensure that no manipulation has happened in the technical marks scoring after disclosure of

the financial proposals.

E) Pending Admission, Final hearing and Disposal of this Petition Restrain the Respondent No. 1

and its agents or employees from issuing a Letter of Award (LOA) or entering into any contract

with any party pursuant to and pertaining to the impugned Tender No.

GPPC/COM/CCPP?O&M/2024- 25/12, until the final disposal of this petition.

F) Your Lordship may be please to pass any other orders that may be deemed fit and proper, in

interest of justice and equity.

2

C. Your Lordships may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting

aside the Letter of Intent/Letter of Award dated 9

th

June 2025 issued to respondent no. 3 i.e. Steag

Energy Services (India) Pvt Ltd. by respondent no. 1 i.e. GSPC PIPAVAV Power Company Limited

(GPPC) and direct the Respondent No. 1 to issue the LOI to the petitioner as the successful bidder.

Page 8 of 17

13. Pending disposal of the writ petition, the Court directed GPPC to

have the technical bid re-evaluated by its consultant, Fichtner and submit

a report on the allocation of marks after hearing all the parties. While there

was no stay of the contract executed in favour of the appellant, the Court

ordered that it shall be subject to further orders of the Court.

14. Pursuant to the directions of the Court, GPPC filed an affidavit,

placing on record the report of the consultant dated 14.08.2025.

Paragraph 2.2.1 of the report submitted by the consultant is as follows:

“ 2.2.1 … STEAG will be allotted 8 marks out of 10 towards item

3 of Clause 20.2B. The marks allotted is based on Experience of

planning and supervising of two (2) numbers of HGPI and one

(1) number of Cl during the period of last seven (7) years i.e. from

01.01.2018 to 31.12.2024. The earlier allotted marks to STEAG

was 10 and during the re- evaluation it is found that one (1) out of

three (3) numbers of HGPI earlier claimed by STEAG is carried

out beyond the evaluation period which was not evident in the

document earlier submitted by STEAG.”

15. It is evident from the record that the appellant was initially allocated

10 out of 10 marks for item no. 3 of clause 20.2(1)(B) relatable to

“Experience of Planning and Supervising of Major Overhaul, HGPI and CI

of 1 (one) GT (Gas Turbine of ISO rating more than 100 MW). However,

this marks stood revised to 8 marks. Consequently, the status of the two

competing bidders, the appellant and the writ petitioner, was altered,

resulting in a tie between them. This is because with reduction of 2 marks

Page 9 of 17

under 20.2(1)(B) the two competing bidders achieved the technical score

of 93.

16. On the basis of the report submitted by the consultant, the High

Court simply proceeded to evaluate and determine the competing claims

of the appellant and the writ petitioner. For this purpose, the following

comparative chart was reproduced in the High Court order;

S.No Bidder

Name

Technical Score

(St)

Price

Quoted (F)

S = (St.Xtw)+(SfXFw)

1. OMS 93 196555668 95.09989831

2. STEAG 93 196569120 95.0978453

17. When the technical score of the appellant and the writ petitioner

stood at 93 each, the High Court examined the prices quoted by the writ

petitioner and the appellant being Rs. 19,65,55,668 and Rs.19,65,69,120

respectively. Solely based on the marginal difference in the price, the High

Court allowed the writ petition, quashed and set aside the LOA and

contract awarded to the appellant. It directed the GPPC to proceed further

and award the contract to the writ petitioner. For achieving this purpose,

the High Court relied on 20.2 (vi) which provided that “The bidder with the

highest total score (S) shall be considered for award of job.”

18. The High Court’s decision clearly indicates that there is no

arbitrariness or illegality in the actions taken by the owner “GPPC” or its

Page 10 of 17

consultant in fact the High Court records that the total score of the writ

petitioner is marginally higher and also that the difference in miniscule.

The relevant portion of the High Court’s Order is as follows:

“47. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the total score

"S" of the petitioner - O & M is marginally higher than that of the

respondent No.3, though the difference i s minuscule, being

95.09989831 as against 95.0978453 i .e. the difference of

0.00205301, this Court cannot ignore the conditions of Clause

(VI) and validate the contract awarded to the respondent No.3-

STEAG. The recitals of the bid document do not permit the

course suggested by respondent No.3- STEAG of matching the

price bid by reduction.”

19. Mr. D.V.S. Somayajulu, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf

of the appellant, relied on the decision of this Court in Afcons

Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd.

3

to submit that the

High Court committed a serious error in interfering with the decision,

particularly when the difference between the appellant and the writ

petitioner is marginally higher. The relevant portions of this precedent are

as follows:

“11. Recently, in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL- SML (Joint

Venture Consortium) [Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL- SML (Joint

Venture Consortium), (2016) 8 SCC 622 : (2016) 4 SCC (Civ)

106 : (2016) 8 Scale 99] it was held by this Court, relying on a

host of decisions that the decision- making process of the

employer or owner of the project in accepting or rejecting the bid

of a tenderer should not be interfered with. Interference is

permissible only if the decision- making process is mala fide or is

intended to favour someone. Similarly, the decision should not be

interfered with unless the decision is so arbitrary or irrational that

the Court could say that the decision is one which no responsible

3

(2016) 16 SCC 818

Page 11 of 17

authority acting reasonably and in accordance with law could

have reached. In other words, the decision- making process or

the decision should be perverse and not merely faulty or incorrect

or erroneous. No such extreme case was made out by GYT-TPL

JV in the High Court or before us.

(…)

13. In other words, a mere disagreement with the decision-

making process or the decision of the administrative authority is

no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of

mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness,

irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional

court interferes with the decision- making process or the

decision.”

20. In similar circumstances, while considering the scope of judicial

review, this Court in Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd,

4

expressed a word of

caution emphasising that judicial review should be confined to ensuring

that there is no arbitrariness or mala fide in the process of evaluation. The

relevant portions of the judgement are reproduced below:

“26. We respectfully concur with the aforesaid statement of law.

We have reasons to do so. In the present scenario, tenders are

floated and offers are invited for highly complex technical

subjects. It requires understanding and appreciation of the nature

of work and the purpose it is going to serve. It is common

knowledge in the competitive commercial field that technical bids

pursuant to the notice inviting tenders are scrutinized by the

technical experts and sometimes third party assistance from

those unconnected with the owner’s organization is taken. This

ensures objectivity. Bidder’s expertise and technical capability

and capacity must be assessed by the experts. In the matters of

financial assessment, consultants are appointed. It is because to

check and ascertain that technical ability and the financial

feasibility have sanguinity and are workable and realistic. There

is a multi- prong complex approach; highly technical in nature.

The tenders where public largesse is put to auction stand on a

different compartment. Tender with which we are concerned, is

not comparable to any scheme for allotment. This arena which

we have referred requires technical expertise. Parameters

4

(2016) 15 SCC 272

Page 12 of 17

applied are different. Its aim is to achieve high degree of

perfection in execution and adherence to the time schedule. But,

that does not mean, these tenders will escape scrutiny of judicial

review. Exercise of power of judicial review would be called for if

the approach is arbitrary or malafide or procedure adopted is

meant to favour one. The decision making process should clearly

show that the said maladies are kept at bay. But where a decision

is taken that is manifestly in Page 29 29 consonance with the

language of the tender document or subserves the purpose for

which the tender is floated, the court should follow the principle

of restraint. Technical evaluation or comparison by the court

would be impermissible. The principle that is applied to scan and

understand an ordinary instrument relatable to contract in other

spheres has to be treated differently than interpreting and

appreciating tender documents relating to technical works and

projects requiring special skills. The owner should be allowed to

carry out the purpose and there has to be allowance of free play

in the joints.”

21. The emphasis in the above referred decision is on two principles,

the first being the principle of restraint in judicial review of contractual

matters and the second being the freedom of contract permit ting

allowance of free play in the joints .

22. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel supporting the

decision of the High Court raised an important point that as tender

mandates a maximum and a minimum benchmark within which tenderers

could bid, the difference in the price would naturally be marginal. She

would submit that it is therefore compelling, rather inevitable that

difference in the price of competing bidders will be very less. This is true ,

particularly when highly competitive bidding takes place. However, the

judicial solution for such problems arising out of the fierce competition

Page 13 of 17

between competing bidders is not to be found in the mathematical

precision or application of rigid formulae. While scrutinizing the process

by which evaluation is undertaken, courts must ensure a measure of

reason and integrity so that the action is not fraught by illegality or

arbitrariness. Judicial review must balance justice with flexibility, and this

would require the courts to exercise a nuanced discretion between

multiple outcomes and binary choices. In the process the judicial wisdom

to subserve the purpose and object of the tendering process should not

be lost. Without this approach, it will be difficult to balance certainty in

market with fair play in action, in other words to maintain the equilibrium

between the need for order and quest for justice.

23. There is yet another point that Ms. Meenakshi Arora raised to

sustain the decision impugned before us, which is that the High Court has

merely applied the contractual condition for selecting the writ petitioner

and no more. Answer to this question again takes us back to the approach

that the judicial review proceeding should adopt while considering highly

competitive bids.

5

In its precedents, this court has emphasized that “using

5

Tata Motors Ltd. v. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST), (2023) 19 SCC

1:

50. (…) In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant because

most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon technical issues

beyond our domain. The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make

every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give “fair play in the joints” to the

government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract. Courts must also not interfere where

Page 14 of 17

a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every small

mistake appear like a big blunder.”

24. It is rather strange that in the whole process of judicial Scrutiny the

contesting contractors as well as the Court lost sight of the needs and

requirements of the Owner. It is not uncommon that when judicial review

proceedings are invoked by one or the other parties the entire focus of the

court is in choosing the most eligible party. This enquiry is necessary,

however judicial review courts cannot ignore the needs of the owner(s),

the speed at which they would want the appropriate contractor to be

identified and other considerations that weigh in their endeavour. Let’s

take this very case, GPPC floated the tender way back in January 2025

and LOA itself was granted on 09.06.2025 from which date more than a

such interference will cause unnecessary loss to the public exchequer. (See Silppi Constructions

Contractors v. Union of India [ Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489] .)

55. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the

employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable

is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set

at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in

public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to

the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public

exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should

be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three- Judge

Bench decision of this Court in Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India [ Assn. of Registration

Plates v. Union of India, (2005) 1 SCC 679] .

56. (…) Even when some defect is found in the decision- making process, the court must exercise

its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance

of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the

larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it

comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should

interfere.

Page 15 of 17

year has already passed. Who is to account for the delay in the execution

of the contract and commencement of the work?

25. It is true that the tender document specifically provides that “The

bidder with the highest total score (S) shall be considered for award of

job”. It is important to note that the entity to consider is the ‘Owner’ and

not the court. It is for the reason that while considering the competing

scores the owner must have the necessary “Fair play in the Joints”. We

may note that tender document itself provides that GPPC has a right to

accept any bid and to reject any or all bids. Clause 23.0 and 23.1 is as

follows;

“23.0 GPPC'S RIGHT TO ACCEPT ANY BID AND TO REJECT

ANY OR ALL BIDS

23.1 GPPC reserves the right to accept or reject any Bid, and

to cancel the bidding process and reject all bids, at any time prior

to the award of Contract, without thereby incurring any liability to

the affected Bidder or bidders or any obligation to inform the

affected Bidder or bidders of the grounds for the GPPC’s action.”

26. The final choice is of the owner, and it is for the owner to take the

final decision with necessary flexibility and pragmatism. While exercising

judicial review of contractual matters, constitutional courts do not exercise,

should not exercise ex-ante jurisdiction to pre -empt executive actions. On

this count, High Court has exceeded the first principle of judicial restraint

in contractual matters.

Page 16 of 17

27. Having considered the matter in detail, we are of the opinion that

there was no justification to interfere with the grant of LOA dated

09.06.2025, followed by the execution of the contract on 01.07.2025. Even

otherwise, when the report of the consultant was placed before the Court,

considering the marginal difference between the appellant and the writ

petitioner, the High Court should have restrained from interfering. The

High Court’s observation that “since the learned advocate Mr. Aspi M.

Kapadia, appearing for GSPC agreed to the re-evaluation of the marks

through its consultant (…) directed the consultant to prepare a fresh report

on the allocation of marks after hearing the respective parties” cannot be

an additional ground for an intense inquiry. When constitutional courts

seek further scrutiny of contested fact, counsels appearing for the

Government or its instrumentalities co-operate with the court, which is an

important facet of good practices at the bar. Even before this court Mr.

Aspi M. Kapadia assisted us with a straight bat and left the decision to the

court. However, we believe that the burden is always on the court and the

decision to interfere with the process must be based on settled principles

that we have indicated hereinabove.

28. As regards the other submission of Mr. Somayajulu, with respect to

the claim of additional 5 marks under clause 4 of 20.02 (B) towards

operation and maintenance of sea water system experience of the

Page 17 of 17

appellant, we see no justification whatsoever to interfere with the well-

considered decision of the High Court. The findings of the High Court as

regards clause 4 are based on true and correct fact and reasonable

interpretation of the tender Document. We, therefore, reject this

submission and the Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No.

12328 of 2025 stands dismissed.

29. In view of the above analysis, we are of the opinion that the Letter

of Award (LOA) dated 09.06.2025 followed by the execution of the

contract dates 01.07.2025 by GPPC in favour of the a ppellant should be

upheld. GPPC can now proceed to have the contract performed without

any hindrance.

30. The Civil Appeal arising out of Special Civil Application No. 7289 of

2025 is allowed and judgment and order passed by the High Court is set

aside.

31. There shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………....J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA ]

………………………………....J.

[ALOK ARADHE ]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 25, 2026.

Description

In a significant ruling concerning the intricacies of tender dispute resolution and contractual validity challenges, the Supreme Court of India, in the case of M/S. STEAG ENERGY SERVICES (INDIA) PVT. LTD. v. GSPC PIPAVAV POWER COMPANY LTD. (GPPC) & ORS., overturned a High Court decision, reaffirming the principles of judicial restraint in contractual matters. This judgment, designated 2026 INSC 295, is a critical reference point for legal professionals and is extensively analyzed on CaseOn, offering clear insights into the nuanced application of judicial review in public procurement.

Case Background: The Tender for Power Plant O&M

The dispute arose from a tender floated by GSPC PIPAVAV Power Company Limited (GPPC) in January 2025 for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of its 702.86 MW gas-based combined cycle power plant for an initial period of five years. The tender evaluation was based on a Quality and Cost Based System (QCBS), assigning 70% weightage to technical evaluation and 30% to cost. The contract stipulated that the bidder with the highest total score would be awarded the job.

Following the initial evaluation, M/S. STEAG ENERGY SERVICES (INDIA) PVT. LTD. (the Appellant) was declared the successful bidder. A Letter of Award (LOA) was issued on June 9, 2025, and the formal contract was executed on July 1, 2025, with the Appellant commencing work.

High Court Intervention and Re-evaluation

The unsuccessful bidder, O&M Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (the Writ Petitioner), challenged the tender evaluation process in the High Court, alleging arbitrariness. The High Court directed GPPC's consultant, Fichtner Consulting Engineers India Private Limited, to re-evaluate the technical bids. During this re-evaluation, it was discovered that the Appellant had been erroneously awarded 10 marks instead of 8 for a specific technical experience criterion (Clause 20.2(1)(B), item 3), as one of the claimed experiences fell outside the stipulated seven-year period.

This correction resulted in both the Appellant and the Writ Petitioner achieving an identical technical score of 93 out of 100. Consequently, the High Court re-evaluated the total scores:

  • Writ Petitioner (O&M Solutions Pvt. Ltd.): Total Score (S) of 95.09989831
  • Appellant (STEAG Energy Services): Total Score (S) of 95.0978453

Based solely on this marginal difference, the High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the LOA and contract awarded to the Appellant, and directed GPPC to award the contract to the Writ Petitioner.

IRAC Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decision

Issue: Judicial Interference in Tender Awards

The central legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the tender award and quashing an executed contract, particularly when the initial evaluation showed no mala fide intent, and the eventual difference in scores was minuscule.

Rule: Scope of Judicial Review in Contractual Matters

The Supreme Court reiterated established principles regarding judicial review in tender and contractual disputes:

  1. Limited Scope of Interference: Citing precedents like Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. and Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd., the Court emphasized that judicial intervention in tender processes is warranted only if the decision-making is mala fide, intended to favor someone, or so arbitrary/irrational that no reasonable authority would have made it. A mere disagreement with the process or a finding of minor error is insufficient for interference.
  2. Principle of Restraint and 'Free Play in the Joints': Courts must exercise restraint, especially in complex technical tenders. The owner/employer should be allowed "free play in the joints" to evaluate bids, reflecting commercial realities and ensuring timely project execution.
  3. Public Interest: The Court underscored the importance of considering the larger public interest. Quashing an ongoing contract leads to delays, potential financial losses to the public exchequer, and disruptions to essential services (Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, Assn. of Registration Plates v. Union of India).
  4. Owner's Discretion: Tender documents often reserve the right for the owner (GPPC, in this case, Clause 23.0 and 23.1) to accept or reject any bid without incurring liability, highlighting the owner’s ultimate discretion and flexibility.

Analysis: Applying Principles to the Present Case

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the High Court's decision against these established rules:

  • Minuscule Difference: The Court noted that the High Court itself found no arbitrariness or illegality in GPPC's actions. The difference in the final total scores was a mere 0.00205301. Interfering with an awarded and commenced contract based on such a marginal difference was deemed an overreach.
  • Disregard for Public Interest and Project Continuity: The Supreme Court criticized the High Court for overlooking the practical implications of quashing a contract already underway since July 2025. Such intervention causes delays, creates uncertainty, and could lead to significant financial burdens and operational disruptions for GPPC.
  • Excessive Judicial Scrutiny: The judgment emphasized that courts should not use a "magnifying glass" to find minor flaws in tender processes, especially when the owner's intent is not malafide. The High Court effectively substituted its judgment for that of the owner and its technical consultants, contrary to the principle of "free play in the joints."
  • Owner's Prerogative: The Supreme Court reiterated that the final choice rests with the owner, who needs flexibility and pragmatism in awarding contracts. The High Court's decision usurped this prerogative.

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Conclusion: Upholding Contractual Integrity and Judicial Restraint

The Supreme Court concluded that there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the LOA issued on June 9, 2025, and the subsequent contract execution on July 1, 2025. The Court found that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by not adhering to the principle of judicial restraint in contractual matters. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal arising from Special Civil Application No. 7289 of 2025, setting aside the High Court's judgment and order, and dismissing the related Civil Appeal arising from Special Civil Application No. 12328 of 2025 concerning the appellant's additional marks claim under clause 4. GPPC was directed to proceed with the contract performance without hindrance.

Why This Judgment Is an Important Read for Lawyers and Students

This Supreme Court judgment serves as a pivotal reference for anyone involved in public procurement law, administrative law, and contract law. For lawyers, it reinforces the stringent limits of judicial review in tender disputes, discouraging frivolous challenges based on minor discrepancies. It highlights the importance of demonstrating mala fide intent or gross arbitrariness for a court to intervene, particularly when a contract has already been awarded and commenced. For law students, it provides a clear illustration of the IRAC method in action, demonstrating how legal principles like judicial restraint, public interest, and "free play in the joints" are applied to complex factual scenarios involving commercial contracts and administrative decisions. Understanding this case is crucial for appreciating the balance between maintaining fairness in public tenders and preventing undue judicial interference that can destabilize economic activities and public projects.

Disclaimer

All information provided in this article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Readers should consult with a qualified legal professional for advice pertaining to their specific circumstances.

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