2026:HHC:21286

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Revision Nos. 83 of 2015 & 86 of 2015

Reserved on: 31.03.2026

Decided on: 03-06.2026

_________________________________

1. Cr. Revision No.83 of 2015

Nagesh Awasthi & others Petitioners

vs

State of H.P Respondent

______________________________________

2. Cr. Revision No.86 of 2015

Vishal Thakur @ Goldi and another Petitioners

vs

State of H.P Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

For the petitioners :Mr Lovneesh Kanwar, Sr.

Advocate, with Mr Tarun

Garla, Advocate for petitioner

Nos. 1 & 3 in Cr. Rev. No.83 of

2015.

Mr Peeyush Verma, learned

Senior Advocate, assisted by

Mr Abhishek Thakur, for

petitioner No.2 in Cr. Rev.

No.83 of 2015.

Mr Vinod Thakur, Advocate,

for the petitioners in Cr. Rev.

No.86 of 2015.

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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For the respondent :Mr Jitender Sharma,

Additional Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge:

The present revisions are directed against the judgment

dated 28.02.2015 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III,

Kangra at Dharamshala, Circuit Court at Baijnath, Distt. Kangra, H.P

(hereinafter referred to as the learned Appellate Court), vide which, the

judgment of conviction dated 19.05.2011 and order of sentence dated

20.05.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Baijnath,

District Kangra (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (The parties shall

hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed

before the learned trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision

are that the police presented a challan before the learned trial Court

against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 341, 323, 325, 506, and 147 read with Section 149 of the Indian

Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the informant Sudhir Rana (PW-

8), Subhash Chand (PW-9) and Arun Kumar (DW-3) had gone to

Baijnath temple on 13.11.2006. The informant, Sudhir Rana, and Arun

went to the park after going to the temple. Vishal Thakur @ Goldi and

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his friend Suman Kumar came to the spot along with 5-6 friends. They

obstructed the informant and other persons and gave beatings to them

with kicks, fist blows, and sticks. The informant party shouted for help.

Vishal, Suman Kumar and other persons left the spot and threatened to

kill the informant party. The injured were taken to the hospital, and

intimation was given to the police. The police recorded an entry No. 6

(Ext.PW 10/A) and sent ASI Mehar Deen (PW-4), HC Puni Chand and

HHC Durga Dass for verification. ASI Mehar Deen found on the spot

that the injured had been taken to the hospital. He and the other police

officials went to the hospital, where Sudhir Rana made a statement

(Ext.PW 4/A), which was sent to the police Station, where FIR

(Ext.PW7/A) was registered. An application (Ext.PW4/B) was filed for

conducting the medical examination of the injured. Doctor Sunita (PW-

3) examined Subhash Chand and found that he had sustained multiple

injuries. The fracture and compression of the L4 and L5 vertebrae were

detected after the X-ray. Hence, the nature of the injury was stated to

be grievous. MLC (Ext.PW 3/A) was issued. Doctor Sunita also examined

Arun and found that he had sustained simple injuries, which could have

been caused within six hours of examination. She issued MLC

(Ext.PW3/B). Doctor Sunita also examined Sudhir Rana and found that

he had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused

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within six hours of examination. She issued MLC (Ext.PW3/C). All the

injuries could have been caused by means of a stick, in her opinion.

Mehar Deen (PW-4) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and

prepared the site plan (Ext.PW4/C). He recorded the statements of

witnesses as per their versions. Suman Thakur and Vishal Thakur

produced one stick each on 24.11.2007, which were seized vide memos

(Ext.PW4/K and Ext. PW 4/L). Statements of remaining witnesses were

recorded as per their versions, and after completion of the

investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.

3. Learned trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the

accused. When the accused appeared, they were charged with the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 341, 323, 325,

506 read with Section 149 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty

and claimed to be tried.

4. The prosecution examined 11 witnesses to prove its case.

Tanuj Thakur (PW-1), Tara Chand (PW-2), and Sudarshan Kumar (PW-

11) did not support the prosecution's case. Doctor Sunita (PW-3)

examined the injured. ASI Mehar Deen (PW-4) investigated the matter.

Head Constable Puni Chand (PW-5) obtained the final opinion in the

MLC. Dr Tilak Bhagra (PW-6) went through the X-ray. Surestha Thakur

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(PW-7) signed the FIR and prepared the challan. Sudhir Rana (PW-8) is

the informant/victim. Subhash Chand (PW-9) is an eyewitness. HHC

Gulzar (PW-10) proved the entry in the daily diary.

5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313

of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), denied the prosecution's case in

its entirety. They examined HC Puni Chand (dW-1), Virender Kumar

(DW-1) and Arun Kumar (DW-2) in their defence.

6. The learned trial Court held that the testimonies of eye-

witnesses corroborated each other. The medical evidence corroborated

the statements of the eyewitnesses. Minor discrepancies in the

statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard them. The

statements of defence witnesses were not reliable. The failure to

examine independent witnesses was not sufficient to discard the

prosecution's case. Hence, the learned trial Court convicted and

sentenced the accused as under: -

Sections Sentences

147 IPC Accused were sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of

₹ 300/-each and in default of payment of

fine to undergo further simple imprisonment

for one month

341 of IPC Accused were sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for one month, pay a fine of

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₹300/-each and in default of payment of fine,

to further undergo simple imprisonment for

one month

323 of IPC Accused were sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of

₹ 500/-each and in default of payment of fine,

to further undergo simple imprisonment for

one month

325 of IPC Accused were sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of

₹1000/-each and in default of payment of

fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment

for two months

506 IPC Accused were sentenced to undergo simple

imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of

₹500/-each and in default of payment of fine,

to further undergo simple imprisonment for

one month.

7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the

learned trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by

the learned Additional Session Judge (III), Kangra at Dharamshala,

Circuit Court at Baijnath, District Kangra (learned Appellate Court). The

learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the

learned Trial Court that the statements of eye-witnesses corroborated

each other. The medical evidence also corroborated the statements of

the eyewitnesses. Minor contradictions were not sufficient to discard

the prosecution's case. The statements of the defence witnesses did not

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cast any doubt on the prosecution's case. Hence, the appeal was

dismissed.

8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the

learned Courts below, the accused have filed two separate appeals. In an

appeal filed by Nagesh Awasthi and others (Cr. Revision No.83 of 2015),

it has been asserted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating

the material on record. Independent witnesses had not supported the

prosecution's case, which made the prosecution's case highly doubtful.

The recovery of the sticks was also not proved by the testimonies of

independent witnesses. There was a discrepancy regarding the date of

the incident, the benefit of which should have been granted to the

accused. Medical Officer admitted in her cross-examination that

injuries could have been caused by means of a fall. The informant

stated that the incident had occurred on the path, which is contrary to

the case set up by the prosecution; therefore, it was prayed that the

present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the

learned Courts below be set aside.

9. In a revision filed by Vishal Thakur & another (Cr. Revision

No.86 of 2015), it has been asserted that the prosecution failed to prove

the motive behind the commission of the crime. The witnesses

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admitted that many people were present on the spot, but no witness

was examined. The informant and the investigating officer asserted

that the incident occurred on 14.11.2006, whereas other witnesses

mentioned the date of occurrence as 13.11.2006. This discrepancy made

the prosecution's case highly suspect. Police had not recovered the torn

cloth to corroborate the informant’s version. Therefore, it was prayed

that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order

passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

10. I have heard Mr. Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Senior

Advocate, assisted by Mr. Tarun Garla, learned Counsel for petitioners

No.1 and 3, Mr. Peeyush Verma, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Mr.

Abhishek Thakur, learned Counsel for the petitioner No.2, Mr. Vinod

Thakur, learned Counsel for the petitioners in Criminal Revision No. 86

of 2015 and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General

for the respondent-State.

11. Mr Lovneesh Kanwar, learned Counsel for the petitioners

No.1 and 3 in Criminal Revision No. 83 of 2015, submitted that the

identity of the accused was not proved. The prosecution witnesses

admitted that there was a huge rush, but no independent witness was

examined. The independent witnesses cited by the prosecution have

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not supported the prosecution's case, and the recovery of the sticks was

not established. Hence, he prayed that the present revision be allowed

and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set

aside.

12. Mr Peeyush Verma, learned Counsel for petitioner No.2 in

Criminal Revision No.83 of 2015, adopted the submission of Mr

Lovneesh Kanwar, Senior Advocate and further submitted that the

testimonies of the witnesses contradicted each other. The statements

of hostile witnesses were not considered. The learned Courts below had

discarded the major contradictions by calling them minor

contradictions; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be

allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts

below be set aside.

13. Mr Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners in

Criminal Revision No. 86 of 2015, adopted the submissions of Mr

Lovneesh Kanwar and Mr Peeyush Verma and further submitted that

the investigating officer had not collected the corroborative evidence to

support the testimonies of eye-witnesses. The benefit of doubt should

have been extended to the petitioners. He relied upon the judgment of

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sunder Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and

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another Criminal Appeal No.of 2024 (@ SLP (Crl.) No.10756/2023 in

support of his submissions.

14. Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General

for the respondent/State, submitted that the statements of the injured

witnesses corroborated each other in material particulars. They had

properly identified the accused in the Court, and the identification was

never in dispute. The mere fact that an independent witness has not

supported the prosecution's case is not sufficient to discard it. The

testimonies of defence witnesses do not inspire confidence and were

rightly rejected by learned Courts below. This Court should not

interfere with the concurrent findings of fact while deciding a revision

petition. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

15. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made

at the Bar and have gone through the records carefully.

16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet

Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri)

348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court can only rectify the

patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

207-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the

outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent

findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a

detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought

on record. The High Court in criminal revision against

conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like

the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision

is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure

Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or

himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any

finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the

regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The

object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an

error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded

error that is to be determined on the merits of individual

cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same,

the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts

and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

17. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh

Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it

was observed at page 695:

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under

Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to

call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the

purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and

regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The

object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an

error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept

in such proceedings.

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this

Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v.

Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687:

(2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been

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considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475,

paras 12-13)

“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the

power to call for and examine the records of an

inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to

the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order

made in a case. The object of this provision is to set

right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.

There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not

be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,

which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful

consideration and appear to be in accordance with law.

If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it

emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked

where the decisions under challenge are grossly

erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions

of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence,

material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is

exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not

exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each

case would have to be determined on its own merits.

13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional

jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one

and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of

the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against

an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to

keep in mind that the exercise of revisional

jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie.

Where the Court is dealing with the question as to

whether the charge has been framed properly and in

accordance with law in a given case, it may be

reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional

jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within

the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the

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charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings

under CrPC.”

18. The present revisions have to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

19. Dr. Sunita (PW-3) medically examined the injured. She

found multiple injuries on the person of Subhash Rana, Arun and

Sudhir Rana. Arun Kumar (DW-3) stated that some persons had beaten

Sudhir and Subhash near the Baijnath temple, and many people had

rescued them. They had also sustained injuries in the incident and were

medically examined. Therefore, as per the testimony of Arun Kumar,

the injuries were caused in a beating, and the injuries on the bodies of

Sudhir Rana (PW-8) and Subhash Rana (PW-9) show their presence on

the spot.

20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajan

Singh @ Harbhajan Singh & Ors. Versus State of Haryana (2011) 7 SCC 421,

that the evidence of an injured witness must be given due weightage as

his presence on the spot cannot be doubted. It was observed: -

“36. The evidence of the stamped witness must be given due

weight, as his presence at the place of occurrence cannot be

doubted. His statement is generally considered to be very

reliable, and it is unlikely that he has spared the actual

assailant to falsely implicate someone else. The testimony

of an injured witness has its own relevancy and efficacy, as

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he has sustained injuries at the time and place of

occurrence, and this lends support to his testimony that he

was present at the time of occurrence. Thus, the testimony

of an injured witness is accorded a special status in law.

Such a witness comes with a built-in guarantee of his

presence at the scene of the crime and is unlikely to spare

his actual assailant(s) in order to falsely implicate someone.

"Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured

witness". Thus, the evidence of an injured witness should be

relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection of his

evidence on the basis of major contradictions and

discrepancies therein. (Vide: Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya

Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259; Kailas & Ors. v. State of

Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 793; Durbal v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, (2011) 2 SCC 676; and State of U.P. v. Naresh & Ors.,

(2011) 4 SCC 324).

21. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma

v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the

testimony of the injured witness has to be accepted as correct unless

there are compelling circumstances to doubt such a statement. It was

observed:

“22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial

cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling

circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt

such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable

evidence in a criminal trial.

23. In Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra [Balu Sudam

Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365: 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the principles which

are to be kept in mind when appreciating the evidence of an

injured eyewitness. This Court held as follows: (SCC para 26)

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“26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be

appreciated, the under-noted legal principles

enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in

mind:

26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the

time and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted

unless there are material contradictions in his

deposition.

26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the

evidence, it must be believed that an injured witness

would not allow the real culprits to escape and falsely

implicate the accused.

26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater

evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist,

their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot be

doubted on account of some embellishment in

natural conduct or minor contradictions.

26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial

embellishment in the evidence of an injured witness,

then such contradiction, exaggeration or

embellishment should be discarded from the evidence

of the injured, but not the whole evidence.

26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution

version must be taken into consideration, and

discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of

memory with the passage of time should be

discarded.” (emphasis supplied)

22. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of Haryana,

2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed:

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“33. When the evidence of an injured eye-witness is to be

appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by

the Courts are required to be kept in mind:

“(a) The presence of an injured eye-witness at the time

and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless

there are material contradictions in his deposition.

(b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it

must be believed that an injured witness would not allow

the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate the

accused.

(c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater

evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist,

their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

(d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be doubted

on account of some embellishment in natural conduct or

minor contradictions.

(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial

embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness,

then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment

should be discarded from the evidence of the injured, but

not the whole evidence.

(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version must

be taken into consideration, and discrepancies which

normally creep due to loss of memory with passage of

time should be discarded.”

34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the

eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in

the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their

presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations as

would make it possible for them to witness the facts

deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is anything

inherently improbable or unreliable in their evidence. In

respect of both these considerations, circumstances either

elicited from those witnesses themselves or established by

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other evidence tending to improbabilise their presence or to

discredit the veracity of their statements, will have a bearing

upon the value which a Court would attach to their evidence.

Although in cases where the plea of the accused is a mere

denial yet the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to

be examined on its own merits, where the accused raise a

definite plea or put forward a positive case which is

inconsistent with that of the prosecution, the nature of such

plea or case and the probabilities in respect of it will also

have to be taken into account while assessing the value of

the prosecution evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of

Maharashtra:(2023) 13 SCC 365).

23. Therefore, the testimonies of the injured witnesses are

entitled to a great weight because their presence on the spot is

established and being injured, they will not substitute any other person

for the real assailants.

24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of

Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person speaking on oath

should be presumed to be a truthful witness unless there is something

inherently improbable in his testimony. It was observed:

“The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under

an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be

untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The High

Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have assumed

that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved that they

are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly deposing on oath

in the witness box during a trial upon a grave charge of

murder, must be presumed to act with a full sense of

responsibility for the consequences of what they state. It

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may be that what they say is so very unlikely or unnatural or

unreasonable that it is safer not to act upon it or even to

disbelieve them.”

25. Sudhir Rana (PW-8) stated that he, Subhash Rana and Arun

Kumar were going to the Baijnath Shiv temple. Goldi, Suman and the

other accused came from the opposite side and attacked him and the

persons accompanying him. The accused were armed with sticks, and

they gave beatings with the sticks, kicks and fist blows. They were

taken to the hospital. He stated in his cross-examination that the house

of Subhash Rana was located at Baijnath at a distance of 10-11 km from

his house. He was studying in the second year of B.Com at the time of

the incident. He admitted that the Baijnath Shiv temple is a huge

temple and many people are usually present in the temple. He had

reached the temple after changing 2–3 buses. The offices of Irrigation

and Public Health and many other shops are also located in the vicinity.

He regained consciousness in the vehicle. He did not remember the

time of the visit from the police. He denied that he had a scuffle with

some unknown person and filed a false complaint against the accused.

26. Subhash Rana (PW-9) stated that he, Sudhir and Arun were

going to the temple. The accused came and started beating him and the

persons accompanying him. The accused left the spot and threatened

him. He stated in his cross-examination that he had known Sudhir for

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two years. The distance between his house and Sudhir's house is about

one and a half kilometers. One case was pending in the Court against

him. The incident continued for 5-10 minutes. He became unconscious

but regained consciousness after some time. He denied that the accused

had not beaten him, and he was making a false statement.

27. Sudhir Rana (PW-8) stated in his examination-in-chief that

the incident had occurred on 14.11.2006. It was submitted that this

statement is contrary to the prosecution's case as reflected in the FIR,

and the discrepancy in the date will make the prosecution’s case

suspect. This submission will not help the accused. Arun Kumar (DW-

2) stated that the incident had occurred on 13.11. 2006. The FIR was

registered on 13.11.2006. The medical examination of the injured was

conducted on 13.11. 2006. Therefore, it is apparent that the date

14.11.2006 was mentioned mistakenly, and this mistake is not sufficient

to doubt the prosecution's case.

28. The witnesses Sudhir Rana (PW-8) and Subhash Rana (PW-

9) were confronted and contradicted with the portion of the statements

recorded by the police. It was submitted that these confrontations and

contradictions will make the prosecution's case highly suspect. This

submission cannot be accepted. ASI Mehar Deen (PW-4) investigated

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the matter. No question was asked of him regarding the statements

made by Sudhir Rana and Subhash Rana before him. Therefore, the

confrontations have not been proved as per the law. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Bombay High Court about a century ago in Emperor vs.

Vithu Balu Kharat (1924) 26 Bom. L.R. 965 that the previous statement

has to be proved before it can be used. It was observed:

“The words "if duly proved" in my opinion, clearly show

that the record of the statement cannot be admitted in

evidence straightaway but that the officer before whom the

statement was made should ordinarily be examined as to

any alleged statement or omitted statement that is relied

upon by the accused for the purpose of contradicting the

witness; and the provisions of Section 67 of the Indian

Evidence Act apply to this case, as well as to any other

similar ease. Of course, I do not mean to say that, if the

particular police officer who recorded the statement is not

available, other means of proving the statement may not be

availed of, e.g., evidence that the statement is in the

handwriting of that particular officer.”

29. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muthu

Naicker and Others, etc. Versus State of T.N. (1978) 4 SCC 385, that if the

witness affirms the previous statement, no proof is necessary, but if

the witness denies or says that he did not remember the previous

statement, the investigating officer should be asked about the same. It

was observed: -

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“52. This is the most objectionable manner of using the

police statement, and we must record our emphatic

disapproval of the same. The question should have been

framed in a manner to point out that, from amongst those

accused mentioned in examination-in-chief, there were

some whose names were not mentioned in the police

statement and if the witness affirms this, no further proof is

necessary and if the witness denies or says that she does not

remember, the investigation officer should have been

questioned about it.”

30. The Gauhati High Court held in Md. Badaruddin Ahmed v.

State of Assam, 1989 SCC OnLine Gau 35: 1989 Cri LJ 1876, that if the

witness denies having made the statement, the portion marked by the

defence should be put to the investigating officer and his version

should be elicited regarding the same. It was observed at page 1880: -

“13. The learned defence counsel has drawn our attention to

the above statement of the Investigating Officer and

submits that P.W. 4 never made his above statement before

the police and that the same, being his improved version,

cannot be relied upon. With the utmost respect to the

learned defence counsel, we are unable to accept his above

contention. Because, unless the particular matter or point in

the previous statement sought to be contradicted is placed

before the witness for explanation, the previous statement

cannot be used in evidence. In other words, drawing the

attention of the witness to his previous statement sought to

be contradicted and giving all opportunities to him for

explanation are compulsory. If any authority is to be cited

on this point, we may conveniently refer to the case of Pangi

Jogi Naik v. State reported in AIR 1965 Orissa 205: (1965 (2) Cri

LJ 661). Further, in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P.,

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reported in AIR 1959 SC 1012: (1959 Cri LJ 1231), it was also

held that the statement not reduced to writing cannot be

contradicted and, therefore, in order to show that the

statement sought to be contradicted was recorded by the

police, it should be marked and exhibited. However, in the

case at hand, there is nothing on the record to show that the

previous statement of the witness was placed before him

and that the witness was given the chance for explanation.

Again, his previous statement was not marked and

exhibited. Therefore, his previous statement to the police

cannot be used. Hence, his evidence that when he turned

back, he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from

his chest is to be taken as his correct version.

14. The learned defence counsel has attempted to persuade

us not to rely on the evidence of this witness on the ground

that his evidence before the trial Court is contradicted by his

previous statement made before the police. However, in

view of the decisions made in the said cases we have been

persuaded irresistibly to hold that the correct procedure to

be followed which would be in conformity with S. 145 of the

Evidence Act to contradict the evidence given by the

prosecution witness at the trial with a statement made by

him before the police during the investigation will be to

draw the attention of the witness to that part of the

contradictory statement which he made before the police,

and questioned him whether he did, in fact, make that

statement. If the witness admits having made the particular

statement to the police, that admission will go into evidence

and will be recorded as part of the evidence of the witness

and can be relied on by the accused as establishing the

contradiction. However, if, on the other hand, the witness

denies to have made such a statement before the police, the

particular portions of the statement recorded should be

provisionally marked for identification as B-1 to B-1, B-2 to

B-2 etc. (any identification mark) and when the

23.2026:HHC:21286

investigating officer who had actually recorded the

statements in question comes into the witness box, he

should be questioned as to whether these particular

statements had been made to him during the investigation

by the particular witness, and obviously after refreshing his

memory from the case diary the investigating officer would

make his answer in the affirmative. The answer of the

Investigating Officer would prove the statements B-1 to B-1,

B-2 to B-2, which are then exhibited as Ext. D. 1, Ext. D. 2,

etc. (exhibition mark) in the case and will go into evidence,

and may, thereafter, be relied on by the accused as

contradictions. In the case in hand, as was discussed in

above, the above procedure was not followed while cross-

examining the witness to his previous statements, and,

therefore, we have no alternative but to accept the

statement given by this witness before the trial Court that

he saw the accused Badaruddin lowering the gun from his

chest to be his correct version.”

31. Andhra Pradesh High Court held in Shaik Subhani v. State of

A.P., 1999 SCC OnLine AP 413: (1999) 5 ALD 284: 2000 Cri LJ 321: (1999) 2

ALT (Cri) 208 that putting a suggestion to the witness and the witness

denying the same does not amount to putting the contradiction to the

witness. The attention of the witness has to be drawn to the previous

statement, and if he denies the same, the same is to be proved by the

investigating officer. It was observed at page 290: -

“24… As far as the contradictions put by the defence are

concerned, we would like to say that the defence Counsel did

not put the contradictions in the manner in which it ought

to have been put. By putting suggestions to the witness and

the witness denying the same will not amount to putting

24.2026:HHC:21286

contradiction to the witness. The contradiction has to be put

to the witness as contemplated under Section 145 of the

Evidence Act. If a contradiction is put to the witness and it is

denied by him, then his attention has to be drawn to the

statement made by such witness before the Police or any

other previous statement and he must be given a reasonable

opportunity to explain as to why such contradiction appears

and he may give any answer if the statement made by him is

shown to him and if he confronted with such a statement

and thereafter the said contradiction must be proved

through the Investigation Officer. Then, it only amounts to

putting the contradiction to the witness and getting it

proved through the Investigation Officer.”

32. The Calcutta High Court took a similar view in Anjan

Ganguly v. State of West Bengal, 2013 SCC OnLine Cal 22948: (2013) 2 Cal

LJ 144 and held at page 151: -

“21. It was held in State of Karnataka v. Bhaskar Kushali

Kothakar, reported as (2004) 7 SCC 487, that if any statement

of the witness is contrary to the previous statement

recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. or suffers from omission

of certain material particulars, then the previous statement

can be proved by examining the Investigating Officer who

had recorded the same. Thus, there is no doubt that for

proving the previous statement, the Investigating Officer

ought to be examined, and the statement of the witness

recorded by him can only be proved by him, and he has to

depose to the extent that he had correctly recorded the

statement, without adding or omitting, as to what was

stated by the witness.

23. Proviso to Section 162(1), Cr.P.C. states in clear terms

that the statement of the witness ought to be duly proved.

The words, if duly proved, cast a duty upon the accused who

wants to highlight the contradictions by confronting the

25.2026:HHC:21286

witness to prove the previous statement of a witness

through the police officer who has recorded the same in the

ordinary way. If the witness in the cross-examination

admits contradictions, then there is no need to prove the

statement. But if the witness denies a contradiction and the

police officer who had recorded the statement is called by

the prosecution, the previous statement of the witness on

this point may be proved by the police officer. In case the

prosecution fails to call the police officer in a given situation

Court can call this witness, or the accused can call the police

officer to give evidence in defence. There is no doubt that

unless the statement as per proviso to sub-section (1) of

Section 162, Cr.P.C. is duly proved, the contradiction in

terms of Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be

taken into consideration by the Court.

24. To elaborate on this further, it will be necessary to

reproduce Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act.

“S. 145. A witness may be cross-examined as to previous

statements made by him in writing or reduced into

writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such

writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it

intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention

must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those

parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of

contradicting him.”

25. Therefore, it is appropriate that before the previous

statement or statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. is proved,

the attention of the witness must be drawn to the portion in

the statement recorded by the Investigating Officer to bring

to light the contradiction, a process called confrontation.

26. Let us first understand what the proper procedure is. A

witness may have stated in the statement under Section 161,

Cr.P.C. that ‘X murdered Y’. In the court, the witness stated

‘Z murdered Y’. This is a contradiction. Defence Counsel or

26.2026:HHC:21286

Court, and even prosecution if the witness is declared

hostile, having resiled from a previous statement, is to be

confronted to bring contradiction on record. The attention

of the witness must be drawn to the previous statement or

statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C., where it was stated

that ‘X murdered Y’. Since Section 145 of the Indian

Evidence Act uses the word being proved, therefore, in the

course of examination of the witness, a previous statement

or a statement under Section 161, Cr.P.C. will not be

exhibited but shall be assigned a mark, and the portion

contradicted will be specified. The trial court, in the event of

contradiction, has to record as under:

27. The attention of the witness has been drawn to portions

A to A of the statement marked as 1, and confronted with the

portion where it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this

manner, by way of confrontation, contradiction is brought

on record. Later, when the Investigating Officer is

examined, the prosecution or defence may prove the

statement, after the Investigating Officer testifies that the

statement assigned mark was correctly recorded by him; at

that stage, the statement will be exhibited by the Court.

Then the contradiction will be proved by the Investigating

Officer by stating that the witness had informed or told him

that ‘X murdered Y’ and he had correctly recorded this fact.

28. Now, a reference to the explanation to Section 162,

Cr.P.C., which says that an omission to state a fact or

circumstance may amount to contradiction. Say, for

instance, if a witness omits to state in Court that ‘X

murdered Y’, what he had stated in a statement under

Section 161, Cr.P.C. will be material? contradiction, for the

Public Prosecutor, as the witness has resiled from the

previous statement, or if he has been sent for trial for the

charge of murder, omission to state ‘X murdered Y’ will be a

material omission, and amount to contradiction so far as

the defence of ‘W is concerned. At that stage also attention

27.2026:HHC:21286

of the witness will also be drawn to a significant portion of

the statement recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C., which the

witness had omitted to state, and note shall be given that

attention of the witness was drawn to the portion A to A

wherein it is recorded that ‘X murdered Y’. In this way, the

omission is brought on record. The rest of the procedure

stated earlier, qua confrontation shall be followed to prove

the statement of the witness and the fact stated by the

witness.

29. Therefore, to prove the statement for the purpose of

contradiction, it is necessary that the contradiction or

omission must be brought to the notice of the witness. His

or her attention must be drawn to the portion of the

previous statement (in the present case statement under

Section 161, Cr.P.C)”

33. A similar view was taken in Alauddin v. State of Assam, 2024

SCC OnLine SC 760, wherein it was observed:

“7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they

become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a

statement in his evidence before the Court which is

inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement

recorded by the Police, there is a contradiction. When a

prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1)

or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual

aspects before the Court which he has not stated in his prior

statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of

CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an

omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his

statement recorded by the Police, which he states before the

Court in his evidence. The explanation to Section 162 CrPC

indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction

when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is

not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it

28.2026:HHC:21286

satisfies the test laid down in the explanation under Section

162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction,

the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of

Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in

the cross-examination.

8. As stated in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of section 162,

the witness has to be contradicted in the manner provided

under Section 145 of the Evidence Act. Section 145 reads

thus:

“145. Cross-examination as to previous statements in

writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to

previous statements made by him in writing or reduced

into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without

such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if

it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his

attention must, before the writing can be proved, be

called to those parts of it which are to be used for the

purpose of contradicting him.”

The Section operates in two parts. The first part provides

that a witness can be cross-examined as to his previous

statements made in writing without such writing being

shown to him. Thus, for example, a witness can be cross-

examined by asking whether his prior statement exists. The

second part is regarding contradicting a witness. While

confronting the witness with his prior statement to prove

contradictions, the witness must be shown his prior

statement. If there is a contradiction between the statement

made by the witness before the Court and what is recorded

in the statement recorded by the police, the witness's

attention must be drawn to specific parts of his prior

statement, which are to be used to contradict him. Section

145 provides that the relevant part can be put to the witness

without the writing being proved. However, the previous

statement used to contradict witnesses must be proved

subsequently. Only if the contradictory part of his previous

29.2026:HHC:21286

statement is proved can the contradictions be said to be

proved. The usual practice is to mark the portion or part

shown to the witness of his prior statement produced on

record. Marking is done differently in different States. In

some States, practice is to mark the beginning of the portion

shown to the witness with an alphabet and the end by

marking with the same alphabet. While recording the cross-

examination, the Trial Court must record that a particular

portion marked, for example, as AA was shown to the

witness. Which part of the prior statement is shown to the

witness for contradicting him has to be recorded in the

cross-examination. If the witness admits to having made

such a prior statement, that portion can be treated as

proved. If the witness does not admit the portion of his prior

statement with which he is confronted, it can be proved

through the Investigating Officer by asking whether the

witness made a statement that was shown to the witness.

Therefore, if the witness is intended to be confronted with

his prior statement reduced into writing, that particular

part of the statement, even before it is proved, must be

specifically shown to the witness. After that, the part of the

prior statement used to contradict the witness has to be

proved. As indicated earlier, it can be treated as proved if the

witness admits to having made such a statement, or it can

be proved in the cross-examination of the concerned police

officer. The object of this requirement in Section 145 of the

Evidence Act, of confronting the witness by showing him

the relevant part of his prior statement, is to give the

witness a chance to explain the contradiction. Therefore,

this is a rule of fairness.

9. If a former statement of the witness is inconsistent

with any part of his evidence given before the Court, it can

be used to impeach the credit of the witness in accordance

with clause (3) of Section 155 of the Evidence Act, which

reads thus:

30.2026:HHC:21286

“155. Impeaching credit of the witness. — The credit of a

witness may be impeached in the following ways by the

adverse party, or, with the consent of the Court, by the

party who calls him—

(1) ….……………………………………

(2) ………………………………………

(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any

part of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted.”

It must be noted here that every contradiction or omission is

not a ground to discredit the witness or to disbelieve his/her

testimony. A minor or trifle omission or contradiction

brought on record is not sufficient to disbelieve the

witness's version. Only when there is a material

contradiction or omission can the Court disbelieve the

witness's version either fully or partially. What is a material

contradiction or omission, depending upon the facts of each

case? Whether an omission is a contradiction also depends

on the facts of each individual case.

10. We are tempted to quote what is held in a landmark

decision of this Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh v. State

of U.P.1959 Supp (2) SCR 875. Paragraph 13 of the said

decision reads thus:

“13. The learned counsel's first argument is based

upon the words “in the manner provided by Section 145

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872” found in Section 162 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 145 of the

Evidence Act, it is said, empowers the accused to put all

relevant questions to a witness before his attention is

called to those parts of the writing with a view to

contradicting him. In support of this contention, reliance

is placed upon the judgment of this Court in Shyam Singh

v. State of Punjab [(1952) 1 SCC 514: 1952 SCR 812]. Bose, J.

describes the procedure to be followed to contradict a

31.2026:HHC:21286

witness under Section 145 of the Evidence Act, thus at p.

819:

Resort to Section 145 would only be necessary if the

witness denies that he made the former statement. In

that event, it would be necessary to prove that he did,

and if the former statement was reduced to writing, then

Section 145 requires that his attention must be drawn

to these parts which are to be used for contradiction.

But that position does not arise when the witness

admits the former statement. In such a case, all that is

necessary is to look to the former statement of which

no further proof is necessary because of the admission

that it was made.”

It is unnecessary to refer to other cases wherein a

similar procedure is suggested for putting questions

under Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, for the said

decision of this Court and similar decisions were not

considering the procedure in a case where the statement

in writing was intended to be used for contradiction

under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Section 145 of the Evidence Act is in two parts: the first part

enables the accused to cross-examine a witness as to a

previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to

writing without such writing being shown to him; the second

part deals with a situation where the cross-examination

assumes the shape of contradiction: in other words, both

parts deal with cross-examination; the first part with cross-

examination other than by way of contradiction, and the

second with cross-examination by way of contradiction only.

The procedure prescribed is that, if it is intended to

contradict a witness by the writing, his attention must,

before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it

which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.

The proviso to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

only enables the accused to make use of such a statement to

32.2026:HHC:21286

contradict a witness in the manner provided by Section 145

of the Evidence Act. It would be doing violence to the

language of the proviso if the said statement be allowed to

be used for the purpose of cross-examining a witness within

the meaning of the first part of Section 145 of the Evidence

Act. Nor are we impressed by the argument that it would not

be possible to invoke the second part of Section 145 of the

Evidence Act without putting relevant questions under the

first part thereof. The difficulty is more imaginary than real.

The second part of Section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly

indicates the simple procedure to be followed. To illustrate: A

says in the witness box that B stabbed C; before the police, he

had stated that D stabbed C. His attention can be drawn to

that part of the statement made before the police, which

contradicts his statement in the witness box. If he admits his

previous statement, no further proof is necessary; if he does

not admit it, the practice generally followed is to admit it

subject to proof by the police officer. On the other hand, the

procedure suggested by the learned counsel may be

illustrated thus: If the witness is asked, “Did you say

before the police officer that you saw a gas light?” and he

answers “yes”, then the statement which does not

contain such recital is put to him as a contradiction. This

procedure involves two fallacies: one is that it enables the

accused to elicit by a process of cross-examination what

the witness stated before the police officer. If a police

officer did not make a record of a witness's statement,

his entire statement could not be used for any purpose,

whereas if a police officer recorded a few sentences, by

this process of cross-examination, the witness's oral

statement could be brought on record. This procedure,

therefore, contravenes the express provision of Section

162 of the Code. The second fallacy is that by the

illustration given by the learned counsel for the

appellants, there is no self-contradiction of the primary

statement made in the witness box, for the witness has

33.2026:HHC:21286

not yet made on the stand any assertion at all which can

serve as the basis. The contradiction, under the section,

should be between what a witness asserted in the witness

box and what he stated before the police officer, and not

between what he said he had stated before the police

officer and what he actually made before him. In such a

case, the question could not be put at all: only questions

to contradict can be put, and the question here posed

does not contradict; it leads to an answer which is

contradicted by the police statement. This argument of

the learned counsel based upon Section 145 of the

Evidence Act is, therefore, not of any relevance in

considering the express provisions of Section 162 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure.” (emphasis added)

This decision is a locus classicus, which will continue to guide

our Trial Courts. In the facts of the case, the learned Trial

Judge has not marked those parts of the witnesses' prior

statements based on which they were sought to be

contradicted in the cross-examination.”

34. It was laid down in Kalabhai Hamirbhai Kachhot v. State of

Gujarat, (2021) 19 SCC 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 347 that minor

contradictions cannot be used to discard the prosecution case. It was

observed at page 564:

“22. We also do not find any substance in the argument of

the learned counsel that there are major contradictions in

the deposition of PWs 18 and 19. The contradictions that are

sought to be projected are minor contradictions that cannot

be the basis for discarding their evidence. The judgment of

this Court in Mohar [Mohar v. State of U.P., (2002) 7 SCC 606:

2003 SCC (Cri) 121], relied on by the learned counsel for the

respondent State, supports the case of the prosecution. In

the aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that convincing

34.2026:HHC:21286

evidence is required to discredit an injured witness. Para 11

of the judgment reads as follows: (SCC p. 611)

“11. The testimony of an injured witness has its own

efficacy and relevancy. The fact that the witness

sustained injuries on his body would show that he was

present at the place of occurrence and had seen the

occurrence by himself. Convincing evidence would be

required to discredit an injured witness. Similarly,

every discrepancy in the statement of a witness cannot

be treated as fatal. A discrepancy which does not affect

the prosecution’s case materially cannot create any

infirmity. In the instant case, the discrepancy in the

name of PW 4 appearing in the FIR and the cross-

examination of PW 1 has been amply clarified. In

cross-examination, PW 1 clarified that his brother

Ram Awadh had three sons: ( 1) Jagdish, PW 4, (2)

Jagarnath, and (3) Suresh. This witness, however,

stated that Jagarjit had only one name. PW 2 Vibhuti,

however, stated that at the time of occurrence, the son

of Ram Awadh, Jagjit alias Jagarjit, was milking a cow,

and he was also called as Jagdish. Balli (PW 3)

mentioned his name as Jagjit and Jagdish. PW 4 also

gave his name as Jagdish.”

23. The learned counsel for the respondent State has also

relied on the judgment of this Court in Naresh [State of U.P. v.

Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324: (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216]. In the

aforesaid judgment, this Court has held that the evidence of

injured witnesses cannot be brushed aside without assigning

cogent reasons. Paras 27 and 30 of the judgment, which are

relevant, read as under: (SCC pp. 333-34)

“27. The evidence of an injured witness must be given due

weight, being a stamped witness; thus, his presence

cannot be doubted. His statement is generally considered

to be very reliable, and it is unlikely that he has spared the

actual assailant in order to falsely implicate someone else.

35.2026:HHC:21286

The testimony of an injured witness has its own relevancy

and efficacy as he has sustained injuries at the time and

place of occurrence, and this lends support to his

testimony that he was present during the occurrence.

Thus, the testimony of an injured witness is accorded a

special status in law. The witness would not like or want

to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to

implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the

offence. Thus, the evidence of the injured witness should

be relied upon unless there are grounds for the rejection

of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and

discrepancies therein. (Vide Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab

[Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1

SCC (Cri) 107], Balraje v. State of Maharashtra [Balraje v.

State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6 SCC 673: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)

211] and Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P. [Abdul Sayeed v. State

of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 259: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1262])

***

30. In all criminal cases, normal discrepancies are bound

to occur in the depositions of witnesses due to normal

errors of observation, namely, errors of memory due to

lapse of time or due to mental dispositions such as shock

and horror at the time of occurrence. Where the

omissions amount to a contradiction, creating serious

doubt about the truthfulness of the witness and other

witnesses also make material improvement while

deposing in the court, such evidence cannot be safe to rely

upon. However, minor contradictions, inconsistencies,

embellishments or improvements on trivial matters

which do not affect the core of the prosecution case,

should not be made a ground on which the evidence can

be rejected in its entirety. The court has to form its

opinion about the credibility of the witness and record a

finding as to whether his deposition inspires confidence.

36.2026:HHC:21286

‘9. Exaggerations, per se, do not render the evidence brittle.

But it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the

prosecution version when the entire evidence is put in a

crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility.’

[Ed.: As observed in Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar

Singh, (2004) 9 SCC 186, p. 192, para 9: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1435]

Therefore, mere marginal variations in the statements of a

witness cannot be dubbed as improvements, as the same

may be elaborations of the statement made by the witness

earlier. The omissions which amount to contradictions in

material particulars, i.e. go to the root of the case/materially

affect the trial or core of the prosecution's case, render the

testimony of the witness liable to be discredited. (Vide State

v. Saravanan [State v. Saravanan, (2008) 17 SCC 587 : (2010) 4

SCC (Cri) 580], Arumugam v. State [Arumugam v. State, (2008)

15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], Mahendra Pratap Singh v.

State of U.P. [Mahendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 11

SCC 334 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1352 ] and Sunil Kumar

Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra [Sunil Kumar

Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 13 SCC

657 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 375]”

24. Further, in Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of

Maharashtra [Narayan Chetanram Chaudhary v. State of

Maharashtra, (2000) 8 SCC 457: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1546], this

Court has considered the effect of the minor contradictions

in the depositions of witnesses while appreciating the

evidence in a criminal trial. In the aforesaid judgment, it is

held that only contradictions in material particulars and not

minor contradictions can be grounds to discredit the

testimony of the witnesses. The relevant portion of para 42

of the judgment reads as under: (SCC p. 483)

“42. Only such omissions that amount to a

contradiction in material particulars can be used to

discredit the testimony of the witness. The omission in

the police statement by itself would not necessarily

37.2026:HHC:21286

render the testimony of the witness unreliable. When

the version given by the witness in the court is

different in material particulars from that disclosed in

his earlier statements, the case of the prosecution

becomes doubtful and not otherwise. Minor

contradictions are bound to appear in the statements

of truthful witnesses, as memory sometimes plays

false, and the sense of observation differs from person

to person. The omissions in the earlier statement, if

found to be of trivial details, as in the present case, the

same would not cause any dent in the testimony of PW

2. Even if there is a contradiction of a statement of a

witness on any material point, that is no ground to

reject the whole of the testimony of such witness.”

35. It was submitted that the statements of witnesses Sudhir

Rana (PW-8) and Subhash Rana (PW-9) were recorded after the

examination of ASI Mehar Deen, and the defence counsel could not

have put the contradictions and confrontations to the investigating

officer. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down

by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram, (1999)

3 SCC 507: 1999 SCC (Cri) 436: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 315 that the defence

can always summon the investigating officer to prove the former

statement. It was observed at page 516:

“32. One of the permitted modes of impeaching the credit of

a witness is proof of former statements which is

inconsistent with any part of his testimony, as indicated in

Section 155(3) of the Evidence Act. But the mode of using

such former statements for the purposes of contradicting

38.2026:HHC:21286

the witness is prescribed in Section 145 of the Evidence Act.

It cannot be contended that the aforesaid former statement

was not available for the defence to confront PW 15 (Mota

Ram) with since the Head Constable PW 8 was examined

later. It was open to the defence to request for recalling the

witness for the purpose of further cross-examination to

impeach his veracity on the strength of the alleged former

statement which came on record subsequently (vide Naba

Kumar Das v. Rudra Narayan Jana [AIR 1923 PC 95: 28 CWN

589]). In this case, PW 15 was not asked anything about what

he had told or not told PW 8, Head Constable. We are unable

to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel on that

score. In view of the retracing made by PW 8 during the

latter part of the cross-examination, we are not disposed to

give any further opportunity to the accused to confront PW

15 with that material.”

36. In the present case also, it was open for the defence to seek

further cross-examination of the investigating officer after the

examination of Sudhir Rana and Subhash Rana, and if they had not

sought the further examination of the investigating officer, they

cannot take the advantage of it.

37. It was submitted that the prosecution witnesses admitted

that the place of the incident is heavily populated, and no independent

witness was examined. This submission will not help the accused. The

Court has found that the testimonies of the injured are reliable and

there is no reason to disbelieve those testimonies. Therefore, the

question of corroboration would not arise in the present case because

39.2026:HHC:21286

the corroboration is required when the testimony of a witness is found

to be not wholly reliable and requires confirmation from independent

sources. Since, in the present case, the testimonies of the injured

witnesses are satisfactory, the non-examination of independent

witnesses will not make the prosecution's case suspect.

38. Virender Kumar (DW-1) stated that he was discharging the

duties from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on 13.11.2006 at Shiv temple. No

quarrel had taken place on that date. He knew the accused and the

accused or the police officials had not visited the temple complex on

13.11.2006. He stated in his cross-examination that he and Ramesh

Kumar were posted as security guards. The complex of the temple was

huge. There were five passages to the temple. He admitted that it is

difficult to find out what is happening if one stands towards the side of

the temple. He could not say as to what had transpired on 13.11. 2006.

39. The statement of this witness is not sufficient to discard the

prosecution's case. He has not given any particular reason for

remembering the date 13.11.2006. Further, he admitted that a person

standing on the side of the temple cannot know what was happening on

the other side, which shows that it was possible for a person standing

on one side not to know about the quarrel that had taken place towards

40.2026:HHC:21286

the other side. Therefore, the testimony of this witness cannot be used

to discard the prosecution's case.

40. Arun Kumar (DW-2) has not supported the prosecution's

case. He stated that the informant party was beaten by some unknown

persons, and a false case was made against the accused. He has not

assigned any cogent reason to falsely implicate the accused. He had not

protested before any person regarding the false implication of the

accused. Therefore, it is difficult to rely upon his testimony to discard

the prosecution's case.

41. The statement (Ext.PW4/A) mentions that Vishal Thakur

and his friend Suman Kumar came to the temple complex with 5-6

people and gave beatings to the informant party. This clearly shows

that the victim was aware of the names of only two persons and did not

know the others. The informant, Sudhir Rana, stated that Goldi, Suman

Kumar and other accused came to the spot and attacked him. Similarly,

Subhash Rana stated that the accused came to the spot and gave

beatings to them. Therefore, the identity of only two persons, namely

Goldi and Suman Kumar, has been established, and the other persons

have been described as the accused persons without identifying them

by their names. The act done by the accused was also not mentioned by

41.2026:HHC:21286

the witnesses. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Pandurang vs. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216, that it is unsafe to

rely upon the omnibus statement that the accused had committed the

offence. It was observed:

“Rasikabai says that the "accused" raised their axes and

sticks and threatened her when she called out to them, but

that again is an all-embracing statement which we are not

prepared to take literally in the absence of further

particulars. People do not ordinarily act in unison like a

Greek chorus, and, quite apart from dishonesty, this is a

favourite device with witnesses who are either not mentally

alert or are mentally lazy and are given to loose thinking.

They are often apt to say "all" even when they only saw

"some" because they are too lazy, mentally, to differentiate.

Unless, therefore, a witness particularises when there are

several accused, it is ordinarily unsafe to accept omnibus

inclusions like this at their face value.”

42. Therefore, the vague statements made by the witnesses

that the accused persons had given beatings are not sufficient to

establish the identity of the accused, except Goldy and Suman.

43. ASI Mehar Deen (PW4) did not explain how he traced the

other accused. It was laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand

v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 702: 2002 SCC (Cri) 256: 2001 SCC

OnLine SC 1243 that when the identity of the accused is not disclosed,

the Investigating Officers should explain the steps leading to the

42.2026:HHC:21286

detection of the offender to exclude the likelihood of his innocence

having been branded as a culprit. It was observed at 713:

“26. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on

record an observation of ours, touching on an aspect of the

case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a

cognizable crime having been committed is known, but

neither the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there

any indication available of the witnesses who would be able

to furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to

the test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant

investigating officer, well-versed with the techniques of the

job, is in a position to collect the threads of evidence,

finding out the path that leads to the culprit. The ends,

which the administration of criminal justice serves, are not

achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The

accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The

evidence of the investigating officer given in the court

should have a rhythm explaining step by step how the

investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the

offender and the collection of evidence against him. This is

necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent person

having been picked up and branded as a culprit, and then the

gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy persuading

the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious

circumstances, treating them as of “beyond doubt”

evidentiary value”..

44. The prosecution relied upon the identification made in the

Court. However, not much advantage can be derived from the

identification made for the first time in the Court. Professor Rupert

Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence, Fifth

43.2026:HHC:21286

Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first

time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed:

"It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not

be better identification of an accused than that of a witness

who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock

is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time,

or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence

is suspect where there has been no previous identification of

the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is

reduced by the reflection that, if there is any degree of

resemblance between the man in the dock and the person

previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to

himself that the police must have got hold of the right

person, particularly if he has already described the latter to

them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear

positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain.

People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well

known to them with sufficient frequency to make them

question the propriety of convicting an accused person on

nothing more than the visual identification of a single

witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in

poor light."

45. It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4

th

Edition

Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the

Court is improper and the witness should be asked to identify the

accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in

para 363:

“A witness shouldn't be asked to identify the defendant for

the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general

44.2026:HHC:21286

practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed

previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential

witnesses may be asked to pick him up.”

46. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.

Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791: 2024

SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the

witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is

not acceptable. It was observed on page 605:

“17. The admitted position in this case is that the test

identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was

not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified

the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not

known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not

seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a

stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them

have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime

while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”!

xxx

21.It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police

investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a

substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of

evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock

identification, that is, identification made by a witness in

court during the trial. This identification has been made in

court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismissed

the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the

appellant, i.e. Accused 2, was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1

had seen the appellant for the first time when he was

wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit

the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the

court was not proper.

45.2026:HHC:21286

xxxx

23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong

in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of

the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a

witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be

very cautious while accepting the dock identification by

such a witness (see: Kunjumon v. State of Kerala, (2012) 13

SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406]).

xxx

27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the

accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by

the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis of

TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown

by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of

Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab,

(2022) 9 SCC 402: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404.

28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, this Court

disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by

a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the

aspect of TIP in the following words: (Jayan v. State of

Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38, SCC p. 44, para 18)

“18. It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the

investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The

question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is

not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by

a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first

time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a

weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time

gap between the date of the incident and the date of

recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may

make the identification of the accused by the witness before

the Court trustworthy.”

46.2026:HHC:21286

47. Therefore, the identification of the accused by the witnesses

for the first time in the Court without any corroboration from previous

Test Identification Parades will be meaningless, and cannot be relied

upon to record the conviction.

48. Thus, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the

identity of the accused Suman Thakur and Vishal Thakur alias Goldi

was established, but erred in holding that the identity of Nagesh

Awasthi, Arvind Katoch and Gopal Singh was proved.

49. Doctor Sunita (PW-3) admitted in her cross-examination

that the injuries noticed by her are consistent with a fall on a hard

surface. It was submitted that this testimony makes the defence

version highly probable that the injuries were caused by a fall. This

submission is only stated to be rejected. The Medical Officer had

admitted an alternative hypothesis in her cross-examination, and an

alternative hypothesis admitted by the medical Officer does not make

the prosecution's case suspect. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai, (2003) 12 SCC 395: 2003

SCC OnLine SC 1086, that when the testimonies of the witnesses are

found credible, the medical evidence pointing to alternative

47.2026:HHC:21286

possibilities is not sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. It was

observed at page 404:

“22. It is trite that where the eyewitnesses' account is found

credible and trustworthy, medical opinion pointing to

alternative possibilities is not accepted as conclusive.

Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice.

Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the

trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful

independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility,

which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other

evidence, including the medical evidence, the sole

touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence

must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent

probability of the story; consistency with the account of

other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with

the undisputed facts; the “credit” of the witnesses; their

performance in the witness box; their power of observation,

etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes

eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative

evaluation.”

50. The accused examined Arun Kumar (DW-2), who

specifically stated that Sudhir Rana and Subhash Rana were injured by

beatings. Therefore, the defence never doubted the fact that the injuries

were caused by means of beating. Hence, the admission made by the

Medical Officer in her cross-examination that the injuries can be

caused by a fall will not make the prosecution's case suspect.

51. Tanuj Kumar (PW-1) did not support the prosecution's case.

He stated that he was not aware of the facts of the case. He was

48.2026:HHC:21286

permitted to be cross-examined by the learned APP, and he admitted

in his cross-examination that he had gone to the temple. He had not

witnessed anything. He denied the previous statement recorded by the

police. ASI Mehar Deen (PW-4) specifically stated that he had written

the statement of Tanuj Kumar (Ext. PW 4/A) as per his version. This

was not suggested to be incorrect in the cross-examination, which

means that this part of his testimony has been accepted as correct.

Hence, Tanuj Kumar is shown to have made two inconsistent

statements, one before the police that he had witnessed the incident

and the other before the Court that he had not witnessed any incident.

Therefore, his credit has been impeached under Section 155 (3) of the

Indian Evidence Act, and no reliance can be placed upon his testimony.

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi

Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has been thoroughly

discredited by confronting him with the previous statement, his

statement cannot be relied upon. However, when he is confronted with

some portions of the previous statement, his credibility is shaken to

that extent, and the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was

observed:

“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that

even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-

49.2026:HHC:21286

examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by the

party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be

treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the

Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of

such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness

stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed

regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in

the process, the credit of the witness has not been

completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering

the evidence of the witness as a whole, with due caution and

care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record,

that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy

and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony

of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness

stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as

a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”

52. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman versus.

State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:

“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been

called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined

on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility

and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support

for the view we have taken from the various authorities of

the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi

Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400 , the Apex

Court observed:

"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has

been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be

cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the

result of that course being adopted is to discredit this

witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part

of his testimony. Thus, his testimony cannot be

used to discard the prosecution's version.

50.2026:HHC:21286

53. Tara Chand (PW-2) is the witness to recovery. He did not

support the prosecution's case and stated that no recovery was made in

his presence. He admitted in his cross-examination that he had signed

the memo after acknowledging its correctness, and his signature was

not obtained forcibly. He also denied the previous statement recorded

by the police. ASI Mehar Deen proved that he had recorded the

statement of Tara Chand (Ext. Pw 4/D) as per his version. Therefore,

Tara Chand is also shown to have made two inconsistent statements

and his credit has been impeached.

54. Even if the recovery of the sticks is not proved, the same will

not make the prosecution's case suspect. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anwarul Haq v. State of U.P., (2005) 10 SCC

581: 2005 SCC OnLine SC 865 that the failure to recover the weapon of

offence will not be fatal to the prosecution. It was observed at page 585:

“15. Eyewitnesses in the present case have described the

knife, and merely because the knife has not been recovered

during the investigation, the same cannot be a factor to

discard the evidence of PWs 1 and 2. Wounds noticed by the

doctor (PW 3) also throw considerable light on this aspect.

The doctor's opinion about the weapon, though theoretical,

cannot be totally wiped out. In that view of the matter, the

appellant has been rightly convicted under Section 324 IPC.”

55. Therefore, the prosecution's case cannot be doubted simply

because the recovery of sticks was doubtful.

51.2026:HHC:21286

56. It was submitted that the prosecution has not proved the

motive in the incident, which makes the prosecution's case doubtful.

This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Subhash Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2025) 8 SCC

440: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 808 that failure to prove motive is not

sufficient to record acquittal. It was observed at page 449:

“29. The declaration in the cited decisions and the decisions

relied on therein is to the effect that if the case is built solely

upon circumstantial evidence, the absence of motive will be

a factor that weighs in favour of the accused. Just as a strong

motive does not by itself result in a conviction, the absence

of motive on that sole ground cannot result in an acquittal.

When the eyewitnesses are not convincing, a strong motive

cannot by itself result in conviction. Likewise, when the

circumstances are very convincing and provide an unbroken

chain leading only to the conclusion of guilt of the accused

and not to any other hypothesis, the total absence of a

motive will be of no consequence.

30. We extract para 17 from a three-Judge Bench decision,

Jan Mohammad v. State of Bihar [Jan Mohammad v. State of

Bihar, (1953) 1 SCC 5], which also is of vintage flavour,

succinctly putting forth the proposition: (SCC p. 12)

“17. Motive is a relevant fact under the Evidence Act

(Section 8). It is an important element in a chain of

presumptive proof where the evidence is purely

circumstantial, but it may lose importance in a case

where there is direct evidence by witnesses implicating

the accused. In a case such as the present, where the

prosecution evidence itself shows that the relations

between the deceased and the appellants were cordial,

52.2026:HHC:21286

the absence of an apparent motive, though not

necessarily fatal to the prosecution case, may reasonably

be regarded as a fact in favour of the accused. We think,

therefore, that the attempt to prove a motive against any

of the appellants has failed. [sic]”

31. Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar [Suresh Chandra

Bahri v. State of Bihar, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80: 1995 SCC (Cri)

60] held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence,

proof of motive would “supply a link in the chain of

circumstances” but all the same, absence of motive cannot

be a ground to altogether reject the prosecution case. Para 21

reads as follows: (SCC p. 95)

“21. At the very outset, we may mention that sometimes

motive plays an important role and becomes a

compelling force to commit a crime, and therefore, the

motive behind the crime is a relevant factor for which

evidence may be adduced. A motive is something that

prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do a

certain illegal act or even a legal act, but with illegal

means, with a view to achieve that intention. In a case

where there is clear proof of motive for the commission of

the crime, it affords added support to the finding of the court

that the accused was guilty of the offence charged with. But it

has to be remembered that the absence of proof of motive

does not render the evidence bearing on the guilt of the

accused nonetheless untrustworthy or unreliable because

most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who

knows as to what circumstances prompted him to a certain

course of action leading to the commission of the crime.”

(emphasis supplied)

32. Sukhpal Singh v. State of Punjab [Sukhpal Singh v. State of

Punjab, (2019) 15 SCC 622 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 460] found that

if prosecution establishes motive, it will undoubtedly

strengthen the prosecution case, but to say that absence of

motive will be fatal to the prosecution, irrespective of other

53.2026:HHC:21286

material before the court in the form of circumstantial

evidence is far-fetched. Para 15 reads as follows: (SCC p.

627)

“15. The last submission that we are called upon to deal

with is that there is no motive established against the

appellant for committing murder. It is undoubtedly true

that the question of motive may assume significance in a

prosecution case based on circumstantial evidence. But

the question is whether, in a case of circumstantial evidence,

the inability on the part of the prosecution to establish a

motive is fatal to the prosecution's case. We would think that

while it is true that if the prosecution establishes a motive for

the accused to commit a crime it will undoubtedly strengthen

the prosecution version based on circumstantial evidence,

but that is far cry from saying that the absence of a motive

for the commission of the crime by the accused will

irrespective of other material available before the court by

way of circumstantial evidence be fatal to the prosecution. In

such circumstances, on account of the circumstances

which stand established by evidence as discussed above,

we find no merit in the appeal and the same shall stand

dismissed.” (emphasis supplied)

33. Motive remains hidden in the inner recesses of the mind

of the perpetrator, which cannot, oftener than ever, be

ferreted out by the investigation agency. Though in a case of

circumstantial evidence, the complete absence of motive

would weigh in favour of the accused, it cannot be declared

as a general proposition of universal application that, in the

absence of motive, the entire inculpatory circumstances

should be ignored and the accused acquitted.”

57. In the present case, the testimonies of the witnesses are

found to be reliable, and the absence of the motive will not make the

prosecution’s case doubtful.

54.2026:HHC:21286

58. It was submitted that the police had not recovered the

clothes of the injured, which makes the prosecution's case doubtful.

This submission cannot be accepted. It has been noted above that the

testimonies of injured witnesses are reliable; hence, they do not require

any corroboration. The recovery of the clothes would have only

provided the corroboration, and the non-recovery of torn clothes will

not make the prosecution’s case doubtful.

59. In the present case, the prosecution evidence establishes

that the accused Vishal Thakur and Suman Thakur, along with some

persons, had attacked and beaten the injured. The prosecution has

failed to prove the identity of those persons, but that will not make the

prosecution's case suspect that 4-5 persons had attacked Sudhir Rana

and Subhash Rana. Therefore, Sections 147 and 149 will continue to

apply.

60. The prosecution evidence proved that the accused Vishal

Thakur and Suman Thakur along with other persons had wrongfully

restrained the informant Sudhir Rana and Subhash Rana and caused

simple hurt to Sudhir Rana and grievous hurt to Subhash Rana in

furtherance of the common object of wrongfully restraining and

causing hurt to the informant party, therefore, they were rightly

55.2026:HHC:21286

convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341,

323, 325, 147 read with Section 149 of IPC.

61. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the

commission of an offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC. This

conviction was upheld by the learned Appellate Court. Criminal

intimidation is defined in Section 503 of the IPC as under: -

503. Criminal intimidation

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person,

reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of

anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to

cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any

act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any

act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means

of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal

intimidation.

Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any

deceased person in whom the person threatened is

interested is within this section.

62. Section 503 requires that the threat of injury should have

been made with an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act,

which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any act which he

is legally entitled to do. It was laid down by this Court in Inder Pratap

Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the

complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the

accused to attract section 506 of IPC. It was observed:

56.2026:HHC:21286

“21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation

can be made out, it must be established prima facie that the

accused persons (like petitioners in the present case)

intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party, i. e.,

Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by

the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from

interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his

exclusive property, would not constitute an offence of

criminal intimidation.”

63. Similar is the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vikram

Johar v. State of U.P., (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC

OnLine SC 609 wherein it was held at page 209: -

“25. Now, reverting back to Section 506, which is an offence

of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona

Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1

SCC (Cri) 715 have also to be applied when the question of

finding out as to whether the ingredients of the offence are

made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant

abused the complainant. For proving an offence under

Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients that have to be

proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of

Crimes, 27th Edn., with regard to proof of offence, states the

following:

“… The prosecution must prove:

(i) That the accused threatened some person.

(ii) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person,

reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property

of someone in whom he was interested;

(iii) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or

to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally

bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled

57.2026:HHC:21286

to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.”

(emphasis supplied)

A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not

satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.

64. Therefore, it is necessary to prove that the accused had

caused an alarm to the informant or had caused him to do anything,

which he would not have done or omitted to do anything which he

would have done but for the threat.

65. Sudhir Rana and Subhash Chand have not stated that the

intimidation had caused alarm to them. Sudhir Rana (PW-8) stated that

the accused had told him not to depose against them; otherwise, they

would be killed. Subhash Rana (PW-9) stated that the accused left the

spot and threatened them. Therefore, no witness has stated that they

were alarmed by the threats advanced by the accused; hence, they

cannot be convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under

Section 506 read with Section 149 of the IPC.

66. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to

undergo simple imprisonment for one year for the commission of an

offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC and pay a fine of ₹

1000/-, and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple

imprisonment for two months. The rest of the sentences were less than

this sentence. Considering that the accused had gathered together and

58.2026:HHC:21286

given beatings to the informant party in the temple premises, a public

place, resulting in grievous hurt to Subhash Rana, the punishment of

one year cannot be said to be excessive. The other sentences are less

than one year and cannot be said to be harsh. Therefore, no

interference is required with the sentences imposed by the learned trial

court as affirmed by the learned Appellate Court.

67. In view of the above, the Criminal Revision No. 83 of 2015 is

allowed and accused Nagesh Awasthi, Gopal Singh and Arvind Katoch

are acquitted of the commission of the offences, with which, they were

charged and Criminal Revision No. 86 of 2015 is partly allowed and

accused Vishal Thakur & accused Suman Thakur are acquitted of the

commission of offences punishable under Section 506 read with

Section 149 of the IPC.

68. The fine amount be refunded to the accused after the period

of appeal in case no appeal is preferred, and in case of appeal, the same

be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

69. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of

Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023) the petitioners Nagesh Awasthi, Gopal Singh and Arvind Katoch

are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one

59.2026:HHC:21286

surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar

(Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for

six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave

Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the

petitioners on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court.

70 A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned

Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

03 June 2026. (meera)