2025 INSC 643 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2127 OF 2024]

P. NALLAMMAL …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE, VIGILANCE AND ANTI-

CORRUPTION POLICE, DINDIGUL, TAMIL NADU

…RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2288 OF 2024]

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 2491-2492 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO(S).5196-5197 OF

2024]

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1.I had the benefit of going through the Judgment authored by my

learned brother Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. where the Accused

No.2 (P. Nallammal) has been acquitted for the offence under

2

Section 109 of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2)

of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as

‘the PC Act’). Though I agree with some of the observations

made by my brother Judge, yet I am unable to accept the

conclusion and findings of acquittal as regards Accused No.2,

who was the wife of the public servant Accused No.1.

Consequently, I have found it necessary to pen down my

reasons for doing so.

2.I would, first of all, make it clear that the delivery of this order

has taken more time than usual. But then I was only handed

over his opinion by my learned Brother a fortnight back and it

has taken this much of time further for me to give my reasons.

3.Leave granted.

4.There are four appeals before us:

a.Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2127/2024 filed by the

Accused No.2 (P. Nallammal) challenging the impugned

order dated 20.11.2023 by which appellant’s conviction

and sentence of one year R.I for offence under Section 109

of IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of PC

Act by the Trial Court, has been affirmed.

3

b.Appeal arising from SLP (Crl) No.2288/2024 filed by

Accused No.2 and Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children

of the Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the

attachment Order as modified by the impugned order dated

20.11.2023.

c.Appeals arising from SLP (Crl) No.5196-5197/2024 filed by

the Legal Heirs of the Accused No.1 (children of the

Accused No.1 and Accused No.2), challenging the

Administrative Order dated 03.03.2022 by which the Chief

Justice of the High Court had listed the criminal appeals

for fresh hearing which finally resulted in the common

impugned order dated 20.11.2023 by which order of

Accused No.2’s conviction and sentence as well as the order

of the attachment, with modification, were affirmed.

5.For the sake of convenience, the facts of the case are being taken

from the Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl) No. 2127 of

2024. However, the facts are not being reproduced in detail.

6.For the present purpose, it is sufficient to take note of the

following details of this case:

a.Accused no.1 (husband of the appellant) who was a

Member of the Legislative Assembly and a Minister, was

4

accused of acquiring disproportionate assets while holding

public office as a public servant. The properties were also

accumulated in the name of the present appellant i.e.

Accused no.2 and their minor children. The present

appellant was thus accused of abetting the accumulation of

disproportionate assets.

b.The Trial Court convicted Accused No.1 under sections

13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act, whereas the appellant

(Accused No.2) was convicted under sections 13(2) and

13(1)(e) of the PC Act read with section 109 of the IPC.

Accused No.1 and appellant (Accused No.2) were sentenced

to rigorous imprisonment of two years and one year,

respectively.

c.An attachment order dated 03.01.2001 was passed under

sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment

Ordinance, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Ordinance’),

whereby the disproportionate assets belonging to Accused

No.1 and the appellant were attached.

d.Against both these orders (of conviction and sentence, and

attachment, respectively), the accused filed appeals before

the High Court. The High Court dismissed the criminal

5

appeals by the impugned judgment dated 20.11.2023.

However, the High Court modified the attachment order by

reducing the quantum of disproportionate assets calculated

by the Trial Court.

e.During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court,

Accused No.1 (husband of the appellant) has passed away.

Now, we have only Accused No.2 i.e. P. Nallammal, wife of

the main accused (A.M Paramasivam) who is now

deceased, before us.

7.The challenge before us is to a judgment delivered by the Madras

High Court on 20.11.2023, whereby the conviction of the

appellant under sections 13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the PC Act read

with section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘IPC’) and consequent sentence of rigorous

imprisonment of one year imposed by the Trial Court was

upheld.

8.At the outset, I must note that there are concurrent findings

against the accused in this case, holding her guilty of abetment

in amassing disproportionate assets during Accused No.1’s

tenure in public office i.e. between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996

(hereinafter ‘check period’).

6

9.The prosecution case was that the accused had amassed

disproportionate assets, since there was a vast difference

between the assets in their name at the beginning of the check

period i.e., between 16.06.1991 and 09.05.1996. The

prosecution case against the present appellant was that

although she had no independent income as such, she abetted

her husband in acquisition of these assets in her name and in

the name of her children as their representative and natural

guardian.

10.On the other hand, defence would argue that the figure of

disproportionate assets arrived at by the prosecution was

grossly exaggerated and based on arbitrary calculations. They

had also challenged the inclusion of many immovable

properties by the prosecution, arguing that these were acquired

before the check period. It was also the contention that their

assets were traceable to legitimate sources of income, such as

income from agriculture, gifts etc. and this was forthcoming

from the Income Tax returns submitted by them. Moreover, the

counsel for the appellant would also argue that the present

appellant, in any case, is not a public servant and thus, she

has no obligation to explain her sources of income and further,

7

she cannot be convicted under Section 109 of IPC read with

Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2).

11.We have heard both sides and perused the record.

12.The Trial Court undertook a thorough examination of the oral

and documentary evidence on record, as well as the arguments

made by both sides, to arrive at the conclusion that the

prosecution had proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and

that the Accused No.1 was guilty of misusing his public office

in order to accumulate disproportionate assets, which

constituted ‘criminal misconduct’ under section 13 of the Act.

Further, the present appellant, i.e. Accused no.2, was held

guilty of abetment of the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC

Act. It was specifically held that the accused had failed to

establish that the assets treated as disproportionate by the

prosecution were traceable to legitimate sources of income,

since the evidence brought on record by the accused to prove

the same was not satisfactory. These findings of the Trial Court

were affirmed by the High Court by the impugned judgment.

13.Before us, the learned counsel for the appellant also tried to

argue that many of the assets considered by the Courts as

‘disproportionate assets’, were actually gifted by the father of

8

the appellant at the time of her marriage to accused No.1.

Further, a substantial portion of the immovable properties

sought to be included in the ‘disproportionate assets’ by the

prosecution were, in fact, purchased long before the check

period. These arguments have rightly been disbelieved as the

Trial Court arrived at a specific finding on these on

examination of documents and witnesses which show that the

properties were purchased only between March and May 1996,

which falls within the check period.

14.The story of defence that some portion of land, included in

‘disproportionate assets’, was purchased by Accused No.1 from

his brother in the year 1988 (i.e. before the check period), but

for which the sale deed was executed in favour of the children

of the Accused No.1 and appellant only in the year 1994, is

very difficult to believe, and the High Court and the Trial Court

rightly rejected this line of reasoning.

15.The efforts to prove that the income alleged to be

‘disproportionate assets’ by the prosecution is from legitimate

sources failed as the evidence presented by the defence was not

only vague but lacked credibility as well.

9

16.We must also keep in mind that insofar as corruption cases

under section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act are concerned, the burden

of proof is reversed, and it becomes the responsibility of the

accused to dislodge the presumption against him. This position

has been reiterated by this Court in State of T.N. v. R.

Soundirarasu (2023) 6 SCC 768:

“83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a

departure from the principle of criminal

jurisprudence that the burden will always lie on

the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the

offences charged and never shifts on the

accused to disprove the charge framed against

him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is

that it is for the prosecution to establish

that the accused was in possession of

properties disproportionate to his known

sources of income but the term “known

sources of income” would mean the sources

known to the prosecution and not the

sources known to the accused and within

the knowledge of the accused. It is for the

accused to account satisfactorily for the

money/assets in his hands. The onus in

this regard is on the accused to give

satisfactory explanation… ”

In the present case, the prosecution succeeded in establishing

that the accused were in possession of assets hugely

disproportionate to their known sources of income. The

prosecution had successfully discharged its initial burden.

Thereafter, it was for the accused to satisfy the Court, through

10

cogent evidence, that the assets are from legitimate sources.

Upon perusal of the material on record and considering the

concurrent findings of the Courts below, I am of the opinion

that the accused miserably failed to discharge this burden of

satisfactorily explaining the source of income behind the

‘disproportionate assets’.

17.In fact, as far as the evaluation of disproportionate assets is

concerned, I and my learned brother (Ahsanuddin Amanullah,

J.), both agree that the High Court has rightly evaluated the

assets, after considering the material on record. The only point

of our disagreement is the question of the culpability of the

appellant (P. Nallammal). In the opinion of my learned brother

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J., it was the appellant’s husband

(Accused No.1) who had accumulated assets disproportionate to

his known sources of income and the prosecution could not

prove that the appellant was aware that the money from which

assets were being purchased or bought in her name, were from

unlawful sources. It is this finding that I disagree with.

18.There is no doubt that mere registration of disproportionate

assets in the name of a public servant’s relative or friend does

not make that person guilty of abetment of the offence of

11

Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. All the same, it is also a settled

position of law that a person who is not a public servant still

can commit an offence under Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2)

of the PC Act read with Section 109 of the IPC. I am of the

opinion that the appellant was an accomplice in the

commission of the crime when she allowed Accused No.1 to

register the properties in her name. Where there is abetment by

a close relative in corruption matters, such as the spouse in the

present case, the culpability of such a relative has to be tested

by the surrounding circumstances and his/her overall conduct.

This is because, in such cases, there would rarely be direct

evidence of abetment. This factor has to be kept in mind.

19.The appellant married Accused No.1 in the year 1983 and she

was a housewife without any independent source of income.

After going through the records, the High Court notes that from

the year of marriage (i.e.1983) till 1991, there is no acquisition

of immovable property either in the name of the appellant or

Accused No.1. Accused No.1 became MLA in the year 1991 and

minister in the year 1993 and then the acquisition of

properties, moveable and immovable, also starts. After perusing

the document showing the properties acquired by the accused,

12

the Trial Court observed how land was purchased in the name

of the appellant or in the name of minor children through the

appellant, on more than one occasion. This is what was

observed by the Trial Court:

“(5) On 25.11.92, the 2nd Accused purchased

0.45 Acres of land for a sale consideration of

Rs.16,875 situated at Kodikulam Village under

Ex.P.2, Stamp fee is Rs.2,030, PW-1, PW-46

deposed about sale. (6) On 14.02.1992, the 2nd

Accused purchased 9 cents of land for a sale

consideration of Rs. 4500 situated at Kodikulam

Village under Ex. P.11, Stamp fee is Rs.540, PW-

2, PW-48 deposed about sale. (7) On

16.04.1993, the 2nd Accused purchased 1.45

acre of land for a sale consideration of

Rs.64,980 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian

situated at Kodikulum Village under Ex.P.3,

Stamp fee is Rs.7860, PW-1, PW-47 deposed

about sale. (8) On 22.09.1993, the 2nd Accused

purchased a house situated at K.K Nagar,

Madurai and 1 cents of land situated at Kerala,

for a sale consideration of Rs1,50,000 under

Ex.P.16, Stamp fee is Rs.9050, PW-4, PW-44

deposed about sale. On 04.04.1994, the 2nd

Accused purchased 2.48 acres of Nanja land for

a sale consideration of Rs.80,600 on behalf of

Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam

Village under Ex.P.4, Stamp fee is Rs.9680, PW-

1, PW-54 deposed about sale. (10) On

12.09.1994, the 2nd Accused purchased 2.43

acres of Nanja land for a sale consideration of

Rs.1,23,160 on behalf of Selvakumar Pandian

situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.5,

Stamp fee is Rs.14,860, PW-1, PW-45 deposed

about sale. (11) On 23.09.1994, the 2nd

Accused purchased 1.29 acre of Nanja land for

a sale consideration of Rs.70,950 on behalf of

Selvakumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam

13

Village under EX.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.8520, PW-

1, Pw-49 deposed about sale…..(14) On

11.04.1996, the 2nd Accused purchased 4.27

acres Nanja land for a sale consideration of

Rs.2,32,210 on behalf of daughter Suriyakala

situated at Kodikulam Village under Ex.P.7,

Stamp fee is Rs.28000, PW-1, PW-51 deposed

about sale….(16) On 06.05.1996, the 2nd

Accused purchased 1.61 acre of Nanja land for

a sale consideration of Rs.87,620 on behalf of

Rajkumar Pandian situated at Kodikulam

Village under Ex.P.6, Stamp fee is Rs.10,680,

PW-1, PW-50 deposed about sale….”

Not only this, but additionally, two cars and other movable and

immovable properties were also purchased in the name of the

appellant and the minor children through the appellant.

20.Thus, it is not the case that there were only one or two

transactions in the name of the appellant for which the

appellant can say that she acted in a bona fide manner without

knowing that the funds which were used for acquiring these

assets were from unlawful sources. In my considered opinion,

these transactions during the check period demonstrate how

the appellant aided her husband in the accumulation of

disproportionate assets by allowing him to register the same in

her name. The High Court notes that the total salary drawn by

accused No.1 during the check period was Rs. 2,17,178, and

considering this, it is impossible to imagine that the appellant

14

was not aware of her husband’s legitimate income. It is very

hard to believe that she was not aware that these assets which

were in her name were not acquired from her husband’s

legitimate sources of income.

21.Moreover, it was never the appellant’s case that she was not

aware that her husband had been purchasing the properties in

her name by using the funds gained from illegitimate sources.

From the Trial Court to this Court, what the appellant has only

been unsuccessfully arguing is that her independent income

was not taken into account and her assets prior to the check

period were not properly assessed. All these grounds have

already been dealt with by the Trial Court and High Court, and

the appellant has failed to show that there has been any

discrepancy in the evaluation of assets. Even on re-evaluation

by the High Court, the High Court has only found a

discrepancy of around Rs.2 lacs and even by reducing that

amount from the total worth of disproportionate assets, the

percentage of disproportionality remained above 400% of the

accused’s known sources of income. There is no doubt that the

appellant intentionally aided her husband in the accumulation

of disproportionate assets.

15

22.The Trial Court as well as the High Court have rightly relied upon

the decision of this Court in P. Nallammal & Anr. v. State

(1999) 6 SCC 559 to hold the appellant guilty of abetment of

the offence of Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act. In that case, this

Court had accepted the submission of the State that a person

who is not a public servant, can also be an abettor for the

offences under Section 13 of the PC Act. Accepting and

reiterating the illustrations suggested by the State’s Counsel, it

was observed by this Court as follows:

“24.…

The first illustration cited is this:

If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him

of how other public servants have become more

wealthy by receiving bribes and A persuades the

public servant to do the same in order to become

rich and the public servant acts accordingly. If it

is a proved position there cannot be any doubt

that A has abetted the offence by instigation.

Next illustration is this:

Four persons including the public servant decide

to raise a bulk amount through bribery and the

remaining persons prompt the public servant to

keep such money in their names. If this is a

proved position then all the said persons are

guilty of abetment through conspiracy.

The last illustration is this:

If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his,

that he has acquired considerable wealth through

bribery but he cannot keep them as he has no

known source of income to account, he

requests A to keep the said wealth in A's name,

16

and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it

is a proved position A is guilty of abetment falling

under the “Thirdly” clause of Section 107 of the

Penal Code.

25. Such illustrations are apt examples of how

the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act

can be abetted by non-public servants. The only

mode of prosecuting such offender is through the

trial envisaged in the PC Act.”

It is clear that the appellant’s case squarely falls within the

third illustration produced above. Interestingly, the case cited

above i.e. of P. Nallamal (Supra) relates to none other but the

present appellant and her deceased husband, who had earlier

approached this Court seeking quashing of the present

criminal case.

23.My learned brother has also discussed two other cases of this

Court, though in my humble opinion, these are distinguishable

on facts and would be of no help to the appellant.

24.The first case is K. Ponnuswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu (2001)

6 SCC 674. In this case, the High Court upheld the conviction

of the main accused for acquiring disproportionate assets while

his wife and daughter were acquitted. When the main accused

came before this Court, this Court dismissed his criminal

appeal, whereas in relation to the acquittal of wife and

daughter, this Court did not say anything since the State had

17

submitted that they are going to file an appeal challenging the

acquittal of the daughter and wife of the main accused. No

such appeal was filed by the State. On the contrary, the wife

and daughter of the main accused therein approached this

Court challenging the order confiscating their properties. This

Court remitted the matter to the High Court on the ground that

the Courts below did not record proper reasons for confiscating

the properties belonging to the wife and daughter. Finally, the

High Court gave directions for the exclusion of their assets from

the order of confiscation, considering that they stand acquitted

in the matter. However, that case cannot be read as a decision

in favour of the daughter and wife, since the innocence or guilt

of the daughter and wife of the public servant involved in that

case was never an issue before this Court. Hence, that case

cannot come to the aid of the present appellant.

25.The second case which my learned brother relies upon is State v.

Uttamchand Bohra (2022) 16 SCC 663 . The facts of this case

are also totally distinguishable from the case at hand. In that

case, a public servant (main accused) working for the Central

Government was accused of buying some property, in the name

of a company named M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., using

18

the money from his unknown sources of income. There one

Uttamchand Bohra (respondent therein) was also made an

accused, alleging that he had abetted the public servant in the

accumulation of disproportionate assets inasmuch as

Uttamchand Bohra’s employee was the witness of the sale

deed, and title deeds were also recovered from his house. The

respondent moved a discharge application, which was

dismissed by the Trial court. Later, in revision, the High Court

quashed the case against Uttamchand Bohra. Thereafter, the

State approached this Court against the order of the High

Court. This Court dismissed the State’s appeal and affirmed

the order of the High Court. The relevant portion of the

judgment is as follows:

“25. The charge-sheet further does not contain

any allegation which can amount to an offence

under Section 109IPC. The prosecution has not

suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire

disproportionate assets in any manner; the only

allegation is that the title deeds to the flat, which

is in the name of M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt.

Ltd. was seized from his custody and that he had

instructed his employee to witness the document.

An allegation of the existence of signatures of

Uttamchand's employee, as a witness to the sale

deed cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1

to acquire disproportionate assets. Witnessing a

sale deed is a formal requirement. Likewise, the

fact that the sale deed was in Uttamchand's

19

residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any of

the offences alleged against him.

26. The statements of the approvers, A-3 and A-

4, who were tendered pardon by the Court, do

not reveal any involvement by Uttamchand in

commission of the alleged offence. During the

pendency of the present proceedings the

recording of depositions of 74 witnesses was

completed. Those were part of this Court's record;

they do not show any incriminating material as

far as Uttamchand is concerned. Furthermore,

crucially, the money trail for the property bought

under the sale deed, does not show

Uttamchand's involvement. It may implicate A-3

and A-4, however as stated before, the Court has

granted a pardon to them, for which they have

turned approvers.

….

29. CBI cannot deny that Uttamchand's name

was included in the present case, although the

sale deed was seized during a search conducted

in relation to another FIR (the earlier case) — and

not in relation to the present case, which relates

to the disproportionate assets case. The FIR in

the present case names only A-1 and A-2 as the

accused. The sale deed had already been seized

from Uttamchand's house by then.

….

36. An entire overview of the material produced

before the trial court, with the charge-sheet and

final report, as well as deposition of the 74

witnesses who were examined during the trial,

does not support CBI's allegation of Uttamchand.

He did not directly or indirectly finance the

transaction by which property was sold to M/s

Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd., which, according to

that prosecution, was in fact by A-1. The

respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated

the flow of money to fund acquisition of the flat.

The material put against him is that the sale

20

deed was seized, prior to the present case. The

other circumstance put against him is that his

employee witnessed the sale deed. The

respondent is concededly neither the owner, nor

has any links with M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt.

Ltd. In these circumstances, this Court is of the

opinion that no material which can prima facie

support an inference that Uttamchand was either

a conspirator or had abetted the commission of

the offences alleged against the accused A-1 is

made out.”

(Emphasis Provided)

Thus, it is clear that the facts of the above case are entirely

distinct from the present matter. The accused in that case had

no involvement in the offence as the assets were allegedly

purchased by the public servant in the name of a company

with which the accused (Uttamchand Bohra) had nothing to do.

The only allegations against Uttamchand Bohra were that the

title deeds were recovered from his residence, and that one of

his employees was a witness to the sale deed by which assets

disproportionate to known sources of income were purchased

by the public servant.

26.In no way can the facts of the above cases be compared to the

case at hand. In the present case, the appellant actively

participated in the purchase of various movable and immovable

properties in her name. It has come in unrebuttable evidence of

21

the prosecution that the present appellant had visited the office

of the concerned Registrar for getting the sale deeds registered.

And this had happened on more than one occasion for different

sale deeds. The Trial Court and the High Court had rightly

accepted the prosecution’s case that the appellant knowingly

allowed her husband to accumulate illegal wealth in her name

and thus, committed an offence under Section 109 of the IPC

read with Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(2) of the PC Act.

27.In view of the above, I find no reason to interfere with the

impugned order dated 20.11.2023 passed by the High Court.

Also, like my brother Judge, I do not see any fault in the

administrative order dated 03.03.2022 passed by the High

Court. Accordingly, I dismiss all these appeals.

28.The appellant is directed to surrender within ten weeks from

today to undergo her remaining sentence.

29.Interim order(s), if any, stand(s) vacated.

30.Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

.......………………………….J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

NEW DELHI;

May 07, 2025.

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2127 OF 2024 ]

P. NALLAMMAL …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2288 OF 2024 ]

TMT. P. NALLAMMAL & ORS. …APPELLANTS

A1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL

A2: THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS.

A2.1: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN

A2.2: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN

A2.3: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA

VERSUS

STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY

INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2491-2492 OF 2025

2

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS.5196-5197 OF 2024 ]

THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

…APPELLANTS

A1.1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL

A1.2: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN

A1.3: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN

A1.4: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA

VERSUS

STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY

INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH, J.

Leave granted.

2. The present appeals arise from a common set of facts and have,

therefore, been heard together, and are disposed of by this Judgment. It

is necessary to first advert to the relevant factual background, wherefrom

the instant appeals have traversed to this Court.

FACTUAL LENS:

3

3. A. M. Paramasivam (hereinafter also referred to as the ‘1

st

Accused’) was an elected Member of the Tamil Nadu Legislative

Assembly during the period 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. He also served as

the Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of Tamil Nadu during the

period 17.05.1993 to 09.05.1996. On 20.08.1996, CR

No.5/AC/96/Headquarters was registered against him and his wife, P.

Nallamal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2

nd

Accused’) alleging acquisition

of properties beyond known pecuniary resources, which were

disproportionate to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/- during the Check Period

i.e., between 16.06.1991 to 09.05.1996. The 1

st

Accused and 2

nd

Accused are hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Accused’.

4 A. M. Paramasivam was charged for the offence under Section

13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) for acquiring properties and

pecuniary resources which were disproportionate to his known sources

of income to the extent of Rs.38,72,545/-, which he had not satisfactorily

accounted for. Whereas, P. Nallamal was tried for offence under Section

109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’)

read with Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(c) of the Act for abetting the

offence by permitting the 1

st

Accused to acquire a substantial portion of

4

the properties in her name and in the names of her minor children and for

holding such properties on his behalf.

5. Before the learned III Special Judge/XIII Additional Judge,

Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’), on behalf of the

prosecution, 62 witnesses (PW1 to PW62) were examined, 160 Exhibits

(Ex.P1 to Ex.P160) were marked along with 31 material objects (MO1 to

MO31). On the side of the defence, 30 witness (DW1 to DW30) were

examined and 15 Exhibits (Ex.D1 to Ex.D15) were marked.

6. The Trial Court vide Judgment and Order dated 15.11.2000

determined the value of the assets acquired by the 1st Accused

disproportionate to his known source of income as being Rs.35,25,136/-

for the purpose of action under Section 12 of the Criminal Law

(Amendment) Ordinance Act, 1944, and convicted both the 1

st

and 2

nd

Accused:

Accuse

d

Offence

[under the

Act as it

then stood]

Conviction and

Sentence

1

st

Accused

Section

13(2) r/w

13(1)(c) of

the Act

To undergo two years

Rigorous Imprisonment

and to pay fine of

Rs.10,000/. In default of

payment of fine, to

5

undergo 2 months

further Simple

Imprisonment.

2

nd

Accused

Section

109, IPC

r/w 13(2)

r/w 13(1)

(c) of the

Act

To undergo one year

Rigorous Imprisonment

and to pay fine of

Rs.5000/-. In default of

payment of fine, to

undergo 1 month further

Simple Imprisonment.

7. In view of the above conviction, the learned Principal Sessions

Judge, Madurai by Order dated 03.01.2001 in Crl. O.P. No.2 of 1997

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Attachment Order’) made the earlier

interim attachment order dated 06.03.1997 of the schedule-mentioned

properties in Crl. M.P. No.1168/1997, absolute and ordered that the

amount of Rs.35,25,136/- shall be recovered by forfeiture of the attached

properties.

8. The 1

st

and 2

nd

Accused filed Criminal Appeal No.1170/2000

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Criminal Appeal’) before the High Court of

Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’)

challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court.

Along with this Criminal Appeal, the accused filed Civil Miscellaneous

Application No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment Order. With the

6

leave of the High Court, the accused marked two additional documents

as Ex.D16 & Ex.D17.

9. The story takes a rather interesting turn from here. It would be

material to note the case of the appellants. According to them, between

08.02.2013 and 20.02.2013, the Criminal Appeal was listed before the

High Court and elaborate arguments were advanced by both sides,

subsequent to which the judgment was reserved by a learned Single

Judge. On 30.04.2013, as put forth by the appellants, the learned Single

Judge pronounced Judgment and acquitted both the accused.

Thereafter, the counsel for the accused filed applications dated

30.04.2013, 09.12.2013 and 16.02.2015 praying for a Certified Copy of

the Judgment/Order dated 30.04.2013, which was not made available.

On 23.03.2015, the 1

st

Accused passed away. Later, the 2

nd

Accused also

made a complaint to the Registrar General of the High Court to the effect

that a Certified Copy of the Judgment/Order dated 30.04.2013 had not

been furnished by the Registry and no reason was assigned for the

same. The Assistant Registrar (Administration) of the High Court, on

19.08.2015, replied to the 2

nd

Accused, stating that no action could be

taken in judicial proceedings on letters received by post.

7

10.After over five years, the High Court, on 19.07.2018, listed the

criminal appeal for ‘fresh hearing’. The 2

nd

Accused filed Writ Petition

(Criminal) No.437/2021 titled P Nallammal v The Registrar General

High Court of Judicature at Madras before this Court challenging the

fresh listing of the Criminal Appeal, which was disposed of vide Order

dated 13.12.2021 with a request to Hon’ble the Chief Justice of the High

Court to conduct an enquiry on the administrative side and to take a

decision. Pursuant to this Order, an enquiry was conducted by the

learned Chief Justice on 23.02.2022, in which the 2

nd

Accused

participated. By an order dated 03.03.2022 in R.O.C. No.2/2022/Crl.Sec.

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Administrative Order’), the

Chief Justice, in the absence of a judgment on record, directed the

appeal to be listed for fresh hearing.

11.Pursuant to the Impugned Administrative Order, the appeal along

with CMA No.425/2001 challenging the Attachment Order, was re-heard.

Vide Final Judgment and Order dated 20.11.2023 (hereinafter referred to

as the ‘Impugned Order’), the High Court dismissed the Criminal Appeal

and confirmed the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court.

The High Court, in the Impugned Order, found the value of the assets

disproportionate to the known source of income of the accused to be

Rs.33,25,136. Accordingly, CMA No.425/2001 was dismissed and the

8

Attachment Order was confirmed with a modification to the effect of

recovering a sum of Rs.33,25,165/- instead of Rs.35,25,136/- with

interest @ 6% per annum from the date of interim attachment viz.

06.03.1997.

12.For the sake of clarity, the three appeals before us presently are:

(i) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024 filed by the 2

nd

Accused challenging the conviction and sentence imposed by the

Impugned Order.

(ii) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) No.2288/2024 filed by the 2

nd

Accused and the Legal Heirs of the 1

st

Accused (children of the 1

st

and

2

nd

Accused), challenging the Attachment Order as modified by the

Impugned Order.

(iii) Appeal arising from SLP (Criminal) Nos.5196-5197/2024 filed by the

Legal Heirs of the 1

st

Accused (2

nd

Accused and children of the 1

st

and 2

nd

Accused) challenging the Impugned Administrative Order directing fresh

hearing of the Criminal Appeal as well as the Impugned Order.

APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS :

9

13.At the outset, learned senior counsel for the appellants submitted

that after the acquittal of the appellants by the High Court by

pronouncing a Judgment in open court on 30.04.2013, it was not

constitutionally permissible to rehear the disposed of appeal only on the

ground that the Judgment which was pronounced in open court was not

found in the case bundle, that too after over five years of the

pronouncement of the judgement and almost three years after the death

of the 1

st

Accused. It was submitted that the Judgment dated 30.04.2013

had properly appreciated the evidence on record and acquitted the

accused, and this, in itself, would prove that the Impugned Order is

erroneous and illegal.

14.It was submitted that in terms of DSP v K Inbasagaran, (2006) 1

SCC 420, when there is evidence that the wife had independent income

and the same is proved, it cannot be included with the assets of the

husband-public servant. In the present case, in Statement-II, the

prosecution had admitted that at the time of marriage, the 2

nd

Accused

was given 100 sovereigns of gold. The properties acquired in the name

of the 2

nd

Accused during the Check Period were valued at Rs.5,42,375/-.

It was submitted that Item 19 (second-hand Ambassador Car) was

valued at Rs.1,30,000/- whereas PW55 (the vendor) stated that he had

10

sold it for only Rs.40,000/-. Thus, the total amount of properties acquired

in the name of the 2

nd

Accused is only Rs.4,52,375/-.

15.It was contended that way before the Check Period, the 2

nd

Accused had agricultural lands as per Ex.P93 and her father/DW29 had

given 1.18 acres and 1.35 acres of Nanja land to her as stridhana. For

some lands, the patta stands in her name. Further, DWs 3, 6, 11, 14, 19,

23, and 25 have given evidence stating that they borrowed money from

the 2

nd

Accused before the Check Period and were paying interest for the

same. The income from agriculture and by way of interest also stands

corroborated from Ex.D2 and Ex.D3, which are the returns recovered

from PW62 (auditor) during the course of investigation.

16.Next, it was argued that the Income Tax Department has

assessed the agricultural income and the income by way of interest and

the Trial Court has disbelieved the defence witnesses and documents in

this behalf, without assigning any cogent reasons. It was argued that the

2

nd

Accused was not a pauper, that she was a daughter of a rich family

and also paying income tax of her own. Learned senior counsel

submitted that the Courts below had rejected the explanation so offered

by the 2

nd

Accused without any reasoning. Further, it was pointed out that

there is no evidence that the 1

st

Accused contributed anything ever to the

11

2

nd

Accused to purchase any assets. Instead, the purchases made by the

2

nd

Accused were from her own income and from the contributions of her

father/DW29.

17.It was further contended that if the assets standing in the name of

the 2

nd

Accused are excluded, then the assets held by the 1

st

Accused at

the end of the Check Period itself would be within limits. It was urged that

there was no disproportionality in the assets held by him. There were as

many as fifteen documents and 30 witnesses on the side of the defence,

which would discharge the 1

st

accused from the burden under Section

106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Impugned Order failed to refer

to the defence documents. As per Ex.D3, Ex.D16 and Ex.D17 and the

oral evidence of the defence witnesses, it has been clearly established

that the 1

st

Accused had an agricultural income of Rs.13,55,715/- and the

2

nd

Accused had an agricultural income of Rs.1,59,250/-. Furthermore,

the Impugned Order failed to note the evidence of PW29 and Ex.P60

which would prove that the income of the 2

nd

Accused from the sale of

sugarcane at the mill and the amounts earned by the sugarcane mill

were to the tune of Rs.4,21,349/-. The Travelling Allowance and

Dearness Allowance paid to the 1

st

Accused totalling Rs.1,20,779/- has

also not been taken into account by the Courts below. Kartarey v State

of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 76 and Reena Hazarika v State of

12

Assam, (2019) 13 SCC 289 were referred to in support of the

propositions canvassed by the learned senior counsel.

18.Learned senior counsel submitted that the Accused have

discharged the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and

established their lawful sources of income and the acquisitions made by

them. In such scenario, the Impugned Order is liable to be set aside and

the 2

nd

Accused is entitled to be acquitted. As a consequence, the

Impugned Attachment Order in CMA No.425/2001, upholding the

Attachment Order is also liable to be set aside in the absence of proof

that such properties were acquired by committing a scheduled offence. It

was prayed to allow the respective appeals as aforesaid.

19.We may also note that though, in the pleadings, there is an

argument that the ingredients of Section 107 of IPC are not made out

and hence, the 2nd Accused cannot be punished for abetment by

invoking Section 109 of IPC, the same was not canvassed during oral

submissions.

RESPONDENT-STATE’S SUBMISSIONS :

13

20.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted

that the appeals are without merit and the prosecution had proved the

charges beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that the prosecution

had demonstrated, through witness testimonies and documentary

evidence, that the accused, particularly the 1

st

Accused, Late Mr. A. M.

Paramasivam, who held public office as a Member of the Legislative

Assembly and later as Minister for Labour Welfare, Government of Tamil

Nadu, had amassed wealth significantly beyond his disclosed income

sources. Despite claims by the Accused that their incomes were from

agricultural lands and independent sources of income of the 2

nd

Accused,

these claims had not been substantiated by reliable documentation or

testimony.

21.The assessment of the Accuseds’ assets, submitted learned

counsel, as determined by the Trial Court, was accurate and based on

credible evidence, which led to a determination that the appellants were

in possession of assets worth Rs.37,71,590/-, significantly

disproportionate to their known income sources, amounting to a 442%

disparity, which justified conviction. It was submitted that except for about

5 acres of land in possession at the beginning of the Check Period, the

accused had not produced any acceptable evidence to show that they

had other lands that they were cultivating or owned.

14

22.It was contended that the 2

nd

Accused had no independent

income and aided the 1

st

Accused in illegally acquiring wealth in her and

her children's name. It is submitted that the Accused relied heavily on

Income Tax Returns and agricultural income claims, but the returns alone

cannot substantiate the claim of legal acquisition of assets. The income

disclosed in the Income Tax Returns and the findings of the Income Tax

Department are confined to income assessable to tax and is not proof

that the assets from which the income is derived, were acquired legally. It

was submitted that Ex.D1, Ex.D2 and Ex.D3 were self-serving

documents which surfaced after the search conducted at the residential

premises of the Accused, and would be of no evidentiary value.

23.It was further submitted that the self-serving evidence testified by

interested witnesses in respect of the Accuseds’ immovable properties

are hard to believe. Particularly, when the 1

st

Accused himself claims that

he was a full-time politician, his tall claim of cultivating about 6.61 acres

of land under lease besides owning 5 acres of land, has rightly been

disbelieved by the Trial Court as lacking evidence.

24.For the sake of argument, even if the explanation of the Accused

is accepted, assuming that the relatives of the Accused presented

15

household articles during the house-warming ceremony, the entire value

of such house-hold appliances like Colour Television, Fridge etc. being

only a sum of Rs.1,24,740/- could be reduced from the total value of the

assets acquired during the Check Period. At the most, the dispute in

valuation can be only in respect of Architect fees (less Rs.75,000/-) and

the value of the household articles alleged to have been gifted by known

persons and relatives (less Rs.1,24,740/-). At this, the value of assets

acquired during the Check Period would reduce, from Rs.37,70,590/- to

Rs.35,71,330/.

25.Moreover, the marriage of the Accused took place in 1983,

whereas the Check Period commenced from 16.06.1991. It was

submitted that no document was placed before the Courts to indicate

that, after the marriage and till soon before the Check Period, the 1

st

Accused had any source of income other than 5 acres of land shown in

Statement-I or had purchased any property. It is submitted that the Act

shifts the burden of proof to the public servant when disproportionate

assets are found. The Accused attempted to rely on Income Tax Returns

and self-serving testimony regarding gifts and agricultural income, but

these efforts failed to meet the required standards. Reliance was placed

on State of Karnataka v J Jayalalithaa, (2017) 6 SCC 263. In the

context of burden of proof when disproportionate assets are found being

16

on the defence, learned counsel cited Kedari Lal v State of Madhya

Pradesh, (2015) 14 SCC 505 and State of Tamil Nadu v R

Soundirarasu, (2023) 6 SCC 768.

26.With regard to the grievance of the appellants regarding the fresh

listing of the Criminal Appeal, learned counsel stated that it is pertinent to

mention that the appellants had not pursued the matter immediately in

the year 2013 itself, when the Judgment is said to have been delivered

on 30.04.2013. No explanation was given by the appellants, except

stating that repeated prayers were made to the learned Single Judge

concerned for obtaining Certified Copy(ies) of the said Judgment. It was

thus within the appellants’ knowledge that the Judgment dated

30.04.2013 had not been furnished. Moreover, the contention urged was

that the Impugned Administrative Order cannot be challenged directly via

filing a Special Leave Petition and the appellants should have

approached the High Court by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India. In this backdrop, the State sought dismissal of

all the appeals.

ANALYSIS, REASONING & CONCLUSION:

17

27.We have heard the rival contentions and perused the material on

record. At the outset, we may indicate that we do not intend to undertake

the exercise of re-evaluation/re-assessment of the quantum insofar as

the disproportionate assets are concerned. The Impugned Order has

rightly considered the material on record and is well-reasoned in that

regard. Therefore, we circumscribe our enquiry to the question of

culpability of the 2

nd

Accused under Section 109 IPC read with Sections

13(2) and 13(1)(e) of the Act. The 2

nd

Accused was charged with

colluding with the 1

st

Accused and purchase of properties in her name, in

the names of her daughter and sons and keeping the said properties on

behalf of the 1

st

Accused.

28.It would be profitable to set out Sections 107 and 109 of the IPC

at the outset:

‘107. Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of a

thing, who—

First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or

persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act

or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that

conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly.—Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the

doing of that thing.

xxx

109. Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is

committed in consequence and where no express

provision is made for its punishment.—Whoever abets

18

any offence shall, if the act abetted is committed in

consequence of the abetment, and no express provision is

made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be

punished with the punishment provided for the offence.

Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed in

consequence of abetment, when it is committed in

consequence of the instigation, or in pursuance of the

conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment.

Illustrations

(a) A offers a bribe to B, a public servant, as a reward for

showing A some favour in the exercise of B's official

functions. B accepts the bribe. A has abetted the offence

defined in S. 161.

(b) A instigates B to give false evidence. B, in consequence

of the instigation, commits that offence. A is guilty of abetting

that offence, and is liable to the same punishment as B.

(c) A and B conspire to poison Z. A, in pursuance of the

conspiracy, procures the poison and delivers it to B in order

that he may administer it to Z. B, in pursuance of the

conspiracy, administers the poison to Z in A's absence and

thereby causes Z's death. Here B is guilty of murder. A is

guilty of abetting that offence by conspiracy, and is liable to

the punishment for murder.’

29.The question as to whether offences under the Act are abettable

by non-public servants and whether they can be prosecuted by the

Special Courts under the Act is no longer res integra. Interestingly, the

position of law was also expounded in an earlier round of litigation

wherein the 2

nd

Accused had approached this Court seeking pre-trial

exoneration. The decision is reported as P Nallamal v State, 1999 6

SCC 559, wherein the Court cited illustrations fitting within each of the

three clauses in Section 107 of the IPC vis-à-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the

Act. They are:

19

‘24. Shri Shanti Bhushan cited certain illustrations which,

according to us, would amplify the cases of abetments fitting

with each of the three clauses in Section 107 of the Penal

Code vis-a-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.

The first illustration cited is this:

If A, a close relative of the public servant tells him of how

other public servants have become more wealthy by

receiving bribes and A persuades the public servant to do the

same in order to become rich and the public servant acts

accordingly. If it is a proved position there cannot be any

doubt that A has abetted the offence by instigation.

Next illustration is this:

Four persons including the public servant decide to raise a

bulk amount through bribery and the remaining persons

prompt the public servant to keep such money in their

names. If this is a proved position then all the said persons

are guilty of abetment through conspiracy.

The last illustration is this:

If a public servant tells A, a close friend of his, that he has

acquired considerable wealth through bribery but he cannot

keep them as he has no known source of income to account,

he requests A to keep the said wealth in A's name,

and A obliges the public servant in doing so. If it is a proved

position A is guilty of abetment falling under the “Thirdly”

clause of Section 107 of the Penal Code.’

30. Although the illustrations supra were cited by the

prosecution/respondents therein, the Court was ad idem therewith.

Ultimately, this Court held that the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the

Act can be abetted by a non-public servant.

31.We may note that it is not the case of the prosecution that the 2

nd

Accused instigated the 1

st

Accused to amass wealth disproportionately or

20

that she is holding the properties benami. No material has been brought

on record by the prosecution to suggest so. Therefore, the act of

abetment as alleged is either one of conspiracy or one of intentionally

aiding. The properties acquired in the name of the 2

nd

Accused during the

check period were valued at Rs.5,34,179/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Thirty

Four Thousand One Hundred and Seventy Nine) by the Impugned Order.

The question, therefore, before us is whether the 2

nd

Accused is liable for

abetment merely by reason of the fact that she was the wife of the 1

st

Accused and some properties were acquired/purchased in her name.

32.At this juncture, it is expedient to understand the scope of Section

109 of the IPC vis-à-vis Section 13(1)(e) of the Act and the evidentiary

burden to be discharged by the prosecution. In K Ponnuswamy v State

of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 6 SCC 674, which lies in a similar factual

scenario, the main accused therein challenged his conviction by the High

Court, which challenge was negatived by this Court. The High Court

convicted the main accused (A1) for being unable to satisfactorily

account for the disproportionate assets, while acquitting his wife (A2) and

daughter (A3), in whose name the bulk of the properties were held. While

doing so, the High Court [vide its Judgment and Order dated 12.04.2001

in Criminal Appeal No.749/2000] returned the following findings:

‘45. It has been clearly found that the properties and

resources standing in the name of A2 and A3 were not

21

satisfactorily accounted for by A1. A4’s explanation was

already found to be not acceptable. A2 and A3 are not the

earning members of the family, except they get a meagre

income from agricultural property. The defence of A2 is that

she purchased movable and immovable property by using

the gift cheques received by her through A4. This theory was

not accepted for the reasons already recorded. So far as A3

is concerned she could not say anything as to how the

properties came in her name. She being a student may not

be knowing naturally. Therefore, merely because A2 & A3

have acquired properties in their names whether they can be

held to have abetted the first accused to commit the offence?

The offence of abetment can be established only by proving

that the abettor instigated the main offender to do the offence

or conspired together or intentionally aided by any act or

illegal omission, for the commission of the offence. Insofar as

the first limb of Section 107 I.P.C. is concerned, there is no

evidence that either A2 or A3 instigated A1 to acquire

properties and resources disproportionate to his known

sources of income. There is also no evidence of any

conspiracy for that end. The last limb of Section 107 is

intentional aid by any act or illegal omission. Nodoubt [sic],

A2 & A3 are holding properties rather purchased properties in

their names. There is ample proof to that effect. Whether

mere purchase of properties including jewels would amount

to intentional aid is a point to be decided. This last limb can

be held to be established only either when A1 informs A2 and

A3 or A2 & A3 have knowledge that the ill-gotten money was

being used for the purpose of purchasing properties in their

names. In the absence of such a proof, A2 & A3 cannot be

held to be liable for the offence of abetment…

46. Though Section 13(1)(e) of the Act was abettable still

there is no evidence to bring A2 to A5 within the ambit of

abetment. Therefore, benefit of doubt has to be given to

them…’

(emphasis supplied)

33.K Ponnuswamy (supra), however, noted that ‘…As we are told

that the State is going to file an appeal against the acquittal of Accused 2

and 3, we are not making any comments thereon.’ Yet, the same was not

22

filed as is apparent from Order dated 31.03.2009 passed by this Court in

Criminal Appeals No.849-850 of 2001 , where A2 and A3 had

approached this Court challenging the order of the High Court in ordering

confiscation of the properties in their name despite acquitting them of all

charges. By the said Order dated 31.03.2009, this Court allowed their

appeals and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration,

on the ground that no tangible or sustainable reasons were recorded by

the Courts below in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 452

1

of the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with regard to the confiscation of

properties owned and possessed by A2 and A3. Post-remand, on fresh

consideration, the High Court by its Judgment dated 28.07.2018

2

in

Criminal Appeals Nos.882/2000 and 884/2000 allowed the appeals and

held that having acquitted A2 and A3, assets standing in their names had

to be excluded from the order of confiscation and ordered accordingly. In

1

‘452. Order for disposal of property at conclusion of trial.—(1) When an inquiry or trial in any Criminal Court is con-

cluded, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the disposal, by destruction, confiscation or delivery to any

person claiming to be entitled to possession thereof or otherwise, of any property or document produced before it or in

its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commis-

sion of any offence.

(2) An order may be made under sub-section (1) for the delivery of any property to any person claiming to be

entitled to the possession thereof, without any condition or on condition that he executes a bond, with or without

sureties, to the satisfaction of the Court, engaging to restore such property to the Court if the order made under sub-

section (1) is modified or set aside on appeal or revision.

(3) A Court of Session may, instead of itself making an order under sub-section (1), direct the property to be

delivered to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, who shall thereupon deal with it in the manner provided in Sections 457,

458 and 459.

(4) Except where the property is livestock or is subject to speedy and natural decay, or where a bond has

been executed in pursuance of sub-section (2), an order made under sub-section (1) shall not be carried out for two

months, or when an appeal is presented, until such appeal has been disposed of.

(5) In this section, the term “property” includes, in the case of property regarding which an offence appears to

have been committed, not only such property as has been originally in the possession or under the control of any

party, but also any property into or for which the same may have been converted or exchanged, and anything ac-

quired by such conversion or exchange, whether immediately or otherwise.’

2

This Judgment was amended by the Madras High Court by Order dated 11.03.2019.

23

Kishori Lal v State of Madhya Pradesh, (2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court

explained:

‘6. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence

of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in

IPC. A person, abets the doing of a thing when (1) he

instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with

one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of

that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission,

the doing of that thing. These things are essential to

complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate” literally

means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by

persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by

instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the

three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the

act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and

there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment,

then the offender is to be punished with the punishment

provided for the original offence. “Abetted” in Section 109

means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence

for the abetment of which a person is charged with the

abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.’

(emphasis supplied)

34.Relevant reference can be made to the discussion in State v

Uttamchand Bohra, (2022) 16 SCC 663 which although not in reference

to a family member of the principal accused but explains in-depth the

requirements of conspiracy and abetment vis-à-vis a charge of

accumulation of disproportionate assets by a public servant:

‘22. As is evident from the discussion of the facts,

Uttamchand is accused of abetting and/or conspiring with the

principal accused, a public servant (A-1), so as to permit him

to accumulate assets disproportionate to his known sources

of income. A-1 was a senior official of the Central

Government, working in the Income Tax Department.

According to the prosecution, he acquired the flat, through

the Company. Two other accused, who facilitated the

24

acquisition, turned approver; they also deposed during the

trial. The role attributed to the respondent is that he helped in

the execution of the sale deed of the property, and kept

custody of the title deed to it. The document was in fact

seized from his house. The seizure took place over a year

before the present case was initiated; in fact, CBI had

initiated another criminal proceeding, in which A-1 too was

implicated. In that case, CBI had seized Rs 50 lakhs from

him. In the present case, the recovery from Uttamchand's

custody of the sale deed of the property, owned by the

Company led to initiation of separate proceeding; inter alia,

Uttamchand was charged with “criminal conspiracy”, defined

under Section 120-A IPC and punishable under Section 120-

B IPC and “abetment”, defined by Section 107 IPC and

punishable under Section 109 IPC.

xxx

25. The charge-sheet further does not contain any allegation

which can amount to an offence under Section 109 IPC. The

prosecution has not suggested that he abetted A-1 to acquire

disproportionate assets in any manner; the only allegation is

that the title deeds to the flat, which is in the name of M/s

Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. was seized from his custody

and that he had instructed his employee to witness the

document. An allegation of the existence of signatures of

Uttamchand's employee, as a witness to the sale deed

cannot amount to his aiding or abetting A-1 to acquire

disproportionate assets. Witnessing a sale deed is a formal

requirement. Likewise, the fact that the sale deed was in

Uttamchand's residence cannot satisfy the ingredient of any

of the offences alleged against him.

xxx

31. This Court explained the essence of conspiracy in the

context of acts or omissions, and allegations relating to

conspiracy along with offences under the PCA, in K.

Narayana Rao [CBI v. K. Narayana Rao, (2012) 9 SCC 512:

(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 737: (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1183], and

observed that: (SCC p. 530, para 24)

“24. The ingredients of the offence of criminal

conspiracy are that there should be an agreement

between the persons who are alleged to conspire

and the said agreement should be for doing of an

illegal act or for doing, by illegal means, an act

which by itself may not be illegal. In other words, the

25

essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to

do an illegal act and such an agreement can be

proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial

evidence or by both and in a matter of common

experience that direct evidence to prove conspiracy

is rarely available. Accordingly, the circumstances

proved before and after the occurrence have to be

considered to decide about the complicity of the

accused. Even if some acts are proved to have

been committed, it must be clear that they were so

committed in pursuance of an agreement made

between the accused persons who were parties to

the alleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved

circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn

only when such circumstances are incapable of any

other reasonable explanation. In other words, an

offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have

been established on mere suspicion and surmises

or inference which are not supported by cogent and

acceptable evidence.”

32. The material to implicate someone as a conspirator

acting in concert with a public servant, alleged to have

committed misconduct, under the PCA, or amassed assets

disproportionate to a public servant's known sources of

income, thus, has to be on firm ground. In the present case,

only two circumstances — the custody of the sale deed (of

the property allegedly belonging to A-1) and the fact that it

was witnessed by Uttamchand's employee — are alleged

against the respondent. These are wholly insufficient to raise

a reasonable suspicion, or make out a prima facie case

against him, for conspiracy.

33. It would be useful, in the context of the present case, to

recollect the decision of this Court, in P.

Nallammal v. State [P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559:

1999 SCC (Cri) 1133] which observed, as follows: (SCC pp.

564-65, para 15)

“15. Thus, the two postulates must combine

together for crystallisation into the offence, namely,

possession of property or resources

disproportionate to the known sources of income of

public servant and the inability of the public servant

to account for it. Burden of proof regarding the first

limb is on the prosecution whereas the onus is on

the public servant to prove the second limb. So it is

26

contended that a non-public servant has no role in

the trial of the said offence and hence he cannot

conceivably be tagged with the public servant for

the offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act.”

34. As far as the respondent Uttamchand is concerned, the

initial burden of showing that a conspiracy existed, cannot

even be alleged against him, given the nature of the material

presented along with the charge-sheet.

xxx

36. An entire overview of the material produced before the

trial court, with the charge-sheet and final report, as well as

deposition of the 74 witnesses who were examined during

the trial, does not support CBI’s allegation of Uttamchand. He

did not directly or indirectly finance the transaction by which

property was sold to M/s Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd.,

which, according to that prosecution, was in fact by A-1. The

respondent also is not alleged to have facilitated the flow of

money to fund acquisition of the flat. The material put against

him is that the sale deed was seized, prior to the present

case. The other circumstance put against him is that his

employee witnessed the sale deed. The respondent is

concededly neither the owner, nor has any links with M/s

Raviteja Trading Co. Pvt. Ltd. In these circumstances, this

Court is of the opinion that no material which can prima facie

support an inference that Uttamchand was either a

conspirator or had abetted the commission of the offences

alleged against the accused A-1 is made out.’

(emphasis supplied)

35.In the above light, let us turn back to the facts of the instant case.

The defence put forth by the 2

nd

Accused before the Trial Court has been

noted in its Judgment dated 15.11.2000 as below:

‘The summary of the written statement filed by the 2nd

Accused: During the time of marriage of the Accused, to the

2nd Accused the family of him had given 100 sovereigns of

gold and lands as Sreedhanam. Through which the Accused

family got income. During the time of marriage, the gift

amount of Rs.10,000/- has acquired. The above said

incomes were all shown in the list which is annexed herewith.

27

The 1st Accused was head of the family and he maintained

the income and expenditure of the family. A false case is filed

to take revenge and to cause disgrace against the Accused.’

(sic)

(emphasis supplied)

36.The 2

nd

Accused is the widow of the 1

st

Accused-public servant.

The assets standing in her name are three immovable properties, two

cars, share certificates and some cash balance in the bank. Pausing

here, we may note that the Trial Court has observed that the 2

nd

Accused

showed interest to purchase the land, that she had given the sale

consideration which is proved by witnesses and therefore her acts fall

within the third limb of Section 107 of the IPC, which is one of intentional

aid. Regard being had to the fiduciary relationship shared between the

Accused, mens rea cannot ipso facto be presumed by the mere fact that

some assets stood in the name of the 2

nd

Accused, and she had

extended consideration for the same. This Court cannot be oblivious to

human realities, especially the usual course of human conduct in marital

relationships. We are cognizant of the presumptions provided for in

criminal law, but the same by itself cannot supplant evidence. We

reiterate that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of

evidence. To presume culpability of a close relative of the public servant

merely on the ground that certain transactions were made in such

relative’s name would be akin to reversing the burden of proof. This may

28

have dangerous consequences and result in diluting the presumption of

innocence, beyond what the statute in question contemplates.

37.Another striking feature in the present case is that during the

entire trial, the prosecution never took the line of proving that the 2

nd

Accused was all along aware that the money from which the assets were

being bought in her name was obtained through ill-gotten or unlawful

sources. Thus, under bonafide belief, she has tried to defend the

acquisition of the assets trying to explain the sources from various

means which cannot lead to the presumption in law that she was party

ab initio to such illegal acquisition(s) as ultimately she is a housewife

and, from the record, it can be safely stated that it was the late husband-

1

st

Accused who arranged for the money from which the assets,

disproportionate to the known sources of the income of the family, have

been bought in her name. Thus, the role of the 2

nd

Accused, in our

opinion, does not fall within the three illustrations taken note of by this

Court in P Nallamal (supra).

38.It is for the prosecution to prove its case beyond all reasonable

doubt and a solitary circumstance of name-lending, such as the one at

present, cannot lead us to draw and sustain an inference which

unerringly points to the guilt of the 2

nd

Accused. There has to be

29

something more in the form of positive evidence to satisfy the essential

requirements for the offence of abetment. Life and liberty are not things

to be trifled with on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Suresh

Thipmppa Shetty v State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine 1038

held:

‘18. On a deeper and fundamental level, when this Court is

confronted with a situation where it has to ponder whether to

lean with the Prosecution or the Defence, in the face of

reasonable doubt as to the version put forth by the

Prosecution, this Court will, as a matter of course and of

choice, in line with judicial discretion

[Although in the context

of bail jurisprudence, for a working idea as to what ‘judicial

discretion’ entails, peruse the views of a learned Single Judge

(sitting as Judge-in-Chambers) of this Court in Gudikanti

Narasimhulu v Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra

Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240.], lean in favour of the Defence.

We have borne in mind the cardinal principle that life and

liberty are not matters to be trifled with, and a conviction can

only be sustained in the absence of reasonable doubt. The

presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and

insistence on the Prosecution to prove its case beyond

reasonable doubt are not empty formalities. Rather, their

origin is traceable to Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution of

India. Of course, for certain offences, the law seeks to place

a reverse onus on the accused to prove his/her innocence,

but that does not impact adversely the innocent-till-proven-

guilty rule for other criminal offences.

19. In Coffin v. United States, 156 US 432 (1895), the United

States' Supreme Court held:

‘The principle that there is a presumption of

innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted

law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement

lies at the foundation of the administration of our

criminal law.’

20. We see no quarrel with the afore-noted statement as the

same applies on all fours to our criminal justice system. The

presumption of innocence is also a human right, per the

pronouncement in Narendra Singh v. State of Madhya

30

Pradesh, (2004) 10 SCC 699. In Ranjeetsing Brahmajeetsing

Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294, a 3-

Judge Bench of this Court, at Paragraph 35, had opined that

‘… Liberty of a person should not ordinarily be interfered with

unless there exist cogent grounds therefor. …’’

(emphasis supplied)

39. The presumption of innocence is a basic tenet of criminal

jurisprudence and it gets dislodged only by presenting cogent and

reliable evidence. Not for nothing is it stated that the accused is the

favourite child of the law and to him/her enure all the benefits of doubt as

available in law. There is absolutely no evidence on record, much less

any evidence to satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to

establish that the 2

nd

Accused conspired/colluded with or intentionally

aided the 1

st

Accused in committing offence(s) under Sections 13(2) r/w

13(1)(e) of the Act. Therefore, we hold that the acts of the 2

nd

Accused do

not fall within the ambit of Section 107 of the IPC and in such

circumstances, it would be unsafe to sustain her conviction with the aid

of Section 109 of IPC.

40.Accordingly, the Impugned Order is set aside to the extent of

conviction of the 2

nd

Accused and she stands discharged of the liability of

her bail bonds and sureties. As we have acquitted the 2nd Accused, we

see no reason to interfere in the Attachment Order as it attaches the

assets standing in her name beyond the value which has been explained

31

by her and accepted by the Courts below. Further, the Impugned

Administrative Order, having worked itself out, does not call for any

interference. However, the learned Single Judge who pronounced the

‘Judgment’ dated 30.04.2013, as revealed by the Impugned

Administrative Order, is already under appropriate scrutiny. The conduct

of this learned Single Judge in not making available copies of his

judgments/orders at all, or having made them available much after his

date of retirement (26.05.2017) has been adversely commented upon by

this Court in State through Inspector of Police CBI Chennai v Naresh

Prasad Agarwal, (2024) 3 SCC 515 and State through the Inspector

of Police CBI, ACB, Chennai v S Murali Mohan, Criminal Appeal

No.4166/2024 [Order dated 01.10.2024]. We say no more. As evincible

from the Impugned Administrative Order, there did not exist any

‘Judgment’ dated 30.04.2013. The learned then Chief Justice of the High

Court, thus, cannot be faulted for restoring the criminal appeal for fresh

hearing.

41.Consequently, the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal)

No.2127/2024] is allowed; the appeal arising from SLP (Criminal)

No.2288/2024 is dismissed, and; the appeals arising from SLP (Criminal)

Nos.5196-5197/2024 are dismissed.

32

42. No order as to costs.

43. Pending I.A.s/Crl. M.P.s are closed.

.…………………......................J.

[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

NEW DELHI

MAY 07, 2025

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2489 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2127 OF 2024 ]

P. NALLAMMAL …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2490 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.2288 OF 2024 ]

TMT. P. NALLAMMAL & ORS. …APPELLANTS

A1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL

A2: THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS.

A2.1: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN

A2.2: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN

A2.3: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA

VERSUS

STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY

INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT

WITH

2

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 2491-2492 OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NOS.5196-5197 OF 2024 ]

THIRU A. M. PARAMASIVAM (DIED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

…APPELLANTS

A1.1: TMT. P. NALLAMMAL

A1.2: P. RAJAKUMAR PANDIAN

A1.3: P. SELVAKUMAR PANDIYAN

A1.4: SELVI SURIYAKALA @ SUDARSENA

VERSUS

STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED BY

INSPECTOR OF POLICE …RESPONDENT

ORDER

We have authored separate judgments, though

we differ only with respect to the appeal arising

from SLP (Criminal) No.2127/2024.

2. We are though unanimous as to the appeals

emanating from SLP (Criminal) No.2288/2024 and SLP

(Criminal) Nos.5196-5197/2024 and these are hereby

dismissed.

3

3. In view of the above, Registry to place the

relevant papers of the appeal arsing from

SLP(Criminal) No.2127/2024, before Hon’ble the

Chief Justice of India for appropriate directions.

.…………………......................J.

[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

.…………………......................J.

[AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

NEW DELHI

MAY 07, 2025