LPA 72/2024, Delhi High Court, Pankaj Prakash, promotion, APAR, uncommunicated adverse report, retrospective benefits, United India Insurance, writ petition, service law
 29 May, 2026
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Pankaj Prakash Vs. United India Insurance Company Limited & Anr.

  Delhi High Court LPA 72/2024
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Case Background

As per case facts, the appellant was denied promotion in the 2014-15 exercise despite good performance, due to an adverse Annual Performance Appraisal Report (APAR) for 2011-12 which was never ...

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LPA 72/2024 Page 1 of 19

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Reserved on: 17.03.2026

% Judgment Delivered on: 29.05.2026

+ LPA 72/2024 & CM APPL. 70543/2025

PANKAJ PRAKASH .....Appellant

versus

UNITED INDIA INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED

& ANR. .....Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case

For the Appellant: Mr. Ravi Kumar, Advocate.

For the Respondents: Mr. Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. K.

Enatoli Sema, Ms. Chubalemla

Chang, Mr. Chisho G. Kiho, Ms.

Rokosieno Meyase and Mr. Prang

Newmai, Advocates.

Mr. P.S. Singh, Advocate for R2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

JUDGMENT

TEJAS KARIA, J

1.The presentintra-courtAppeal has been filed by the Appellant

assailing the judgment dated 15.12.2023 (“Impugned Judgment”) passed

by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) 44/2021 (“Writ Petition”),

dismissing the Writ Petition.

LPA 72/2024 Page 2 of 19

FACTUAL MATRIX

2.Respondent No. 1 is a leading general insurance company, and

Respondent No. 2 is the Deputy General Manager of Respondent No. 1

Company. The Appellant joined the services of Respondent No. 1 on

27.11.1989 as a direct recruit in Scale I and was subsequently promoted to

Scale II in 1998. Thereafter, the Appellant was promoted to Scale III in

2009.

3.According to the Appellant, the next promotion fell due in the

promotion exercise for the year 2014-15, which was conducted on the basis

of the written examination, seniority, and Annual Performance Appraisal

Reports (“APARs”).

4.The Appellant appeared in the written examination and secured 71

marks out of 100. However, upon declaration of the result of the promotion

exercise on 29.05.2014, the Appellant was not selected for promotion. The

Appellant thereafter filed an application under the Right to Information Act,

2005 (“RTI Act”) on 02.06.2014 seeking copies of the APARs for the years

2010-11, 2011-12, and 2012-13. In response thereto, Respondent No. 1, by

letter dated 02.07.2014, furnished the final APAR ratings awarded to the

Appellant.

5.Subsequently, the Appellant submitted another RTI application dated

04.08.2014,inter alia, seeking information from Respondent No. 1

Company regarding the marks obtained by him and the minimum cut-off

marks prescribed for the promotion exercise conducted in 2014-15. By letter

dated 09.09.2014, the Central Public Information Officer (“CPIO”)

responded by disclosing the total marks secured by the Appellant in the said

LPA 72/2024 Page 3 of 19

promotion exercise as well as the cut-off marks for promotion from Scale III

to Scale IV. The Appellant had also sought the minutes of his interview

under the fast-track channel in the promotion exercise of 2014-15; in reply

thereto, the CPIO stated that the said minutes could not be furnished as the

same were exempt under Section 8(1)(b) of the RTI Act.

6.The Appellant instituted Writ Petition No. 7631(S/B)/2016 before the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, seeking,inter alia, quashing of the

result of the promotion exercise undertaken by the Respondents and a

direction for consideration of his case for promotion. The said writ petition

came to be dismissed by judgment dated 06.10.2016. Thereafter, the review

petition preferred by the Appellant, being Review Petition No. 103173/2016,

was also dismissed by order dated 17.01.2017.

7.Thereafter, the Appellant preferred Civil Appeal Nos. 5340-

5341/2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court assailing the aforesaid

judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated

06.10.2016 and 17.01.2017, respectively, on the ground that the entries in

the APARs had not been disclosed to him, thereby depriving him of the

opportunity to submit an appropriate representation at the relevant time.

8.Videjudgment dated 10.07.2019, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed

the said Civil Appeals, set aside the judgment and order passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad, and directed the Respondents to

communicate to the Appellant the previously uncommunicated entries in the

APARs considered for the promotion exercise of 2014-15.

9.The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that, upon receipt of the

said entries, it would be open to the Appellant to submit a representation to

LPA 72/2024 Page 4 of 19

Respondent No. 1 Company, which representation was to be duly

considered. Based on the decision taken thereon, the competent authority

was directed to determine whether any modification was warranted in the

decision relating to the Appellant’s promotion from Scale III to Scale IV for

the year 2014-15.

10.In the said judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court also noted that the

Union of India had issued Office Memorandum dated 14.05.2009 and

13.04.2010 requiring compliance with the decision inDev Dutt v. Union of

India, (2008) 8 SCC 725, wherein it was held that every entry in the Annual

Confidential Report (“ACR”) of a public servant must be communicated to

the concerned employee. It was further observed that a specific

communication in this regard had also been addressed to public sector

insurance companies on 19.10.2012.

11.On 19.08.2019, Respondent No. 1 Company furnished the APARs for

the years 2011-12, 2012-13, and 2013-14. According to the Appellant,

however, the same were not supplied in conformity with the aforesaid Office

Memorandum dated 14.05.2009 and were in derogation of the directions

issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment dated 10.07.2019.

12.The Appellant thereafter addressed a letter dated 30.08.2019 to

Respondent No. 1 Company contending that the APARs had not been

communicated in terms of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and

the instructions contained in the Office Memorandum dated 14.05.2009.

13.In reply to the aforesaid letter dated 30.08.2019, Respondent No. 1

Company, by communication dated 26.09.2019, informed the Appellant that

the uncommunicated entries in the APARs for the relevant years 2011-12,

LPA 72/2024 Page 5 of 19

2012-13, and 2013-14 had already been furnished to him by letter dated

19.08.2019.

14.Consequently, the Appellant filed Contempt Petition (Civil) Nos.

1248-1249/2019 in Civil Appeal Nos. 5340-5341/2019, which came to be

dismissed by order dated 06.01.2020 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, pursuant to the judgment dated

10.07.2019, the APARs had been communicated to the Appellant and,

therefore, it was difficult to accept the contention that there had been a

breach of the directions contained in the said judgment. At the same time,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that it would remain open to the

Appellant to submit an appropriate representation raising all necessary

contentions.

15.Pursuant thereto, the Appellant submitted a representation dated

15.01.2020 to Respondent No. 1 Company, reiterating his contentions and

enclosing a sample APAR of an officer of Ordinance Factory Services,

which, according to him, had been communicated in accordance with the

Office Memorandum dated 14.05.2009.

16.Respondent No. 1 Company considered the said representation and,

by order dated 21.09.2020, informed the Appellant that no circumstances

existed warranting any alteration in the APAR ratings and that the decision

taken in the promotion exercise of 2014-15 was correct and did not call for

any modification. The said representation was accordingly disposed of.

17.Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 21.09.2020, the Appellant

filed the Writ Petition before this Court, seeking,inter alia, quashing of the

said order and a direction to the Respondents to grant him promotion with

LPA 72/2024 Page 6 of 19

effect from 29.05.2014. By the Impugned Judgment, the learned Single

Judge dismissed the Writ Petition. Aggrieved thereby, the Appellant has

preferred the present Appeal.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

18.The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that:

18.1.The adverse APAR for the year 2011-12 was communicated to

the Appellant by Respondent No. 1 Company only on

19.08.2019, i.e., long after the conclusion of the promotion

exercise held on 29.05.2014. Nevertheless, the representation

submitted by the Appellant on 15.01.2020 came to be rejected

on the ground that the APARs had been communicated in a just

and proper manner.

18.2.Adverse and uncommunicated APARs could not have been

reconsidered after a lapse of five years from the conclusion of

the promotion exercise and, accordingly, the Appellant’s case

for promotion ought to have been decided only on the basis of

the APARs that were duly available and communicated. The

concealment of the overall final grading renders the APARs

effectively uncommunicated even as on date.

18.3.The Impugned Judgment erroneously proceeds on the premise

that the Appellant had been duly afforded an effective

opportunity to be considered for promotion in the promotion

exercise of 2014-15, which finding is contrary to the material

available on record. The conclusion that the belated

LPA 72/2024 Page 7 of 19

communication of the APARs was justified is contrary to the

settled position of law.

18.4.Respondent No. 1 Company did not issue any caveat or

warning to the Appellant prior to recording the adverse APAR

for the year 2011-12, despite being aware that the Appellant

had received ‘Outstanding’ APAR gradings both prior and

subsequent to the said year. Consequently, the said APAR

ought not to have been taken into consideration by Respondent

No. 1 Company.

18.5.APARs are not the sole criterion governing promotion and that,

having regard to his seniority, the Appellant was otherwise

entitled to be promoted in the promotion exercise of 2014-15.

Reliance is placed on the following decisions of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court:

a.Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725

b.Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 9 SCC 566

c.Rukhsana Shaheen Khan v. Union of India and others,

(2018) 18 SCC 640

d.R.K. Jibanlata Devi v. High Court of Manipur, (2023) 19

SCC 472

18.6.In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that the

present Appeal be allowed and the Impugned Judgment be set

aside, thereby granting promotion to the Appellant with effect

from the year 2014.

LPA 72/2024 Page 8 of 19

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

19.The learned Counsel for the Respondents has submitted that:

19.1.The Appellant was considered for promotion in the promotional

exercise of 2014-15, however, he did not meet the required cut-

off marks for promotion.

19.2.In accordance with the directions issued by the Hon’ble

Supreme Courtvidejudgment dated 10.07.2019 in Civil Appeal

Nos. 5340-5341/2019, Respondent No. 1 – Company gave

copies of the Appellant’s APARs for the years 2011-12,

2012-13 and 2013-14 to the Appellant.

19.3.It is well settled in law that promotion is not a fundamental

right, instead, the right to be considered for promotion is a

fundamental right, which has been held by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court inUnion of India v. Sangram Keshari Nayak,

(2007) 6 SCC 704, andUnion of India v. Hemraj Singh

Chauhan, (2010) 4 SCC 290. The Appellant was duly

considered for promotion during the 2014-15 promotional

exercise, however, he did not meet the required criteria for the

same. As the Appellant was given due consideration for

promotion, there is no case made out for violation of his

fundamental right.

19.4.In view of the foregoing submissions, it is prayed that the

Appeal be dismissed and the Impugned Judgment be upheld.

LPA 72/2024 Page 9 of 19

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

20.Heard the learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the material

placed on record.

21.The Appellant has contended that the adverse APAR for the year

2011-12 was communicated to him only after the conclusion of the

promotion exercise for the year 2014-15. It has further been urged that

adverse and uncommunicated APARs could not have been reconsidered

after a lapse of five years from the conclusion of the said promotion exercise

and, therefore, the Appellant’s claim for promotion ought to have been

considered only on the basis of the APARs that were duly available and

communicated at the relevant time.

22.Further, as recorded in the order dated 28.07.2025 passed in the

present Appeal, the Appellant has also contended that the Impugned

Judgment fails to take into account the effect of the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court inRukhsana Shaheen Khan(supra). The relevant portion

of the said order is extracted as under:

“2. The principal contention of the learned counsel appearing for

the appellant is that the impugned judgment does not take into

account the effect of the judgment of the Apex Court inRukhsana

Shaheen Khan v. Union of India and others, (2018) 18 SCC 640.

3. The facts of the case reveal that in the promotion exercise 2014-

2015, the appellant was to be considered for the promotion to the

post of Manager (Scale IV) from Deputy Manager (Scale III). In the

said exercise, the Annual Performance Appraisal Reports (APARs)

for the years 2011- 12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 were considered and

the appellant was granted “B” Grade for 2011-12, “A” for 2012-13

and “A” again for 2013-14. Learned Counsel for appellant states

that amongst various other parameters, the APARs had its own

significant role in considering the appellant for promotion.

LPA 72/2024 Page 10 of 19

4. Learned Counsel for appellant further states that the APAR of the

year 2011-12 was not communicated to the appellant which is in

violation of the law laid down by the Apex Court inDev Dutt vs

Union of India (2008) 8 SCC 725 and Sukhdev Singh vs Union of

India (2013) 9 SCC 566. He states that inRukhsana Shaheen

Khan(supra), the Apex Court had directed the respondent therein,

who had considered the uncommunicated adverse APARs and had

denied the requisite promotion to the petitioner therein, to ignore the

uncommunicated APARs and take appropriate decision in

accordance with law.

5. Learned Counsel for appellant also states that in view of the then

prevailing law, which was binding on the respondent, which is an

instrumentality of the State, the same should have been adopted in

the case of the petitioner, rather than considering the adverse APAR

for the year 2011-12 which was not communicated to him for as

long as five years, especially while conducting the promotion

exercise for the petitioner.

6. We find strength in the aforesaid contentions by learned counsel

for appellant. As such, Mr. Amit Kumar, learned counsel for the

respondents is directed to take instructions as to why this Court

should not follow the procedure adopted inRukhsana Shaheen

Khan(supra).”

23.The Hon’ble Supreme Court inSukhdev Singh(supra), relying upon

its decision inDev Dutt(supra), held that every entry in the ACR of a public

servant must be communicated to him within a reasonable period. The

relevant portion of the decision inSukhdev Singh(supra) is reproduced as

under:

“3. Subsequent to the above two decisions, in Dev Dutt v. Union of

India [Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2 SCC

(L&S) 771] , this Court had an occasion to consider the question about

the communication of the entry in the ACR of a public servant (other

than military service). A two-Judge Bench [Dev Dutt v. Union of India,

LPA 72/2024 Page 11 of 19

(2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 771] on elaborate and

detailed consideration of the matter and also after taking into

consideration the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam [U.P. Jal

Nigam v. Prabhat Chandra Jain, (1996) 2 SCC 363 : 1996 SCC (L&S)

519 : (1996) 33 ATC 217] and principles of natural justice exposited by

this Court from time to time particularly in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of

India [(1969) 2 SCC 262] ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1

SCC 248] ; Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC 398 : 1985

SCC (L&S) 672] ; Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy [(2005) 6 SCC 321 :

2005 SCC (L&S) 833] and State of Maharashtra v. Public Concern for

Governance Trust [(2007) 3 SCC 587] concluded that every entry in the

ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him within a

reasonable period whether it is poor, fair, average, good or very good

entry. This is what this Court observed in paras 17 and 18 of the Report

in Dev Dutt [Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2

SCC (L&S) 771] at SCC p. 733:

“17. In our opinion, every entry in the ACR of a public servant must

be communicated to him within a reasonable period, whether it is a

poor, fair, average, good or very good entry. This is because non-

communication of such an entry may adversely affect the employee

in two ways: (1) had the entry been communicated to him he would

know about the assessment of his work and conduct by his superiors,

which would enable him to improve his work in future; (2) he would

have an opportunity of making a representation against the entry if

he feels it is unjustified, and pray for its upgradation. Hence non-

communication of an entry is arbitrary, and it has been held by the

Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Maneka

Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248] that arbitrariness

violates Article 14 of the Constitution.

18. Thus, it is not only when there is a benchmark but in all cases

that an entry (whether it is poor, fair, average, good or very good)

must be communicated to a public servant, otherwise there is

violation of the principle of fairness, which is the soul of natural

justice. Even an outstanding entry should be communicated since

LPA 72/2024 Page 12 of 19

that would boost the morale of the employee and make him work

harder.”

(emphasis in original)

4. Then in para 22 at SCC p. 734 of the Report this Court in Dev Dutt

case [Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2 SCC

(L&S) 771] made the following weighty observations:

“22. It may be mentioned that communication of entries and giving

opportunity to represent against them is particularly important on

higher posts which are in a pyramidical structure where often the

principle of elimination is followed in selection for promotion, and

even a single entry can destroy the career of an officer which has

otherwise been outstanding throughout. This often results in grave

injustice and heart-burning, and may shatter the morale of many

good officers who are superseded due to this arbitrariness, while

officers of inferior merit may be promoted.”

5. In paras 37 and 41 of the Report this Court then observed as follows:

(Dev Dutt case [Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008)

2 SCC (L&S) 771] , SCC pp. 737-38)

“37. We further hold that when the entry is communicated to him the

public servant should have a right to make a representation against

the entry to the authority concerned, and the authority concerned

must decide the representation in a fair manner and within a

reasonable period. We also hold that the representation must be

decided by an authority higher than the one who gave the entry,

otherwise the likelihood is that the representation will be summarily

rejected without adequate consideration as it would be an appeal

from Caesar to Caesar. All this would be conducive to fairness and

transparency in public administration, and would result in fairness

to public servants. The State must be a model employer, and must

act fairly towards its employees. Only then would good governance

be possible.

***

41. In our opinion, non-communication of entries in the annual

confidential report of a public servant, whether he is in civil,

LPA 72/2024 Page 13 of 19

judicial, police or any other service (other than the military),

certainly has civil consequences because it may affect his chances

for promotion or get other benefits (as already discussed above).

Hence, such non-communication would be arbitrary, and as such

violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

6. We are in complete agreement with the view in Dev Dutt [Dev

Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 771]

particularly paras 17, 18, 22, 37 and 41 as quoted above. We approve

the same.

xxxxx

8. In our opinion, the view taken in Dev Dutt [Dev Dutt v. Union of

India, (2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 771] that every entry in

ACR of a public servant must be communicated to him/her within a

reasonable period is legally sound and helps in achieving threefold

objectives. First, the communication of every entry in the ACR to a

public servant helps him/her to work harder and achieve more that

helps him in improving his work and give better results. Second and

equally important, on being made aware of the entry in the ACR, the

public servant may feel dissatisfied with the same. Communication of

the entry enables him/her to make representation for upgradation of the

remarks entered in the ACR. Third, communication of every entry in the

ACR brings transparency in recording the remarks relating to a public

servant and the system becomes more conforming to the principles of

natural justice. We, accordingly, hold that every entry in ACR—poor,

fair, average, good or very good—must be communicated to him/her

within a reasonable period.”

24.Following the law laid down inSukhdev Singh(supra), the Hon’ble

Supreme Court inRukhsana Shaheen Khan (supra) held that

uncommunicated and adverse ACRs cannot be relied upon in the promotion

process, and directed the competent authority to ignore the uncommunicated

and adverse ACRs and take fresh decision in accordance with law. The

LPA 72/2024 Page 14 of 19

relevant portion of the decision inRukhsana Shaheen Khan(supra) is

reproduced as under:

“2. In view of the decision of this Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Union of

India [Sukhdev Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 9 SCC 566 : (2014)

1 SCC (L&S) 279] , there cannot be any dispute on this aspect. This

Court has settled the law that uncommunicated and adverse ACRs

cannot be relied upon in the process.

3. This appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned judgment

[Rukhsana Shaheen Khan v. Union of India, 2006 SCC OnLine Del

1840] is set aside with the following directions:

(a) The competent authority is directed to ignore the

uncommunicated adverse ACRs and take a fresh decision in

accordance with law.

(b) The appellant shall be afforded an opportunity of hearing

in the process.”

25.Similarly, inR.K. Jibanlata Devi(supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court

held as under:

“18. In the present case the petitioner got “Good” gradings for the

year 2016-2017 and received “Very Good” gradings in her ACRs

for the years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019. It was the specific case on

behalf of the petitioner which has not been denied that the ACRs

grading of “Good” for the year 2016-2017 was never

communicated to the petitioner even till the DPC met. Therefore, as

per the law laid down by this Court in catena of decisions more

particularly, as observed and held by this Court in Rukhsana

Shaheen Khan [Rukhsana Shaheen Khan v. Union of India, (2018)

18 SCC 640 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 401] ; Sukhdev Singh [Sukhdev

Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 9 SCC 566 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S)

279] and Dev Dutt v. Union of India [Dev Dutt v. Union of India,

(2008) 8 SCC 725 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 771] uncommunicated

adverse ACRs may be even with “Good” entry which can be said to

be adverse in the context of eligibility for promotion is not to be

LPA 72/2024 Page 15 of 19

relied upon for consideration of promotion. Therefore,

uncommunicated ACR for the year 2016-2017 having the grading

“Good” could not have been relied upon for consideration for

promotion.

19. Similarly so far as the ACR gradings for the year 2019-2020 is

concerned, admittedly the same was communicated to the petitioner

on 8-4-2021, just one day before the DPC met on 9-4-2021. The

petitioner was having 15 days' time to make the representation

against the ACR grading for the year 2019-2020. Before the 15 days

were over, the DPC met on 9-4-2021 and considered the case of the

petitioner for promotion. The submission on behalf of the High

Court that the other candidates who were also communicated the

ACRs for the year 2019-2020 on 8-4-2021 submitted their

representations on 9-4-2021 and therefore the petitioner also could

have submitted the representation on 9-4-2021 like other candidates

is concerned, it is neither here nor there. The fact remains that the

petitioner was having 15 days' time from 8-4-2021 to make a

representation. Therefore, either the DPC could have been

postponed or the ACR for the year 2019-2020 ought not to have

been considered and the same ought to have been treated as

uncommunicated ACR.

xxxxx

22. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the case of

the petitioner for promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar as on

9-4-2021 is required to be considered afresh ignoring the

uncommunicated ACRs for the years 2016-2017 and 2019-20 and

her case is required to be considered afresh taking into

consideration the ACRs for the years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019 for

which the petitioner was having “Very Good” gradings.

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, present

petition is allowed. The DPC proceedings dated 9-4-2021 denying

the promotion to the petitioner for the post of Assistant Registrar are

hereby quashed and set aside. The case of the petitioner for

promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar as on 9-4-2021 i.e. the

LPA 72/2024 Page 16 of 19

date on which the juniors came to be promoted is directed to be

considered afresh ignoring the uncommunicated ACRs for the years

2016-2017 and 2019-20 and thereafter the DPC/competent

authority to take a fresh decision in accordance with law and taking

into consideration the ACRs of remaining years i.e. 2017-2018 and

2018-2019. Such an exercise be completed within a period of six

weeks from today.”

26.InR.K. Jibanlata Devi(supra), the petitioner had secured ‘Good’

grading for the years 2016-17 and 2019-20, whereas ‘Very Good’ grading

for the years 2017-18 and 2018-19 in her ACRs. The ACR grading for the

year 2016-17 was not communicated to the petitioner till the Departmental

Promotion Committee (“DPC”)had met, whereas the grading for the year

2019-20 was communicated to the petitioner just one day before the DPC

met on 09.04.2021. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the adverse and

uncommunicated grading of ‘Good’ for the years 2016-17 and 2019-20

cannot be relied upon for consideration of promotion and the same is to be

ignored. It was further directed that the DPC/competent authority shall take

a fresh decision in accordance with law, ignoring the ACRs for the years

2016-17 and 2019-20.

27.In view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s position inRukhsana

Shaheen Khan(supra) andR.K. Jibanlata Devi(supra), it emerges that

adverse and uncommunicated ACRs cannot be considered for the purposes

of promotion, and the same is to be ignored by the competent authority.

28.In the present case,vis-à-visthe promotion exercise 2014-2015, the

Appellant was to be considered for the promotion to the post of Manager

(Scale IV) from Deputy Manager (Scale III). The APARs for the years

LPA 72/2024 Page 17 of 19

2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 were considered in the said promotion

exercise and the Appellant was awarded ‘B’ Grade for the year 2011-12, and

‘A’ grade for the years 2012-13 and 2013-14.

29.There is no cavil that entries in the APARs for the said years were not

communicated to the Appellant before 19.08.2019, and the same were only

communicated to the Appellant pursuant to the directions of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court issuedvidejudgment dated 10.07.2019 passed in Civil

Appeal Nos. 5340-5341/2019.

30.Further, it is imperative to note that in the said judgment dated

10.07.2019, it was also observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the

lower grade awarded to the Appellant in the year 2011-12, has a material

effect on the issue of promotion of the Appellant. The relevant portion is

extracted hereunder:

“13. Admittedly, for one of the years under consideration (2011-12)

for the promotional exercise for 2014-15, the appellant was graded

a "B", while for the subsequent two years, he was graded an "A".

Consequently, the fact that the appellant was given a lower grading

for 2011-12 would materially affect whether or not he should be

prompted from Scale III to Scale IV for the year in question. The

non-communication of the entries is, therefore, a matter in respect of

which a legitimate grievance can be made by the appellant,

particularly having regard to the position in law laid down in Dev

Dutt (supra) and Sukhdev Singh (supra).”

31.Therefore, it is clear that the ‘B’ grade awarded to the Appellant in his

APAR for the year 2011-12, which was evidently adverse in nature given

that the Appellant was awarded ‘A’ grade for the subsequent two years, was

LPA 72/2024 Page 18 of 19

considered for the promotion exercise of 2014-15 despite its entries being

uncommunicated to the Appellant when the said exercise took place.

32.Accordingly, in view of the settled position of law as enunciated in

Rukhsana Shaheen Khan(supra) andR.K. Jibanlata Devi(supra), and

having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of

the considered opinion that the Appellant’s case for promotion from Scale

III to Scale IV in the promotion exercise of 2014-15 warrants fresh

consideration by the competent authority. Such consideration shall be

undertaken by taking into account the Appellant’s APARs for the years

2012-13 and 2013-14, while excluding from consideration the adverse

APAR for the year 2011-12, the entries whereof had remained

uncommunicated at the time when the said promotion exercise was

conducted.

33.In view of the foregoing, the present Appeal is allowed and the

Impugned Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby set aside.

Consequently, the order dated 21.09.2020 passed by Respondent No. 1,

whereby the Appellant was denied promotion in the promotion exercise of

2014-15, is also quashed and set aside. Respondent No. 1 is directed to

reconsider the Appellant’s case for promotion from Scale III to Scale IV in

the promotion exercise of 2014-15 by excluding the APAR for the year

2011-12 from consideration and by taking into account the APARs for the

years 2012-13 and 2013-14.

34.Since the Appellant was ultimately promoted in the year 2018, in the

event he is found entitled to promotion pursuant to the fresh exercise

directed hereinabove, he shall be entitled to all consequential benefits on a

LPA 72/2024 Page 19 of 19

retrospective basis, including arrears, with effect from the date on which

promotion would have accrued in the promotion exercise of 2014-15, i.e.,

29.05.2014, instead of the year 2018.

35.The present Appeal stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Pending

application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

TEJAS KARIA, J

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ

MAY 29, 2026

St / ap

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