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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT JABALPUR

BEFORE

HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE VIVEK KUMAR SINGH

&

HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI

ON THE 15

th

OF JANUARY, 2026

MISCELLANEOUS CRIMINAL CASE NO.5062 of 2024

PRADEEP CHAUDHARY

Versus

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH , THROUGH SPECIAL POLICE

ESTABLISHMENT, LOKAYUKTA OFFICE, BHOPAL

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Appearance :

Ms. Shobha Menon – Senior Advocate with Shri Rahul Choubey for the

petitioner.

Shri Abhinav Shrivastava – Advocate for the respondent No.1/S.P.E.

Lokayukta.

Shri Shivendra Pandey – Advocate for the respondent

No.4/Complainant.

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Reserved on      :  17/12/2025

Pronounced on : 15/01/2026

O R D E R

By way of this petition, under Section 482 of Code of Criminal

Procedure (in short, ‘CrPC’), the petitioner is seeking quashment of the

charge-sheet No.81/2022 dated 10.09.2022 whereby he has been

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implicated in criminal proceeding under Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for brevity, ‘PC Act’) read with

Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code on the ground that the sanction for

prosecution order dated 21.03.2022 was issued by incompetent authority

i.e. Joint Director, whose post was equivalent to the petitioner and there

was no material on record that the competent authority of the petitioner i.e.

Managing Director, had applied its mind for grant of sanction and further,

the petitioner is also assailing the order dated 29.11.2023 whereby the

Court below has rejected his application under Section 227 of the CrPC for

discharge of consequential order of framing of charges under Section 13(1)

(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act read with Section 120-B of the IPC.

2.Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts germane to the institution of

the present criminal case is as under :-

(i)The petitioner vide order dated 15.06.2012 came to be

posted as Additional General Manager, Bhopal, a class-I post, in

the Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company

Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as ‘MPMKVVCL’) and served as

such until his retirement on 30.04.2020.

(ii)The disciplinary power to remove the petitioner from the

services on the post held by him i.e. Additional General

Manager, vests with the Managing Director of MPMKVVCL.

(iii)On the basis of a complaint that petitioner is allegedly in

possession of assets to the tune of Rs.70 crores, which was

disproportionate to his known source of income and a Crime

No.340/2014 came to be registered against the petitioner under

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Section 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the PC Act and an F.I.R. was

registered on 25.07.2014.

(iv)Thereafter, a Final Report/charge-sheet dated 10.09.2022

was filed.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner succinctly submits that insofar as

Section 19 of the PC Act, 1988 is concerned, it categorically postulates

that no Court shall take cognizance of offence punishable under sections

referred to therein committed by public servant except with the previous

sanction of the authority competent to remove him from his office and in

the present case, as referred to above and is explicit from the document

Annexure A/1, it is the Managing Director who alone could have granted

sanction for prosecution. It is also submitted that Joint Director is a class-I

post likewise present petitioner, therefore, the sanction granted by him

would amount to the sanction granted by the incompetent authority. It is

further submitted that the word ‘removal’ carries a great significance

inasmuch as it results in cessation of inter-relation between the office and

abuse by the holder of the office. The link between the power with

opportunity to abuse and the holder of office would be severed by removal

from office and also in the catena of decisions rendered by Apex Court, it

has been held that the authority entitled to grant sanction must apply its

mind to the facts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts

before according the sanction. More appropriately, a grant of sanction is

not an idle formality but solemn and sacrosanct act which removes the

umbrella of protection of government servants against frivolous

prosecutions and must be strictly complied with before any prosecution

could be launched against public servant.

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4.Further, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this

Court on Section 19(1) and 19(1)(c) of the PC Act, which affords

protection to public servants by making it mandatory that no Court shall

take cognizance of offence under Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 except with the

previous sanction of competent authority and further as per Section 19(1)

(c), the ‘competent authority’ for grant of sanction for prosecution would

be the authority who is competent to remove the delinquent from his office

and in the present circumstances, the power to remove petitioner or to take

disciplinary action was exclusively vested with Managing Director of

MPMKVVCL.

5.To bolster her arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has

placed reliance on plethora of judgments rendered by the Apex Court in

the cases of Ashok Kumar Sahu v. Union of India, (2006) 6 SCC 704;

Vijayadevi Navalkishore Bhartia v. Land Acquisition Officer, (2003) 5

SCC 83; Paramjeet Singh Patheja v. ICDS Ltd. AIR 2007 (SC) 168;

Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) LTD. and others,

(2003) 2 SCC 111; R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay, (1984) 2 SCC 183, State

of Goa v. Babu Thomas, (2005) 8 SCC 130; P.L. Tatwal v. State of

M.P., (2014) 11 SCC 431 and CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14

SCC 295. Learned counsel has also relied upon various judgments of this

Court and of other High Courts viz. Shri Baini Prasad Chansoriya vs.

State of M.P. and others (Cr.R. No.1629/2022), G.S. Matharoo vs. C.B.I.

(Delhi High Court), Sanjay Dikshit vs. C.B.I. (Allahabad High Court) and

M.D. Rangaswamy vs. State of Karnataka.

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6.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 rebutted the

submissions putforth by learned counsel for the petitioner and submitted

that adequacy of material placed before sanctioning authority cannot be

gone into at this stage and the said position of law has been enunciated by

this Court in Sabit Khan vs. State of M.P. and others 2021 SCC Online

MP 1482, wherein it has been held that challenge to sanction order on that

ground that it suffers from non-consideration of relevant material is

required to be made during the trial and can be established by leading

evidence. Additionally, referring to the decision of Apex Court rendered in

the case of State of M.P. vs. Krishna Chandra Saksena (1996) 11 SCC

439, this Court has further taken a view that where sanction order is not

ex-facie illegal or invalid, proceedings cannot be quashed. It is further

submitted that present case is not a case where it can ex-facie be said that

the present case is illegal or invalid and as such, the petitioner is required

to raise objection, if any, during trial. Further reliance is placed on yet

another decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of State of Punjab

vs. Hari Kesh reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 49, wherein it has been

held that :-

“8.In the instant case, it appears that the petition

for quashing of Sanction Order was filed by the

respondent after the trial court framed the charge

and commenced the trial, rather after the

prosecution examined five witnesses. It is pertinent

to note that whether the Sanction has been granted

by the competent authority or not, would be a

matter of evidence. Further, as per the Explanation

to sub-section (4), for the purpose of Section 19,

error includes “competency of the authority to

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grant Sanction.” Therefore, in view of the settled

legal position, the High Court should not have

quashed the Sanction Order and the consequent

proceedings, unless it was satisfied that the failure

of justice had occurred by such error or irregularity

or invalidity. There is not a whisper in the

impugned order about any failure of justice having

occurred on account of the impugned Sanction

Order. The High Court also should not have

entertained the petition for quashing the Sanction

Order when the prosecution had already examined

seven witnesses.

9.In that view of the matter, we are of the

opinion that the High Court has committed gross

error in quashing the Sanction Order and the

consequent proceedings vide the impugned order.”

7.Learned counsel for the respondent No.1, in view of the aforesaid

decisions, has submitted that the grounds raised by the petitioner regarding

the sanction granted by the incompetent authority can be raised before the

learned trial Court and this is without prejudice to the fact that sanction

(Annxure A/9) has been passed by the competent authority after

considering proper material on record.

8.Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 also submits that the

defence of the accused cannot be looked into at the stage of deciding

application under Section 227 of CrPC and the submission of the

accused/petitioner is to be confined to the material produced by

Investigating Agency as while deciding application under Section 227 of

CrPC and while framing charges, the competent authority has to only

determine the prima facie case against the accused and the said position

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has been settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa

vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC 568 and State of Gujarat vs.

Dilipsinh Kishorisinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294. It is further

submitted that in view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, documents

produced by the petitioner, including those with respect to delegation of

powers, cannot be examined at this stage, as the same is part and parcel of

defence of the petitioner which is to be considered at the stage of trial.

9.Learned counsel for the respondent No.1 also submits that in the

case of Shri Baini Prasad Chansoriya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh &

others (Cr.R. No. 1629/2022), this Court in para-6.2 has opined that

sanction is to grant formal permission to do something or to

impose/authorise punishment. Even if, the present matter is analyzed in

accordance with aforesaid decision, it would be evident that matter relating

to sanction was dealt by the Managing Director and after discussion and

perusal of the material, it was decided that sanction be granted. In the

same paragraph, this Court has also opined that the Hon’ble Court need

not enter into realm of knowing the exact meaning of these two

expressions ‘approval’ and ‘sanction’. He further submits that vide order

dated 11.07.2017 passed in M.Cr.C No. 19471/2016 (Vijay Kant Pandey

vs. State of Madhya Pradesh), in para-7 and 8, this Court has discussed

issue regarding difference between ‘formal authentication’ of order and

authority that has considered and granted sanction. Ergo, that signature of

Joint Director in sanction order dated 21.03.2022 in the present case is also

formal authentication of order whereas sanction has been considered,

granted and approved by the Managing Director. Lastly, learned counsel

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for respondent No.1 vehemently submits that prima facie case is made out

against the petitioner and the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court

in the case of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335

are not applicable in the present case and in view of the aforesaid decisions

of the Apex Court, the present petition filed by the petitioner is wholly

misconceived and without any substance, therefore, the same is liable to be

dismissed.

10.After considering the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the

parties, it it is apposite to discuss the relevant statutory provisions i.e.

Sections 13 and 19 of the PC Act, which reads as under :-

13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—

[(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence

of criminal misconduct,—

(a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently

misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own

use any property entrusted to him or any property

under his control as a public servant or allows any

other person so to do; or

(b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly

during the period of his office.

Explanation 1.—A person shall be presumed to

have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or

any person on his behalf, is in possession of or has,

at any time during the period of his office, been in

possession of pecuniary resources or property

disproportionate to his known sources of income

which the public servant cannot satisfactorily

account for.

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Explanation 2.—The expression “known sources

of income” means income received from any

lawful sources.]

(2) Any public servant who commits criminal

misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment

for a term which shall be not less than [four years]

but which may extend to [ten years] and shall also

be liable to fine.”

“19. Previous sanction necessary for

prosecution.—(1) No court shall take

cognizance of an offence punishable under

[Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15] alleged to have been

committed by a public servant, except with the

previous sanction [save as otherwise provided in

the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013],—

(a) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as

the case may be, was at the time of commission of

the alleged offence employed] in connection with

the affairs of the Union and is not removable from

his office save by or with the sanction of the

Central Government, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person [who is employed, or as

the case may be, was at the time of commission of

the alleged offence employed] in connection with

the affairs of a State and is not removable from his

office save by or with the sanction of the State

Government, of that Government;

(c) in the case of any other person, of the

authority competent to remove him from his

office.

[Provided that no request can be made, by a person

other than a police officer or an officer of an

investigation agency or other law enforcement

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authority, to the appropriate Government or

competent authority, as the case may be, for the

previous sanction of such Government or authority

for taking cognizance by the court of any of the

offences specified in this sub-section, unless—

(i) such person has filed a complaint in a

competent court about the alleged offences for

which the public servant is sought to be

prosecuted; and

(ii) the court has not dismissed the complaint

under Section 203 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and directed the

complainant to obtain the sanction for prosecution

against the public servant for further proceeding:

Provided further that in the case of request from

the person other than a police officer or an officer

of an investigation agency or other law

enforcement authority, the appropriate

Government or competent authority shall not

accord sanction to prosecute a public servant

without providing an opportunity of being heard to

the concerned public servant:

Provided also that the appropriate Government or

any competent authority shall, after the receipt of

the proposal requiring sanction for prosecution of a

public servant under this sub-section, endeavour to

convey the decision on such proposal within a

period of three months from the date of its receipt:

Provided also that in case where, for the purpose

of grant of sanction for prosecution, legal

consultation is required, such period may, for the

reasons to be recorded in writing, be extended by a

further period of one month:

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Provided also that the Central Government may,

for the purpose of sanction for prosecution of a

public servant, prescribe such guidelines as it

considers necessary.

Explanation.—For the purposes of sub-section (1),

the expression “public servant” includes such

person—

(a) who has ceased to hold the office during which

the offence is alleged to have been committed; or

(b) who has ceased to hold the office during which

the offence is alleged to have been committed and

is holding an office other than the office during

which the offence is alleged to have been

committed.]

(2) Where for any reason whatsoever any doubt

arises as to whether the previous sanction as

required under sub-section (1) should be given by

the Central Government or the State Government

or any other authority, such sanction shall be given

by that Government or authority which would have

been competent to remove the public servant from

his office at the time when the offence was alleged

to have been committed.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a

Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a

Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the

ground of the absence of, or any error, omission

or irregularity in, the sanction required under

sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that

court, a failure of justice has in fact been

occasioned thereby;

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(b) no court shall stay the proceedings under

this Act on the ground of any error, omission or

irregularity in the sanction granted by the

authority, unless it is satisfied that such error,

omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure

of justice;

(c) no court shall stay the proceedings under

this Act on any other ground and no court shall

exercise the powers of revision in relation to any

interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial,

appeal or other proceedings.

(4) In determining under sub-section (3) whether

the absence of, or any error, omission or

irregularity in, such sanction has occasioned or

resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have

regard to the fact whether the objection could and

should have been raised at any earlier stage in the

proceedings.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section,—

(a) error includes competency of the authority

to grant sanction;

(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes

reference to any requirement that the prosecution

shall be at the instance of a specified authority or

with the sanction of a specified person or any

requirement of a similar nature.”

11.Pondering upon the aforesaid provisions which mandates granting of

“sanction” and the ‘authority competent to remove him from his office’ is

required to take a decision which is manifest from the third proviso of sub-

section (1) of Section 19 and the word ‘sanction’ carries a significance

which came in for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in

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the case of Baini Prasad Chansoriya (supra) wherein the Division Bench

after scrutinizing Section 17-A of PC Act observed that the object of the

said provision is likewise similar to that of Section 19 i.e. to protect the

public servant from frivolous and malicious prosecution. The Division

Bench further clarified and enumerated that the legislature had chosen to

use the expression ‘approval’ instead of ‘sanction’ and in saying so,

dictionary meaning and usage of the said words ‘approval’ and ‘sanction’

came to be delineated. Further, in paragraph-6.2, the Division Bench has

observed as under :-

“6.2. Since the term ‘approval’ is neither defined

in the PC Act nor in the CrPC, one has to fall back

upon the dictionary meaning of the phrases. From

the dictionary meaning and usage of said two

expression, it is apparent that the cardinal

difference is that ‘approval’ is used in general

context while the expression ‘sanction’ is used in

official, formal and legal context. Moreso, again

‘approval’ denotes giving consent while ‘sanction’

is grant of formal permission to do something or to

impose/authorize punishment.”

12.In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the teeth of sanction order

dated 21.03.2022, it is apparent that it is not disputed that the decision of

Joint Director to grant sanction against the petitioner came to be approved

by competent authority i.e. Managing Director. In this regard, it is

pertinent to mention that the statement of sanction witness i.e. Joint

Director has already been recorded before the learned Court of Special

Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988) and charges have also been

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framed against the petitioner for the aforesaid offence. Even for the sake

of argument, if we accept that the sanction was not granted by the

competent authority then at this stage, it cannot be said that the

prosecution sanction given by the Joint Director, which is admittedly

approved by the Managing Director, who is competent to remove the

petitioner from his office, is not valid. This fact can be considered only at

the time of passing of the judgment after considering all the evidence

adduced by the prosecution. Any opinion of this Court regarding the

validity of sanction, would prejudice the defence of the petitioner which

would be taken by him during the trial. Further, while deciding an

application under Section 227 CrPC and while framing charges, the

competent Court has to only determine a prima facie case against the

accused keeping in view the decision of Apex Court in the case of C.B.I.

vs. Ashok Kumar Aggrawal reported in AIR 2014 SC 827 wherein it has

been held that validity of an order granting sanction can be challenged

only at the time of trial and not at the stage of inquiry or pre-trial, as has

been done in the case in hand. The submission of the petitioner/accused is

to be confined to the material produced by the Investigating Agency. The

documents produced by the petitioner, including those with respect to

delegation of power, cannot be examined at this stage as the same is a part

of defence of the petitioner which is to be considered at the stage of trial.

13.In addition to above, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State

of Punjab vs. Hari Kesh, 2025 SCC OnLine 49, has held that whether the

sanction has been granted by the competent authority or not, would be a

matter of evidence. Further, as per sub-section (3)(a) of Section 19 of P.C.

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Act, “no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be

reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the

ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the

sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court,

a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.” Subsequently, the

explanation to sub-section (4), for the purpose of Section 19, error includes

“competency of the authority to grant sanction”.

14.Upon due consideration of the submissions advanced and a careful

examination of the record, without expressing any opinion on the merits of

the legal issue involved, this Court, is of the opinion that the findings

recorded by the Court below in the impugned order are reasoned,

supported by the material placed on record and based on sound judicial

appreciation, therefore, it does not suffer from any illegality, perversity, or

material irregularity so as to warrant interference by this Court. It is a

settled law that inherent powers under Section 482 of CrPC should not be

exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. From the material on record, it

could not be said that the prosecution initiated against the petitioner was

either false, vexatious or an abuse of process of Court.

15.Accordingly, this petition filed by the petitioner under Section 482

of Cr.PC is hereby dismissed.

(VIVEK KUMAR SINGH) (AJAY KUMAR NIRANKARI)

JUDGE JUDGE

PK