LPA 487/2025 Page 1 of 18

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment Reserved on: 10.03.2026

% Judgment Delivered on: 29.05.2026

+ LPA 487/2025

PRAVESH KUMAR & ANR. .....Appellants

Versus

DELHI JAL BOARD & ORS. .....Respondents

Advocates who appeared in this case

For the Appellants: Ms. Aruna Mehta and Mr. Lakshay

Mehta, Advocates.

For the Respondents: Mr. Tushar Sannu and Mr. Parvin

Bansal, Advocates for DJB.

Dr. Monika Arora, CGSC with Mr.

Subhrodeep Saha, Ms. Anamika

Thakur, Mr. P. Kumar and Mr.

Abhinav Verma, Advocates for R-2.

CORAM:

HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA

JUDGMENT

TEJAS KARIA, J

FACTUAL MATRIX

1.The present Appeal arises from the Judgment dated 18.11.2024

(“Impugned Judgment”) rendered in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 10651/2016

(“Writ Petition”), instituted by the Appellants under Article 226 of the

LPA 487/2025 Page 2 of 18

Constitution of India, 1950 (“Constitution”). By way of the Writ Petition,

the Appellants sought compensation in the sum of ₹30,00,000/- together

with interest on account of the tragic death of their 9-year-old son, Master

Justin/Joy, who is stated to have fallen into a pit situated on a vacant plot in

the possession of Respondent No. 1 (“Vacant Land”) and died as a

consequence of the alleged negligence of Respondent No. 1.

2.By the Impugned Judgment, the learned Single Judge directed

Respondent No. 1 to pay a lump sum compensation of ₹22,00,000/- together

with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 20.07.2016,i.e., the

date of the incident, until the date of realisation, to the Appellants on

account of the death of their son (“Deceased-Child”).

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:

3.The learned Counsel for the Appellants made the following

submissions:

3.1The Vacant Land had broken boundary walls and contained an

uncovered pit, which was neither barricaded nor otherwise

secured. Children residing in the locality were accustomed to

playing on the Vacant Land. During the rainy season, the Vacant

Land used to become inundated with rainwater.

3.2On 20.07.2016, at about 06:00 to 06:30 PM, the Deceased-Child,

while chasing a kite that had drifted towards the Vacant Land, is

stated to have slipped into the pit situated therein. Appellant No. 2

returned home at about 06:00 PM after imparting tuition classes

and waited for the Deceased-Child; however, he did not return.

Appellant No. 2 thereupon searched for the Deceased-Child in the

LPA 487/2025 Page 3 of 18

locality, but he could not be traced. At about 08:00 to 08:30 PM,

Appellant No. 2 informed Appellant No. 1, who, along with the

neighbours, commenced a search for the Deceased-Child. One of

the children informed them that he had seen the Deceased-Child

proceeding towards the Vacant Land. Thereafter, they went to the

Vacant Land and found a pit filled with water. As it was the rainy

season, one of the neighbours dived into the pit and retrieved the

Deceased-Child, who was immediately taken to Aruna Asaf Ali

Hospital, where he was declared brought dead.

3.3Thereafter, Appellant No. 1 caused an FIR to be registered against

the unknown officials of Respondent No. 1, who had allegedly dug

the pit on the Vacant Land but had neither barricaded the same nor

deployed any guard to maintain vigilance over the area. The

Deceased-Child is stated to have lost his life due to the negligence

of the officials of Respondent No. 1. Thepost mortemexamination

of the Deceased-Child revealed the presence of dirty water in his

chest, and the cause of death was opined to beante-mortem

drowning.

3.4At the relevant time, Appellant No. 1, the father of the Deceased-

Child, was employed as a Supervisor at Sun City Restaurant,

Delhi, and was earning a salary of ₹20,000/- per month. Appellant

No. 2, the mother of the Deceased-Child, is employed as an

Assistant Teacher at St. Mother Teresa Public School, Burari,

Delhi, and is earning a salary of ₹17,000/- per month. At the time

of his death, the Deceased-Child was studying in the 4

th

standard at

LPA 487/2025 Page 4 of 18

St. Teresa School, Sant Nagar, Delhi, was stated to be

academically bright, and had secured a CGPA of 9.5 in the 3

rd

standard.

3.5The learned Single Judge,videthe Impugned Judgment, while

taking Appellant No. 1’s monthly salary as the assumed monthly

income of the Deceased-Child and relying uponSh. Kishan Lal

and Ors. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, Neutral Citation:

2007:DHC:692, andSmt. Kamla Devi v. Government of NCT of

Delhi and Anr., 2004 SCC OnLine Del 721, awarded

compensation in the sum of ₹22,00,000/- together with simple

interest at the rate of 6% per annum from 20.07.2016,i.e., the date

of the incident, until the date of realisation.

3.6It is the grievance of the Appellants, however, that the learned

Single Judge failed to take into account that the assumed income

of the Deceased-Child would necessarily increase over time on

account of inflation and the erosion in the value of money, and

consequently computed the compensation without considering

future prospects.

3.7The learned Single Judge ought to have awarded compensation of

at least ₹30,78,947/- together with interest at the rate of 9% per

annum from the date of filing of the Writ Petition, in accordance

with the principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in

Laxmi Narayan and Anr. v. Government of NCT of Delhi,

Neutral Citation: 2019:DHC:1454-DB, as well asRajeev Singhal

and Anr. v. MCD (East Delhi Municipal Corporation) and Anr.,

LPA 487/2025 Page 5 of 18

Neutral Citation: 2018:DHC:6263-DB, wherein future prospects

were taken into account while determining the presumed income

of the child. It is contended that if the formula set out inLaxmi

Narayan(supra) andRajeev Singhal(supra) for cases involving

the death of children of tender age is applied, the compensation

would be computed under two heads:

i.Standard compensation; and

ii.Pecuniary damages

3.8The standard compensation as observed inKamla Devi(supra)

was stated to be ₹50,000/- in the year 1989. Kamla Devi(supra)

further observed that the said sum of ₹50,000/- would require to be

adjusted with reference to the date of death of the deceased based

on the basis of Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers

(“CPI-IW”) published by the Labour Bureau of Government of

India with respect to base year 1982=100. The average CPI-IW for

the year 1989 was 171, whereas the CPI-IW for July 2016 was

1296. Accordingly, the inflation corrected value worked out to

₹3,78,947/- i.e., ₹50,000 x 1296/171 in July 2016. Thus, standard

compensation comes to ₹3,78,947/-.

3.9In the instant case the Deceased-Child was 9-year-old and his

father i.e., Appellant No. 1 was earning ₹20,000/- per month.

Accordingly, for the purposes of computation of pecuniary loss of

dependency, the income of Appellant No. 1 was taken as the

income of the Deceased-Child:

₹20,000/- x 1.5 = ₹30,000/-

LPA 487/2025 Page 6 of 18

Deducting 50% as personal expenses being unmarried = ₹15,000/-

per month

₹15000/- x 12 x 15 = ₹27,00,000/-

3.10Thus, the compensation under the pecuniary head works out to

₹27,00,000/-, and the standard compensation works out to

₹3,78,947/-, thereby taking the total compensation in the present

case to ₹30,78,947/-. Accordingly, the Appellants are entitled to

compensation in the sum of ₹30,78,947/- together with interest at

the rate of 9% per annum from the date of filing of the Writ

Petition until the date of realisation.

3.11There are several decisions of the Division Bench of this Court,

includingLaxmi Narayan(supra),Rajeev Singhal(supra),

Sharafat Khan and Another v. Northern Railway and Another,

Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:4108-DB, andVarinder Prasad v.

B.S.E.S. Rajdhani Power Ltd. and Others, 190 (2012) DLT 293,

wherein compensation was awarded after taking into account the

future increase in the income of the deceased by applying the

multiplicand factor of 1.5 so as to offset the effects of inflation and

erosion in the value of money.

3.12The learned Single Judge failed to appreciate that where

fundamental rights are violated by the acts or omissions of State

functionaries, the Court is duty-bound, in the exercise of its public

law jurisdiction, to award just compensation so as to ensure that

citizens live under a legal regime in which their rights and interests

are duly protected and preserved.

LPA 487/2025 Page 7 of 18

3.13Accordingly, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to enhance

the compensation awarded under the Impugned Judgment and to

modify the rate of interest from 6% to 9% per annum.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

4.The learned Counsel for Respondent No. 1 made the following

submissions:

4.1.The learned Single Judge computed the compensation on the basis

of the averment made in the Writ Petition that Appellant No. 1 was

earning ₹20,000/- per month and, accordingly, proceeded on the

footing of the salary claimed by Appellant No. 1. The Appellants

failed to place on record any salary slip, Income Tax Return, or

certificate in support of the said monthly income of ₹20,000/-. In

contrast, documentary proof was placed on record only in respect

of the income of Appellant No. 2, namely, a school certificate

evidencing that she was earning ₹17,000/- per month.

4.2.InSharafat Khan(supra), the Division Bench of this Court, while

directing payment “along with simple interest @ 6% from date of

filing of writ petition”, was dealing with the case of a 12-year-old

child, where the certainty of academic achievement and future

career prospects was relatively more crystallised. The Court in the

said case adopted a lower base income, namely ₹15,000/- and,

thereafter, applied a factor of 1.5 towards future prospects.

4.3.On the aforesaid basis, it is contended that the Appellants cannot

rely uponSharafat Khan(supra) to seek enhancement of the rate

of interest to 9% per annum, when the said decision itself awarded

LPA 487/2025 Page 8 of 18

interest only at the rate of 6% per annum. The addition of 50%

towards “future prospects” is speculative in the case of a child

aged 9 years. The Impugned Judgment already adopts a rational

approach by taking the salary of Appellant No. 1, namely

₹20,000/- per month, instead of minimum wages, as the basis for

computing compensation. Granting an additional 50% towards

“future prospects” over and above the said established income, for

the purposes of computation in the case of a 9-year-old child,

would, according to Respondent No. 1, result in “unjust

enrichment” rather than “just compensation”.

4.4.The Impugned Judgment accepted the higher base income of

Appellant No. 1 without making any deduction towards tax or

uncertainties, while refraining from adding the speculative

component of 50% towards future increase. According to

Respondent No. 1, ifSharafat Khan(supra) were to be applied

strictly, the Court may have to consider minimum wages or a

lower base income. The Appellants seek to retain the higher actual

salary of ₹20,000/- per month, as accepted by the learned Single

Judge, and in addition apply the factor of 1.5 adopted inSharafat

Khan(supra), thereby claiming a double benefit which, according

to Respondent No. 1, is unsupported in law.

4.5.The Appellants also place reliance uponKamla Devi(supra) to

seek enhancement of compensation. However,Kamla Devi(supra)

is factually distinguishable from the present case. InKamla Devi

(supra), the deceased was a 29-year-old earning adult with an

LPA 487/2025 Page 9 of 18

established income, and the Court was, therefore, in a position to

assess the actual loss of dependency, the deceased being the

breadwinner of the family. The principles governing computation

of pecuniary loss of dependency in the case of an adult earning

member cannot be mechanically applied to the case of a child, who

was a non-earning member and in whose case the element of

dependency is necessarily prospective and speculative.

4.6.Accordingly, the strict multiplier method involving future

prospects, as applied in the case of earning adults inKamla Devi

(supra), cannot, according to Respondent No. 1, be treated as the

governing standard in cases concerning the death of children. It is

in this context that reliance is placed upon the observations made

by this Court inKishan Lal(supra):

“Calculating the compensation for pecuniary loss of

dependency, is somewhat more complicated. Whereas

Kamla Devi (supra) involved an earning adult whose

death had an immediate financial impact on his family, the

present petition involves the death of a small child who

was not contributing to the household income and who

would have been unable to do so for many more years. A

somewhat different approach would be needed.”

4.7.This Court inKishan Lal(supra) adopted the propositions laid out

inM.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, (2001) 8 SCC 151, wherein

the Supreme Court observed that, in the case of children, the Court

must estimate the ‘potential earning capacity’ based on the

parents’ status and the school attended by the child. The learned

Single Judge correctly followed this mandate by taking into

consideration the father’s income to assess the future prospects of

LPA 487/2025 Page 10 of 18

the child, instead of mechanically applying the formula applicable

to earning adults fromKamla Devi(supra). The award of interest

at the rate of 6% by the learned Single Judge is also consistent

with the Supreme Court’s direction inM.S. Grewal(supra). The

Appellants’ claim for enhancement of interest to 9% is, therefore,

contrary to the precedents governing cases involving death of

school-going children.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

5.We have heard the learned Counsel for the Parties and perused the

material placed on record.

6.The present Appeal is confined to the limited question of whether the

compensation awarded under the Impugned Judgment warrants

enhancement and whether the rate of interest granted therein calls for

modification.

7.The learned Single Judge, upon consideration of the material placed

on record, observed that it was the primary responsibility of Respondent No.

1 to maintain safe conditions and to take due precautions in and around the

Vacant Land, which obligation Respondent No. 1 had failed to discharge.

Accordingly, compensation in the sum of ₹22,00,000/- was awarded to the

Appellants together with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum from

the date of the incident,i.e., 20.07.2016, until the date of realisation.

8.While assessing compensation under the pecuniary head, the learned

Single Judge accepted the income of Appellant No. 1 at ₹20,000/- per

month, as asserted in the rejoinder affidavit filed in the Writ Petition, as the

basis for estimating the future earning capacity of the Deceased-Child. The

LPA 487/2025 Page 11 of 18

relevant observations of the learned Single Judge are reproduced below:

“InKishan Lal, while the Court relied uponKamla Devito

calculate the standard compensation, it also opined that there is a

need to adopt a different approach while calculating the pecuniary

losses. It was observed that the Court inKamla Deviwas

adjudicating a prayer for compensation involving an earning adult

whose death had an immediate financial impact on his family,

whereas, in contrast, the prayer for compensation inKishan Lal

concerns the death of a small child who was not contributing to the

household income. Consequently, the Court, relying on the

principles laid down inM.S. Grewal v Deep Chand Sood & Ors

evolved the following methodology for calculating compensation for

the death of a minor, which reads as under:-

“31. Calculating the compensation for pecuniary loss of

dependency is somewhat more complicated, Whereas Kamla

Devi (supra) involved an earning adult whose death had an

immediate financial impact on his family, the present petition

involves the death of a small child who was not contributing

to the household income and who would have been unable to

do so for many more years. A somewhat different approach

would be needed.

32. In Smt Kumari v State of Tamil Nadu & Others: 1992

ACJ 283, the six-year old son of the appeilant died as a result

of falling in an open manhole. The appellant filed a petition

under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking a writ of

mandamus directing the respondents to pay Rs.50,000/- as

compensation. The Madras High Court dismissed the writ

petition on the ground that in a writ petition it was not

possible to determine which respondent was negligent in

leaving the sewerage tank uncovered. The Supreme Court set

aside the judgment of the High Court and awarded the

appellant the sum of Rs.50,000 with interest at 12% per

annum from the date of the accident until the date of

payment. The Supreme Court further held that the State of

Tamil Nadu may take appropriate proceedings to claim the

said amount from any of the respondents who might have

been responsible for leaving the manhole uncovered. Thus,

one method of calculating the compensation of pecuniary loss

of dependency is to bring the above compensation given in

Kumari (supra) up to date based on India's inflation rate

LPA 487/2025 Page 12 of 18

between 1992, when the case was decided, and 2005, when

Puran died, and to subtract from it what the standard

compensation would have been in 1992.

33. However, the approach in M.S. Grewal (supra) appears

to be the better and more rational approach. In M.S. Grewal

(supra) fourteen children drowned in a river during a school

picnic as a result of the school's negligence. The Supreme

Court awarded Rs.5 lakhs to each family, partly on the basis

that the school was one of the most affluent in the country

and the deceased children's earning potential was significant.

Therefore, the method of calculating the compensation for

pecuniary loss of dependency entails the examination of

Puran's potential earning capacity had he lived to adulthood.

The petitioner No.1, Puran's father, was working in a market

as a Security Guard and was earning approximately Rs

4,000/- per month. The late Puran, who was in the 3rd

Standard, when he passed away, was an excellent student. In

the previous academic year, he was ranked First in his

class. Therefore, we can safely assume that Puran as an

adult would have earned at least as much as his father, if

not more. So, as evidenced by his academic skills, Puran's

father's salary can be used as a starting base for calculating

the compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency. The

multiplicand would be the expected annual income less

what he required for himself. Since, this expected income

would only arise when Puran grew up to be an adult, it

would be safe to assume that his personal expenditure

would be higher. True, he would be contributing to the

household, but his contribution in my view would definitely

not exceed half of his income. It must be remembered that

here we are concerned with compensation for pecuniary

loss of depending of Puran's parents. For some stretch of

time Puran's father would be earning and his dependency

would not be much. Furthermore, Puran would have

married and would have had to support his wife and

children. So, the assumption that, in the maximum, Puran's

parents would have lost only half of Puran's expected

annual. income, would not, be an unreasonable one.Thus,

the multiplicand would work out to Rs.24,000/- (4000 x 12 x

1/2). The multiplicand and is to be multiplied by the

multiplier of 15 as derived from the Second Schedule to the

LPA 487/2025 Page 13 of 18

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in respect of victim in the age

group of upto 15 years. Therefore, Puran's parents would be

entitled to a sum of Rs.3,60,000/- (24000x15) for

compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency.

34. Accordingly, the petitioners are entitled to a total

compensation of Rs.5,13,801/-. The standard compensation

or conventional sum being Rs. 1,53,801/- and the

compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency being an

amount of Rs.3,60,000/- as computed above.”

(emphasis supplied)

Therefore, adhering to the same principle as laid down inKishan

Lal, the multiplicand can be calculated by considering the father's

monthly salary as the assumed monthly income of the deceased. This

amount is multiplied by 12 to arrive at the annual income and then

halved. Subsequently, this multiplicand amount is multiplied by the

appropriate multiplier as prescribed. In the instant case, the

monthly salary of the father, as indicated in the rejoinder affidavit

filed by the petitioners, is approximately Rs. 20,000. Consequently,

the annual income would be Rs. 2,40,000, and the annual loss of

dependency is calculated accordingly, as under: -

(2,40,000/2) (multiplicand) x 15 (multiplier) = Rs. 18,00,000/-

The total compensation is, thus, computed to be:

18,00,000 (pecuniary loss of dependency) + 3,78,947(standard

compensation) = Rs. 21,78,947/-”

9.It is the case of the Appellants that the income of Appellant No. 1,

i.e., ₹20,000/- per month, ought to have been multiplied by a factor of 1.5 in

terms ofSharafat Khan(supra),Laxmi Narayan(supra) andRajeev

Singhal(supra) to offset the effects of inflation and erosion in the value of

money. The Appellants contend that upon applying the factor of 1.5, the

monthly income would work out to ₹30,000/- and, after deducting 50%

towards personal expenses and applying the multiplier of 15, the

compensation under the pecuniary head would come to ₹27,00,000/-. It is

further the case of the Appellants that, upon addition of the standard

compensation of ₹3,78,947/-, the total compensation would aggregate to

LPA 487/2025 Page 14 of 18

₹30,78,947/- and, accordingly, the Appellants would be entitled to

enhancement of compensation together with modification of the rate of

interest from 6% to 9% per annum.

10.Per contra, it is the case of Respondent No. 1 that the learned Single

Judge adopted a just and reasonable approach while computing the

compensation by taking the income of Appellant No. 1 at ₹20,000/- per

month, instead of minimum wages or a lower notional income. It is

submitted that the learned Single Judge, while relying uponKishan Lal

(supra) andM.S. Grewal(supra), correctly assessed the future earning

capacity of the Deceased-Child by treating the income of Appellant No. 1 as

the base income and thereafter computing the annual income at ₹2,40,000/-.

It is further the case of Respondent No. 1 that, after deducting 50% towards

personal expenses and applying the multiplier of 15, the Impugned

Judgment correctly quantified compensation under the pecuniary head at

₹18,00,000/- and, upon addition of the standard compensation of

₹3,78,947/-, rightly awarded a total compensation of ₹22,00,000/-.

11.We find that there is merit in the submission advanced on behalf of

the Appellants that, while computing the pecuniary compensation payable to

them, the effects of inflation and erosion in the value of money ought to

have been duly considered.

12.The learned Single Judge, while computing compensation, accepted

the income of Appellant No. 1 at ₹20,000/- per month as the basis for

assessing the future earning capacity of the Deceased-Child and thereafter

deducted 50% towards personal expenses and applied the multiplier of 15.

However, the factor of 1.5 to offset inflation and devaluation of money was

LPA 487/2025 Page 15 of 18

not taken into consideration, which has consistently been recognised by this

Court while awarding compensation, including in cases involving the death

of children of tender age.

13.InLaxmi Narayan(supra), the Division Bench of this Court observed

that the two components of total compensation are to be quantified as

follows:

“1. Pecuniary Compensation:

A Notional average annual income of deceased

(Of the deceased, or of the parent, if minor)

B Deduction (By a factor, on account of

decreasing contribution to family income)

C Multiplier Factor (In terms of judgement of

Supreme Court in National Indsurance Co. Vs

Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680)

D Multiplier to counter inflationary aspects

Formula: ((A – B) X C X D)

2. Standard Compensation:

Formula: (50,000 X CPI (IW) Index for the concerned month (with

base year 1982)) / 171 (“171” being the Index Number in 1989)

(May also use CPI(IW) Index number with base year 2001 and

multiply the same with linking factor 4.63 to arrive at relevant index

number with 1982 base)”

14.InLaxmi Narayan(supra), this Court applied a multiplier of 1.5 so as

to account for inflationary adjustments.

15.InRajeev Singhal(supra) this Court observed as under:

“28. We find that in the present case both the appellants herein,

namely, the father and the mother are earning. As per income tax

returns of the appellants which are available on record, the average

annual income of the appellant No.1 (father) based on the income

tax returns for the three assessment years 2010-2011 to 2012-2013

indicates that his annual average income would come to

Rs.2,22,741.66. Similarly, based on the assessment of the income tax

LPA 487/2025 Page 16 of 18

returns of the aforesaid three assessment years, the annual average

income of the appellant No.2 (mother) would come to

Rs.2,03,471.66. It has been held in both these cases that the annual

income of the parents can be taken into consideration for assessing

the annual income of a child. If that be so, we find that the total

annual income of parents comes to Rs.4,26,213.32 and if this is

divided by 2, we can safely conclude that the annual income of the

deceased child can be assessed at Rs.2,13,106.66. As per the

formula laid down for calculating the pecuniary loss, a multiplier of

15 can be applied, considering the fact that the victim was 14 years

of age. In the case of Varinder Prasad (supra), it was noted that as

the deceased “would have grown up, his personal expenses would

have only risen. The contribution to the household would not have

exceeded half of the income.” Accordingly, the total annual income

of the victim as indicated hereinabove, i.e. Rs.2,13,106.66, has to be

divided by 2 to arrive at the same and thereafter it has to be

multiplied with a factor namely 1.5 to counter inflation and erosion

of the value of money and by multiplying it with 15 in terms of the

multiplier provided in the second schedule of the Motor Vehicles

Act, the pecuniary compensation works out to Rs.23,97,449.92.”

[Emphasis Supplied]

16.Similar approach has been adopted inSharafat Khan(supra) wherein

it was observed that:

15. The compensation under the head of pecuniary loss caused to

the appellants is calculated on the principle of loss of earnings and

can be assessed on basis of the method discussed in Kamla Devi,

Varinder Prasad etc. As observed in Varinder Prasad, on the basis

of Kamla Devi, i) for assessment of the pecuniary loss of

dependency, the income of parents can be taken as a standard

measure for arriving at the expected annual income of the children

and ii) the method of calculating the compensation for pecuniary

loss of dependency depends upon the potential earning capacity of

the deceased, had she/he attained adulthood. The appellant no.1,

who is father of the deceased, was stated to be earning Rs.700-800

per day on the day of incident, by plying a battery-operated

rickshaw and after deducting his expenses, the net monthly income

of the appellant no.1 could be assessed at Rs.15,000/- . The

appellant no.2, who is mother of the deceased, had no earnings. The

LPA 487/2025 Page 17 of 18

deceased was aged about 12 years at the time of his death. The

income of the appellant no.1 for calculating the compensation would

be taken as income of the child i.e. the deceased. It is presumed that

the deceased would have earned at least what the appellant no.1

was earning. Accordingly, the multiplicand would be the expected

annual income of the deceased less what he needed for himself. It

would be appropriate after considering future increase in income of

the appellant no.1, to apply and adopt the multiplicand factor of 1.5

to set off the effects of inflation and erosion of the value of the

money….”

[Emphasis Supplied]

17.Accordingly, the annual income determined for the purposes of

assessing pecuniary compensation is liable to be multiplied by a factor of 1.5

so as to offset inflation and erosion in the value of money. The said principle

has been evolved to ensure that the compensation awarded remains just, fair,

and realistic, having due regard to the impact of inflation and the

diminishing value of money.

18.In the present case as well, once the monthly salary of Appellant No.

1 was taken as the assumed monthly income of the Deceased-Child, the

factor of 1.5, as recognised inLaxmi Narayan(supra),Rajeev Singhal

(supra), andSharafat Khan(supra), would equally apply for the purpose of

offsetting inflation and devaluation of money. The contention advanced on

behalf of Respondent No. 1 that application of the factor of 1.5 would

amount to conferring a double benefit cannot be accepted, inasmuch as the

said factor is applied solely as a measure to neutralise inflationary effects

and erosion in the value of money while determining just compensation in

accordance with settled law.

19.In view of the above, the compensation payable to the Appellants

under the pecuniary head is liable to be recomputed by taking the monthly

LPA 487/2025 Page 18 of 18

income of Appellant No. 1 at ₹20,000/- and, thereafter, applying the factor

of 1.5. The adjusted monthly income thus works out to ₹30,000/-. Upon

deducting 50% towards personal expenses, the monthly contribution is

assessed at ₹15,000/-. Applying the multiplier of 15, the compensation

payable under the pecuniary head is quantified at ₹27,00,000/- and adding

the standard compensation in the sum of ₹3,78,947/- to the pecuniary

compensation, the total compensation payable to the Appellants stands re-

assessed at ₹30,78,947/-.

20.Insofar as the rate of interest is concerned, we do not find any ground

warranting interference with the rate of 6% per annum awarded by the

learned Single Judge, the same being consistent with the rate of interest

awarded in similar cases. Accordingly, the enhanced compensation of

₹30,78,947/- shall carry simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the

date of the incident,i.e., 20.07.2016, until the date of realisation.

21.Consequently, the present Appeal stands partially allowed and the

Impugned Judgment is modified in the aforesaid terms.

TEJAS KARIA, J

DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ

MAY 29, 2026

HK