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PETITIONER:

PUNJAB NAT.IONA.L BANK, DASUYA

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

CHAJJU RAM & ORS. .

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/08/2000

BENCH:

B.N.Kirpal, A.P.Misra, Ruma Pal

JUDGMENT:

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KIRPAL, J:

Special leave granted.

The .appellant, on 26th August, 1988 filed a suit for

recovery of Rs. 6,19,250/- in the Civil Court. By

judgment. dated 16th February, 1994, the trial court,

decreed the suit. for the aforesaid amount with interest.

at. the rate of 16/1/2 per cent. per annum from the date

of filing of the suit t.ill the recovery of money. On 21st.

December, 1994, an execution application .was filed by the

appellant, before the Court, of Civil Judge, Dasuya.

According to the appellant, an amount, of Rs.l2,91,398/-

being the principal amount, of Rs.6,19,250/- plus interest,

thereon as per the decree, had become due & payable and it

was in respect, of this amount, that. execution was

sought..

In the meanwhile on 25th June, ,1993, the Recovery of

Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993

(hereinafter referred to as "the Act") had come into force.

On 30th August; 1994, a Tribunal was set. up in

Jaipur and it was given jurisdiction to decide claims even

with regard to those arising in the State of Punjab, On 18th

February, 1997, the. appellant moved an application before

the Civil Court, Dasuya. for transfer of the execution

proceedings to the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur. This

application was allowed and the trial court ordered the

transfer of the execution proceedings to the Debts Recovery

Tribunal, Jaipur.

The respondents thereupon filed a revision petition in

the High Court. By judgment dated 1st April, 1999) the High

Court came to the conclusion, while reversing the decision

of the trial court, that the execution proceedings could

not. be transferred and it. is only the Civil Court.,

which had passed the decree, which could execute the same.

Hence, this appeal by special leave.

The point in issue is no longer resintegra After

analysing the provisions of the Act, this Court, in

Allahabad Bank vs. Canara Bank & Another. JT 2000 (4) SC

411 held that the word ^proceeding* in Section 31 of the

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Act. would include an execution proceeding pending before a

Civil Court before the commencement of the Act. It was

further held that, the suits and proceedings so pending

would stand transferred to the Tribunal. This conclusion

emanated from the fact that the definition of the word

'debt* contained in Section 2(g) of the Act, inter all.a,

meant any liability which was due to a bank and was payable

under a decree or order of a Civil Court. The

decretal amount, being a debt. as envisaged by

Section 2(g) would clearly attract, t.he provisions of

Sections 17 and 18 of the Act. which give exclusive

jurisdiction to the Tribunals constituted thereunder to

decide the questions regarding recovery of debts due to the

banks a.nd financial institutions. Section 31 which deals

with transfer of cases reads as under :

"31. Transfer of pending cases. - (1) Every suit or

other proceeding pending before any court . immediately

before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under this

Act, being a suit or proceeding the cause of action whereon

it is based is such that it would have been, if it had

arisen after such establishment, within the jurisdiction of

such Tribunal, shall stand tra.nsf erred on that, date to

such Tribunal.

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply

to any appeal pending as aforesaid before any court.

(2) Where any suit, or other proceeding stands

transferred from any court to a Tribunal under sub-section

(1), -

(a) the court shall, as soon as may' be- after such

transfer, forward the records of such suit or other

proceeding to the Tribunal; and

(b) the Tribunal may, on receipt cof such records)

proceed to deal with such suit of other proceeding, so far

as may be, in the same manner' as in the case of an

application made under Section 19 from the stage which was"

reached before such transfer or from any earlier stage or de

novo as the Tribunal may deem fit,"

A bare reading of the aforesaid Section shows that

execution application being a proceeding pending in a Civil

Court when the Act came into force was liable to be

transferred to the Tribunal because the amount for

which the execution application had been filed as per the

decree which had been passed, was over Rs. 10 lakhs.

Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the

use of the words 'cause of action* in Section 31 indicated

that it is only penning suits which could be transferred.

We are unable to agree with this submission. The words

'cause of action' are preceded by the words 'being a suit or

proceeding''. Section .31 contemplates not only the

transfer of a suit but also transfer of a proceeding which

may be other than a suit, like an execution application.

Understood in this context, the words 'being a suit or

proceeding the cause of action whereon it is based ...,...*

would mean that in the case of an execution application if

the decree is for more than Rs, . 10 lakhs, then that is

the cause of action or the reason for an application for

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execution being filed before the Tribunal.

To put matters beyond doubt, the Act has been amended

by the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial

Institutions (Amendment) Act, 2000 and Section 31A has been

inserted which reads as follows :

"31A. Power of Tribunal to issue certificate of

recovery in case of decree or order, - (1) Where a decree or

order was passed by any court before the commencement of the

Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions

(Amendment) Act, 2000 and' has not yet been executed, then,

the decree-holder may

apply to the Tribunal to pass an order for recovery of

the amount,

(2) On receipt of an application under sub-section

(1), the Tribunal may issue a certificate for recovery to a

Recovery Officer.

( 3 ) On receipt of a certificate under sub-section

(2) ) the Recovery Officer shall proceed to recover t.he

amount as if it was a certificate in respect- of a debt

recoverable under this Act."

The aforesaid Section 31A is clearly applicable in the

present case. The decree was passed by court before the

commencement of the Amendment Act and the same has not yet.

been executed. At least after the amendment, it is only the

Tribunal which would have the jurisdiction of entertaining

the application for execution of the decree inasmuch as the

amount due for which the decree was sought to be executed is

over Rs.lO lakhs. We are also unable to agree with the High

Court that because t.he original decree which was passed was

for principal sum of Rs.6,19,250/- the Tribunal would get no

jurisdiction. It is to be seen that decree was for a sum of

Rs.6,19,250/- plus interest at the rate of 18-1/2 per cent

per annum from the date of filing of the suit till the

recovery of money. As and when the amount due to the bank

under the decree became more than Rs. 10 lakhs and an

application for execution was filed, it could only be.

entertained by the Tribunal and not by the Civil Court. It

is clear that in view of the provisions of Section 34 of the

Act, the provisions of Order 21 Rule 10 C.P.C. would have

no application.

For the aforesaid reasons, the appeal is allowed and

the judgment of the High Court is set aside, with costs

throughout.