2026 INSC 313 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 847 OF 2026

PUNJAB & SIND BANK … APPELLANT

VS.

SH. RAJ KUMAR … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

The greater the trust reposed, the stricter the scrutiny imposed.

1. The present appeal, by special leave, at the instance of Punjab and

Sind Bank

1

takes exception to the judgment and order dated 11

th

September, 2024

2

of the High Court of Delhi

3

. Vide the impugned

order, a writ appeal

4

filed by the P&SB was dismissed and the

judgment and order

5

of the Single Judge, allowing a writ petition filed

by the respondent, affirmed. The Single Judge modified the

punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ imposed upon the respondent

1

P&SB

2

impugned order

3

High Court

4

LPA No. 410 of 2023

5

dated 3

rd

February, 2023

2

to ‘compulsory retirement’ on the ground of discrimination in

imposition of punishment thereby offending Article 14 of the

Constitution.

2. Facts, triggering this appeal, are these:

a. Respondent joined the P&SB as a Clerk/Cashier in the year 1987 until

he was placed under suspension in December of 2011, followed by

disciplinary action of dismissal from service on 25

th

November, 2024.

At the time of dismissal, the respondent held the post of “Senior

Manager in MMGS-III Scale”.

b. The punishment of dismissal imposed on the respondent (senior

manager at the relevant time) was preceded by a show cause notice,

a chargesheet and an inquiry in accordance with the Punjab and Sind

Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1981 on the allegation that

the respondent connived with two others (one officer

6

and a gunman

7

)

to misappropriate money of the customers for their personal gain,

stealing bank records, etc. The disciplinary authority imposed the

penalty of compulsory retirement on the co-delinquent gunman while

the co-delinquent officer was awarded “lowering by two stages”. The

precise import of the said punishment remains unclear; however, we

assume that the expression denotes a reduction in ‘pay’ by two

stages.

6

Gurjant Singh

7

Sukhdev Singh

3

c. Dejected, the respondent unsuccessfully filed an appeal and

subsequently a review against the order of the disciplinary authority

but to no avail. Seeking his reinstatement, the respondent then

approached the writ court by filing a writ petition

8

.

d. Initially, the said writ petition was disposed of by a Single Judge vide

order dated 12

th

December, 2017. After rejecting the claim of the

respondent on the merits of the disciplinary proceedings, the Single

Judge directed the appellate authority to impose an appropriate

punishment upon the respondent keeping the principle of parity in

mind. Respondent carried the said order in an intra-court appeal

9

,

which was disposed of by a Division Bench (vide order dated 8

th

January, 2019) by setting aside the order under appeal and directing

the Single Judge to decide the writ petition on merits.

e. Apart from challenging the decision on merits, the respondent’s claim

before the High Court was also that he was discriminated against in

imposition of punishment; while one of the co-delinquents was

compulsorily retired and the other awarded punishment of “lowering

by two stages”, he was dismissed from service. Later, before the

Single Judge who decided the writ petition on remand, the respondent

limited his challenge only to the quantum of punishment, on the

ground of parity with the co-delinquents. The Single Judge proceeded

to allow the writ petition after noting that for similar charges, different

8

WP (C) No. 11034/2017

9

LPA No. 708 of 2018

4

punishments were imposed on the co-delinquents with the respondent

having been given the most severe punishment without any difference

in their roles. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment of the Single

Judge are reproduced below:

11. The only issue that this Court is required to delve into is to test the

correctness and legality of the action of Punjab and Sind Bank in awarding

the punishment of dismissal to the Petitioner while awarding lesser

punishment to those alleged and proved to have acted in 'connivance’……

16. From a conspectus of the aforementioned judgments, it is luminously

clear that doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of

India is not an abstract doctrine and is enforceable in Court of Law. It is

applicable to all equally placed even if they are guilty and the principle of

parity has to be kept in mind by the disciplinary authority tasked to decide

the quantum of punishment. …………

19. Having perused the respective charges, it is amply clear that the

charges against the Petitioner and the two co -delinquent employees

related to the same transactions/incidents and the gravamen of the

allegations was the same………. This Court is unable to find any substantial

difference in the charges levelled against the three co-delinquents, which

would justify a differential treatment in punishment, save and except, that

the Petitioner in his capacity as Bank Manager had signed the documents

and/or checked the transactions in question. This by itself is not an

aggravating factor of such a magnitude, which would justify one co -

delinquent being sent home on compulsory retirement, remaining entitled

to pensionary and terminal benefits for life and thereafter family pension

to his family and the other being dismissed, entailing forfeiture of the

entire past service, not only depriving him of all retiral/terminal benefits

but leaving the dependents in his family in a state of penury.

20. In my view, Bank has been unable to substantiate and justify why the

Petitioner was awarded the extreme punishment of dismissal while the

other two have been let off with lesser punishment… .

23. Looking at the punishments awarded to the co-delinquents for same

incidents/transactions and acts of connivance and testing the impugned

action on the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as well as

keeping in mind the long and unblemished spell of service of the Petitioner,

save and except, the present delinquency, this Court is inclined to convert

the punishment from 'dismissal' to one of 'compulsory retirement'… .

(emphasis ours)

5

f. This order was carried in an intra-court appeal by the P&SB which has

been dismissed vide the impugned order. The Division Bench found no

perversity in the order of the Single Judge.

3. Mr. Rajesh Kumar Gautam, learned counsel for the P&SB cited

authorities to buttress his point as to how interference with the order

of punishment by the High Court is contrary to settled principles of

law and, thus, merits interdiction by this Court.

4. Per contra, Mr. G.S. Chaturvedi, representing the respondent,

supported the impugned order upholding the decision of the Single

Judge by referring to the invidious discrimination that he was

subjected to. Additionally, he invited our attention to an observation

made by a Division Bench of the High Court in its order dated 8

th

January, 2019 to the following effect:

9. It appears that on 2

nd

January, 2012 while he was still under suspension,

the Appellant wrote a letter to the Bank in Hindi stating that if there was

any mistake on his part while working as the Branch Manager at

Roshanpur, he was prepared to make good the loss incurred by the Bank.

He further stated that on that date he had deposited Rs. 2 lacs. It appears

that a police complaint was also filed. This led to the Appellant submitting

another handwritten letter in Hindi which was received by the Bank on 19

th

May,2012 whereby upon the direction of the police, he deposited demand

drafts worth Rs. 4,19,214.00/-. The last few lines of the said letter are

significant where he stated "sriman ji meri koi galti nahi hai bahut dabav

ke karan paise jama kar raha hu. Samaaj mein apni izzat bachae rakhne

ke liye kar raha hu". Prima facie, therefore, appears that on both the

occasions, the Petitioner was depositing money under pressure and neither

of his letters could be actually viewed as an admission of guilt by the

Appellant.

(italics in original, underlining ours)

The plea advanced (though abandoned before the benches of the

High Court) touches upon the merits of the respondent’s claim of

innocence and that he was unfairly punished.

6

5. Counsel for the parties have been heard and the materials on record

perused.

6. The disciplinary action taken by the P&SB having not been assailed

on its merits by the respondent before the Single Judge except the

quantum of punishment, we are tasked to decide a limited point.

7. In light of the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are

reminded of the consistent line of decisions of this Court delineating

the circumstances in which judicial interference is warranted in

matters concerning imposition of punishment by disci plinary

authorities.

8. We consider it apt to note the relevant passages from a few of these

decisions, hereunder:-

a. Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh

10

:

15. …It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate

with the gravity of the misconduct, and that any penalty disproportionate

to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the

Constitution. …

b. Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India

11

:

25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision,

but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the

choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion

of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the

offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so

disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in

itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part

of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which

is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the

decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic,

then the sentence would not be immune from correction . Irrationality and

perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review… .

(emphasis ours)

10

(1983) 2 SCC 442

11

(1987) 4 SCC 611

7

c. B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India

12

(three-Judge Bench):

18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary

authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact -finding

authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to

maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose

appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the

misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial

review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and

impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary

authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High

Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the

disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to

shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose

appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.

d. Union of India v. G. Ganayutham

13

(three-Judge Bench):

Punishment in disciplinary matters: Wednesbury and CCSU tests

32. Finally, we come to the present case. It is not contended before us that

any fundamental freedom is affected. We need not therefore go into the

question of “proportionality”. There is no contention that the punishment

imposed is illegal or vitiated by procedural impropriety. As to “irrationality”,

there is no finding by the Tribunal that the decision is one which no sensible

person who weighed the pros and cons could have arrived at nor is there a

finding, based on material, that the punishment is in “outrageous” defiance

of logic. Neither Wednesbury nor CCSU tests are satisfied. We have still to

explain “Ranjit Thakur [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5

ATC 113] ”.

33. In Ranjit Thakur [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC

113] this Court interfered with the punishment only after coming to the

conclusion that the punishment was in outrageous defiance of logic and was

shocking. It was also described as perverse and irrational. In other words,

this Court felt that, on facts, Wednesbury and CCSU tests were satisfied. In

another case, in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 :

1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] a three-Judge Bench said the same

thing as follows……….

34. In such a situation, unless the court/tribunal opines in its secondary

role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational

according to Wednesbury [(1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680]

or CCSU [1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935] norms, the punishment

cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the

appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as

12

(1995) 6 SCC 749

13

(1997) 7 SCC 463

8

pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi case [AIR 1961 SC 418 : (1961) 2 SCR 343]

that the Court might — to shorten litigation — think of substituting its own

view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment

awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C. Chaturvedi [AIR 1961 SC 418

: (1961) 2 SCR 343] and other cases referred to therein it has however

been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different.)

For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent,

namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar [(1988) 2 SCC 52: 1988

SCC (L&S) 436 : (1988) 6 ATC 876] cannot be of any help.

35. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the order of the Tribunal which

has interfered with the quantum of punishment and which has also

substituted its own view of the punishment. The punishment awarded by

the departmental authorities is restored. In the circumstances, there will be

no order as to costs.

(emphasis ours)

e. Om Kumar v. Union of India

14

:

67. But where an administrative action is challenged as “arbitrary” under

Article 14 on the basis of Royappa [(1974) 4 SCC 3 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 165]

(as in cases where punishments in disciplinary cases are challenged), the

question will be whether the administr ative order is “rational” or

“reasonable” and the test then is the Wednesbury test. The courts would

then be confined only to a secondary role and will only have to see whether

the administrator has done well in his primary role, whether he has acted

illegally or has omitted relevant factors from consideration or has taken

irrelevant factors into consideration or whether his view is one which no

reasonable person could have taken. If his action does not satisfy these

rules, it is to be treated as arbitrary. [In G.B. Mahajan v. Jalgaon Municipal

Council [(1991) 3 SCC 91] (SCC at p. 111).] Venkatachaliah, J. (as he then

was) pointed out that “reasonableness” of the administrator under Article

14 in the context of administrative law has to be judged from the stand

point of Wednesbury rules. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC

651] (SCC at pp. 679-80), Indian Express Newspapers Bombay (P) Ltd. v.

Union of India [(1985) 1 SCC 641 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 121] (SCC at p. 691),

Supreme Court Employees' Welfare Assn. v. Union of India [(1989) 4 SCC

187 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 569] (SCC at p. 241) and U.P. Financial Corpn. v.

Gem Cap (India) (P). Ltd. [(1993) 2 SCC 299] (SCC at p. 307) while judging

whether the administrative action is “arbitrary” under Article 14 (i.e.

otherwise then being discriminatory), this Court has confined itself to a

Wednesbury review always.

68. Thus, when administrative action is attacked as discriminatory under

Article 14, the principle of primary review is for the courts by applying

proportionality. However, where administrative action is questioned as

“arbitrary” under Article 14, the principle of secondary review based on

Wednesbury principles applies.

14

(2001) 2 SCC 386

9

Proportionality and punishments in service law

69. The principles explained in the last preceding paragraph in respect of

Article 14 are now to be applied here where the question of “arbitrariness”

of the order of punishment is questioned under Article 14.

70. In this context, we shall only refer to these cases. In Ranjit Thakur v.

Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] this Court referred

to “proportionality” in the quantum of punishment but the Court observed

that the punishment was “shockingly” disproportionate to the misconduct

proved. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC

(L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] this Court stated that the court will not

interfere unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the

conscience of the court. Even then, the court would remit the matter back

to the authority and would not normally substitute one punishment for the

other. However, in rare situations, the court could award an alternative

penalty. It was also so stated in Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997

SCC (L&S) 1806].

(emphasis ours)

f. Union of India v. R.K. Sharma

15

:

13. In our view, the observations in Ranjit Thakur case [(1987) 4 SCC 611

: 1988 SCC (L&S) 1 : (1987) 5 ATC 113] extracted above, have been

misunderstood. In that case the facts were such that they disclosed a bias

on the part of the Commanding Officer. In that case the appellant Ranjit

Thakur had fallen out of favour of the Commanding Officer because he had

complained against the Commanding Officer. For making such a complaint

the Commanding Officer had sentenced him to 28 days' rigorous

imprisonment. While he was serving the sentence he was served with

another charge-sheet which read as follows:

“Accused 1429055-M Signalman Ranjit Thakur of 4 Corps Operating Signal

Regiment is charged with—

Army Act, Disobeying a lawful command given by his

Section 41(2). superior officer

In that he,

at 1530 hours on 29-5-1985 when ordered by JC 106251 -P Sub Ram

Singh, the Orderly Officer of the same Regiment to eat his food, did not

do so.”

On such a ridiculous charge rigorous imprisonment of one year was

imposed. He was then dismissed from service, with the added

disqualification of being declared unfit for any future civil employment. It

was on such gross facts that this Court made the observations quoted above

and held that the punishment was so strikingly disproportionate that it

called for interference. The above observations are not to be taken to mean

that a court can, while exercising powers under Article 226 or 227 and/or

15

(2001) 9 SCC 592

10

under Article 32, interfere with the punishment because it considers the

punishment to be disproportionate. It is only in extreme cases, which on

their face show perversity or irrationality that there can be judicial review.

Merely on compassionate grounds a court should not interfere.

(emphasis ours)

g. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank v.

P.C. Kakkar

16

:

11. The common thread running through in all these decisions is that the

court should not interfere with the administrator's decision unless it was

illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or was shocking to the

conscience of the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or moral

standards. In view of what has been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated

Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 :

(1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA)] the court would not go into the correctness of

the choice made by the administrator open to him and the court should not

substitute its decision to that of the administrator. The scope of judicial

review is limited to the deficiency in decision-making process and not the

decision.

12. To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary

authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the

court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference. Further, to shorten

litigation it may, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate

punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. In the normal

course if the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate it would

be appropriate to direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority

to reconsider the penalty imposed.

(emphasis ours)

h. State of Gujarat v. Anand Acharya

17

:

15. The well-settled proposition of law that a court sitting in judicial review

against the quantum of punishment imposed in the disciplinary proceedings

will not normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty is not in dispute.

However, if the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the

Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court, then the court would

appropriately mould the relief either by directing the

disciplinary/appropriate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed or to

shorten the litigation it may make an exception in rare cases and impose

appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof (see Bhagat

Ram v. State of H.P. [(1983) 2 SCC 442 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 342] , Ranjit

Thakur v. Union of India [(1987) 4 SCC 611 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 1] and U.P.

SRTC v. Mahesh Kumar Mishra [(2000) 3 SCC 450 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 356]).

16

(2003) 4 SCC 364

17

(2007) 9 SCC 310

11

i. S.R. Tewari v. Union of India

18

:

28. The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings is very

limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or findings by

replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed appreciation

of the evidence on record. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the

scope for interference by the court is very limited and restricted to

exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or

the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court,

cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court has to record reasons as

to why the punishment is disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts

to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would

not suffice. …

(emphasis ours)

j. Rajasthan SRTC v Bajrang Lal

19

:

21. As regards the question of disproportionate punishment is concerned,

the issue is no more res integra. …

22. In view of the above, the contention raised on behalf of the respondent

employee, that the punishment of removal from service is disproportionate

to the delinquency is not worth acceptance. The only punishment in case of

the proved case of corruption is dismissal from service.

(emphasis ours)

9. What follows from the precedents noted above is that courts should

exercise restraint while interdicting orders of punishment. Normally,

no court in exercise of its power of judicial review should interfere

with an order of punishment imposed on a delinquent as a measure

of disciplinary action by the competent authority and substitute its

own judgment for that of the former. This is premised on the reason

that the disciplinary authority is the best judge of the situation, and

the requirements of maintaining discipline within the work force.

While it is not the law that the courts should invariably stay at a

distance when legality and/or propriety of a particular punishment is

18

(2013) 6 SCC 602

19

(2014) 8 SCC 693

12

questioned, judicial scrutiny of the disciplinary action by way of

punishment could arise only if the circumstances are such that no

reasonable person would impose the punishment which is questioned

and/or such punishment has the effect of shocking the conscience of

the court. To put in simpler words, interference could be warranted if

it appeals to the court that the disciplinary authority has ‘used a

sledgehammer for cracking a nut’. A punishment, which is strikingly

or shockingly disproportionate and is not commensurate with the

gravity of misconduct, proved to have been committed in course of

inquiry or otherwise, would border on arbitrariness and offend Article

14 of the Constitution.

10. Where a court, upon due consideration, arrives at the conclusion that

the punishment imposed is disproportionate, its intervention is

circumscribed in nature. Judicial scrutiny and interference, if at all,

has to be based on reasons in support of the court’s ultimate

satisfaction that the disciplinary authority has faltered in the exercise

of his discretion. In such a situation, the court may adopt one of two

courses: it may remit the matter to the competent authority for

reconsideration of the punishment; or, in the rarest of cases, it may

substitute the punishment while supporting such a course with cogent

reasons.

11. After refreshing our memory with these well-established principles,

the only question that arises for consideration is whether interference

by the Single Judge with the order passed by the Disciplinary

13

Authority, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, satisfied

the requisite threshold. If we find that such interference was not

called for, then the impugned order (which upheld the view taken by

the Single Judge) will have to be set aside.

12. Whether the imposition of lighter punishment on the co-delinquents

while imposing the punishment of ‘dismissal from service’ upon the

respondent is in outright defiance of logic? We think not.

13. Sight cannot be lost of the fact that the respondent, when he

committed the offence, was holding the post of “Senior Manager in

MMGS-III Scale”, which is obviously much higher than the co -

delinquents (officer and gunman). Authority carries accountability;

higher the authority, higher the accountability. The rank of the

respondent was not merely titular; it carried with it an increased

degree of responsibility and integrity. The role of the respondent not

only necessitated personal obedience but also supervi sion of the

actions of the subordinates. The co-delinquents, having limited

powers and authority, could not have been equated with the

respondent. The gravity of the misconduct necessarily had to be

measured with the nature of the misconduct. Thus, grant of the

benefit of parity to the respondent by the High Court merely because

the co-delinquents were given lighter punishment was entirely

misconceived. The differentiation in rank coupled with the increased

trust of the employer on the respondent certainly constituted a

14

compelling ground for a more stringent punishment to be imposed on

him.

14. Taking an overall view, the fact that the disciplinary authority found

it prudent in the circumstances to impose a harsher punishment on a

higher-ranking official is neither disproportionate, nor shocks our

conscience. The High Court clearly fell in error in the course of

adjudication of the lis.

15. Quite apart, equating a branch manager of a bank with its gunman

seems to us to be in outrageous defiance of logic and reason. This is

not a case akin to Sengara Singh v. State of Punjab

20

where this

Court interfered with disciplinary action finding that some out of

several, guilty of the same misconduct, were picked and chosen for

harsher punishment leaving aside others without any convincing

reason.

16. Reference to the observation made by the Division Bench, noted in

paragraph 4 supra, is of no real consequence. Manifest as it is, the

Division Bench while remanding the writ petition for a fresh decision

recorded only a prima facie finding that the respondent might have

been pressurized to make deposit of a portion of the misappropriated

amount. Even the Single Judge, on remand, did not finally record

similar such finding to rule in favour of the respondent. The argument

made in desperation to salvage the situation is, thus, rejected.

20

(1983) 4 SCC 225

15

17. Considering the facts of the present case, we do not find any

perversity or irrationality with the punishment imposed. We have,

therefore, reached the irresistible conclusion that interference by the

Single Judge with the decision of the disciplinary authority, since

affirmed by the Division Bench vide the impugned order, was uncalled

for.

18. Thus, the impugned order (upholding the order of the Single Judge)

is set aside together with the order that it upheld. The punishment

imposed by the disciplinary authority (namely, dismissal f rom

service) imposed on the respondent is restored.

19. The appeal is allowed on the aforesaid terms.

20. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.

……………… …………. ……………J .

(DIPANKAR DATTA)

………… ………..……………………J .

(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA )

New Delhi;

April 02, 2026.