2026:HHC:38124

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 116 of 2013

Reserved on: 24.8.2026

Date of Decision: 09.9.2026

Rakesh Kumar ...Appellant

Versus

State of H.P. ...Respondent

Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

No.

For the Appellant : Mr N.K. Thakur, Senior

Advocate, with Mr Divya Raj

Singh, Advocate.

For the Respondent/State : Mr Lokender Kutlehria,

Additional Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The present appeal is directed against the judgment

dated 14.3.2013, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Fast Track Court, Una, District Una (learned Trial Court), vide

which the appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was

convicted and sentenced as under:

Conviction Sentence

Section 325 of IPC To undergo rigorous

imprisonment for three years, pay

a fine of ₹5,000/- and, in default

of payment of the fine, to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for two

months.

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they

were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused

for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 452,

326, 353, 333, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was

asserted that the informant, Om Parkash (PW-1), was working as

a Forest Guard. He had gone to Joh Khad Reserve Forest on

4.11.2011. He found a tractor loading stones in the khad at about

1:00 PM. The accused Rocky Sharma was the owner of the tractor.

A driver and another person were present at the spot. The

informant told the driver that it was illegal to transport stones

from the khad. The driver and the other person left the spot. The

informant was washing utensils in his room at about 8:00–8:15

PM. Rocky Sharma came to the room and caught the informant

by his neck. He inquired who the informant was to stop the

tractor. The accused picked up the pressure cooker and inflicted a

blow on the informant’s face. The informant shouted for help.

Vyas Dev (PW-2) and Gurdev (PW-4) came to the spot and

rescued the informant. The accused threatened to kill the

informant. The informant was taken to the hospital. The matter

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was reported to the police, and an entry (Ex. PW-9/A) was

registered at the police station.

3. ASI Manmohan Singh (PW-14) visited the hospital

and filed an application (Ex. PW-8/B) for obtaining the medical

opinion regarding the informant’s fitness to make the statement.

Dr Sandeep Narula (PW-8) found the informant fit to make a

statement. He found an incised wound on the left cheek, with

fresh blood oozing profusely from the wound. He admitted the

informant to the hospital. Subsequently, the informant

developed trismus, which raised suspicion that he might have a

fracture associated with the underlying bone, for which he was

advised to have an X-ray and CT scan. Dr R.K. Sharma (PW-7)

performed the CT scan of the informant’s face. He found a

fracture of the left zygomatic arch at three places with

depression of the central fragment. He also found a fracture of

the lesser wing of the sphenoid on the left side. He issued the

report (Ex. PW-7/A). The nature of the injury was grievous, and it

could have been caused by the pressure cooker (Ex. P-1). Dr

Sandeep Narula (PW-8) issued a final opinion (Ex. PW-8/A)

stating that the nature of the injury was grievous, which could

have been caused by means of the pressure cooker (Ex. P-1). ASI

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Manmohan Singh recorded the informant’s statement (Ex. PW-

1/A) and sent it to the police station, where FIR (Ex. PW-11/A)

was registered.

4. HC Yashpal Singh (PW-13) investigated the matter.

He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex. PW-13/A).

Vijay Anand (PW-5) took photographs (Ex. PW-5/A to Ex. PW-

5/F). Gurdev Dutt handed over the pressure cooker lifted from the

spot, which was put in a cloth parcel. The parcel was sealed with

three seals of seal ‘K’. A seal impression (Ex. PW-13/B) was taken

on a separate piece of cloth. The seal was handed over to Om

Parkash after use. The pressure cooker was seized vide memo

(Ex. PW-1/B). The informant produced his blood-stained kurta-

pyjama, undervest, and underwear (Ex. P-2 to Ex. P-5), which

were put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with three

seals of impression ‘M’. A seal impression (Ex. PW-13/F) was

taken on a separate piece of cloth. HC Yashpal seized the tractor

vide memo (Ex. PW-9/B). An application (Ex. PW-14/A) was filed

for obtaining the discharge card, and the discharge card (Ex. PW-

14/B) was obtained. An application (Ex. PW-14/C) was filed for

obtaining the certificate regarding the informant’s duty and his

appointment letter. The certificate (Ex. PW-14/D) and

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appointment letter (Ex. PW-14/E) were taken into possession.

Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and

after the completion of the investigation, the challan was

prepared and presented before the learned Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Court No. 2, Amb, District Una, who committed it to

the learned Sessions Judge.

5. The learned Sessions Judge assigned the case to the

learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Una

(learned Trial Court).

6. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the

commission of offences punishable under Sections 452, 326, 333,

353, and 506 of the IPC, to which the accused pleaded not guilty

and claimed to be tried.

7. The prosecution examined 17 witnesses to prove its

case. Informant Om Parkash (PW-1) narrated the incident. Vyas

Dev (PW-2) and Gurdev Dutt (PW-4) are the eyewitnesses.

Rakesh Kumar (PW-3) witnessed the recovery. Vijay Anand (PW-

5) took the photographs. Arun Kumar (PW-6) and Deepak Rana

(PW-10) did not support the prosecution case. Dr R.K. Sharma

(PW-7) examined the CT scan of the informant’s face. Dr

Sandeep Narula (PW-8) examined the informant. Constable

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Jarnail Singh (PW-9) proved the entry in the Daily Diary and

witnessed the recovery. Jatinder Kumar (PW-11) prepared the

challan. SI Ram Ditta (PW-12) signed the FIR. HC Yashpal (PW-

13) and ASI Manmohan Singh (PW-14) investigated the matter.

Devender Nath (PW-15) produced the appointment order of the

informant. HC Ravi Dutt (PW-16) was working as MHC, with

whom the case property was deposited. HHG Rakesh Kumar

(PW-17) brought the case property to the police station.

8. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), admitted that he

had produced the tractor along with the documents. He denied

the rest of the prosecution case. He stated that witnesses deposed

falsely against him because they were related to the informant’s

landlord. The informant had sustained injuries while he was

patrolling in the daytime after having a scuffle with the driver.

He claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. He

did not produce any evidence in his defence.

9. The learned Trial Court held that the informant’s

testimony was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the

statement of Gurdev. There was no evidence to conclude that the

accused had made preparations for causing hurt to the

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informant. The injuries were caused to the informant when he

was not discharging his official duties. No person deposed that

injuries were caused to deter the informant from discharging

official duties. The informant had sustained a grievous injury,

but it was caused by a pressure cooker, which is not a sharp-

edged or dangerous weapon. Hence, the learned Trial Court

convicted the accused of the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 325 of the IPC and sentenced him as

mentioned above.

10. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by

the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal,

asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly

appreciate the evidence on record. The prosecution failed to

prove that the accused is the owner of the tractor or that he had

deputed anyone to pick up stones from the khad. Deepak Rana

(PW-10), the driver of the tractor, did not support the

prosecution case. He claimed that he and the informant had a

scuffle and the informant sustained injury by way of a fall. This

version was discarded by the learned Trial Court without any

justification. The informant’s testimony was not credible and

should not have been relied upon. The benefit of the Probation of

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Offenders Act was not granted to the accused. Therefore, it was

prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and

order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

11. I have heard Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate,

assisted by Mr Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the

appellant/accused, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned

Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

12. Mr N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate for the

appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred

in appreciating the evidence on record. The informant’s

statement was not corroborated in material particulars. Vyas Dev

(PW-2) did not support the prosecution case that the informant

had stopped the driver of the tractor. The accused was not the

owner of the tractor, and the prosecution version that the

accused had beaten the informant because he had objected to the

transportation of the stone was doubtful. Deepak Rana (PW-10)

stated that he had a scuffle with the informant and the informant

fell, causing injuries to him. This was a probable version, and the

learned Trial Court erred in rejecting this version. When two

versions appear on record, the version in favour of the accused

should have been preferred to the version in favour of the

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prosecution. The learned Trial Court erred in not extending the

benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the accused. Hence,

he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment

and sentence passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

13. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate

General for the respondent/State, submitted that the accused had

caused grievous injuries by means of a pressure cooker on the

informant’s face. The accused admitted that he had produced the

tractor and the documents; therefore, the possession of the

tractor was not in dispute. There is no infirmity in the judgment

and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed

that the present appeal be dismissed.

14. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

15. Informant Om Parkash (PW-1) stated that he was

posted as a Forest Guard in Joh. He was patrolling Joh Khad on

4.11.2011. He noticed a tractor parked in the khad at about 1:00–

1:30 PM. Two persons were loading stones into the tractor. He

asked them not to load the stones, and they left the spot. He was

washing utensils in his room at about 8:00–8:15 PM when the

accused came to the room and caught him by his neck. The

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accused lifted the cooker which the informant was cleaning and

hit it on the informant’s left cheek. Blood started coming out of

the injury. He (the informant) shouted for help. Vyas Dev and

Gurdev came to the spot and rescued him from the accused. The

accused asked about his capacity to intercept the tractor. He was

taken to the hospital. He stated in his cross-examination that the

daily patrolling routine is not entered in any document. He was

posted under the Range Officer, Bharwain. The distance between

Prithipur and Joh was about 1 kilometre. He was not aware of the

name of the tractor driver and the labourer. He had reported the

matter to the Block Officer at Prithipur, who visited the hospital

during the night. He had not impounded the tractor. He had to

report the matter to higher authorities the next morning and had

informed Rakesh Kumar telephonically about this fact. He denied

that the reserve khad fell under the jurisdiction of the Mining

Department. He volunteered to say that the khad in the reserve

forest fell within the jurisdiction of the Forest Department. He

reached his residence at about 5:00–6:00 PM. He admitted that

there are many residential houses near his house. Many people

had gathered on the spot. He had identified the accused before

the police. He was not aware that Mukesh was the owner of the

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tractor. He denied that he had sustained injuries during the

scuffle and had made a false complaint against the accused.

16. Gurdev Dutt (PW-4) stated that the informant is

residing near his house. He was present in his house when he

heard the noise of cries coming from the informant’s house. He

went to the informant’s house and found the accused having an

altercation with the informant. Blood was coming out of the

informant’s left cheek, and his clothes were stained with blood.

The accused left the spot on his tractor. He stated in his cross-

examination that the informant had talked about the

interception of a tractor during the daytime. He admitted that the

informant had told him about the beatings given to him during

the daytime. He stated in his cross-examination by learned

counsel for the defence that his house is situated at a distance of

60–70 meters from the informant’s room. There were about 40–

45 houses in the neighbourhood. 14–15 people had gathered on

the spot. No person had given beatings to the informant in his

presence. He was not aware whether the accused was the owner

of any tractor. The cooker was inside the room. The police came

to the spot at about 9:00 PM on the same day. He denied that the

informant had not disclosed any fact to him. Nobody had tried to

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catch the accused on the spot. He had produced the cooker before

the police because the informant had disclosed about suffering

injuries by means of a cooker. He denied that nothing had

happened in his presence and that he was making a false

statement.

17. The statement of this witness corroborates the

informant’s statement in material particulars. This witness saw

the accused present on the spot and the informant bleeding from

his cheek. This provides valuable corroboration to the

informant’s testimony that the accused had caused injuries to

him by means of a cooker.

18. It was submitted that this witness has not supported

the prosecution version and he was declared hostile; therefore,

his testimony should not be relied upon. This submission is not

acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Dadu v. State of M.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2733 that the statement

of a witness cannot be rejected because he was declared hostile. It

was observed:

19…..The High Court did not refer to the evidence of PW-4

simply on the ground that he had turned hostile, in

ignorance of the law relating to appreciation of the

evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile. A

profitable reference may be made to the decision of this

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Court in State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra (1996) 10 SCC

360: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1278 wherein it was held that it is

settled law that the evidence of a hostile witness would not

be totally rejected if spoken in favour of either the

prosecution or the accused. It would rather have to be

subjected to closer scrutiny, and that portion of the

evidence which is consistent with the case of the

prosecution or defence may be accepted. The mere

rejection of the evidence of PW-4 in the manner aforesaid

is contrary to the law laid down by this Court.

19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Selvamani v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 837, that the testimony of

a hostile witness is not effaced from the record and the version

which is as per the prosecution evidence or the defence version

can be accepted if corroborated by other evidence on record. It

was observed:

“9. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Khujji @

Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1991) 3 SCC

627: 1991 INSC 153, relying on the judgments of this Court

in the cases of Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana (1976) 1

SCC 389: 1975 INSC 306, Sri Rabindra Kuamr Dey v. State of

Orissa (1976) 4 SCC 233: 1976 INSC 204, Syad Akbar v. State of

Karnataka (1980) 1 SCC 30: 1979 INSC 126, has held that the

evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in

toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as

hostile and cross-examined him. It was further held that

the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as

effaced or washed off the record altogether, but the same

can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be

dependable on a scrutiny thereof.

10. This Court, in the case of C. Muniappan v. State of

Tamil Nadu (2010) 9 SCC 567: 2010 INSC 553 , has

observed thus:

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“81. It is a settled legal proposition that (Khujji case,

SCC p. 635, para 6)

‘6.… the evidence of a prosecution witness

cannot be rejected in toto merely because the

prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and

cross-examined him. The evidence of such

witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or

washed off the record altogether, but the same

can be accepted to the extent their version is

found to be dependable on a scrutiny thereof.’

82. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra,

(1996) 10 SCC 360, this Court held that (at SCC

p. 363, para 7) evidence of a hostile witness

would not be totally rejected if spoken in

favour of the prosecution or the accused but

required to be subjected to scrutiny and that

portion of the evidence which is consistent

with the case of the prosecution or defence

can be relied upon. A similar view has been

reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v.

State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543, Gagan

Kanojia v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516,

Radha Mohan Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 2

SCC 450, Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh,

(2007) 13 SCC 360 and Subbu Singh v. State,

(2009) 6 SCC 462.

83. Thus, the law can be summarised to the

effect that the evidence of a hostile witness

cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant

parts thereof, which are admissible in law, can

be used by the prosecution or the defence.”

20. Therefore, the testimony of a witness cannot be

discarded simply because he was declared hostile.

21. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sat

Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a witness has

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been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with the

previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon.

However, when he is confronted with some portions of the

previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and

the rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:

“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that

even in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-

examined and contradicted with the leave of the court by

the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of

law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for

the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a

result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the

witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be

believed regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge

finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not

been completely shaken, he may, after reading and

considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with

due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other

evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he

finds to be creditworthy and act upon it. If in a given case,

the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and

in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally

discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence,

discard his evidence in toto.”

22. This Court also took a similar view in Ian Stilman

versus State 2002(2) ShimLC 16 wherein it was observed:

“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has

been called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-

examined on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness

loses credibility and cannot be relied upon by the defence.

We find support for the view we have taken from the

various authorities of the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The

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State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400,

the Apex Court observed:

"It is now well settled that when a witness, who has

been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be

cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the

result of that course being adopted is to discredit

this witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a

part of his testimony.

23. In the present case, Gurdev Dutt was contradicted

only with that part of the statement wherein he had told the

police about what was disclosed by the informant to him during

the day. Such a statement was otherwise hearsay in nature and

inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, even if this witness has not

supported the prosecution version regarding what was disclosed

by the informant to him, the same would not have any effect

because of the evidence being inadmissible.

24. Dr Sandeep Narula (PW-8) examined the informant.

He found fresh blood oozing profusely from the wound on the

left cheek. Subsequently, the informant developed trismus. A CT

scan was advised. Dr R.K. Sharma (PW-7) went through the CT

scan and found a fracture of the left zygomatic arch at three

places with depression of the central fragment. The injuries

noticed by Dr Sandeep Narula could have been caused by means

of a cooker (Ex. P-1). Dr Sandeep stated in his cross-examination

that it was a rare possibility that injury on the person of the

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informant, which was localised and on the left cheek only with

the fracture of underlying bone, could be caused by a person

falling on a hard surface and striking against a sharp object. The

cross-examination of this witness rules out the possibility of

sustaining injury by way of a fall. Therefore, the defence version

that the informant had sustained injuries during the daytime

when he had a scuffle with the driver of the tractor is not proved

on record.

25. Heavy reliance was placed upon the statement made

by Dr R.K. Sharma in the cross-examination that injury could be

caused by way of a fall on a hard surface. However, he had not

examined the patient after the incident, but had only carried out

the CT scan of the informant. Therefore, his opinion cannot be

preferred to the opinion of Dr Sandeep Narula, who had

examined the patient immediately after the incident.

26. Vyas Dev (PW-2) stated that he heard the noise from

the informant’s room and he went to the spot. He saw a quarrel

between accused Rakesh Kumar and the informant. The

informant’s clothes were stained with blood, and the informant

had sustained injuries. He was permitted to be cross-examined.

He admitted that Om Parkash and Gurdev had also reached the

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spot. He denied that he had separated the informant and the

accused, or that the accused had left the spot on his tractor. He

denied that he made inquiries from the informant and that the

informant disclosed the incident that had occurred during the

daytime. He was confronted with the previous statement, and he

denied the same. He stated in his cross-examination that no

quarrel or beating had taken place in his presence. Blood was

oozing out of the informant’s injuries, and his clothes were

stained with blood. He could not say who had caused injuries to

the informant. He volunteered to say that except the accused and

3–4 local persons, no outsider was present on the spot. He could

not say that the informant had sustained injuries outside and

somebody had brought the informant to his room. He denied that

he made a false statement against the accused.

27. The statement of this witness corroborates the

informant’s version regarding the presence of the accused on the

spot. The mere fact that he has not supported the prosecution

version that he had separated the informant and the accused

does not shake the prosecution version. Further, the fact that he

has not disclosed what was told to him by the informant is also

not material because such evidence is inadmissible in nature.

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However, his testimony establishes the presence of the accused

on the spot, the injuries sustained by the informant on his face,

and the blood coming out of the injuries.

28. The fact that blood was coming out of the injuries of

the informant, which was even noticed by the Medical Officer,

shows that the injuries were fresh. Thus, the defence version that

the injuries were caused during the daytime by a fall during a

scuffle cannot be believed.

29. Deepak Rana (PW-10) stated that he used to drive the

tractor of Mukesh Kumar. He was permitted to be cross-

examined. He denied that he had gone to Joh Khad for taking

stones on the tractor; the informant came to the spot and asked

him not to pick up stones from the spot. He denied the previous

statement recorded by the police. He stated in his cross-

examination by learned counsel for the defence that he had

loaded stones from the dump of Mukesh Kumar which were to be

taken to the village. He admitted that he had gone to the village

through the reserve forest, where the informant met him. He

admitted that the informant had asked whether stones were

picked up from the reserve forest, and he denied it. The

informant compelled him to admit the lifting of stones from the

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reserve forest, and when he refused, the informant had a scuffle

with him. He pushed the informant, and the informant fell and

sustained injuries from the fall. He admitted that he had

informed the owner of the tractor about this incident.

30. The statement of this witness shows that he was

transporting the stones in the tractor and the tractor was

intercepted by the informant. Thus, the informant’s version that

the tractor was transporting stones and he had objected to it is

duly corroborated by the statement of this witness. Therefore,

the fact that witnesses Vyas Dev and Gurdev have not supported

the statement about the revealing of the incident to them will not

make any difference to the prosecution case.

31. The accused admitted in his statement recorded

under Section 313 of the CrPC that he had produced the tractor

and documents before the police. Therefore, the prosecution

version that the accused was having control of the tractor was

duly corroborated by the admission made by the accused. It was

laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra

v. Sukhdev Singh, (1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705: 1992 SCC

OnLine SC 421 that the Courts can rely upon the statement of the

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accused recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. It was observed

at page 742:

“51. That brings us to the question of whether such a

statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code can

constitute the sole basis for conviction. Since no oath is

administered to the accused, the statements made by the

accused will not be evidence stricto sensu. That is why

sub-section (3) says that the accused shall not render

himself liable to punishment if he gives false answers.

Then comes sub-section (4), which reads:

“313. (4) The answers given by the accused may be

taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and

put in evidence for or against him in any other

inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which

such answers may tend to show he has committed.”

Thus, the answers given by the accused in response to his

examination under Section 313 can be taken into

consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This much is

clear on a plain reading of the above sub-section.

Therefore, though not strictly evidence, sub-section (4)

permits that it may be taken into consideration in the said

inquiry or trial. See State of Maharashtra v. R.B. Chowdhari

(1967) 3 SCR 708: AIR 1968 SC 110: 1968 Cri LJ 95. This Court,

in the case of Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of M.B. 1951

SCC 1060: 1953 Cri LJ 1933: AIR 1953 SC 468, held that an

answer given by an accused under Section 313 examination

can be used for proving his guilt as much as the evidence

given by a prosecution witness. In Narain Singh v. State of

Punjab (1963) 3 SCR 678: (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730, this Court held

that if the accused confesses to the commission of the

offence with which he is charged, the Court may, relying

upon that confession, proceed to convict him. To state the

exact language in which the three-Judge bench answered

the question, it would be advantageous to reproduce the

relevant observations at pages 684-685:

“Under Section 342 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure by the first sub-section, insofar as it is

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material, the Court may at any stage of the enquiry

or trial and after the witnesses for the prosecution

have been examined and before the accused is called

upon for his defence shall put questions to the

accused person for the purpose of enabling him to

explain any circumstance appearing in the evidence

against him. Examination under Section 342 is

primarily to be directed to those matters on which

evidence has been led for the prosecution to

ascertain from the accused his version or

explanation, if any, of the incident which forms the

subject-matter of the charge and his defence. By

sub-section (3), the answers given by the accused

may ‘be taken into consideration’ at the enquiry or

the trial. If the accused person in his examination

under Section 342 confesses to the commission of the

offence charged against him the court may, relying

upon that confession, proceed to convict him, but if he

does not confess and in explaining circumstance

appearing in the evidence against him sets up his

own version and seeks to explain his conduct

pleading that he has committed no offence, the

statement of the accused can only be taken into

consideration in its entirety.” (emphasis supplied)

Sub-section (1) of Section 313 corresponds to sub-section

(1) of Section 342 of the old Code, except that it now

stands bifurcated in two parts with the proviso added

thereto clarifying that in summons cases where the

presence of the accused is dispensed with, his

examination under clause (b) may also be dispensed with.

Sub-section (2) of Section 313 reproduces the old sub-

section (4), asd the present sub-section (3) corresponds to

the old sub-section (2) except for the change necessitated

on account of the abolition of the jury system. The present

sub-section (4) with which we are concerned is a verbatim

reproduction of the old sub-section (3). Therefore, the

aforestated observations apply with equal force.”

32. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh, (2002) 10 SCC 236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514:

2002 SCC OnLine SC 933, that the statement made by the accused

under Section 313 Cr.P.C. can be used to lend credence to the

evidence led by the prosecution, but such statement cannot form

the sole basis for conviction. It was observed at page 244:

27. The statement made in defence by the accused under

Section 313 CrPC can certainly be taken aid of to lend

credence to the evidence led by the prosecution, but only a

part of such statement under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure cannot be made the sole basis of his

conviction. The law on the subject is almost settled that

the statement under Section 313 CrPC of the accused can

either be relied on in whole or in part. It may also be

possible to rely on the inculpatory part of his statement if

the exculpatory part is found to be false on the basis of the

evidence led by the prosecution. See Nishi Kant Jha v. State

of Bihar (1969) 1 SCC 347: AIR 1969 SC 422: (SCC pp. 357-58,

para 23)

“23. In this case, the exculpatory part of the

statement in Exhibit 6 is not only inherently

improbable but is contradicted by the other evidence.

According to this statement, the injury that the

appellant received was caused by the appellant's

attempt to catch hold of the hand of Lal Mohan

Sharma to prevent the attack on the victim. This was

contradicted by the statement of the accused himself

under Section 342 CrPC to the effect that he had

received the injury in a scuffle with a herdsman. The

injury found on his body when he was examined by

the doctor on 13-10-1961 negates both these

versions. Neither of these versions accounts for the

profuse bleeding which led to his washing his clothes

and having a bath in River Patro, the amount of

bleeding and the washing of the bloodstains being so

considerable as to attract the attention of Ram

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Kishore Pandey, PW 17 and asking him about the

cause thereof. The bleeding was not a simple one, as

his clothes all got stained with blood, as also his

books, his exercise book, his belt and his shoes. More

than that, the knife which was discovered on his

person was found to have been stained with blood

according to the report of the Chemical Examiner.

According to the post-mortem report, this knife

could have been the cause of the injuries on the

victim. In circumstances like these, there being enough

evidence to reject the exculpatory part of the statement

of the appellant in Exhibit 6, the High Court had acted

rightly in accepting the inculpatory part and piercing the

same with the other evidence to come to the conclusion

that the appellant was the person responsible for the

crime.” (emphasis supplied)

33. It was laid down in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh,

(2012) 4 SCC 257: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 382: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 213,

that the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so

far as it supports the prosecution’s case, can be used against him

for recording a conviction. It was observed at page 275: -

“52. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to

put material evidence to the accused under Section 313

CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of

recording a statement under this provision of the CrPC is

to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the

circumstances appearing against him as well as to put

forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once he

does not avail this opportunity, then consequences in law

must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this

opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313

CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution,

can be used against him for rendering a conviction. Even

under the latter, he faces the consequences in law.”

34. This position was reiterated in Ashok Debbarma v.

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State of Tripura, (2014) 4 SCC 747: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 417: 2014 SCC

OnLine SC 199, and it was held that the statement of the accused

recorded under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. can be used to lend

corroboration to the statements of prosecution witnesses. It was

held at page 761: -

24. We are of the view that, under Section 313 statement,

if the accused admits that, from the evidence of various

witnesses, four persons sustained severe bullet injuries

by the firing by the accused and his associates, that

admission of guilt in Section 313 statement cannot be

brushed aside. This Court in State of Maharashtra v.

Sukhdev Singh [(1992) 3 SCC 700: 1992 SCC (Cri) 705 held

that since no oath is administered to the accused, the

statement made by the accused under Section 313 CrPC

will not be evidence stricto sensu and the accused, of

course, shall not render himself liable to punishment

merely on the basis of answers given while he was being

examined under Section 313 CrPC. But, sub-section (4)

says that the answers given by the accused in response to

his examination under Section 313 CrPC can be taken into

consideration in such an inquiry or trial. This Court, in

Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, 1951

SCC 1060: AIR 1953 SC 468: 1953 Cri LJ 1933, held that the

answers given by the accused under Section 313

examination can be used for proving his guilt as much as

the evidence given by the prosecution witness. In Narain

Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 1 Cri LJ 730: (1963) 3 SCR

678, this Court held that when the accused confesses to

the commission of the offence with which he is charged,

the court may rely upon the confession and proceed to

convict him.

25. This Court in Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh (2002) 10 SCC

236: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1514 held that: (SCC p. 244, para 27)

“27. The statement made in defence by the

accused under Section 313 CrPC can certainly be

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taken aid of to lend credence to the evidence led

by the prosecution, but only a part of such

statement under Section 313 CrPC cannot be

made the sole basis of his conviction.”

In this connection, reference may also be made to the

judgments of this Court in Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev

Krishan Singla (2005) 9 SCC 15: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 and

Bishnu Prasad Sinha v. State of Assam (2007) 11 SCC 467:

(2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 766. The abovementioned decisions

would indicate that the statement of the accused under

Section 313 CrPC for the admission of his guilt or

confession as such cannot be made the sole basis for

finding the accused guilty, the reason being he is not

making the statement on oath, but all the same the

confession or admission of guilt can be taken as a piece of

evidence since the same lends credence to the evidence led

by the prosecution.

26. We may, however, indicate that the answers given by

the accused while examining him under Section 313, fully

corroborate the evidence of PW 10 and PW 13 and hence

the offences levelled against the appellant stand proved,

and the trial court and the High Court have rightly found

him guilty for the offences under Sections 326, 436 and

302 read with Section 34 IPC.”

35. It was duly proved by the medical evidence that the

informant had sustained injuries that could have been caused by

means of a pressure cooker (Ex. P-1). The injuries are not stated

to have been caused by way of a fall. It was held by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3

SCC 125: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 13 that the testimony of the injured

witness has to be accepted as correct unless there are compelling

circumstances to doubt his testimony. It was observed:

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“22. The importance of an injured witness in a criminal

trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling

circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt

such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely

valuable evidence in a criminal trial.

23. In Balu Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra [Balu

Sudam Khalde v.State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365:

2023 SCC OnLine SC 355], this Court summed up the

principles which are to be kept in mind when appreciating

the evidence of an injured eyewitness. This Court held as

follows: (SCC para 26)

“26. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to

be appreciated, the under-noted legal principles

enunciated by the Courts are required to be kept in

mind:

26.1. The presence of an injured eyewitness at the

time and place of the occurrence cannot be

doubted unless there are material contradictions

in his deposition.

26.2. Unless it is otherwise established by the

evidence, it must be believed that an injured

witness would not allow the real culprits to

escape and falsely implicate the accused.

26.3. The evidence of the injured witness has greater

evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons

exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

26.4. The evidence of the injured witness cannot

be doubted on account of some embellishment in

natural conduct or minor contradictions.

26.5. If there be any exaggeration or immaterial

embellishment in the evidence of an injured

witness, then such contradiction, exaggeration

or embellishment should be discarded from the

evidence of the injured, but not the whole

evidence.

26.6. The broad substratum of the prosecution

version must be taken into consideration, and

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discrepancies which normally creep due to loss of

memory with the passage of time should be

discarded.” (emphasis supplied)

36. This position was reiterated in Rajan v. State of

Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1952, wherein it was observed:

“33. When the evidence of an injured eyewitness is to be

appreciated, the undernoted legal principles enunciated by

the Courts are required to be kept in mind:

“(a) The presence of an injured eyewitness at the time

and place of the occurrence cannot be doubted unless

there are material contradictions in his deposition.

(b) Unless it is otherwise established by the evidence, it

must be believed that an injured witness would not

allow the real culprits to escape and falsely implicate

the accused.

(c) The evidence of an injured witness has greater

evidentiary value, and unless compelling reasons exist,

their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

(d) The evidence of an injured witness cannot be

doubted on account of some embellishment in natural

conduct or minor contradictions.

(e) If there be any exaggeration or immaterial

embellishments in the evidence of an injured witness,

then such contradiction, exaggeration or embellishment

should be discarded from the evidence of the injured,

but not the whole evidence.

(f) The broad substratum of the prosecution version

must be taken into consideration, and discrepancies

which normally creep due to loss of memory with

passage of time should be discarded.”

34. In assessing the value of the evidence of the

eyewitnesses, two principal considerations are whether, in

the circumstances of the case, it is possible to believe their

presence at the scene of occurrence or in such situations

as would make it possible for them to witness the facts

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deposed to by them and secondly, whether there is

anything inherently improbable or unreliable in their

evidence. In respect of both these considerations,

circumstances either elicited from those witnesses

themselves or established by other evidence tending to

improbabilise their presence or to discredit the veracity of

their statements, will have a bearing upon the value which

a Court would attach to their evidence. Although in cases

where the plea of the accused is a mere denial yet the

evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be examined

on its own merits, where the accused raise a definite plea

or put forward a positive case which is inconsistent with

that of the prosecution, the nature of such plea or case and

the probabilities in respect of it will also have to be taken

into account while assessing the value of the prosecution

evidence. (See: Balu Sudam Khaldev.State of Maharashtra:

(2023) 13 SCC 365).

37. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

State of Punjab vs. Hari Singh 1974 (3) SCR 725 that a person

speaking on oath should be presumed to be a truthful witness

unless there is something inherently improbable in his

testimony. It was observed:

“The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking

under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be

untruthful or unreliable in any particular respect. The

High Court, reversing this approach, seems to us to have

assumed that witnesses are untruthful unless it is proved

that they are telling the truth. Witnesses, solemnly

deposing on oath in the witness box during a trial upon a

grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with a

full sense of responsibility for the consequences of what

they state. It may be that what they say is so very unlikely

or unnatural or unreasonable that it is safer not to act

upon it or even to disbelieve them.”

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38. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

State of U.P. Versus Smt. Noorie Alias Noor Jahan and Others, (1996)

9 SCC 104, that while assessing the evidence of an eyewitness, the

Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the

circumstances of the case, the eyewitness could be present and

whether there is anything inherently improbable or unreliable. It

was observed: -

“7. The High Court having acquitted the accused persons

on appreciation of the evidence, we have ourselves

scrutinised the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. The conclusion

is irresistible that their evidence on material particulars

has been brushed aside by the High Court by entering into

the realm of conjecture and fanciful speculation without

even discussing the evidence, more particularly the

evidence relating to the basic prosecution case. While

assessing and evaluating the evidence of eyewitnesses, the

Court must adhere to two principles, namely, whether, in the

circumstances of the case, it was possible for the eyewitness to

be present at the scene and whether there is anything

inherently improbable or unreliable. The High Court, in our

opinion, has failed to observe the aforesaid principles and,

in fact, has misappreciated the evidence, which has caused

a gross miscarriage of justice. The credibility of a witness

has to be decided by referring to his evidence and finding

out how he has fared in cross-examination and what

impression is created by his evidence, taken insofar as the

context of the case, and not by entering into the realm of

conjecture and speculation. On scrutinising the evidence

of PWs. 1, 2 and 3, we find they are consistent with one

another so far as the place of occurrence, the manner of

assault, the weapon of assault used by the accused

persons, the fact of dragging of the dead body of the

deceased from the place to the grove and nothing has been

brought out in their cross-examination to impeach their

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testimony. The aforesaid oral evidence fully corroborates

the medical evidence. In that view of the matter, we

unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the

prosecution has been able to establish the charge against

the accused persons and the High Court committed an

error in acquitting the three respondents, namely Inder

Dutt, Raghu Raj and Bikram.” (emphasis supplied)

39. In the present case, the injuries sustained by the

informant show his presence on the spot. There is nothing in the

cross-examination of the informant to show that he was making

a false statement or that he had any motive to depose against the

accused. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly relied

upon the informant’s testimony.

40. The informant was shown to have sustained a

grievous injury by means of a pressure cooker. Thus, the learned

Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused of the commission

of an offence punishable under Section 325 of the IPC.

41. It was submitted that the benefit of the Probation of

Offenders Act should have been granted to the accused, and the

learned Trial Court erred in denying such benefit. This

submission cannot be accepted. The injuries were caused to the

informant because he had objected to picking up stones from the

reserve forest. Thus, the intent of the accused was to teach the

informant a lesson for doing his duties. It was laid down by the

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Hon’ble Supreme Court in Siyasaran v. State of M.P., 1994 SCC

OnLine SC 4: 1995 Cri LJ 2126 that the benefit of the Probation of

Offenders Act cannot be granted to a person for using force on a

government servant. Further, the accused had used a pressure

cooker to cause injury to the informant on his face, which was

grievous in nature. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 7 SCC 178: (2009)

3 SCC (Cri) 330: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1233 that where the accused

had caused grave injuries to the victim, the benefit of Probation

cannot be granted. It was observed at page 185:

26. In Manjappa v. State of Karnataka [(2007) 6 SCC 231 :

(2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 76: JT (2007) 7 SC 226 ] this Court

considered the scope of grant of relief under the

provisions of Section 361 CrPC or under the provisions of

the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 reconsidering earlier

judgment of this Court in Om Prakash v. State of Haryana

[(2001) 10 SCC 477: 2003 SCC (Cri) 799], and held that such

a relief should be granted where the offence had not been

of a very grave nature and in certain cases where mens rea

remains absent as in a case of rash and negligent driving

under Section 279 read with Section 304-A IPC. Where the

High Court itself reduces the sentence substantially, such

beneficial provisions should not be given effect to.

27. In the instant case, the High Court reduced the

sentence from three years to one year, and as the instant

case is of a very grave nature as there had been a large

number of injuries, we are not inclined to grant leave

sought by the appellant.

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42. Therefore, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders

Act could not have been granted to the accused, and there is no

error in not extending the benefit of the Act to the accused.

43. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to

undergo simple imprisonment for three years and pay a fine of

₹5,000/- with a default clause for the commission of an offence

punishable under Section 325 of the IPC. The offence under

Section 325 of the IPC is punishable with imprisonment which

may extend to seven years. Thus, considering the circumstances

of the case and the nature of the injuries, the sentence of three

years cannot be said to be excessive, requiring any interference

from this Court.

44. No other point was urged.

45. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is

dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.

46. The record of the learned trial Court be sent back

forthwith.

(Rakesh Kainthla)

Judge

9

th

September, 2026

(Chander)