IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Civil Revision No. 55 of 2024

Date of Decision: 01.01.2026

Raman Jain .....Petitioner.

Versus

Raj Kumar Mehra and Anr. …..Respondents.

Coram

The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge.

Whether approved for reporting?

1

For the Petitioner: Mr. Ashok Sood, Sr. Advocate with Mr.

Rajat, Advocate.

For the Respondents: Mr. Bhupender Gupta, Sr. Advocate with

Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate.

Bipin Chander Negi, Judge

CMP No. 15981 of 2024

The present application has been filed on 2

nd

August,

2024. The same has been filed for enhancement of the use and

occupation charges in the case at hand. Admittedly, eviction by

the Rent Controller in the case at hand had taken place on

15.12.2017. Subsequent thereto, the landlord/tenant

relationship inter se the parties stood cancelled. The landlord

was entitled to use and occupation charges as operation,

execution of the judgment passed by the Rent Controller had

been stayed during the pendency of the appeal preferred before

the 1

st

Appellate Court by the tenant/present petitioner.

Use and occupation charges by the 1

st

Appellate Court,

during the pendency of the appeal preferred before the

Appellate Authority by the tenant, had been determined on the

1

Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

2

4

th

day of July, 2018. For the purpose of determination of use

and occupation charges by the 1

st

Appellate Court, a lease deed

qua shop bearing No. 6 on the Mall Road level, measuring 502

sq. feet (48.33 sq. meters), owned by the wife of the present

petitioner/tenant/non-applicant, executed on 18.1.2017, was

used as the basis for determining the use and occupation

charges. The same was fixed at Rs. 597.60 per sq. foot. The

area of the tenanted premises in the case at hand occupied by

the non-applicant/tenant was taken as 275 sq. feet, and hence

a sum of Rs. 1,64,340 per month (275 × 597.60) was fixed as

use and occupation charges. The same was admittedly assailed

before a Coordinate Bench of this Court by both the parties. The

landlord sought enhancement, whereas the tenant, to the

contrary, sought a decrease in the use and occupation charges.

Both the revision petitions, vide a common order dated

2.1.2019, were dismissed, and the order passed by the first

appellate Court dated 4.7.2018 fixing the use and occupation

charges was upheld.

Post dismissal of the appeal filed before the first

appellate Court on 29.12.2023, the present revision petition

was preferred before this Court on 3.4.2024. Vide order dated

14.5.2024, the execution proceedings in the case at hand filed

by the landlord were kept in abeyance. As has already been

stated supra, use and occupation charges in the case at hand

was determined on 4.7.2018, taking into account a lease deed

3

entered into by the wife of the non-applicant qua property

owned by her on the Mall Road, which was executed on

18.1.2017.

By virtue of the present application, the

applicants/landlords submit that rentals in the vicinity of the

demised premises have increased. In order to demonstrate the

same, the applicants/landlords have placed on record a leave

and licence agreement dated 14.3.2023 entered into with

respect to a shop situated on the Mall Road in the vicinity of the

demised premises. The area of the shop qua which the leave

and licence agreement pertains is 300 sq. feet. Licence fee

payable with respect to the same is Rs. 3 lacs per month plus

GST. Hence, according to the applicants/landlords, the per

square foot rate in terms of the leave and licence agreement

dated 14.3.2023 placed on record is Rs. 1000/-. To show that

the licence fee determined is being paid, relevant bank record

has been placed on record.

Per contra, the tenant/non-applicant has placed on

record supplementary agreements entered into between the

tenant and his wife qua shop No. 6 on the Mall Road, which is

owned by the wife of the tenant in the case at hand. According

to the supplementary agreements placed on record, the rental

of the shop has reduced over a period of time. Other than the

aforesaid, order dated 27.5.2024 passed by a co-ordinate bench

of this court has been placed on record, which pertains to

4

another shop on the Mall Road (in the same building wherein

the premises in question exist), which has been let out by the

present applicants/landlords and which is contiguous to the

demised premises let out to the present non-applicant/tenant.

The applicants/landlords, in the rejoinder filed, have

stated that the supplementary agreements placed on record by

the non-applicant/tenant cannot be given credence, as the

same appear to have been entered into by the tenant therein

and his wife with the intent of reducing the use and occupation

charges fixed by the first appellate Court in the case at hand

and up-held by a co-ordinate bench of this court. It is submitted

that the order dated 27.5.2024 on which reliance has been

placed by the non-applicant is based on the use and occupation

charges fixed in the case at hand on 4

th

July, 2018 by the 1st

Appellate Court, hence, it is of no avail to the non-

applicant/tenant.

Interim orders passed staying the operation and

execution of judgments passed by the Rent Controller and first

appellate Court staying eviction in the case at hand are passed

in an equitable jurisdiction. One who claims equity must do

equity. After an eviction order has been passed by the Rent

Controller, the landlord/tenant relationship comes to an end.

The erstwhile tenant thereafter is a trespasser who, on account

of his occupation of the demised premises, is liable to pay use

and occupation charges to the owner of the demised premises.

5

Had the premises, post passing of the eviction order by the Rent

Controller, been vacated by the erstwhile tenant, then the

owner would have been free to let out the same to a willing

tenant at Mall Road at the market rate. Hence, once the eviction

orders passed by the Rent Controller and the 1st Appellate

Court are stayed, the erstwhile tenant is under obligation to pay

use and occupation charges to the owner at market rate.

Use and occupation charges in the case at hand were

fixed on 4

th

July, 2018 by the 1st Appellate Court. The same

were based on a lease deed dated 18.1.2017. The 1

st

Appellate

Court had affirmed the eviction on 29.12.2023. Thereafter, the

present revision was preferred on 3

rd

April, 2024. Since the

passing of the order dated 4.7.2018 fixing use and occupation

charges in the case at hand, which was affirmed by a

Coordinate Bench of this Court on 2.1.2019, more than seven

and a half years have elapsed.

The mall road where the demised premises are located

is a commercial area. The mall road has to extreme ends. One

is towards the lift and another towards the office of the Deputy

Commissioner. The premises in the case at hand are closer to

the end of the Mall Road which is towards the lift. The premises

qua which leave and licence agreement has been placed on

record by the applicants/landlords is also located towards the

end closer to the lift. Both the demised premises and the shop

6

qua which the leave and licence agreement has been placed on

record are in the immediate vicinity of each other.

The shop owned by the landlord, i.e., the wife of the

non-applicant/tenant, is located towards the other end closer to

the Deputy Commissioner’s office. The same is not in the

immediate vicinity of the demised premises. The supplementary

agreements placed on record by the non-applicant/tenant

showing reduction in rent of the premises let out by the wife of

the non-applicant/tenant cannot be given credence. The

contention of the landlords/applicants qua the same having

been entered into with the sole purpose of reduction of use and

occupation charges in the case at hand carries weight.

The shop area in the case at hand let out to the non-

applicant/tenant is being disputed. The landlords/applicants

claim that the area is 315 sq. feet, whereas the tenant states

that the area is 275 sq. feet. In order to determine the total

area under the occupation of the tenant in the case at hand,

reliance can be placed on Exhibit RW-2/D, i.e., the map placed

on record by the non-applicant/tenant, along with the technical

report Exhibit RW-2/A filed by the tenant/non-applicant. Based

on the same, the total area in terms of square meters comes to

29.308 square meters, which, when converted into square feet,

comes to a little more than 315 square feet. Hence, in this

respect, by placing reliance on the documents filed by the

tenant/non-applicant, it is evident that the total area under the

7

occupation of the tenant/non-applicant is 315 square feet and

not 275 square feet, as has been wrongly contended by the

non-applicant/tenant.

Hence, from the date of filing of the present application

for use and occupation, i.e., from 2

nd

August, 2024, Rs. 1000

per square foot is determined as the use and occupation with

respect to the shop area under the occupation of the non-

applicant/tenant, area whereof is 315 square feet. For the three

years prior to 2

nd

August, 2024, since use and occupation

charges have been paid for 275 square feet, the

applicants/landlords are held entitled to recover use and

occupation charges for the balance 40 square feet at the rate of

Rs. 597.60 per square foot. The amount in this respect is to be

paid within 30 days of the passing of the present order.

In view thereof, the application stands disposed of.

Civil Revision No. 55 of 2024

The petitioner, by filing this petition under section 24(5)

of HP Urban Rent Control Act, 1987, has assailed the judgment

and decree dated 29.12.2023, passed by the learned Appellate

Authority-II, Shimla, District Shimla, HP in Rent Appeal No.4-

S/13(b) of 2018, affirming the eviction order dated 15.12.2017,

passed by the learned Rent Controller, Shimla, HP in Rent

Petition No.11/2 of 2016/12.

2. The scope of interference in a petition seeking revision

of an order passed by the Rent Controller or Appellate Authority

8

is now no longer res integra. For the purpose of convenience

and ready reference sub-Section (5) of Section 24 of the Act is

extracted as under :-

“Vesting of Appellate Authority on officers by the State

Government.

Section 24 … … … …

(5) The High Court may, at any time, on the

application of the aggrieved party or on its own motion

call for and examine the records relating to any order

passed or proceedings taken under this Act for the

purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or

propriety of such order or proceeding and may pass

such order in relation thereto as it may deem fit.”

[Emphasis supplied]

3. In this regard a reference to the authoritative

pronouncement of a five-Judges Bench of the apex Court

reported in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs.

Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 would be appropriate and

relevant. The findings can be summarized as under:

(i) The term ‘propriety’ would imply something which

is legal and proper.

(ii) The power of the High Court even though wider

than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code

of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the

appellate Authority.

(iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an

appeal in disguise.

9

(iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be

permitted to be reheard as an appellate Authority.

(v) The expression “revision” is meant to convey the

idea of much narrower expression than the one

expressed by the expression “appeal”. The revisional

power under the Rent Control Act may not be as

narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of

the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make

the HighCourt a second court of first appeal. While

holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in

Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao

Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246.

(vi). The meaning of the expression “legality and

propriety” so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar

Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent

that exercise of the power is not confined to

jurisdictional error alone and has to be “according to

law”.

(vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to

law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone,

as to whether such finding of fact is based on some

legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like

misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the

material evidence all together; suffers from perversity;

illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross

miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of

Ram Dass (supra) does not exposit that the revisional

power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an

appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence

for coming to a finding contrary to the findings

returned by the authority below.

10

(viii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court

shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on

reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different

view thereupon.

(ix) The exercise of such power to examine record and

facts must be understood in the context of the purpose

that such findings are based on firm legal basis and

not on a wrong premise of law.

(x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with.

Reconsideration of all questions of fact is

impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of

appeal.

(xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality,

high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for

the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion.

Consideration of the evidence is confined only to

adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the

order.

(xii) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the

context of such findings being perverse, based on no

evidence; and misreading of evidence.

4. The first and foremost contention of the learned counsel

appearing on behalf of the petitioner/tenant is that the eviction

petition in the case at hand has been filed under Section 14,

Sub-section (3), Clause (a), sub-clause (i) of the H.P. Urban

Rent Control Act (hereinafter for purpose of brevity referred to

as the Act) thereof. In this respect, it is specifically contended

that insofar as the first proviso to the aforesaid provision is

11

concerned, the landlords/respondents are debarred from filing a

petition for eviction if they are occupying another non-

residential building in the urban area concerned.

5. The petitioner/tenant contends in the case at hand that

the landlords/respondents are occupying non-residential

premises owned by them in the urban area, amounting to 3,906

sq.ft.. The same exists in the building wherein the suit premises

are located.

6. In the aforesaid backdrop, learned counsel further

submits that in the building wherein the demised premises

exist, the shop area owned by the landlords/respondents on the

Mall Road level is 594 sq. ft., below the Mall Road level, they

have an area of 1,656 sq. ft., which, according to the learned

counsel for the petitioner/tenant, has been converted from

residential to non-residential premises under Section 12 of the

Act.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner/tenant has drawn the

attention of this Court to Exhibit PW-2/A, i.e., a copy of the

order dated 11.10.2001, permitting the landlord/respondent to

convert the first floor of the building existing below the Mall

Road level, wherein the suit premises is located from a

residential to a non-residential premises.

8. Besides the aforesaid, it is submitted that there is a

basement area in the building which is being used for

commercial purposes, which is an area of 1,495 sq. ft. It is

12

further submitted that there is a shed area in the basement

measuring 161 sq. ft., which is also non-residential.

9. Based on the aforesaid it is contended that the

eviction petition filed by the respondent/landlord in the case at

hand is itself not maintainable. The aforesaid contention is

sought to be supported by the authoritative pronouncement of

the Apex Court reported as 1994 Supp (1) SCC 729 titled D.

DevaJi vs. K. Sudarashana Rao (94 (1) RCR 185 ). Per

contra learned Senior counsel appearing for the

respondent/landlord has submitted that the judgement being

referred to in D. DevaJi (supra) by the tenant/petitioner has no

applicability to the facts of the case at hand. The same deals

with a provision of the Andhra Rent Control Act, which is not

pari materia to the provision being considered herein. Learned

Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord has

placed reliance on Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass, (2005) 5

SCC 375 wherein the apex court had an occasion to deal with the

first proviso to Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (a), sub-

clause (i) of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act which is the basis

of the contention of the petitioner/tenant before this court. In

view of the law laid therein it is asserted that the petition filed

for eviction in the case at hand by the landlord/respondent

before the rent controller is maintainable.

10. The relevant part of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the

Act reads as under:

13

“14. (3) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an

order directing the tenant to put the landlord in

possession—

(a) in the case of a residential building and non-

residential building, if—

(i) he requires it for his own occupation:

Provided that he is not occupying another residential

and non-residential building owned by him, in the

urban area concerned:

11. The scope of the first proviso came up for consideration in

Kailash Chand v. Dharam Dass , (2005) 5 SCC 375. Therein it

was held that the first proviso is not to be read in isolation. It

has to be read along with the principal provision to which it is

appended. The occupation of another non-residential building,

to act in denial of the landlord’s right to evict the tenant to

satisfy his requirement, must have correlation with the

requirement of the landlord. The first proviso would come into

play only if the landlord is occupying another non-residential

building of his own in the same urban area and such building is

considered by the court as reasonably enough and suitable to

satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord.

12. With respect to the first proviso to Section 14, Sub-

section (3), Clause (a), sub-clause (i) of the Act in Kailash

Chand v. Dharam Dass , (2005) 5 SCC 375 the following was

held;

“What is the scope of the first proviso? Whether the

occupation by the landlord of any other residential

accommodation of whatever nature, in abstract and

without consideration of any other relevant factor

14

would be enough to attract the applicability of the first

proviso and to deny the landlord his right to seek an

order of eviction against the tenant? In our opinion,

the first proviso is not to be read in isolation. It has to

be read along with the principal provision to which it is

appended. The ground for eviction in the case of a

residential building is “he requires it for his own

occupation”. If the pleadings and the evidence

adduced by the landlord do not make out a case of

requirement, there would be no question of the tenant

being directed to put the landlord in possession. Even

on the requirement having been proved, the landlord

would be denied the order for possession from the

tenant because of his being in occupation of “another

residential building owned by him in the same urban

area”. The occupation of another residential building,

to act in denial of the landlord’s right to evict the

tenant to satisfy his requirement, must have

correlation with the requirement of the landlord. To

illustrate, another residential building in occupation of

the landlord may be crumbling, or may be in a

dilapidated condition or may consist of very little

residential space, say one small room alone, which it

would be a misnomer to call availability of a residential

building in occupation of the landlord by any stretch of

imagination. The legislature could not have intended

such an absurd and unreasonable consequence to

follow. In our opinion, the first proviso would come

into play only if the landlord is occupying another

residential building of his own in the same urban area

and such building is considered by the court as

reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven

requirement of the landlord.

25…………………………Provisions like Section 14(3)(a)(i) of

the Act should be so interpreted as to advance the

cause of justice instructed by the realities of life and

15

practical wisdom. While the tenant needs to be

protected, the courts would not ordinarily deny the

relief to the landlord, who genuinely and bona fide

requires the premises in occupation of the tenant for

occupation by himself or for the members of his

family, unless they feel convinced that the so-called

requirement of the landlord was a ruse for getting rid

of an inconvenient tenant or was otherwise mala fide

and did not fall within the four corners of the ground

for eviction provided by the law.

13. The judgment D. Devaji relied upon by the petitioner is

not relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case at hand.

The same pertains to an interpretation of a provision under the

Andra Pradesh Rent Control Act. The provision whereupon

reliance has been placed by the present petitioner insofar as the

HP Urban Rent Control Act is concerned is not pari materia to

the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act

which has been considered D. Devaji’s case.

14. Even otherwise in Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons

v. Pushpa Trading Co., (1998) 5 SCC 572 , D. Devaji was

considered. The relevant extract whereof reads as follow:

“…………………

14. It, thus, becomes evident that there is no

conflict as such between the said decisions and they

have gone on in the context of their own facts and the

provisions of law. Even so, the argument of the

appellant’s learned counsel carries weight that the

intention of the legislature in D. Devaji case has been

scuttled by putting an extremely narrow and literal

construction on the provision. It has been observed

therein as under: (SCC p. 732, para 4)

16

“The landlord should not be in possession of another

non-residential building or of which he is entitled to be

in possession in the city, town or village concerned.

The intendment of the legislature thereby is clear that

a landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential

building which is his own or to the possession of which

he is entitled to under the Act or any other law should

not be permitted to recover possession of another non-

residential building belonging to him by evicting the

tenants therefrom.”

15. The aspects of quality, size and suitability of the

building have been totally put out of consideration. We

think this would frustrate the purposes of the Act. Here

was a claim set up by the landlord that the non-

residential premises he owned did not serve the

purpose of his need of setting up a textile and cloth

business and that the need could only be met in

seeking eviction of the tenant from the premises

sought. As we view it there is no difficulty in D. Devaji

case standing in the way of the landlord-appellant to

have the issue examined from the point of view which

would carry out the purposes of the Act. We refrain

from mentioning any facts on the basis of which the

landlord’s claim is based lest the manner they are

recounted cause prejudice to either of the parties.

…………”

15. Besides the aforesaid in Gulab Chand Pukhraj v. R.B.

Jinender Raj, (2009) 9 SCC 752 after referring to Boorgu the

following was stated:

“…………

16. In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons this Court

was clearly of the opinion that the aspects of quality,

size and suitability of the building cannot be put out of

consideration and doing so would be to frustrate the

purposes of the Act

…………”

17

16. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the

apex court in Kailash Chand’s case there is no merit in the

contention of the petitioner/tenant that merely on account of

the fact that the landlord is occupying another non-residential

building of his own in the same urban area that the eviction

petition filed in the case at hand is not maintainable. Once bona

fide requirement is proved, the first proviso would come into

play only if the landlord is occupying another non-residential

building of his own in the same urban area and such building is

considered by the court as reasonably enough and suitable to

satisfy the proven requirement of the landlord.

17. The expression “bona fide requirement” means the

genuine need of the landlord as opposed to a mere wish or

desire of the landlord. The need in the facts substantiated by

the landlord should be natural, real, sincere and honest. The

expression “bona fide requirement” came up for consideration in

Pratap Rai Tanwani and Anr. Vs. Uttam Chand and

Another, 2004 (2) RCR (Rent) 436 : (2004) 8 SCC 490 .

The same was explained in the following manner:-

“12. One of the grounds for eviction contemplated by

all the rent control legislations, which otherwise

generally lean heavily in favour of the tenants, is the

need of the owner landlord to have his own premises,

residential or non-residential, for his own use or his

own occupation. The expressions employed by

different legislations may vary such as "bona fide

requirement", "genuine need", "requires reasonably

and in good faith", and so on. Whatever be the

18

expression employed, the underlying legislative intent

is one and that has been demonstrated in several

judicial pronouncements of which we would like to

refer to only three.

14. In Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra reiterating the

view taken in Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan it was

held that the words "reasonable requirement"

undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element

of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The

distinction between desire and need should doubtless

be kept in mind but not so as to make even the

genuine need as nothing but a desire.

15. Recently, in Shiv Samp Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh

Chand Gupta this Court in a detailed judgment, dealing

with this aspect, analysed the concept of bona fide

requirement and said that the requirement in the

sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere,

honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere

pretence or pretext to evict a tenant refers to a state

of mind prevailing with the landlord. The only way of

peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise

undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in

the armchair of the landlord and then posing a

question to himself- whether in the given facts,

substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the

premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere,

honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is

bona fide. We do not think that we can usefully add

anything to the exposition of law of requirement for

self-occupation than what has been already stated in

the three precedents.”

18. The demised premises in the case at hand exist on the

second floor of the building. The second floor is located at the

Mall Road level. The same has been divided into three portions.

19

In one portion the landlord is running his business in the name

and style of M/s. Nathu Ram. The second part is possessed by

the present tenant and the 3

rd

part is possessed by another

tenant against whom also a separate petition for eviction has

been filed. All three are divided by wooden partitions. By

removing of the same, one single unit can be created by the

landlord at the mall road level.

19. The building wherein the landlord is running his

business and portions whereof have been let out to the present

tenant were purchased by the landlord in the year 1972. The

business is being carried out ever since. In the year 2001

portion of the property existing below the Mall Road level i.e.

first floor of the building was got converted from a residential

into a non-residential premise in terms of order dated

11.10.2001 i.e. Ex.PW-2/A. In the said portion so got

converted, business is being conducted by the landlord in the

name and style of M/s John Raymond Bright (a partnership

firm). The aforesaid conversion of the first floor of the building

into a non-residential premise clearly reflects that the same was

done to accommodate the expansion of the business.

20. After 2001 need on account of expansion arose in 2012.

It is on account of expansion of the existing business carried out

in the name of M/s Nathu Ram and M/s John Raymond Bright

that the present petition for eviction was filed on 18.05.2012.

Additional requirement was necessitated for better display and

20

to serve customers better. The income tax returns filed depict

increase in business.

21. Both the Courts after considering the pleadings and

evidence placed on record have concurrently held that the bona

fide requirement of the landlord in the case at hand is genuine

bona fide and made in good faith. No infirmity calling for

interference by this court in this respect has been pointed out. I

see no reason to differ with the view taken by both the Courts

below.

22. The bona fide personal need is a question of fact. Once

the bona fide requirement is established then neither the Court

nor the tenant can dictate the landlord as to how the property

belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him for the

purpose of his business. The landlord is the best judge of his

own requirement. Even otherwise as concurrently held the

occupation of the other part of the building in the case at hand

is not reasonably enough and suitable to satisfy the proven

requirement of the landlord. In this respect, suffice it to state

that the demised premises are located in the best commercial

area of Shimla, i.e., the Mall Road. One of the purposes of

expansion of business is to display the goods being sold, other

than stacking/storing of the same. The demised premises, being

on the Mall Road, have high visibility. No other part of the

building, in the case at hand, exists on the Mall Road level. As

has already been stated supra, by removal of the wooden

21

partition, the shop size and frontage of the shop occupied by

the landlord, post eviction of the tenant in the case at hand,

would be increased.

23. The second contention raised on behalf of the

petitioner/tenant is that insofar as the present suit premises are

concerned, they were taken over from a previous tenant, as is

evident from the cross-examination of the

respondents/landlords on the ground of bona fide personal

requirement. In view thereof, it is submitted that the second

proviso to Section 14, Sub-section (3), Clause (d) of the Act is

applicable. The same reads as under:-

“Provided further that where the landlord has obtained

possession of any building or rented land under the

provisions of clause (a) or clause (b), he shall not be

entitled to apply again under the said clause for the

possession of any other building of the same class or

rented land:”

24. Per contra learned Senior counsel appearing for the

respondent/landlord has placed reliance on Kailash Chand v.

Dharam Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 wherein it is contended that

the aforesaid proviso came up for consideration.

25. A pari materia provision of the Haryana Urban Rent

Control Act came up for consideration in Molar Mal v. Kay

Iron Works (P) Ltd., (2000) 4 SCC 285 wherein the

expression “entitled to apply again” found in the proviso came

up for consideration therein. The apex court held that Haryana

22

Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 like any other

similar Act in other States in India is an enactment which

controls the fixation of rent and eviction of the tenants from

rented premises to which the Act is applicable. This Act controls

the right of a landlord to seek eviction of tenanted premises, it

restricts the right of a landlord to seek eviction on those

grounds mentioned in the Act. Section 13 enumerates various

grounds on which a landlord can seek possession. This right is

further restricted if the landlord has obtained possession of

similar premises under the same provisions of law by the

proviso. Following examples were cited therein by the apex

court, if the landlord is seeking eviction of a tenant on the

ground that the same is required for the use of his son then, in

view of the proviso applicable to that sub-section, he can seek

eviction of the premises only once. Similarly, if the landlord is

seeking eviction for his own occupation under Section 13(3)(b)

of the Act then by virtue of the proviso applicable to that sub-

section, the landlord can seek such eviction only once in regard

to the premises of the same nature. Based on the aforesaid in

the opinion of the apex court in Molar Mal, the bar imposed by

the proviso is in fact a bar on the right of the landlord to seek

actual eviction and not confined to the filing of the application

for eviction. Further the apex court held in Molar Mal that the

proviso does not make any such distinction between a landlord

seeking possession of the premises held by more than one

23

tenant occupying the same building or the tenants occupying

different independent buildings under the same landlord. For

the reason, the object of the proviso like any other provisions of

the Act, is to further restrict the right of the landlord to seek

eviction; if that be so, no justification was found in reading into

the proviso something as conferring a larger right on the

landlord to evict more than one tenant if those tenants are

occupying different parts of the same premises.

26. A Bench of three Judges in Kailash Chand v. Dharam

Dass, (2005) 5 SCC 375 did not accept the aforesaid

construction placed on the said proviso. The apex court held

that a landlord by virtue of the said proviso would not be denied

relief under sub-section 14(3)(a)(i) if the requirement has

undergone a change or a new requirement unrelated to the

previous one has come into existence. The said proviso would

only kick into operation if the requirement is mala fide . The

relevant extract reads as follow;

13…………………………………………The third proviso cannot

be so interpreted as to restrict the right conferred by

sub-section (3)(a)(i) on the landlord to be exercisable

only “once in a lifetime”. The proviso has to be read as

providing a statutory expression of a situation which

would otherwise have been held to be mala fides of a

requirement. A landlord, having obtained possession of

any building to satisfy a requirement, cannot again

and again plead the same set of circumstances or

similar circumstances for evicting tenants one after the

other. That is what the third proviso aims at providing.

24

The proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that in

spite of the requirement having undergone a change or

a new requirement unrelated to the previous one

having come into existence, the landlord would yet be

denied relief under sub-section (3)(a)(i) merely

because at some point of time in the past he had

resorted to this provision for seeking an eviction. Such

an interpretation is too rigid an interpretation and

would cause such hardship to the landlord as the

legislature cannot be said to have intended.”

27. In the case at hand the new requirement which has

arisen in 2012 is unrelated to the previous one. Hence the

contention raised on behalf of the petitioner/tenant that insofar

as the present suit premises are concerned, they were taken

over from a previous tenant, on the ground of bona fide

personal requirement in view of the second proviso to Section

14, Sub-section (3), Clause (d) of the Act the present eviction

petition is not maintainable is rejected.

28. The lease deed entered into between the parties to the lis

is an un-registered document. A lease deed for more than a

period of eleven months is compulsorily registerable. In the

absence of registration the same can only be looked into for a

collateral purpose. There is no provision in the Urban Rent

Control Act applicable in the case at hand whereby a fixed term

commercial tenancy can be created. Even otherwise post

entering into a lease agreement, the present

respondents/landlords are not debarred from filing an eviction

25

petition on grounds available therein. In view of the aforesaid,

there is no force in the contention of the petitioner/tenant that

by virtue of the lease agreement entered into between the

parties to the lis a lease for an in-definite time had been

created.

29. In view of the aforesaid, the present revision petition is

dismissed being devoid of any merit.

Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, stand

disposed of.

(Bipin Chander Negi)

Judge

01

st

January, 2026

(Gaurav Rawat/Trn)