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CGHC010011562021 2026:CGHC:30853-DB

NAFR

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRA No. 58 of 2021

1 - Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi S/o Shri Jagarsai Dhobi Aged About 48

Years R/o Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh

Chhattisgarh.

2 - Santan Dansena S/o Shri Ratan Dansena Aged About 45 Years R/o

Village Aamapali, Police Station Gharghoda, District Raigarh

Chhattisgarh.

--- Appellants

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh Through S.H.O. of The Police Station Gharghoda,

District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

--- Respondent

CRA No. 63 of 2021

Jeevanlal Dhobi S/o Shri Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi, Aged About 28

Years R/o. Village - Aamapali, Police Station - Gharghoda, District -

Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

--- Appellant

Versus

State of Chhattisgarh Through - S.H.O. Of The Police Station -

Gharghoda, District - Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

... Respondent

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellants :Mr. Abhishek Saraf, Advocate

For Respondent/State :Mr. Sumit Singh, Deputy Advocate General

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Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

21.07.2026

1.Since both the criminal appeals arise out of the judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 24.12.2020, they were

clubbed together, heard analogously, and are being decided by

this common judgment.

2.CRA No.58/2021 has been filed by two accused persons namely

Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi and Santan Dansena and CRA

No.63/2021 has been filed by accused Jeevanlal Dhobi

challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence

dated 24.12.2020 passed by the Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act),

Raigarh, District Raigarh (C.G.) in Special Criminal Case under

Atrocities Act No. 07 of 2018, whereby learned Special Judge has

convicted and sentenced the appellants Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi

and Santan Dansena, as follows:-

Conviction Sentence

Under Section 302/34 of

Indian Penal Code, 1860

:Life imprisonment and fine of

Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment

of fine, additional imprisonment

for 1 year

Under Section 201/34 of

Indian Penal Code, 1860

:Rigorous imprisonment for 07

years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in

default of payment of fine,

additional imprisonment for 1 year

Under Section 3(2)(v) of ---

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the Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities)

Act, 1989

(Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently)

3.Likewise, appellant Jeevanlal Dhobi has been convicted for the

offence punishable under Section 201/34 of the Indian Penal

Code, 1860 (for short, ‘IPC’) as well as under Section 3(2)(v) of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989and sentenced to undergo r igorous

imprisonment for 07 years and fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of

payment of fine, additional imprisonment for 1 year.

4.Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that deceased Mehar

Prasad Rathia, a member of the Scheduled Tribe (Kanwar)

community and resident of Village Aamapali, Police Station

Gharghoda, District Raigarh, was found dead in the morning of

20.10.2017 near the toilet constructed in the premises of the

Government Primary School, Village Aamapali. The prosecution

alleged that during the intervening night of 19.10.2017 and

20.10.2017, accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi, in furtherance of

his common intention with co-accused Santan Dansena,

committed the murder of the deceased by strangulating him with

a rope in the verandah situated adjoining the backyard of the

house of accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi. It was further alleged

that after committing the murder, accused Ramkumar Dhobi

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Dhobi and Santan Dansena, with the assistance of accused

Jeevan Lal Dhobi, removed the dead body from the place of

occurrence and abandoned it near the toilet of the Government

Primary School with an intention to screen themselves from legal

punishment and to cause disappearance of the evidence of the

offence. Since the deceased belonged to a Scheduled Tribe

community and the accused persons did not belong either to the

Scheduled Tribe or Scheduled Caste community, offences under

the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 were also invoked.

5.The prosecution further alleged that on the morning of

20.10.2017, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia, who was then the Up-

Sarpanch of Village Bahirkela, received information from his wife

Krishna Bai that Barato Bai, the mother of the deceased, had

informed her that the dead body of Mehar Prasad Rathia was

lying near the toilet of the Primary School situated in Village

Aamapali. Upon reaching the spot, PW-8 noticed that the

deceased was lying in a supine position with visible injuries on his

neck and left knee. Suspecting that the deceased had been

strangulated to death and recalling that two days earlier the

deceased had informed him that accused Ramkumar Dhobi

Dhobi had threatened to kill him because of the rape case

instituted by his wife, PW-8 immediately proceeded to Police

Station Gharghoda and lodged the merg intimation and

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information regarding the occurrence. On the basis of the said

information, Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/11A) and Dehati Merg Intimation

(Ex.P/12) were recorded, which subsequently culminated into

registration of FIR (Ex.P/16) for offences punishable under

Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code.

6.During investigation, PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam , the

Investigating Officer, immediately visited the place of occurrence

and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/13A). In the presence of

witnesses, he issued notice under Section 175 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure for preparation of the inquest proceedings

and thereafter prepared the inquest report (Ex.P/2). The dead

body was sent for post-mortem examination vide requisition

(Ex.P/14). PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, who conducted the autopsy,

proved the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) and opined that the

deceased had died on account of asphyxia caused by

strangulation with a rope, approximately 15 to 17 hours prior to

the examination. The Medical Officer categorically opined that the

nature of death was homicidal.

7.The prosecution further asserted that during investigation, a

tracker dog named "Ruby" was requisitioned to assist the

investigating agency. According to the prosecution, the tracker

dog, after smelling the place where the dead body was found,

proceeded towards the house of accused Ramkumar Dhobi

Dhobi. The proceedings relating to the tracker dog operation

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were reduced into writing vide Dog Running Panchnama

(Ex.P/10). The prosecution relied upon this circumstance as one

of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence connecting

accused Ramkumar Dhobi Dhobi with the commission of the

crime.

8.The prosecution further relied upon the memoranda recorded

under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was alleged that

while in police custody on 21.10.2017, accused Ramkumar Dhobi

Dhobi made a disclosure statement (Ex.P/3) stating that he had

concealed the rope used for strangulating the deceased near the

wooden structure adjacent to his verandah. Pursuant to the said

memorandum, a green plastic rope measuring approximately 113

inches and containing four knots was allegedly recovered and

seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P/4). Likewise, accused Jeevan

Lal Dhobi made a memorandum statement (Ex.P/5) leading to

the recovery of a torch allegedly used while shifting the dead

body during the night, which was seized vide Ex.P/6A. The

prosecution also recorded the memorandum of accused Santan

Dansena (Ex.P/6) during investigation.

9.During the course of investigation, the Investigating Officer also

seized the caste certificate of the son of the deceased vide

seizure memo (Ex.P/7A) to establish that the deceased belonged

to the Scheduled Tribe community. Subsequently, PW-10

Vandana Rathia, Patwari, prepared the spot map (Ex.P/12A) and

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spot inspection memorandum (Ex.P/9). Upon completion of

investigation, all the three accused persons were arrested, their

arrest memos (Ex.P/18, Ex.P/19 and Ex.P/20) were prepared,

intimation of arrest was furnished to their relatives and, after

recording the statements of the witnesses and collecting all

documentary evidence, the investigating agency submitted the

charge-sheet before the Court of the learned Special Judge,

SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raigarh.

10.In order to bring home the guilt of the accused persons, the

prosecution examined twelve witnesses, namely PW-1 Dileshwar

Rathia, PW-2 Uttara Kumar, PW-3 Chandan Singh, PW-4

Parmeshwar Rathia, PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, PW-6 Ashok Kumar

Rathia, PW-7 Doleram, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia (informant),

PW-9 Ramesh, PW-10 Vandana Rathia (Patwari), PW-11 DSP

Neha Verma and PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam (Investigating

Officer), besides exhibiting documentary evidence including

Ex.P/1 to Ex.P/21. Upon appreciation of the oral and

documentary evidence, the learned Special Judge convicted

accused Ramkumar Dhobi for offences punishable under

Sections 302 and 201 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 3(2)

(v) of the SC/ST Act, convicted accused Santan Dansena under

Sections 302/34 and 201/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the

SC/ST Act, and convicted accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi under

Section 201/34 IPC and Section 3(2)(vi) of the SC/ST Act, by the

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impugned judgment dated 24.12.2020, which is under challenge

in the present criminal appeals.

11.Mr. Abhishek Saraf, learned counsel appearing for the appellants

would vehemently submit that the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special

Judge is contrary to the evidence available on record, suffers

from patent illegality and perversity and is liable to be set aside. It

is contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate

the entire evidence in its correct perspective and has recorded

the conviction merely on the basis of surmises and conjectures

without there being a complete chain of incriminating

circumstances. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has

utterly failed to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond all

reasonable doubt, yet the learned trial Court has erroneously

convicted them by ignoring the settled principles governing

appreciation of circumstantial evidence. He would submit that the

entire prosecution case rests upon circumstantial evidence and

none of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution has

been proved in accordance with law. It is argued that the

prosecution has failed to establish a complete chain of

circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of the

appellants and excludes every hypothesis consistent with their

innocence. According to learned counsel, each circumstance

relied upon by the prosecution suffers from serious infirmities,

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material contradictions and omissions, rendering the entire

prosecution story highly doubtful. It is contended that the learned

trial Court has failed to appreciate these glaring deficiencies and

has recorded the conviction on wholly insufficient evidence.

12.Learned counsel would further submit that the alleged recoveries

made pursuant to the memorandum statements under Section 27

of the Indian Evidence Act have no evidentiary value. Inviting the

attention of this Court to the testimony of PW-3 Chandan Singh,

one of the seizure witnesses, it is argued that he has not

supported the prosecution case and has been declared hostile. In

the absence of independent corroboration, the alleged recovery

of the plastic rope and torch cannot be relied upon. It is further

submitted that the rope and torch are ordinary household articles

commonly available in every village household and their alleged

recovery from the open backyard or courtyard of the accused

persons does not constitute an incriminating circumstance.

Learned counsel would contend that the prosecution has not

produced any scientific or forensic evidence connecting the

seized rope with the alleged strangulation. Neither the rope was

subjected to forensic examination nor was any medical opinion

obtained from the autopsy surgeon regarding whether the injuries

found on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by

the seized rope. In these circumstances, according to learned

counsel, the alleged recoveries lose all evidentiary significance.

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13.Learned counsel would next contend that the medical evidence

completely belies the prosecution story. Drawing the attention of

this Court to the testimony of PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra, who

conducted the post-mortem examination and proved Ex.P/8, it is

argued that in his cross-examination the doctor admitted that in

cases of strangulation the tongue and eyes generally protrude

and a distinct ligature mark is ordinarily found around the neck. It

is submitted that the doctor has not specified the dimensions or

characteristics of any ligature mark found on the neck of the

deceased. Learned counsel further submits that the doctor has

categorically admitted that if a person is forcibly overpowered by

sitting on his body while strangulating him, corresponding injuries

would normally be found on the back and other parts of the body,

whereas no such injuries were noticed during the post-mortem

examination. It is further contended that PW-5 has also admitted

that the seized rope was never shown to him for obtaining any

medical opinion regarding its compatibility with the injuries

sustained by the deceased. According to learned counsel, these

admissions create a serious dent in the prosecution case and

completely demolish the theory that the deceased was

strangulated by using the rope allegedly recovered from the

possession of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi.

14.Learned counsel would further submit that the evidence relating

to the alleged motive is equally weak and inconclusive. Merely

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because an earlier criminal case under Section 376 of the Indian

Penal Code was pending against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi at

the instance of the wife of the deceased, the same by itself

cannot constitute proof of guilt. It is argued that motive, however

strong, cannot take the place of legal proof and in the absence of

reliable substantive evidence connecting the appellants with the

commission of the crime, the alleged motive loses all

significance. It is further submitted that the prosecution has failed

to establish any immediate provocation or surrounding

circumstances showing that the appellants acted upon such

alleged motive.

15.Learned counsel would further contend that the so-called "last

seen" circumstance projected by the prosecution is wholly

unreliable. Attention has been invited to the evidence of PW-9

Ramesh, who is alleged to have seen the appellants carrying a

heavy object during the intervening night. Learned counsel

submits that PW-9 has categorically admitted in paragraph 6 of

his cross-examination that neither he nor PW-4 Parmeshwar

Rathia was carrying any torch while returning during the night. He

has further admitted that he did not enquire from the appellants

as to what they were carrying and that he merely noticed some

heavy article being carried by them. He nowhere stated that he

had actually seen the dead body of the deceased being carried

by the appellants. According to learned counsel, in the absence

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of any source of light and in view of these admissions, the alleged

identification of the appellants during the dark hours of the night

becomes wholly doubtful and cannot safely be relied upon.

16.It is further contended that the testimony of PW-6 Ashok Kumar

Rathia also does not inspire confidence. Learned counsel

submits that during his deposition before the Court, PW-6 for the

first time stated that Parmeshwar and Ramesh had informed the

police that they had seen the appellants carrying the dead body

towards the school. This fact was admittedly never stated by him

during investigation under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. Such material improvement made for the first time

before the Court, according to learned counsel, materially affects

the credibility of the witness and renders his testimony wholly

unreliable. The learned trial Court, however, failed to notice these

significant omissions and improvements while recording the

conviction. He would also submit that the testimony of the

complainant PW-8 Thandaram Rathia suffers from serious

infirmities. It is argued that during cross-examination he admitted

that before lodging the report he had discussions with the

villagers in the society and thereafter made the allegations

against the appellants. According to learned counsel, this

admission clearly demonstrates that the witness was a tutored

witness and his testimony was the result of collective deliberation

rather than his own personal knowledge. Such evidence, it is

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contended, ought to have been scrutinized with great caution, but

the learned trial Court has accepted the same without any

independent corroboration.

17.Learned counsel would next submit that the investigation itself

suffers from serious lapses. Inviting the attention of this Court to

the testimony of PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam, the Investigating

Officer, it is argued that he has admitted during cross-

examination that the rope allegedly recovered pursuant to the

memorandum statement of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi was

never sent for forensic examination. He further admitted that no

opinion was sought from the doctor regarding whether the injuries

found on the neck of the deceased could have been caused by

the seized rope. The investigating officer also failed to collect nail

scrapings or other scientific evidence which could have

connected the appellants with the commission of the offence. He

submits that these omissions strike at the very root of the

prosecution case and make the investigation wholly unreliable.

18.Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecution has

placed reliance upon the alleged tracker dog evidence; however,

the dog handler was not examined before the trial Court and no

material was brought on record to establish the training, capability

or reliability of the tracker dog. It is argued that the prosecution

has failed to prove the dog tracking proceedings in accordance

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with law and, therefore, no reliance could have been placed upon

such evidence while recording the conviction.

19.Lastly, learned counsel would submit that the prosecution

evidence is replete with material contradictions, omissions and

improvements, particularly in the statements of the prosecution

witnesses recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure vis-à-vis their depositions before the Court. The

independent witnesses have either not supported the prosecution

or have made substantial improvements during trial. It is

contended that the cumulative effect of these infirmities

completely demolishes the prosecution case and creates more

than a reasonable doubt regarding the involvement of the

appellants. According to learned counsel, the prosecution has

failed to prove the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable

doubt and the learned trial Court has committed a manifest error

in recording the conviction. It is, therefore, prayed that the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence be set

aside and the appellants be acquitted of all the charges by

extending to them the benefit of doubt.

20.On the other hand, Mr. Sumit Singh, learned Deputy Advocate

General vehemently opposed the submissions advanced on

behalf of the appellants and supported the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence. It is submitted that the learned

trial Court has meticulously appreciated the entire oral as well as

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documentary evidence available on record and has rightly arrived

at the conclusion that the prosecution has succeeded in

establishing the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt.

It is contended that the present case is based on circumstantial

evidence, and each circumstance relied upon by the prosecution

has been duly proved and forms a complete and unbroken chain

pointing only towards the guilt of the appellants, leaving no room

for any hypothesis consistent with their innocence. It is further

submitted that the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are

based upon proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer

from any perversity or illegality warranting interference by this

Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.

21.Learned State counsel would further submit that the prosecution

has successfully established the motive behind the commission

of the offence. It is argued that the evidence on record clearly

demonstrates that a criminal case under Section 376 of the

Indian Penal Code was pending against appellant Ramkumar

Dhobi on the complaint lodged by the wife of the deceased, and

the deceased had refused to enter into any compromise despite

repeated pressure exerted by the appellant. According to the

prosecution, the deceased had even disclosed to PW-8

Thandaram Rathia that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had

threatened to kill him if he did not settle the rape case. It is

submitted that the testimony of PW-8, coupled with the

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surrounding circumstances, sufficiently establishes the motive for

the crime. Learned State counsel would further contend that the

evidence of PW-9 Ramesh, who saw the appellants carrying a

heavy object during the intervening night and thereafter returning

empty-handed, constitutes a strong incriminating circumstance.

The recovery of the rope at the instance of appellant Ramkumar

Dhobi and the torch at the instance of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi

pursuant to their disclosure statements under Section 27 of the

Indian Evidence Act further lends corroboration to the prosecution

case.

22.It is further submitted that the medical evidence adduced through

PW-5 Dr. S.R. Paikra fully corroborates the prosecution case. The

post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) unequivocally establishes that the

death of the deceased was homicidal and was caused by

asphyxia due to strangulation. Learned State counsel submits

that the alleged omissions or contradictions highlighted by the

appellants are minor in nature and do not go to the root of the

prosecution case. Similarly, the fact that one of the seizure

witnesses turned hostile would not render the recovery

proceedings illegal, particularly when the testimony of the

Investigating Officer PW-12 Inspector Arun Netam inspires

confidence and there is no reason to disbelieve the official acts

performed during investigation. It is contended that the evidence

relating to the tracker dog, the recoveries made pursuant to the

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memorandum statements, the medical evidence, the motive and

the testimony of the prosecution witnesses constitute a complete

chain of circumstances which has been rightly relied upon by the

learned trial Court.

23.Learned State counsel lastly submits that the appellants have

failed to point out any material contradiction, omission or infirmity

which would render the prosecution case doubtful or make the

findings of the learned trial Court unsustainable. It is argued that

the prosecution has proved each link in the chain of

circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and the defence has not

been able to probabilise any plausible alternative hypothesis

consistent with the innocence of the appellants. The learned trial

Court has assigned cogent and convincing reasons while

convicting the appellants for the offences charged and the

impugned judgment does not suffer from any legal or factual

infirmity warranting interference by this Court. It is, therefore,

prayed that the present criminal appeals, being devoid of merit,

deserve to be dismissed and the judgment of conviction and

order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge be

affirmed.

24.We have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants and

learned State counsel at considerable length, bestowed our

anxious consideration to the rival submissions advanced at the

Bar and carefully gone through the entire record of the case,

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including the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence, the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the

prosecution, the statements of the witnesses, the exhibits proved

during trial, the memorandum and seizure proceedings, the

medical evidence, as well as the findings recorded by the learned

trial Court. We have also examined the grounds urged in the

present appeals and the legal principles governing appreciation

of circumstantial evidence in criminal jurisprudence.

25.In light of the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for

the parties and the evidence available on record, the following

questions arise for consideration in these criminal appeals:

(i) Whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving

beyond reasonable doubt that the death of Mehar Prasad

Rathia was homicidal in nature?

(ii) Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence relied upon

by the prosecution, including the alleged motive, last seen

circumstance, recovery pursuant to the memoranda under

Section 27 of the Evidence Act, tracker dog evidence and

other attending circumstances, forms a complete chain

pointing unerringly towards the guilt of accused Ramkumar

Dhobi and Santan Dansena, excluding every hypothesis

consistent with their innocence?

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(iii) Whether the prosecution has established beyond

reasonable doubt that accused Jeevan Lal Dhobi shared

the common intention of the principal accused or knowingly

caused disappearance of evidence of the offence so as to

attract the offence punishable under Section 201 read with

Section 34 IPC?

Point No.(i)

26.Since the conviction of the appellants rests entirely upon

circumstantial evidence, the first and foremost question that falls

for consideration is whether the prosecution has been able to

establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the death of Mehar

Prasad Rathia was homicidal in nature. Unless the prosecution

first proves the homicidal nature of death by cogent, reliable and

unimpeachable evidence, the subsequent circumstances relied

upon to connect the appellants with the alleged crime lose much

of their significance. The burden to establish this foundational fact

squarely rests upon the prosecution and can never be shifted

upon the accused.

27.The learned Special Judge has answered the aforesaid issue in

the affirmative primarily relying upon the testimony of Dr. S.R.

Painkara (PW-5), the post-mortem report (Ex.P/8), and the

statements of certain prosecution witnesses who noticed injuries

on the neck and legs of the deceased. Having independently re-

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appreciated the entire evidence available on record, this Court

finds that the conclusion so recorded by the learned trial Court

does not inspire complete confidence and suffers from material

omissions and infirmities, which assume considerable

significance in a case resting solely upon circumstantial evidence.

28.PW-1 Dileshwar Rathia, who is the Sarpanch of the village and a

witness to the inquest proceedings (Ex.P/2), merely deposed that

on the morning following the incident he saw the dead body lying

near the toilet of the Primary School, Aamapali, and noticed

certain injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. His

evidence is confined only to the factum of recovery of the dead

body and preparation of the inquest. He neither witnessed the

occurrence nor stated anything regarding the manner in which

the injuries could have been caused. His testimony, therefore, is

of a formal nature and does not advance the prosecution case on

the crucial issue whether the death was homicidal.

29.Likewise, PW-2 Uttara Kumar deposed that after receiving

information he reached the spot and noticed swelling and

scratches on the neck, injury on the left knee and certain marks

on the feet of the deceased. PW-3 Chandan Singh also stated

that he saw injuries on the neck and legs of the deceased. Similar

statements have been made by PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW-

7 Doleram and PW-8 Thandaram Rathia. None of these

witnesses possesses any medical expertise. Their observations

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are confined only to noticing external injuries after the body had

already been discovered. Their evidence, therefore, cannot by

itself establish the exact cause or nature of death.

30.The principal reliance of the prosecution is upon the testimony of

PW-5 Dr. S.R. Painkara, who conducted the post-mortem

examination and proved the report (Ex.P/8). According to the

doctor, multiple abrasions were present over the neck, a ligature

mark was noticed around the neck, scratches were present over

different parts of the body and fractures of the hyoid bone and

thyroid cartilage were detected during internal examination. On

that basis, he opined that death occurred due to asphyxia caused

by strangulation.

31.Ordinarily, the opinion of a medical expert deserves due weight.

However, it is equally well settled that the opinion of an expert is

only advisory in nature and cannot be accepted mechanically,

particularly where the medical evidence itself suffers from

inherent inconsistencies or is unsupported by scientific

examination. The Court is under an obligation to test such opinion

on the touchstone of surrounding circumstances and the

evidence available on record.

32.During an elaborate cross-examination, PW-5 made several

admissions which substantially dilute the certainty of his opinion.

In paragraph 5 of his cross-examination, he admitted that in

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cases of strangulation, the eyes ordinarily protrude, the tongue

usually protrudes outside the mouth and a distinct ligature mark is

generally found around the neck. Surprisingly, while the doctor

opined that the deceased had been strangulated, neither the

post-mortem report (Ex.P/8) nor his deposition mentions the

dimensions, width, depth or complete description of the alleged

ligature mark. Such particulars assume considerable importance

because the prosecution specifically alleged that the deceased

was strangulated with a rope recovered during investigation.

Equally significant is the admission of PW-5 that although a rope

had allegedly been seized during investigation, the same was

never shown to him for examination. Consequently, the doctor

could not express any opinion whether the alleged ligature mark

corresponded to the width, texture or characteristics of the seized

rope. In a prosecution founded upon circumstantial evidence,

where the alleged weapon of offence is a rope, the failure to

obtain a medical opinion regarding its compatibility with the

injuries assumes serious significance.

33.The doctor further admitted that if a person is forcibly pinned

down and strangulated while another person sits upon his chest

or abdomen, corresponding pressure injuries or abrasions would

ordinarily be expected on the back or heel depending upon the

surface. He candidly admitted that no such injuries were noticed

on the back or heel of the deceased. The learned trial Court

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brushed aside this admission by observing that such injuries may

vary depending upon the place of occurrence. In the opinion of

this Court, such reasoning amounts to conjecture rather than

judicial appreciation of evidence. Criminal conviction cannot rest

upon assumptions intended to fill up lacunae in the prosecution

case.

34.It is further noteworthy that the prosecution did not obtain any

forensic examination of the alleged rope. PW-12 Arun Netam, the

Investigating Officer, unequivocally admitted during cross-

examination that the seized rope was neither sent to the Forensic

Science Laboratory nor subjected to any scientific examination.

He further admitted that no query was made to the doctor

regarding the compatibility of the rope with the injuries found on

the neck of the deceased. Thus, one of the most vital links sought

to be relied upon by the prosecution remained wholly

unestablished.

35.Modern criminal jurisprudence increasingly emphasizes the

importance of scientific investigation. Where the prosecution

alleges death by ligature strangulation and claims recovery of the

very rope used in the commission of the offence, failure to subject

such article to forensic examination creates a significant gap in

the chain of evidence. The omission becomes more glaring when

the prosecution seeks conviction solely on circumstantial

evidence.

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36.Another important aspect which escaped the attention of the

learned Special Judge is that the prosecution has not produced

any biological, serological or forensic evidence connecting the

alleged rope with the deceased. There is no report indicating the

presence of blood, skin tissues, fibres, epithelial cells or any other

biological material on the seized article. The alleged weapon,

therefore, remained nothing more than an ordinary rope

commonly available in rural households.

37.The evidence of PW-5, read as a whole, undoubtedly suggests

that the deceased sustained injuries before death. However, the

medical evidence falls short of conclusively establishing, beyond

every reasonable doubt, the precise mechanism by which those

injuries were inflicted. The admissions made during cross-

examination create substantial uncertainty regarding the

prosecution theory that the deceased was strangulated with the

seized rope in the manner alleged.

38.The learned Special Judge has extensively referred to passages

from Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Cox's Medical

Jurisprudence while affirming the prosecution case. In the

considered opinion of this Court, medical literature undoubtedly

furnishes valuable guidance to understand scientific principles.

Nevertheless, authoritative textbooks cannot substitute legal

proof. Criminal Courts are required to decide cases on legally

admissible evidence adduced before them and not merely upon

25

theoretical propositions contained in medical treatises. Where the

prosecution evidence itself suffers from material deficiencies,

reference to medical literature cannot cure those defects.

39.The Supreme Court has consistently held that expert opinion is

advisory and must be evaluated along with the entire body of

evidence. In Anwar Ali v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2020)

10 SCC 166, the Court observed that though medical evidence is

an important piece of evidence, it cannot be read in isolation and

must be tested against the surrounding circumstances. Similarly,

in Ravi Sharma v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2022)

8 SCC 536, the Supreme Court reiterated that where material

inconsistencies exist between medical evidence and the

prosecution case, the accused is entitled to the benefit arising

therefrom.

40.Equally instructive is the principle reiterated in Nagendra Sah v.

State of Bihar, (2021) 10 SCC 725, wherein the Supreme Court

observed that suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof

and that every link forming the foundation of a criminal conviction

must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Where two

possible views emerge from the evidence, the one favourable to

the accused must necessarily prevail.

41.Tested on the anvil of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds

that although the prosecution has succeeded in proving that the

26

deceased suffered ante-mortem injuries and died an unnatural

death, the evidence led by it falls short of conclusively proving,

beyond all reasonable doubt, the precise homicidal manner

alleged by the prosecution. The absence of forensic

corroboration, failure to correlate the seized rope with the injuries,

material admissions of PW-5 during cross-examination and

significant investigative omissions introduce a reasonable doubt

regarding the prosecution version.

42.This Court is conscious that every omission in investigation may

not necessarily enure to the benefit of the accused. However,

where the entire case rests upon circumstantial evidence and the

prosecution seeks conviction for the gravest offence known to

criminal law, every foundational circumstance must be proved

with certainty. The deficiencies noticed herein are not minor

irregularities but strike at very substratum of prosecution case.

43.Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered by holding that although the

prosecution has established that the death of Mehar Prasad

Rathia was unnatural and accompanied by ante-mortem injuries,

it has failed to establish, with the degree of certainty required in

criminal law, that the prosecution version regarding homicidal

death by ligature strangulation stands proved beyond reasonable

doubt.

Point No. (ii)

27

44.Having held while answering Point No.(i) that the prosecution has

not established with complete certainty the precise homicidal

manner of death alleged by it, this Court now proceeds to

examine whether the circumstances relied upon by the

prosecution independently constitute an unbroken chain leading

only to the hypothesis of the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi

and Santan Dansena. Since admittedly there is no ocular account

of the occurrence, the conviction rests entirely upon

circumstantial evidence. The settled principles governing

appreciation of such evidence are too well entrenched to require

elaborate reiteration, yet their application to the facts of the

present case assumes paramount importance.

45.The law is now firmly settled by the Constitution Bench decision

in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984)

4 SCC 116, that before a conviction can be based solely on

circumstantial evidence, each incriminating circumstance must be

firmly established; the proved circumstances must be consistent

only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; they must

exclude every possible hypothesis consistent with innocence; and

the chain must be so complete that there is no escape from the

conclusion that in all human probability the crime was committed

by the accused and none else. These principles have consistently

been reaffirmed in Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989

Supp (2) SCC 706, Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar, (2021) 10

28

SCC 725, Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022) 8 SCC 440

and Ravi Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2022) 8 SCC 536.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that suspicion,

however grave, can never substitute legal proof and that every

missing link in the chain necessarily enures to the benefit of the

accused.

46.The learned Special Judge has founded the conviction principally

upon the following circumstances: (i) motive arising out of the

earlier rape case allegedly lodged against appellant Ramkumar

Dhobi; (ii) the testimony of PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia and PW-9

Ramesh Rathia regarding the appellants allegedly carrying a

heavy object during the night; (iii) recovery of rope and torch

pursuant to memoranda under Section 27 of the Evidence Act;

(iv) tracker dog evidence; and (v) the conduct of the accused

coupled with other surrounding circumstances. This Court shall

examine each of these circumstances independently and

thereafter cumulatively.

47.The prosecution has projected motive on the premise that the

wife of the deceased had earlier lodged a criminal case alleging

commission of rape against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, and that

the deceased had refused to compromise the said criminal case

despite repeated pressure exerted by the appellant. It is true that

certain prosecution witnesses have made a general reference to

the existence of such a criminal case and the alleged refusal of

29

the deceased to enter into a compromise. However, it is equally

well settled that motive, however strong, can never take the place

of proof and assumes significance only when the prosecution has

otherwise succeeded in establishing a complete chain of

incriminating circumstances. In Anwar Ali (supra), the Supreme

Court reiterated that motive by itself cannot sustain a conviction

where the remaining circumstances are not conclusively

established. Likewise, in Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala, (2022)

8 SCC 440, it was held that although motive may lend support to

the prosecution case, its existence cannot compensate for the

absence of reliable evidence establishing the guilt of the accused

beyond reasonable doubt.

48.Even otherwise, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged

motive in accordance with law. Though an assertion has been

made that a rape case was earlier instituted against appellant

Ramkumar Dhobi, the prosecution has not produced any

documentary evidence whatsoever relating to the said criminal

proceedings. Neither the First Information Report, nor the charge-

sheet, nor the judgment of conviction, if any, nor the order of

sentence allegedly imposed upon appellant Ramkumar Dhobi

has been brought on record. There is absolutely no material to

indicate whether the said prosecution culminated in conviction or

acquittal, whether the case was pending on the date of

occurrence, what was the stage of the proceedings, or whether

30

appellant Ramkumar Dhobi had actually undergone any

sentence. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the

prosecution has failed to establish that the alleged criminal case

had assumed such seriousness as to furnish a compelling motive

for the commission of the present offence. Mere oral assertions

by interested witnesses regarding the existence of an earlier

criminal case cannot be treated as proof of motive, particularly

when the best documentary evidence was admittedly available

but deliberately withheld.

49.Furthermore, none of the prosecution witnesses has deposed

with certainty regarding the date, time, place or specific

circumstances in which the alleged threat was administered by

appellant Ramkumar Dhobi to the deceased for effecting a

compromise. No independent witness has been examined to

corroborate the allegation that any demand for compromise was

ever made or that the deceased had categorically refused the

same. Even the Investigating Officer has not collected any

material during investigation demonstrating that such

compromise talks had actually taken place or that any immediate

dispute had arisen shortly before the occurrence.

50.The evidence, therefore, merely establishes the existence of a

prior dispute, if at all, but falls far short of proving a motive so

immediate, proximate and compelling as to irresistibly point

towards the guilt of the appellants. The learned trial Court, in the

31

considered opinion of this Court, has elevated suspicion into

proof while appreciating this circumstance, which approach is

wholly impermissible in a criminal trial founded exclusively upon

circumstantial evidence.

51.The prosecution next relies upon the so-called "last seen"

evidence of PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia and PW-9 Ramesh Rathia.

At the outset, it deserves notice that the evidence of PW-4

remained incomplete as his examination-in-chief was not

concluded owing to his unfortunate demise before cross-

examination. Such testimony, having remained untested by

cross-examination, could not have been relied upon as

substantive evidence against the appellants. The learned Special

Judge committed a manifest error in placing reliance upon such

incomplete testimony.

52.The entire prosecution case, therefore, substantially rests upon

the evidence of PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. According to him, while he

and Parmeshwar were proceeding to catch fish at about 3.00

a.m. on the night of Deepawali, he noticed two persons carrying a

heavy object and thereafter saw three persons, namely

Ramkumar Dhobi, Santan Dansena and Jeevan Lal Dhobi,

returning empty-handed from the direction of the school. The

testimony of PW-9, when carefully scrutinized, does not inspire

the confidence necessary for recording a conviction for murder.

During cross-examination, PW-9 categorically admitted that

32

neither he nor Parmeshwar was carrying any torch. He further

admitted that he did not ask the appellants where they were

going nor did he notice what article they were allegedly carrying.

Significantly, he stated that he merely saw "some heavy object".

He never identified the object as a human body. He did not

depose that any limb, clothing or other feature of a human body

was visible. Thus, the entire inference drawn by the learned

Special Judge that the object carried by the appellants was the

body of the deceased is purely speculative.

53.The circumstance becomes even more doubtful when viewed in

the backdrop of the admitted fact that the incident occurred on

the night of Deepawali, during the early hours of the morning.

PW-9 admitted that there was no torch with him. Although the

learned trial Court presumed that the appellants could be

identified in starlight because they belonged to the same village,

such reasoning overlooks the fundamental principle that criminal

conviction cannot rest upon presumptions. Identification under

difficult lighting conditions without any independent corroboration

necessarily calls for cautious scrutiny.

54.It is equally significant that PW-9 admitted that he did not disclose

certain material facts to the police during investigation. PW-6

Ashok Kumar Rathia admitted in paragraph 22 of his deposition

that the fact that Parmeshwar and Ramesh had allegedly seen

the appellants carrying the dead body was disclosed for the first

33

time before the Court and had not been stated to the police under

Section 161 Cr.P.C. Such material improvement strikes at the root

of the prosecution case. The Supreme Court in Jafarudheen

(supra) has held that material improvements touching the core of

the prosecution story render the testimony unsafe for sustaining

conviction in a case based on circumstantial evidence.

55.Another circumstance heavily relied upon by the prosecution is

the recovery of a rope and torch pursuant to the memoranda

allegedly recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The

evidentiary value of such recovery is, however, extremely limited.

It is well settled that for a discovery under Section 27 to acquire

incriminating significance, the recovered article must have a

direct nexus with the commission of the offence. In the present

case, PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses, did not

support the prosecution and was declared hostile. His evidence

completely demolishes the prosecution version regarding the

recoveries. The remaining seizure witnesses are either interested

witnesses or formal witnesses. More importantly, PW-12 Arun

Netam admitted that neither the rope nor the torch was sent for

forensic examination. The rope was not shown to PW-5 Dr. S.R.

Painkara for obtaining an opinion whether it could have caused

the alleged ligature mark. No blood, hair, skin tissue, fibre or DNA

was detected on the rope. The torch likewise yielded no

incriminating material. Thus, the recovered articles remain

34

ordinary household articles commonly available in every rural

dwelling.

56.In Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen v. State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11

SCC 724, and subsequently reiterated in Ravi Sharma (supra),

the Supreme Court has held that mere recovery of ordinary

articles without establishing their nexus with the crime does not

constitute an incriminating circumstance. Applying the aforesaid

principle, this Court finds that the alleged recoveries in the

present case are wholly innocuous and incapable of connecting

the appellants with the alleged offence.

57.Equally untenable is the reliance placed by the learned Special

Judge upon the tracker dog evidence. According to PW-7

Doleram, PW-6 Ashok Kumar and PW-2 Uttara Kumar, the

tracker dog allegedly proceeded from the place where the dead

body was found to the house of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi.

However, the prosecution failed to examine the dog handler, who

alone could have proved the manner in which the tracking was

conducted. PW-12 Investigating Officer admitted that there was

no order deputing the dog squad, no station diary entry, no

contemporaneous record regarding the deployment of the tracker

dog and even the breed and characteristics of the dog were not

mentioned in Ex.P/10.

35

58.It is a settled principle that tracker dog evidence is merely

corroborative and cannot form substantive evidence of guilt. In

Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar v. State of Maharashtra, (1970)

2 SCC 593, the Supreme Court held that evidence relating to

police dogs is inherently weak and unsafe to form the basis of

conviction unless independently corroborated. The same principle

has consistently been followed in subsequent decisions. In the

present case, the tracker dog evidence is unsupported by the

testimony of the dog handler and suffers from glaring procedural

deficiencies. Consequently, the same deserves to be excluded

from consideration.

59.The learned Special Judge has further relied upon the conduct of

the appellants and certain surrounding circumstances. However,

none of these circumstances possesses any definite incriminating

character. Suspicion generated by the conduct of an accused

cannot substitute proof. Criminal Courts are concerned not with

probabilities or conjectures but with legal evidence establishing

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

60.Another serious infirmity which has escaped the notice of the

learned trial Court is the cumulative effect of the investigative

lapses. The prosecution failed to seize or scientifically examine

any biological material connecting the appellants with the alleged

occurrence. No fingerprints, footprints, DNA, bloodstains or fibre

analysis has been produced. The place where the prosecution

36

alleges the murder to have occurred was never scientifically

linked with the deceased. The alleged rope remained

unexamined. The torch yielded nothing incriminating. Even the

tracker dog evidence remains legally inadmissible in the absence

of the handler's testimony. Each of these omissions assumes

greater significance in a case entirely dependent upon

circumstantial evidence.

61.It is true that every lapse on the part of the Investigating Officer

does not necessarily entitle the accused to acquittal.

Nevertheless, where such lapses destroy the evidentiary value of

the principal incriminating circumstances relied upon by the

prosecution, the Court cannot ignore them. The burden of proving

every link of the chain beyond reasonable doubt always remains

upon the prosecution and cannot be diluted by deficiencies in

investigation.

62.On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence of PW-2, PW-3,

PW-4, PW-6, PW-7, PW-9 and PW-12, read together with Ex.P/8,

Ex.P/10 and the memoranda and seizure proceedings, this Court

is unable to hold that the prosecution has established a complete

chain of circumstances consistent only with the guilt of appellants

Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena. Each of the principal

circumstances suffers either from evidentiary weakness, material

improvement, lack of scientific corroboration or legal

37

inadmissibility. The chain is not merely incomplete; several links

are altogether missing.

63.In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), the Supreme Court

emphatically held that if any one of the essential links in the chain

of circumstantial evidence is not proved, the accused is entitled to

the benefit of doubt. The same principle has been reiterated in

Nagendra Sah (supra) and Jafarudheen (supra). Applying these

well-settled principles, this Court has no hesitation in holding that

the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution do not exclude

every hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants.

64.Consequently, Point No.(ii) is answered in the negative. The

prosecution has failed to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, a

complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing

unerringly towards the guilt of appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and

Santan Dansena.

Point No. (iii)

65.Having held while answering Point No.(ii) that the prosecution has

failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances against

the principal accused, this Court now proceeds to examine

whether the independent conviction of appellant Jeevan Lal

Dhobi under Section 201 read with Section 34 of the IPC can

nevertheless be sustained. The prosecution was under a legal

obligation to establish, beyond all reasonable doubt, either (i) that

38

appellant Jeevan Lal shared the common intention with the

principal offenders in commission of the alleged offence, or (ii)

that after having knowledge or reason to believe that an offence

of murder had been committed, he intentionally caused

disappearance of evidence with the object of screening the

offenders from legal punishment. Unless these essential

ingredients are affirmatively established by reliable evidence,

conviction under Section 201 IPC cannot legally stand.

66.It is settled law that the offence under Section 201 IPC is not

attracted merely because an accused is related to the principal

offender or is present near the place of occurrence. The

prosecution must prove conscious knowledge of commission of

the principal offence coupled with a positive act intended to cause

disappearance of evidence. Suspicion, conjectures or moral

probabilities can never substitute proof. The Supreme Court in

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), V.L. Tresa v. State of

Kerala, (2001) 3 SCC 549, Suresh v. State of Haryana, (2018)

18 SCC 654, and recently in Jumail Singh v. State of Uttar

Pradesh, (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1259 , has reiterated that

before recording conviction under Section 201 IPC, the

prosecution must establish conscious knowledge of commission

of the principal offence and deliberate acts designed to obliterate

evidence. Mere suspicion or post-occurrence presence is legally

insufficient.

39

67.In the present case, the learned trial Court has convicted

appellant Jeevan Lal principally on the reasoning that since he

was allegedly seen accompanying the other accused persons

after the occurrence and was present when the dead body was

allegedly shifted, he must have known about the murder and

therefore shared the common intention to cause disappearance

of evidence. This reasoning, in the opinion of this Court, is legally

unsustainable and contrary to the settled principles governing

criminal jurisprudence. Furthermore, the learned trial Court

appears to have been influenced by the alleged motive attributed

to appellant Ramkumar Dhobi. However, once the prosecution

has failed to prove, by legally admissible evidence, the very

existence and outcome of the alleged rape case said to constitute

the motive, no inference of shared common intention can be

drawn against appellant Jeevan Lal on the basis of an unproved

circumstance.

68.The principal circumstance relied upon by the prosecution against

appellant Jeevan Lal is the testimony of PW-9 Ramesh Rathia. A

careful reading of his deposition shows that he merely stated that

while he and deceased witness Parmeshwar were proceeding for

fishing at about 3.00 a.m., they allegedly noticed two persons

carrying a heavy object and after a short while noticed three

persons returning from the direction of the school. Even if this

testimony is accepted in its entirety, the witness nowhere states

40

that the heavy article being carried was the dead body of Mehar

Prasad Rathia. Equally significant is the fact that the witness

nowhere deposed that he actually saw appellant Jeevan Lal

carrying the body, assisting in shifting the body or participating in

concealment of evidence.

69.On the contrary, PW-9 categorically admitted during cross-

examination that he neither questioned the appellants regarding

the article being carried nor could he identify what exactly was

being transported. He further admitted that he and deceased

witness Parmeshwar were not carrying any torch and that

because of darkness they merely noticed some heavy article

being carried. These admissions substantially dilute the

evidentiary value of his testimony. In criminal jurisprudence, when

the witness himself is unable to identify the alleged object being

carried, it would be wholly unsafe to infer that it was necessarily

the dead body of the deceased.

70.More importantly, the prosecution itself admits that the alleged

eye witness PW-4 Parmeshwar Rathia expired before completion

of his evidence. His cross-examination could never be conducted.

Consequently, his incomplete examination cannot be treated as

substantive evidence against any of the appellants. Therefore,

the only surviving witness regarding the alleged movement during

the night is PW-9 whose testimony, as discussed hereinabove, is

itself inconclusive.

41

71.The prosecution further attempted to connect appellant Jeevan

Lal through the alleged recovery of torch under memorandum.

However, the seizure witnesses themselves do not inspire

confidence. PW-3 Chandan Singh, one of the seizure witnesses,

did not support the prosecution and was declared hostile. The

seized articles namely rope and torch are ordinary household

articles commonly available in every rural household. The

Investigating Officer PW-12 Arun Netam has candidly admitted

that neither the rope nor the torch was ever sent for any scientific

or forensic examination. No fingerprint examination, no biological

examination, no fibre comparison, no blood analysis and no DNA

profiling were undertaken.

72.The absence of forensic linkage assumes great significance

because the prosecution sought to connect appellant Jeevan Lal

only through these recoveries. In Mustkeem @ Sirajudeen

(supra), the Supreme Court has categorically held that recovery

of common household articles without scientific corroboration

cannot become an incriminating circumstance. Similarly, in Pattu

Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2019) 4 SCC 771, it has been

held that recoveries under Section 27 lose much of their

evidentiary value where the recovered articles are common

articles and no scientific evidence connects them with the

offence.

42

73.The learned trial Court further relied upon the alleged conduct of

appellant Jeevan Lal after the incident. The Court observed that

since he reached the spot after discovery of the dead body and

did not disclose the alleged murder to police, an inference should

be drawn that he had knowledge of commission of the offence.

Such reasoning, in the considered opinion of this Court, directly

offends the settled principles governing criminal trials.

74.Silence or failure to volunteer information to police cannot by itself

constitute proof of guilt. Every accused enjoys the constitutional

protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India and

cannot be compelled to become a witness against himself.

Unless there exists independent evidence proving conscious

participation in concealment of evidence, adverse inference

cannot be drawn merely because the accused remained silent.

The Supreme Court in Nizam & Another v. State of Rajasthan,

(2016) 1 SCC 550, observed that conduct of an accused can

constitute an incriminating circumstance only when it is clearly

established and incapable of any innocent explanation.

75.Equally important is the complete absence of any independent

witness proving that appellant Jeevan Lal actually assisted in

shifting the dead body. Neither PW-6 Ashok Kumar Rathia, PW-7

Dole Ram, PW-8 Thandaram Rathia, nor any other prosecution

witness has deposed that appellant Jeevan Lal physically

participated in transporting the body. Even according to the

43

prosecution, nobody witnessed the alleged murder or subsequent

concealment. The finding recorded by the learned Special Judge

is therefore founded upon assumptions rather than legal

evidence.

76.The prosecution has also failed to establish any motive

whatsoever against appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi. The only motive

projected throughout the prosecution case relates to the

allegation that the deceased had refused to compromise an

earlier rape case allegedly registered against appellant

Ramkumar Dhobi. Even this alleged motive has not been legally

established. Apart from vague oral assertions made by certain

witnesses, no documentary evidence whatsoever has been

produced to prove the registration, pendency or ultimate outcome

of the alleged rape case. The prosecution has neither brought on

record the FIR, charge-sheet, judgment of conviction, nor any

other judicial record to demonstrate that appellant Ramkumar

Dhobi was ever convicted in the said case or had undergone any

sentence. Significantly, the only reference to the alleged rape

case appears in the memorandum statement of appellant

Ramkumar Dhobi recorded during investigation, which, being hit

by Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act except to the

limited extent permissible under Section 27, cannot be treated as

substantive evidence to establish motive. In the complete

absence of any legally admissible evidence proving the existence

44

and outcome of the alleged rape case, the prosecution has failed

to establish the very foundation of the alleged motive.

77.Once the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged motive even

against appellant Ramkumar Dhobi, there is absolutely no

material on record to infer that appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi shared

any grievance, animosity or common object arising therefrom. No

prosecution witness has stated that appellant Jeevan Lal had any

dispute with the deceased or that he participated in any earlier

incident relating to the alleged rape case. There is not even a

suggestion that appellant Jeevan Lal stood to gain by the death

of the deceased. In a prosecution resting exclusively upon

circumstantial evidence, failure to establish motive assumes

considerable importance, particularly where the prosecution

seeks to invoke Section 34 IPC by alleging common intention.

The absence of any independent motive against appellant

Jeevan Lal constitutes yet another missing link in the chain of

circumstances.

78.Section 34 IPC postulates existence of prior meeting of minds

resulting in common intention. Such common intention may

undoubtedly develop on the spot; however, there must be cogent

evidence demonstrating participation in furtherance of such

common intention. Mere presence at the place of occurrence or

relationship with another accused is wholly insufficient. In

Krishnan v. State of Kerala, (1996) 10 SCC 508, Pandurang v.

45

State of Hyderabad, AIR 1955 SC 216, and recently Rohtas v.

State of Haryana, (2020) 18 SCC 290, the Supreme Court

reiterated that common intention cannot be inferred merely from

association or presence unless supported by clear overt acts and

surrounding circumstances.

79.The learned trial Court proceeded on the assumption that

because appellant Jeevan Lal allegedly accompanied the other

accused while returning from the school, he necessarily shared

their criminal intention. Such inference overlooks the settled

principle that every incriminating circumstance must be proved

independently before cumulative inference can be drawn. Since

the prosecution has itself failed to establish that the alleged

heavy article was the dead body or that appellant Jeevan Lal

participated in shifting the body, the foundational facts necessary

for invoking Section 34 IPC are completely absent.

80.Another significant circumstance ignored by the learned trial

Court is that the prosecution has failed to establish the exact

place of occurrence. According to the prosecution, the murder

occurred in the courtyard of appellant Ramkumar Dhobi and

thereafter the body was shifted near the school. However, no

blood stains, drag marks, biological material, fingerprints or other

forensic evidence were recovered from the alleged place of

murder. Even the Investigating Officer admitted that no scientific

examination was conducted to establish that the murder had

46

actually taken place at the alleged spot. Once the alleged place

of occurrence itself remains doubtful, the theory regarding shifting

of the body with assistance of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi

becomes equally doubtful.

81.The evidence regarding tracker dog has already been held

inadmissible and unreliable while considering Point No.(ii).

Therefore, no corroboration is available from that circumstance

either. Likewise, the recoveries under Section 27 have also been

found incapable of connecting appellant Jeevan Lal with the

offence.

82.The cumulative effect of these deficiencies is that the prosecution

has failed to establish any positive act attributable to appellant

Jeevan Lal constituting disappearance of evidence. At best, the

material creates suspicion that he may have been present in the

vicinity of the occurrence. However, suspicion, however grave,

can never take the place of legal proof. Criminal courts cannot

sustain conviction on assumptions or probabilities where two

views are reasonably possible.

83.The settled principle of criminal jurisprudence is that where the

foundational facts themselves remain unproved, every

consequential inference necessarily falls to the ground. In the

present case, the prosecution has failed to prove the alleged

motive, has failed to establish the place of occurrence, has failed

47

to prove that the object allegedly carried by the accused was the

dead body of the deceased, has failed to connect the recovered

articles through any scientific evidence, and has failed to prove

any overt act attributable to appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi. The

prosecution having failed to establish the foundational

circumstances beyond reasonable doubt, the benefit of such

failure must necessarily enure to the appellant.

84.Consequently, this Court answers Point No.(iii) in the negative by

holding that the conviction of appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi under

Section 201 read with Section 34 IPC is wholly unsustainable in

law. The evidence led by the prosecution falls far short of the

standard of proof required in criminal jurisprudence and appellant

Jeevan Lal is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

85.In view of the foregoing discussion and upon an independent re-

appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence

available on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that

the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the appellants

beyond reasonable doubt. Though the prosecution has

succeeded in proving that the death of deceased Mehar Prasad

Rathia was homicidal in nature, it has failed to establish a

complete and unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence pointing

unerringly towards the guilt of the appellants. The prosecution

48

has failed even to establish the alleged motive, as no legally

admissible evidence has been produced to prove the alleged

earlier rape case, its outcome, or that appellant Ramkumar Dhobi

had suffered any conviction or sentence therein. The only

reference to such alleged case is found in the memorandum of

the accused, which is not substantive evidence and is wholly

insufficient to establish motive. Likewise, the prosecution has

failed to satisfactorily prove the last seen circumstance, the

recoveries made pursuant to the memoranda under Section 27 of

the Indian Evidence Act, the tracker dog evidence, and the other

attendant circumstances in a manner which excludes every

hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the appellants. The

material contradictions, omissions and investigative lapses

noticed hereinabove create substantial doubt regarding the

prosecution case. It is trite that however grave the suspicion may

be, the same cannot take the place of legal proof. Where two

views are reasonably possible on the evidence on record, the one

favourable to the accused must necessarily be adopted.

86.Consequently, this Court holds that the learned Special Judge

has erred in recording the conviction of the appellants by relying

upon circumstances which do not satisfy the well-settled

principles governing conviction in a case resting solely on

circumstantial evidence. The learned trial Court further committed

an error in treating an unproved allegation of motive as an

49

incriminating circumstance despite the absence of any

documentary or legally admissible evidence establishing the

alleged earlier criminal case or its result. The findings recorded

by the trial Court are not supported by legally admissible and

reliable evidence and, therefore, cannot be sustained. The

appellants are entitled to the benefit of doubt.

87.Accordingly, Criminal Appeal No.58 of 2021 preferred by

appellants Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena, and Criminal

Appeal No.63 of 2021 preferred by appellant Jeevan Lal Dhobi,

deserve to be and are hereby allowed. The judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 18.01.2021 passed by the

learned Special Judge (Atrocities), Raigarh, in Special Sessions

Trial No.07 of 2018, convicting and sentencing the appellants for

the offences punishable under Sections 302/34, 201/34 of the

Indian Penal Code and Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(vi), as

applicable, of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, are hereby set aside.

88.The appellants are acquitted of all the charges by extending to

them the benefit of doubt.

89.It is brought on record that the appellants in Criminal Appeal

No.58 of 2021, namely Ramkumar Dhobi and Santan Dansena,

have remained in custody for more than eight years. Since their

conviction has been set aside by this judgment, they shall be

50

released forthwith, if not required to be detained in connection

with any other case. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No.63 of

2021, namely Jeevan Lal Dhobi, is already on bail. His bail bonds

shall stand discharged, subject to compliance with the provisions

of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

(corresponding provision under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, if applicable).

90.Keeping in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Cr.P.C.

(now Section 481 of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,

2023), the accused-appellants are directed to forthwith furnish a

personal bond in terms of Form No. 45 prescribed in the Code of

Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with two reliable

sureties in the like amount before the Court concerned which

shall be effective for a period of six months along with an

undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave Petition

against the instant judgment or for grant of leave, the aforesaid

appellants on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the

Hon’ble Supreme Court.

91.The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be sent

back immediately to the trial Court concerned for compliance and

necessary action.

Sd/- Sd/-

(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)

Judge Chief Justice

Anu