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GAHC040013292023 2026:GAU-AP:202-DB

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

Case No. : Crl.A./28/2023

Ranbir Sing Kr. @ Ashok Kumar

S/o Shri Gyan Chand, resident of Housing board, House No. 1002, Chandigarh, PS-

Danas, District Chandigarh, Punjab.

VERSUS

The State of AP and Anr

represented by the public Prosecutor.

2:Smti Mamta Chetry

Age: 0

Occupation :

W/o Shri Ranbir Singh @ Ashok Kumar

resident of Tawang

P.O/P.S Tawang

District Tawang

A.

BEFORE

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE BUDI HABUNG

Advocate for the Appellant : Mr. P. Taffo

Advocate for the State Respondent No.1 : Mr. G. Tado, Addl. P.P

Advocate for the Respondent No.2 : Mr. D. Laji, ld. Amicus Curiae

Date on which Judgment is reserved : 11.02.2026

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Date of Hearing : 11.02.2026

Date of Judgment and Order : 27.02.2026

Whether the pronouncement is of the Operative part of the Judgment? :No

Whether the full Judgment has been pronounced ? : Yes

JUDGMENT & ORDER

(CAV)

[Budi Habung, J]

Heard Mr. P. Taffo, learned counsel for the appellant. Also heard Mr. G.

Tado, learned Additional Prosecutor for the State respondent No.1 and Mr. D.

Laji, learned Amicus Curiae for the respondent No.2.

2. This criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant under Section

374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, challenging the judgment dated

27.07.2023 and the order of sentence dated 28.07.2023 passed by the learned

Sessions Judge, Bomdila, Arunachal Pradesh, in Bomdila Sessions Case No.

06/2023, corresponding to Tawang P.S. Case No. 01/2023, under Section 302 of

the IPC, whereby the accused appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and

325 of the IPC and sentenced as follows:

i. Life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand

only) under Section 302 of the IPC;

ii. Imprisonment for 7 (seven) years with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees Ten

Thousand only) under Section 325 of the IPC;

iii. In default of payment of the fines, the accused convict shall undergo

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simple imprisonment for 3 (three) months in addition to the above sentences.

3. Being aggrieved, the appellant has challenged the order of conviction

primarily on the following grounds:

a. The conviction is based solely on the evidence of prosecutrix-P.W.-1.

b. There is no eyewitness to the incident except P.W.-1, and the conviction

has been recorded on assumptions and presumptions without being

supported by the evidence of any independent witness.

c. In addition to the above grounds of challenge, the learned counsel for

the appellant, contends that there was no deliberate intent to cause the

death of the child as such and at most the case would fall under Section

304 Part II of the IPC, which deals with culpable homicide not amounting

to murder, rather than under Section 302 of the IPC.

BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE PROSECUTION CASE

4. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 22.01.2023, the family consisting

of the appellant, his wife (informant-PW-1) with their child (deceased) returned

together from Tawang Monastery after attending the Torgey festival. At night,

the wife (PW-1) prepared dinner, but the accused denied to have dinner with

her. After dinner, when the wife (PW-1) went to sleep with the accused, she

found appellant sleeping with a blanket wrapped around his body. When she

asked him to extend the blanket so that they could sleep together, quarrel took

place between the appellant and his wife. Due to the altercation, the accused

became angry and was about to leave the room with their 2 (two) years old

minor son. The wife asked him not to take their son. The accused stated that if

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he was not allowed to take the son, he would kill him. At that time, when the

wife attempted to take the son, the accused physically assaulted her, causing

dislocation of her left elbow. The accused then held his son’s leg and dashed

him twice against the ground.

5. After hearing the noise, the brother-in-law of the accused (PW-2), who

resides nearby, came and knocked on the door. The PW-1 opened the door.

When PW-2 entered the room, he saw the child in an injured condition and the

accused inside the room; however, the accused immediately fled from the room.

PW-2, then with the help of P.W.-4, took the wife and the child to the hospital

for treatment, but the doctor declared the child “brought dead”. The wife (PW-

1) was found to have sustained severe injuries on her hand. The police were

informed, and accordingly, an FIR was registered as Tawang P.S. Case No.

01/2023 under Sections 302/325 of the IPC. Thereafter, the investigation was

initiated and a post-mortem examination was conducted. As per the post-

mortem report, the following injuries were found on the dead body of the

deceased child:

1. Depression seen on left of scalp on frontal & parietal region with

crackling sound on palpation. On dissection of scalp, diffuse bruising of

scalp is seen & huge amount of blood (20 ml) & clot (10 gm) along with

brain matter (15 gm) is present below the scalp.

2. Depressed comminuted fracture of skull is seen involving the left

frontal, parietal, temporal & right parietal bone.

3. Cranial meninges are rupture and stained with blood and brain

matter.

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4. Avulsion of middle portion of left hemisphere of brain.

5. Left lower limb below the level of lower 1/3

rd

of thigh is externally

related & is moving freely.

6. On dissection of left thigh, displaced compound fracture of lower

1/3

rd

of shaft of left femur.

6. Upon completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the

accused for offences under Sections 302/325 of the IPC, and accordingly,

charges were framed under the said Sections.

7. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined altogether

10 witnesses. In his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C, although he did not

fully and directly admit his guilt, the accused admitted the occurrence of the

incident on 22.01.2023 evening and stated that the child died due to the

mistake of his wife (PW-1). The accused also examined two defence witnesses

including himself.

POINT FOR DETERMINATION

8. From the materials on record and submissions of the parties, the following

points emerge for consideration:

I. Whether the death of the child was homicidal in nature;

II. Whether the appellant caused the death of the child;

III. Whether the act amounts to murder under Section 302 of the IPC or

to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the

IPC;

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IV. Whether the appellant voluntarily caused grievous hurt to P.W.-1

punishable under Section 325 of the IPC; and

V. Whether the impugned conviction is sustainable.

I. WHETHER THE DEATH OF THE CHILD WAS HOMICIDAL IN

NATURE

9. PW-5 is the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination of the

deceased child. PW-5 deposed regarding his findings as under:

“Depression seen on left side of scalp. Frontal & parietal bone

of skull was giving crackling sound on touch. There was defused

bruising on scalp in blue colour. There was huge amount of blood

and blood clot, blood is around 20 ml and clot is about 10 gram on

left side of the scalp, there was 15 grams of brain matters present

below the scalp. On further dissection, depressed multiple fracture

of skull involving frontal parietal, temporal and also the right parietal

bone. Further dissection cranial meninges which protect the brain is

found rapture and stained with blood. On further dissection avulsion

of middle portion of left hemisphere of brain was found out. Left

lower limb was found below the level of 1/3

rd

of thigh, there was

puncture wound and below the injury the leg was freely moving and

externally rotated. On further dissection it was found that there was

displaced compound fracture of lower 1/3

rd

of the left shaft of finer

bone (thigh bone, longest and strongest bone of body)”.

10. PW-5 opined that the cause of death was due to avulsion of the middle

portion of the left hemisphere of the brain following a head injury. The nature of

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the injury was ante-mortem. It was found that there was a severe head injury

on the left side of the head caused by blunt trauma, resulting in the death of

the child. These injuries were extensive, severe, and clearly indicative of a

violent and forceful impact. The nature of the scalp fracture, combined with

brain damage, unequivocally establishes that the death was homicidal, caused

by deliberate and forceful head trauma.

11. Although the defence contended that the death of the child occurred due

to a fall during a push-and-pull struggle between the accused and his wife (PW-

1), when the accused was allegedly leaving the room with the child, and PW-1

pushed them causing them to fall, the severity of the scalp fracture and brain

injury, particularly the brain tissue extrusion and avulsion, is not consistent with

accidental force or minor impact. Such injuries typically result from a high-

impact blow or a fall onto a hard surface with significant force.

12. The medical findings leave little room for alternative explanations, such as

accidental injuries, and point firmly towards the intentional infliction of a fatal

injury. Accordingly, point No. I is answered in the affirmative: the death was

homicidal.

II. WHETHER THE APPELLANT CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE CHILD

13. PW-1, Smti. Mamta Chetry, is the mother and informant of the deceased

child, as well as the wife of the accused appellant. She is a natural and injured

eyewitness. She deposed that after dinner, at about 8:30 P.M., when she went

to bed to sleep, she saw the accused sleeping on the bed with the entire

blanket wrapped around his body. When she asked him to share the blanket,

the accused shouted at her in a loud voice, which frightened her son, who

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began crying and calling out “Mamaji” and “Papaji”. She then told the accused

that if he did not wish to sleep with her, he could go to another room. The

accused got up and attempted to go to another room with their son. However,

she told him that he could not take the child along. At that time, the accused

shouted and stated that if she does not allow him to take their son, he would kill

the child. Thereafter, he snatched her son and hit him on the floor by holding

his leg. She tried to stop him, but the accused pushed her and broke her left

hand at the elbow. Thereafter, he hit her son on the floor due to which her son

sustained injury on his head and blood was oozing out from his mouth and

nose. The child was not making any sound, so she shouted for help. Hearing her

cries, PW-2 came and knocked on the door. She opened the door and continued

shouting for help because her son was not moving.

14. Then, she, along with PW-2, immediately took the child to the hospital,

but the doctor declared him brought dead. Her husband/accused fled from the

residence and did not accompany her or take her son to the hospital, even

though her left hand was broken and her son had sustained injuries to his head

and was bleeding from the nose and mouth. As noted above, PW-1 categorically

stated that the accused appellant threatened to kill the child during the

altercation and forcibly held the deceased child by legs and struck his head on

the floor twice. When she tried to intervene, the accused pushed her causing a

dislocation of her left elbow. After the assault, the accused fled the scene.

15. The testimony of PW-1 remained consistent throughout the trial and was

not materially discredited during cross-examination. Her testimony directly links

the appellant's aggressive acts to the grievous injuries sustained by the

deceased child. The evidence shows that only PW-1 was present at the time of

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the incident. It is settled law that a conviction can be based on the testimony of

a single reliable witness, especially when such testimony is trustworthy and

corroborated by medical evidence and the circumstances of the case.

16. In this regard, the learned Amicus Curiae appearing on behalf of the

respondent No.2/informant relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Prahlad v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2024)

14 SCC 203 [paragraph 41], and Anil Phukan vs. State of Assam, reported

in (1993) 3 SCC 282 [paragraph 3], wherein it was held that “if the testimony

is credible and trustworthy, the absence of an independent witness is

immaterial”.

17. In the instant case, PW-2 corroborated the presence of the accused

appellant at the scene. He was the nearest neighbor. After hearing the shouting,

he immediately came and knocked on the door, and on entering the room he

saw that his sister, PW-1, had sustained injuries and that the accused was inside

the room. He was informed that the accused had broken her hand and hit her

son, who was lying in the room. When he went inside the bedroom, he saw that

the child had sustained fractures on his head, and both his hands and legs were

broken. Blood was oozing from his nose and mouth. He lifted the child, who was

lying on the ground, but the accused had fled from the residence. He

immediately took the child (his nephew) and his sister (PW-1) to the hospital for

treatment, but the doctor declared that the child was no more.

18. PW-3, on receiving information about the incident, went to the hospital

and saw that the child had sustained a head injury, due to which one side of his

head was dashed. Blood and a whitish substance were coming out of his mouth

and nose. He saw that the child was already dead.

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19. Further, PW-4, another neighbor of the accused, deposed that upon

hearing the noise, he went out of his room and saw P.W-2 holding the child of

the accused. He was asked to assist in taking the child to the hospital. He saw

that the child was bleeding from the mouth and nose, and while taking them to

the hospital, he came to know from the doctor that the child was brought dead.

20. PW-7 is the doctor who examined P.W-1. This witness confirmed, through

medical examination, the dislocation of P.W-1’s elbow. This substantiate the

evidence of PW-1 that when she tried to prevent the accused from assaulting

her son, she was broken her elbow and pushed her away.

21. PW-6 is the owner of a house under construction in Kharsa village, Jang

about 4 KM away from the place of occurrence. He deposed that during those

days, a viral message was circulated on social media that a person had killed his

son, injured his wife, and fled. The police had also circulated a photograph of

the accused. He further deposed that when he visited his under-construction

house on 23rd or 24

th

of January 2023, between 3:30 and 4:00 P.M., he saw

that the lock of the kitchen had been tampered with. Upon checking from

outside, he also noticed that the wall was damaged. When he entered the

kitchen, he saw the accused sleeping inside. When the accused saw him, he got

up and tried to flee, but PW-6 overpowered him and apprehended him until the

police arrived. He identified the accused as the same person in the photographs

circulated on social media. He then dragged the accused onto the road and

informed the police, who took him away.

22. The PW-6 proved that the appellant was hiding in his under-construction

building after commission of the offence. The medical evidence of PW-5, i.e., P-

Exhibit-5, aligns with the ocular testimony of PWs-1, 2, 3, and 4, who deposed

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that they had seen the injuries sustained by the child, confirming the nature and

severity of those injuries. The accused claims to be innocent; however, his

conduct does not support such a claim. The evidence reveals that the threats to

kill the child prior to the incident, coupled with the repeated assault on the child

and his wife, demonstrate a pattern of aggressive behaviour by the accused.

After the incident, when he realized that the child was not responding and he

had dislocated the hand of PW-1, the accused immediately fled the scene and

subsequently attempted to hide in an under-construction building in Jang,

approximately 3–4 km away from the place of occurrence. These are relevant

circumstances indicating that he was conscious of his guilt. Any sensible person

would have taken the injured child and wife to the hospital immediately.

However, in this case, although he was the father of the child who was lying on

the floor injured, and his wife was injured in her hand, the accused fled from

the scene, allegedly out of fear of the public. This conduct only indicates his

guilt in committing the alleged offences.

23. Also, the accused appellant’s conduct is inconsistent with his claim of

innocence and supports the inference that he intentionally had caused injuries

that led to the death of the child. A mother is unlikely to falsely implicate the

father in the murder of her own child. It is highly improbable that a mother

would cause injury to her own son and herself to the extent of causing death of

her son and dislocating her hand. The accused failed to explain anything about

the injuries sustained by PW-1. Furthermore, the accused appellant admitted

that he was apprehended by PW-6 from the under-construction building located

at Jang 3-4 Kms away from his house, where he had been hiding after the

incident. Fleeing from the scene and absconding after the incident are relevant

circumstances; however, the accused did not explain why he was hiding in the

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under-construction building away from his house.

24. The defence claimed that the child fell accidentally when PW-1 allegedly

pulled the child’s leg. However, in his evidence as a defence witness (DW-1), the

accused improvised his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., and stated that

when he was holding the child, PW-1 pushed them both, causing them to fall.

This attempt suggests an accidental cause of injury. The accused even went to

the extend to attribute the child’s injuries to the mistake of his wife (PW-1).

However, he provided no explanation for the extensive scalp fractures and brain

avulsion. According to the doctor, such injuries cannot result from a simple fall.

No explanation was provided for the femur fracture either, which also suggests a

high-impact trauma.

25. Furthermore, if the injuries had been caused accidentally, any sensible

person would have immediately rushed the child to the hospital for treatment.

In this case, the accused, being the father of the dying child, chose to flee from

the scene. His conduct is therefore inconsistent with a claim of innocence,

particularly considering his prior threatening behaviour and immediate flight

from the scene. As indicated above, the medical evidence of PW-5 rules out a

simple accident or fall. The nature and extent of the injuries are too severe for

ordinary fall or accidental injury, strongly indicating deliberate infliction of

trauma. Thus, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that

the appellant caused the fatal injuries to the child.

26. Accordingly, point number 2 is answered in the affirmative.

III. WHETHER THE ACT AMOUNTS TO MURDER UNDER SECTION 302

OF THE IPC OR TO CULPABLE HOMICIDE NOT AMOUNTING TO

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MURDER UNDER SECTION 304 OF THE IPC.

27. The learned counsel for the appellant argues that there was a lack of

intention on the part of the accused to kill the child; however, the evidence

suggests otherwise. According to the testimony of PW-1, the accused

threatened to kill the child if he was not allowed to take the child along with

him. The accused forcibly held the child and struck his head on a hard surface

twice, resulting in fatal injuries. The injuries inflicted are sufficient, in the

ordinary course of nature, to cause the death of the child. The act of violently

striking the head of a two-year-old on a hard floor with such force demonstrates

a clear awareness on the part of the accused of the potential for causing harm,

or at least knowledge that death was the most probable consequence. The

repeated nature of the assault further confirms the intention, or at least the

knowledge, of the probable outcome of such actions.

28. Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code – Clause Thirdly (Clause 3), reads as

follows;

“If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any

person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the

ordinary cause of nature to cause dead- then the act amounts to murder.”

29. The evidence in this case firmly establishes that the injuries inflicted on

the child meet this criterion; therefore, the offence falls squarely under Section

300 of the Indian Penal Code, which defines murder. The plea for conversion of

the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304

Part II of the IPC is not sustainable.

30. In view of the above, point number III is answered accordingly. The

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offence is, therefore, murder under Section 302 of the IPC.

IV. WHETHER THE APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY CAUSED GRIEVOUS

HURT TO P.W.-1 UNDER SECTION 325 OF THE IPC

31. PW-7, the doctor who examined PW-1, confirmed in his medical report that

the appellant caused a dislocation of his wife’s (PW-1) left elbow, which was

verified through X-ray examination. This dislocation was confirmed as posterior

and constitutes grievous hurt under Section 320 of the IPC, which defines

grievous hurt to include the fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. PW-1, as

an injured witness, further substantiated the prosecution’s case. It is further

substantiated by the evidence of PW-2 who deposed that he lifted the child

lying on the ground and took him and the PW-1 to hospital. Further, PW-4

another neighbour deposed that he assistance of PW-4 taking them to hospital.

The medical evidence, together with the testimony of the ocular and other

witnesses, collectively establish that the appellant inflicted grievous hurt on PW-

1, satisfying the criteria for conviction under Section 325 of the IPC. Therefore,

the conviction under Section 325 of the IPC is justified.

APPRECIATION OF DEFENCE EVIDENCE

32. The learned counsel for the appellant primarily reiterated the statement

made by the accused in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.,

suggesting that the injuries sustained by the child might have been accidental or

caused during a fall. However, this version of the appellant fails to establish the

probability of the accidental theory in light of the facts and circumstances,

particularly considering the severity and pattern of injuries observed on the

child’s body. The medical evidence, especially regarding the scalp fracture and

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brain avulsion, is inconsistent with a simple fall. Such submissions by the

learned counsel for the appellant do not rebut the consistency of the ocular and

circumstantial evidence of the prosecution side. Accordingly, the defence

evidence does not create any reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution case

and does not undermine the strong evidence pointing to the appellant’s guilt.

33. We have heard the arguments the argument advanced by the learned

counsels for the parties and considered the evidence on record. After a

thorough reappraisal of all the evidence, this Court finds that the death of the

child was homicidal in nature. The appellant caused the fatal injuries to the

deceased child on the night of 22.01.2023 during an altercation with his wife

(PW-1). The act of the accused amounts to murder, punishable under Section

302 of the Indian Penal Code.

34. This Court also finds that the appellant caused grievous hurt to his wife

(PW-1), which has been duly proved. In light of the above, there is no perversity

or illegality in the judgment of the learned trial Court dated 27.07.2023

convicting the accused or in the order of sentenced dated 28.07.2023. The

conviction is based on reliable eyewitness testimony, corroborated by medical

and circumstantial evidence, leaving no ground for reasonable doubt regarding

the appellant’s guilt.

35. In view of the foregoing, this criminal appeal is dismissed. The judgment

dated 27.07.2023 and sentence order dated 28.07.2023 passed by the learned

Sessions Judge, Bomdila, Arunachal Pradesh, in Bomdila Sessions Case No.

06/2023 under Sections 302 and 325 of the IPC are hereby affirmed. The

appellant shall continue to serve the sentence as imposed.

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36. With the above observations, this criminal appeal stands disposed of.

37. Sent back the Trial Court Record.

38. Before parting we would like to put on record our appreciation for Mr. D.

Laji, learned Amicus Curiae for the respondent No.2. who would be entitled to

the prescribed remuneration.

JUDGE JUDGE

Comparing Assistant