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IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION

APPELLATE SIDE

PRESENT:

THE HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE

CRR 3472 of 2022

Rani Bibi

Vs.

Sk. Nurullah & Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Apalak Basu

Mr. Rahul Singh

Mr. Subham Kanjilal

Ms. Sarnali Gupta

For the Opposite Parties : Mr. Anupam Kumar Bhattacharya

Mr. Amit Chowdhury

Mr. Mrityunjoy Saha

Heard on : 08.12.2025

Judgment on : 18.02.2026

Dr. Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.

1. The petitioner herein/wife has assailed the order dated 22

nd August,

2022 passed by learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta in

Criminal Appeal no. 131 of 2022, arising out of a proceeding under section

12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short DV

Act) vide MISCN Case no. 23 of 2020 filed in the court of erstwhile 11

th

Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta (in short 11

th MM).

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2. The petitioner’s case is that she was married to the opposite party

no.1 in accordance with Islamic rituals on 07.02.2013. It is alleged that

inspite of receipt of sufficient amount of dowry, the opposite parties herein

with a malafide intention maltreated the petitioner in every possible way and

she was also not provided with sufficient food. They are blessed with a child.

However, the opposite parties pressed for more dowry and the petitioner

finding no other alternative had to leave the matrimonial home and

presently had taken shelter at a rented accommodation within Taltala Police

Station, Kolkata. Thereafter, she initiated a criminal proceeding against the

opposite party under sections 498A/406/506/34 of the IPC, being Taltala

Women P.S. Case no. 6 dated 17.3.2020

3. The petitioner’s specific contention is that she took the room within

Taltola P.S area, Kolkata, on rent from Sk. Salluddin, on a leave and license

agreement which falls within the jurisdiction of aforesaid Trial Court, when

she and her minor son was driven away from her matrimonial home. Being a

resident of that rented accommodation she filed the instant Application

under section 12 of the DV Act, being aforesaid MISCN. No. 23 of 2020,

seeking relief under section 17,18,20,21 and 22 of the D.V. Act, against the

opposite parties before the then MM 11

th Court, Calcutta, having territorial

jurisdiction to try and proceed with the said Application. The opposite

parties received copy of the said Application and contested the same by

filing written objection. However, instead of providing the petitioner and her

son the equitable relief which they are entitled to get, the opposite parties

herein had come up with the impugned Application of non-maintainability of

the said Application filed under section 12 of DV Act, taking a stand that the

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court concerned has no territorial jurisdiction to try the Application,

because the petitioner is a resident of Medinipur District. Opposite Party no.

1 herein filed a Criminal Appeal being no. 87 of 2022 before learned Chief

Judge, City Sessions Court at Calcutta, with a prayer for dismissal of the

Application on the ground of jurisdiction and learned Sessions Judge

thereafter directed the learned Magistrate to hear on the point of jurisdiction

vide order dated 27.06.2022.

4. Learned 11

th MM. court, Calcutta after hearing both the parties and

after considering the documentary evidence placed on record, by his order

dated 14.07.2022 came to a conclusion that the petitioner has rightly filed

said application under section 12 of the D.V. Act. within the limits of the

local jurisdiction where she resides.

5. Being aggrieved by the said order dated 14.07.2022 the OP

no.1/husband again preferred a criminal appeal being no. 131 of 2022

before learned Chief Judge, City Sessions Court, Calcutta and the Court

below by the impugned order allowed the Appeal on contest and directed the

trial Court to return the Application to the aggrieved person for presentation

before proper court, having territorial jurisdiction, since he has got no

territorial jurisdiction to entertain the said Application.

6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order learned counsel for the

petitioner Mr. Basu submits that the petitioner is victim of the atrocious

activities of the opposite parties and she is living at present within the

territorial jurisdiction of the trial court at Kolkata. She further submits that

she is the permanent resident of the address furnished in the cause title of

the application but she is temporarily residing at her rented house at the

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address mentioned in the cause title, after being driven out from her

matrimonial home by the opposite parties which the court below failed to

consider.

7. He further submits that though learned counsel for the opposite party

herein has agitated much about the maintainability and nomenclature of

the present application contending that application under section 482 of the

erstwhile Cr.P.C is not maintainable, since a proceeding under section 12 of

the D.V. Act is civil in nature but such contention is fallacious since the

caption or nomenclature of an application is hardly of much relevance as

application under section 397/401 and under section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure are both criminal revisional application. Moreover such

argument is also self-contradictory. Since no specific remedy is provided, the

inherent power of the High Court may be invoked to ensure that the

grievances of the aggrieved individual are effectively redressed. Referring the

judgment of Akankha Arora Vs. Tanaya Maben , 2024 SCC Online SC

3688 he contended that the application under section 482 of the Code is

completely maintainable and the High Court in such cases has the option to

treat the application under section 482 as an application under section

397/401 of the Code and address the issue without considering that to be a

bar or a fitter on the availability of the remedy.

8. He further submits that the object of the DV Act clearly suggest that

the same was enacted to meet the exigency and to ensure and to provide for

the remedies for the victims of the domestic violence. Therefore, even when

two views are possible, the interpretation which advances the cause of the

victim in a special enactment has to be adhered. He further submits that in

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any event the husband/opposite party cannot claim prejudice in the case, if

it is taken by learned MM, Calcutta as he has not even pleaded the hardship

which may be caused to him, if such application is permitted to be taken up

by the Court below. He further submits that from the pleadings made in the

application under section 12 of the DV Act, it is clear that the petitioner has

clearly dealt with the jurisdiction of the trial court in her pleading. Moreover

various documents filed on behalf of the petitioner suggest that she

ordinarily resides at the address tendered in the cause title of the

application under section 12 of the Act. He further submits that the resident

certificate issued by the local councillor in favour of the petitioner along with

copies of the Aadhar Card, Voter I Card, Driving License and Ration Card of

the petitioners have also been enclosed. It has been further submitted on

her behalf that postal envelopes containing court papers were refused at

Medinipur address and was subsequently delivered at 15 Imad Ali Lane,

Kol-16, where the petitioner resides. The Domestic Incident Report and the

charge sheet also refer to the address where she is ordinarily residing. There

is no reason to disbelieve the protection officer who has been entrusted with

the position, which has been created especially for the administration and

effective implantation of the DV Act.

9. Furthermore, the charge sheet filed in the proceeding under section

498A of the IPC would reflect that her place of residence is within Taltala

P.S. Similarly the letters sent to the petitioner by the opposite party no.1 for

serving notice upon her in connection with Criminal Revision no. 128 of

2023 was also served upon the present petitioner by the postal department

at the address mentioned in the cause title and not any other address,

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which leaves no room of doubt to conclusively held that at least she resides

there temporarily. All the aforesaid three different documents which are all

endorsed by public servants would show that she is residing within the

jurisdiction of learned MM, Calcutta (Presently JM, Calcutta).

10. His further contention is other documents which includes the court

records and address proof of her family members, which trace back to more

than a decade from the date of the filing of the application, under DV Act

would also suggest that all her relatives are residents of Calcutta. It was

further argued that even otherwise without any proof of address, a lady is

entitled to take refuge at her paternal place, which would also have

jurisdiction not only to treat the proceeding under DV Act but also

proceeding under 498A of the Indian Penal Code and in this context he

relied upon the judgment of Rupali Devi Vs. State of UP and others,

(2019) 5 SCC 384.

11. In the instant case learned Appellate court was not required to enter

into nitty-grities and hold a mini trial at this stage, when an application for

maintainability is taken up for hearing and more so when a well-reasoned

order considering all aspects was already passed by the trial court. It is trite

law that a substitution of view by the learned Appellate Court is

impermissible unless their existed cogent and overwhelming circumstances

warranting such interference. In the instant case no cogent or overwhelming

circumstances have been cited. Moreover, disbelieving a protection officer by

the learned Sessions Court seems to be contrary to the age old tradition. He

also submits that merely because an Aadhar Card was issued

contemporaneously with the lodgement of the FIR, although prior to the

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lodgement of the proceeding under the DV Act, does not suggest any foul

play and therefore, the order impugned is not sustainable in the eye of law.

12. Mr. Anupam Kr. Bhattacharya learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the opposite party in support of the order passed by the court below argued

that the petitioner while staying at her paternal house which is within the

district of Purba Medinipur had made the complaint and in paragraph 9 of

the said Application there is no whisper as to the residence either temporary

or permanent within Taltala P.S. and for the purpose of making the

complain, the petitioner set forth the alleged address at Taltala, Kolkata. The

complainant failed to show that any cause of action arose within that police

station. He further contended that though petitioner relied upon an

agreement dated 2

nd February, 2021 such agreement was for limited period

and it has also been expired in the meantime. The letter of complaint dated

12.03.2020 and the agreement for limited period at the Kolkata address vide

agreement dated 02.02.2021, clearly suggests that the petitioner never

resided at Taltala P.S. on 12.03.2020 or the date of registration dated

17.03.2020. He further argued that the petitioner relied upon an Aadhar

card, which bears the date of issue as 17.03.2020 and it was used for the

purpose of filing the application under section 12 of the DV Act, but such

document was created on the date of registering the FIR i.e. on 17.03.2020.

It is also absurd that the agreement was entered on 02.02.2021 but the

ward councillor had issued residential certificate on 30.10.2019 and

accordingly such documents is also fraudulent. A councillor cannot give any

residential certificate to anyone without examining the document(s) of such

person but in this case the ward councillor gave the residence certificate by

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way of fraudulent practice. In fact the address of the petitioner showing at

Taltala Police Station area is fleeing address and thereafter he procured the

Aadhar Card dated 17.03.2020 and after filing of the application under

section 12 of DV Act, the petitioner procured the agreement for leave and

license on 02.02.2021 only for the purpose of D.V. Act application to attract

Kolkata Jurisdiction. The Opposite party herein in his supplementary

affidavit has also annexed documents which goes to show that the petitioner

is the voter of Santipur Assembly constituency within district Purba

Medinipur. Therefore, it can be safely presumed that the petitioner is the

resident and voter within the district of Purba Mediniupur

13. He further submits that since the proceeding under section 12 of the

Act is civil in nature, the appellate court can consider the subsequent

documents under the provision of order XLI rule 27 of CPC, but not by way

of Revision under section 482 of Cr.P.C. Referring several authoritative

decisions passed by courts regarding the scope and consideration of

Application under section 12 of the DV Act, he further submits that the

application under the said section is a civil litigation and thus it must fall

within the civil side jurisdiction which obviously come within the ambit of

Article 227 of the Constitution of India and in the present case the nature of

relief is civil and therefore revisional application may be preferred within the

civil side or it may be preferred against the impugned judgment under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India but not within the scope of section

482 of the Code of Criminal procedure.

14. In this context he relied upon the judgment of P. Pathmanathan and

others Vs. V Monica and another , 2021 SCC Online Mad 8731 and

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contended that proceeding under section 12 of DV Act is absolutely civil in

nature and remedy is within the four corners of the civil side. He also relied

upon the judgment of Delhi High court passed in Sarad Kumar Pandey

Vs. Mamta Pandey, 2010 DMC 600 (Delhi) and contended since the

address shown by the petitioner is fleeing address, it cannot be called as

temporary residence of the petitioner. Said address also is not a continuing

residence from the alleged date of acquiring residence till filing the

application under section 12 of the Act and for which the agreement for

fleeing residence was executed on 02.02.2021 for a limited period of 11

months. Therefore the judgment passed by Appellate court below are proper

to the perspective of the case of the petitioner and does not call for

interference by this court. Accordingly he prayed for dismissal of the instant

application.

15. Therefore the issues which involves in the present context for

determination by this Court are

(a) Whether the instant application under section 482 Cr.P.C. is

maintainable against the judgment and order passed by the

Appellate court/Court below by which he directed to return the

application filed under section 12 of DV Act to the petitioner for

presenting the same before appropriate forum on the ground of

territoriality principle of jurisdiction

(b) Whether the learned CMM, Calcutta has the jurisdiction under

section 27 of the DV Act to deal with the Application under section

12/23 of the DV Act.

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16. Since learned counsel for the opposite party/Respondent raised

preliminary objection contending that the order passed by the Session

Judge in connection with Appeal under section 29 of the Act cannot be

challenged before this Bench under section 482 of the Code, let such

question be taken up for consideration at the outset.

17. It is true that in view of judgment passed by Madras High Court,

Allahabad High Court and some other High Courts with the observation that

proceeding under section 12 of DV Act are not strictly criminal, so they

should be challenged under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not

under section 482 of Cr.P.C., there were conflict of judicial decisions as to

whether challenge before High Court against an order passed by the

Appellate Court against order of Magistrate would be dealt with under

section 227 of the Constitution of India or under section 482 of Cr.P.C.

18. In the case of Sourabh Kumar Tripathi Vs. Vidhi Rawal reported in

2025 SCC Online SC 1158 the question which has been dealt with by the

Apex court was whether the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under

section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to quash the proceedings arising out of

an Application under section 12(1) of the DV Act, though in that judgment

Court has not dealt with other legal proceedings in which reliefs under

section 18 to 22 are sought in the courts referred to in section 26 of the DV

Act.

19. In this context Supreme Court also held that there is no doubt that

notwithstanding the penal provision in the form of section 31 and 33 of

Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act 2005 are

predominantly of a civil nature, however, in para 31 and 32 of the said

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judgment the Supreme Court has set at rest the dispute and has clearly laid

down the law.

31. There are two parts of Section 482. Both parts save the inherent powers of the

High Court. The first part is applicable where the power is exercised to make such

orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under ‘this Code’. When a

notice is issued on an application under Section 12(1), the learned Magistrate does not

pass any order under the CrPC. When orders granting any of the reliefs under

Sections 18 to 23 are passed, the orders of the learned Magistrate are not under

the CrPC. Therefore, the first part of Section 482 cannot apply to proceedings under

Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005.

32. The second part of Section 482 saves the inherent power of the High Court to

prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice. Therefore, in a given case where a learned Magistrate is dealing with an

application under Section 12(1), the High Court can exercise the power under the

second part of Section 482 to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure

the ends of justice. Hence, the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the CrPC to quash proceedings of an application under Section 12(1) or

orders passed in accordance with Sections 18 to 23 of the DV Act, 2005.

20. Therefore, from the aforesaid decision it is clear, when the Magistrate

grants any of the specific relief under section 18 to 23, the orders of the

Magistrate are not under the Cr.P.C. and therefore the first of part of section

482 cannot apply to proceedings under section 12 (1) of the DV Act.

However since the second part of section 482 save the inherent power of the

High Court to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice, the High Court can exercise the power under the

second part of section 482 to prevent the abuse of the process of any court

or to secure the ends of justice.

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21. In the instant case admittedly challenge is not against any order

granting or refusing any relief under section 18 to 23 of the D.V. Act but by

the order impugned, the court below directed return of Application for

presenting before appropriate forum, which is definitely not an interlocutory

order. Even in a civil proceeding against an order of return of plaint under

order VII rule 10 appeal lies. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination the

order impugned can be called as interlocutory order. In this context it is also

important to note that the expression “interlocutory order” has not been

defined in the Code. In Amar Nath Vs. State of Haryana reported in

(1997) 4 SCC 137 it has been laid down that the word “interlocutory”

merely denotes order of a purely interim or temporary nature, which do not

decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any

order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain

rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar

a revision against that order.

22. In Madhu Limai Vs. State of Maharastra , (1997) 4 SCC 551 It was

held by the Supreme Court that “interlocutory order cannot be equated as

invariably being converse of final order: An order passed during the course

of a proceeding may not be final but, yet it may not be an interlocutory

order, pure and simple. Same kinds of order may fall in between two which

must be taken to be an order of the type falling in the middle course. The

bar of section 397(2) is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of orders. An

order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point, which when accepted, will

conclude the particular proceeding, is an order of this kind not being an

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interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2) of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.”

23. In Sourabh Kuamr Tripathi case (Supra) also the Supreme Court

has clearly observed in para 37 that there are decisions of the High Court

taking a view that the jurisdiction under section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is not

available to quash proceeding of an application under section 12(1) of D.V.

Act 2005. The decisions are primarily based on the premise that proceeding

under section 12(1) are predominantly of a civil nature. The said view is not

correct for the reasons stated in the judgment.

24. The second part of section 482 deals with the cases to prevent ‘abuse

of the process of the court’ and in cases ‘or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice’. ‘Process’ is a general word meaning in effect anything done by the

court. “Abusing the process of the court” is a term generally applied to a

proceeding which is wanting in bonafides and is frivolous vexious or

oppressive. Therefore while exercising power under section 482, it is for the

High Court to take into consideration any special feature which appears in a

particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of

justice to permit a prosecution to continue. Similarly by using the words ‘or

otherwise to secure the ends of justice” the legislature intended to use the

terminology in an unfathomable limits. It is neither circumscribed by any

information nor can it be interpreted in a limited manner. To secure the

ends of justice is much more than to decide case on legal points. The non-

obstinate clause further makes it clear that the words ‘otherwise to secure

the ends of justice’ are wide enough to justify interference with an improper

order in appropriate cases.

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25. Since in the instant case, the question which has been dealt herein by

the court below as to the maintainability of the Application under section 12

of the D.V. Act before the said Trial court is on the ground of territoriality

principle of jurisdiction, I am of the firm view that the order impugned

attracts the second part of section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and therefore instant

application under section 482 of the Code against the impugned order is

maintainable.

26. Now let me consider the other aspect of the matter i.e. the legality and

validity of the order impugned. While the petitioner agitated before the Trial

court in support of it’s jurisdiction that after being allegedly driven away

from her matrimonial home she has taken shelter at a rented

accommodation within Taltala PS, Kolkata as many of his near relatives

reside in Kolkata and wherefrom she has also filed criminal proceeding

under section 498A IPC and in support of her temporary stay she has placed

certain documents, which includes her Aadhar Card, leave and license

agreement, residence certificate and most importantly she claimed that she

has even received notice of other litigations from the said address, the

contention of the opposite party in contrast is that said address is fleeing

address and the documents have been created afterwards for the purpose of

said two proceedings and Aadhar Card was also issued on the same date of

lodging FIR.

27. The place of trial of application under the Domestic Violence Act is

regulated by section 27 of the Act. On discernment of section 27, it is clear

that the judicial Magistrate of first class in whose local limits, any of the

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following things exists, shall be competent to grant protection and other

orders:-

(a) Where the aggrieved person permanently resides; or

(b) Where the aggrieved person temporarily resides; or

(c) Where the aggrieved person carries on business; or

(d) Where the aggrieved person is employed; or

(e) Where the respondent resides; or

(f) Where the respondent is employed ;or

(g) Where the cause of action has arisen.

28. Therefore a plain reading of the above provision makes it clear that

the petition under DV Act inter alia can be filed in a court where the person

aggrieved permanently or temporarily resides or where the cause of action

has arisen. In the instant case the objection raised by the petitioner is

mainly on the ground that the leave and license agreement which has been

filed by the petitioner in support of her temporary residence is dated

02.02.2021 whereas the Application under section 12 of the DV Act was

filed on 12.03.2020 and the residential certificate was issued prior to her

licence agreement and the only document i.e. the Aadhar Card which has

been issued allegedly prior to filing of the proceeding under the DV Act has

also been made to create a jurisdiction which is evident from the fact that it

was obtained on the date of lodging FIR under section 498A of the IPC.

Opposite party’s further contentions is that petitioner never resided at the

given address at the time of filing of the Application under section 12.

Therefore the question is what place can be considered as “temporary

residence” within the meaning of section 27(1) (a) of the Act. The question

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has been dealt with by Delhi High Court in Sarod Kumar Pandey Vs.

Mamta Pandey, 2010 (118) DRJ 625 wherein it was observed.

“9. All legislative enactments on matrimonial disputes or custody matters make

ordinary residence or residence or the place where parties lived together or the

place of cause of action as a ground for invocation jurisdiction of the Court.

Domestic Violence Act is the first Act where a temporary residence of the aggrieved

persons has also been made a ground for invoking the jurisdiction of court; The

expression ‘residence’ means ‘to make abode’-a place for dwelling. Normally place

for dwelling is made with an intention to live there for considerable time or to

settle there. It is a place where a person has a home. In Webster Dictionary, the

residence means to dwell for length of time. The words’ dwelling place’ or abode

are synonyms. A temporary residence, therefore, must be a temporary dwelling

place of the person who has for the time being decided to make the place as his

home. Although he may not have decided to reside there permanently or for a

considerable length of time but for the time being, this must be place of her

residence and this cannot be considered a place where the person has gone on a

casual visit, or a fleeing visit for change of climate or simply for the purpose of

filing case against another persons.”

29. In the light of said judgment the temporary residence as envisaged

under the Act is such residence where an aggrieved person compelled to

take shelter in view of domestic violence perpetrated on her or she either

been turned out of the matrimonial home or has to leave the matrimonial

home. Of course the temporary residence does not include residence in a

lodge or hotel or an inn or residence at a place only for the purpose of filing

a domestic violence case, but the temporary residence must also be a

continuing residence from the date of acquiring residence till the Application

under section 12 disposed of and it must not be a fleeing residence where a

woman comes only for the purpose of contesting the case and otherwise

does not reside there.

30. In the instant case the document which has been relied by the

petitioner and also considering the fact that the petitioner had received

court notices from the Taltala Address it does not indicate that it is not her

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continuing residence nor there is anything to suggest that the petitioner

comes to that residence only for the purpose of contesting the said cases

and otherwise does not reside therein.

31. Apart from what has been discussed above, the proceeding under

section 12 of the DV Act can also be initiated under section 27(1)(c), where

the cause of action has arisen. The expression cause of action does not refer

to any particular fact or facts and it really means the fact or facts which give

a person a right to judicial redress or relief against the adversary. It also

refers to a situation or state of facts which would entitle to a party to sustain

action and give him or her the right to seek a judicial remedy in his or her

behalf. Cause of action may arise in different way i.e. failure to perform legal

obligation to do or refrain from performing it, unlawful violation or invasion

of right etc. Therefore, cause of action embraces those facts which entitles

one person to obtain a remedy from another person. It is to be mentioned in

this context that unless there is any domestic violence within the meaning of

section 3, there cannot be any cause of action for initiating any proceeding

under the Act.

32. Section 3 of the domestic violence Act is quoted below for the sake of

discussion

“3. Definition of domestic violence.—For the purposes of this Act, any act,

omission or commission or conduct of the respondent shall constitute domestic

violence in case it—

(a) harms or injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being,

whether mental or physical, of the aggrieved person or tends to do so and

includes causing physical abuse, sexual abuse, verbal and emotional abuse

and economic abuse; or

(b) harasses, harms, injures or endangers the aggrieved person with a view

to coerce her or any other person related to her to meet any unlawful demand

for any dowry or other property or valuable security; or

(c) has the effect of threatening the aggrieved person or any person related to

her by any conduct mentioned in clause (a) or clause (b); or

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(d) otherwise injures or causes harm, whether physical or mental, to the

aggrieved person.

Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section,—

(i) “physical abuse” means any act or conduct which is of such a nature as

to cause bodily pain, harm, or danger to life, limb, or health or impair the health

or development of the aggrieved person and includes assault, criminal

intimidation and criminal force;

(ii) “sexual abuse” includes any conduct of a sexual nature that abuses,

humiliates, degrades or otherwise violates the dignity of woman;

(iii) “verbal and emotional abuse” includes—

(a) insults, ridicule, humiliation, name calling and insults or ridicule

specially with regard to not having a child or a male child; and

(b) repeated threats to cause physical pain to any person in whom the

aggrieved person is interested;

(iv) “economic abuse” includes—

(a) deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the

aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under

an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of

necessity including, but not limited to, house hold necessities for the aggrieved

person and her children, if any, stridhan, property, jointly or separately owned

by the aggrieved person, payment of rental related to the shared house hold

and maintenance;

(b) disposal of household effects, any alienation of assets whether movable

or immovable, valuables, shares, securities, bonds and the like or other

property in which the aggrieved person has an interest or is entitled to use by

virtue of the domestic relationship or which may be reasonably required by the

aggrieved person or her children or her stridhan or any other property jointly or

separately held by the aggrieved person; and

(c) prohibition or restriction to continued access to resources or facilities

which the aggrieved person is entitled to use or enjoy by virtue of the domestic

relationship including access to the shared household.

Explanation II.—For the purpose of determining whether any act, omission,

commission or conduct of the respondent constitutes “domestic violence” under

this section, the overall facts and circumstances of the case shall be taken into

consideration.

33. The petitioner stated in her application in para 10 that the respondent

no. 1 had married again and inspite of having sufficient income the

respondent no. 1 had not spent a single money to the petitioner and his

child and as such she and her child are completely dependent upon her

aged ailing father and therefore in para 11 she submitted that unless and

until the petitioners/wife will get proper maintenance, protection and

residence order from the trial court she will be highly prejudiced

34. In view of aforesaid averments made in the Application under section

12 of DV Act, it is clear that petitioner herein/wife has alleged that she is

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living in penury and suffering from economic deprivation and is interalia

entitled to monetary relief from petitioner no. 1/ husband, who according to

petitioner has sufficient income of his own. The aforesaid allegation per se

discloses a case of “economic abuse” under section 3 of the Act, which

includes “domestic violence”. “Economic abuse” interalia includes

deprivation of financial or economic resources to which an aggrieved person

is entitled to under the law or custom and such claim is a continuing one

which continues from day to day. It is settled law that continuity of joint

residence in a shared house hold or domestic relationship inter se is not a

sine qua non for the perpetration of domestic violence to an aggrieved person

in the form “economic abuse” under the Act.

35. In Prabin Kumar Ghosh & others Vs. Jharna Ghosh and another ,

2016 (2) Cal.L.J 154. a co-ordinate Bench of this Court had the occasion to

consider the question as to whether a divorced wife is entitled to claim relief

under section 12 of the DV Act for the reason that after divorce, the wife had

no occasion to live with her husband in the shared household and there was

no scopes of domestic violence after divorce. The court held:-

“18. If economic abuse is evident in respect of an aggrieved person, who was in a

domestic relationship and in the event, such economic abuse continues from day to

day, the aggrieved person, in my considered opinion, would be entitled to institute

proceeding under section 12 of the Act of 2005 for necessary relief”

36. Therefore if the aforesaid definition of “economic abuse” is judged in

the context of averments made in the application filed by the petitioner

under section 12 of the D.V. Act, it is clear that the petitioners application

involves continuous/recurrent cause of action and as such, even if it is

taken for granted that the petitioners other documents in support of

20

temporary evidence was issued subsequent to filing of the case under the

DV Act, even then the filing court i.e. 11

th MM Court has the jurisdiction to

entertain the petitioners Application since continuous cause of action has

arisen within the jurisdiction of M.M. Court. Furthermore though Adhar

card is not a document of citizenship but it definitely indicative of the

present address of a person issued by neutral agency and merely because it

was reissued co-incidently on the date of lodging FIR by the petitioner, it

cannot be said that such document cannot be relied, in support of

petitioners claim of temporary residence.

37. In view of aforesaid discussion I find that the order impugned passed

by the court below dated 22.08.2022 is based on perverse finding and

therefore, liable to be set aside.

38. CRR 3472 of 2022 is allowed.

39. The impugned order dated 22.08.2022 is hereby set aside and the

order passed by learned MM 11

th Court, Calcutta in connection with MISCN

Case No. 23 of 2020 dated 14.07.2022 is hereby affirmed.

Urgent Xerox certified photocopies of this Judgment, if applied for, be given

to the parties upon compliance of the requisite formalities.

(DR. AJOY KUMAR MUKHERJEE, J.)