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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

W.P.(S) No. 516 of 2025

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Ravishankar Kumar, aged about 40 years, son of Ishwari Singh, resident of

Eguni, P.O. and P.S. Paraiya, Tahsil Tekari, District Gata, Bihar, Pin-

824209.

… … Petitioner

Versus

1. The Union of India represented through the Chairmn and C.E.O., Railway

Board, 256-A, Raisinha Road, Rail Bhawan, P.O. Sansadmarg, P.S.-

Kartavyapath New Delhi-110011.

2. The Chairman, Railway Recruitment Board, Ranchi, Railway Offices

Complex, Chutia, near Ranchi Railway Station, P.O. and P.S. Chutia,

District Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN-834001.

3. The Member Secretary, Railway Recruitment Board, Ranchi, Railway

Offices Complex, Chutia, near Ranchi Railway Station, P.O. and P.S.

Chutia, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, Pin-834001.

4. The Director Establishment (Railway Recruitment Board), Railway Board,

Govt. of India, Ministry of Railways, Rai Sinha Road, Rail Bhawan, P.O.-

Sansadmarg, P.S.-Kartavyapath New Delhi-110011.

… … Respondents

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD

HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN

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For the Petitioner : Ms. Bharti V. Kaushal, Advocate

For the Respondent : Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I.

Mr. Kumar Vaibhav, C.G.C.

Mr. Ayush, C.G.C.

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CAV/Reserved on 24.03.2026 Pronounced on 06/04/2026

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.

1. The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is

directed against the order dated 23.10.2024 passed in O.A.

No.OA/051/00265/2023 by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,

Patna Bench, Circuit Bench, Ranchi whereby and whereunder, the relief

sought for in the original application has been refused to be granted by

passing the following order:

“8. This Tribunal has considered the whole matter in its entirety and found

that the counsel for applicant has been harping on hurried disposal of his

representation, and drawing inference that this reflects non-application of

mind. This is in our view is a conjecture and without any basis because every

expeditious decision cannot be termed as non-application of mind unless

proved. There is no reason assigned by the applicant that this order is

without merit. Had it been a decision that would have taken a long time then

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it cannot be said that it is because of application of mind and not because

of the lethargy on the part of respondent.

9. The withdrawal of letter issued vide Annexure-8 through another letter

vide Annexure Annexure-9 is based on cogent reasons that it would not be

prudent to change the process when it has already begun. It would have

been another issue of changing the rules of game midway and may have led

to further litigation. Moreover, it relates to the consideration of cases

condoning the delay during the Covid period which started in March 2020.

It is to be noted that when the application for appointment was invited in

2019 this pandemic was not there, hence to use this as the reason for

granting exemption on account of delay in discharge of the applicant after

the cut-off date is not acceptable.

10. Lastly, the applicant while making the application for appointment has

himself mentioned that his date of discharge is 20.03.2020, whereas his

actual discharge was on 30.04.2020 that is after the cut-off date of

31.03.2020 thus making him guilty of making a false statement to make

himself eligible for employment. This fact was noticed during the process of

document verification. The applicant was allowed to appear in the

examination on the basis of his false declaration hence his qualifying in the

examination will not render him eligible for his employment. A parallel

could be drawn with a well qualified candidate of Unreserved category who

has crossed the maximum age limit. He makes a declaration that he belongs

to a reserved category and therefore qualified to appear in the examination.

He is allowed to appear and successfully qualifies the examination. This fact

is detected at the time of document verification. Then he cannot take the plea

that since he has qualified in the examination, he should be allowed to join

because he took advantage of an advanced age that is permitted as a

maximum age limit for a reserved category candidate. On the basis of

consideration of all the factors we find that this O.A. is devoid of merit and

is fit to be dismissed and accordingly it is dismissed. No order as to cost.”

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition

having been enumerated from the original application needs to be referred

here which is as under:

3. It is the case of the petitioner that he was appointed in the Indian Army

against the post of Hav. (OFC) and served w.e.f 19.01.2004 to 30.04.2020,

i.e. for a period a period of more than 16 years. A Centralized Employment

Notice No. CEN No. 01/2019 for non-technical popular categories

(NTPC) Graduate and Under Graduate posts was published on 28.02.2019

on the website of Govt. of India, Ministry of Railway, Railway

Recruitment Boards wherein closing date of online registration of

application was fixed on 31.03.2019. Para 10.2 of the said notice mentions

that Defence personnel to be released within one year from the closing

date of Online Registration of applications for this CEN (i.e. on or before

31.03.2020 can also apply, both for vacancies earmarked for Ex.

Servicemen and for posts not reserved for them). The applicant/petitioner

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herein applied for premature retirement on 27.11.2018 itself before the

publication of the Employment Notice and he was also granted No

Objection Certificate of his Unit on 08.03.2019 itself for applying to the

said post advertised on 28.02.2019. In the meantime, subsequent to his

application the applicant was recommended for pre-mature retirement on

extreme compassionate ground on 28.07.2019 itself. On being declared

successful in the said examination the applicant was shortlisted for

verification of documents. E-Call letter dated 28.11.2022 was issued to

the applicant for verification of documents and medical examination on

07.12.2022. On 07.12.2022 when the applicant appeared before the

authorities for document verification he was orally told that his

candidature had been rejected on the ground that he was not eligible since

he did not retire from defence services on or before 31.03.2020.

4. Aggrieved by this oral rejection of his candidature for different posts of

Level 2, 3, 5 & 6 for which the applicant was shortlisted, he moved the

Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 16/2023 which was disposed of vide order

dated 13.02.2023 with direction to the respondents not to give effect to

oral order and to consider about his candidature and may pass a reason and

speaking order within a reasonable time, but before completion of

selection process. But the respondents did not consider the candidature of

applicant vide impugned order/letter dated 22.03.2023 in terms of para

10.2 and 15.3 (h) of CEN No. 01/2019 and Railway's Board's letter dated

21.02.2023 ignoring the earlier guidelines as contained in letter dated

07.02.2023 issued during Covid Pandemic wherein it was specifically

stated in para-3 that "3..... after careful consideration of the matter, the

Competent Authority has decided that ex-servicemen candidates,

shortlisted for posts of CEN 01/2019(NTPC), who were relieved from

service after 31.03.2020 due to exigency of service, if they found otherwise

suitable, may be considered for empanelment." Applicant has also referred

to a similar case of one Mukesh Anand, Nayak in the defence Forces, who

was relieved from services w.e.f. 31.05.2000 but his candidature was

considered and he was appointed in Guwahati, RRB. Further grievance of

the applicant that the above letter dated 07.02.2023 was withdrawn vide

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letter dated 21.02.2023 without any rhyme and reason and on wrong

interpretation of law.

5. Aggrieved with the order dated 22.03.2023 and letter dated 21.02.2023,

the petitioner preferred O.A. No.OA/051/00265/2023 before the Learned

Central Administrative Tribunal.

6. The learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi

considering the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties had dismissed

the original application being O.A. No. OA/051/00265/2023 vide order

dated 23.10.2024.

7. It is evident as per the pleading made as referred hereinabove that the

petitioner was appointed in the Indian Army against the post of Hav.

(OFC) and served w.e.f 19.01.2004 to 30.04.2020, i.e. for a period a period

of more than 16 years. A Centralized Employment Notice No. CEN No.

01/2019 for non-technical popular categories (NTPC) Graduate and Under

Graduate posts was published on 28.02.2019 on the website of Govt. of

India, Ministry of Railway, Railway Recruitment Boards wherein closing

date of online registration of application was fixed on 31.03.2019. Para

10.2 of the said notice mentions that Defence personnel to be released

within one year from the closing date of Online Registration of

applications for this CEN (i.e. on or before 31.03.2020 can also apply,

both for vacancies earmarked for Ex. Servicemen and for posts not

reserved for them). The applicant applied for premature retirement on

27.11.2018 itself before the publication of the Employment Notice and he

was also granted No Objection Certificate of his Unit on 08.03.2019 itself

for applying to the said post advertised on 28.02.2019. In the meantime,

subsequent to his application the applicant was recommended for pre-

mature retirement on extreme compassionate ground on 28.07.2019 itself.

On being declared successful in the said examination the applicant was

shortlisted for verification of documents. E-Call letter dated 28.11.2022

was issued to the applicant for verification of documents and medical

examination on 07.12.2022. On 07.12.2022 when the applicant appeared

before the authorities for document verification he was orally told that his

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candidature had been rejected on the ground that he was not eligible since

he did not retire from defence services on or before 31.03.2020.

8. The same was questioned the same by filing original application being

O.A. No. 16 of 2023. The tribunal has disposed of the original application

by directing the respondents to pass reasoned order. The reasoned order

was passed on 22.03.2023 justifying the reason of rejection of the

candidature by taking the grounds that the petitioner has not been

separated from service of the armed forces up to 31.03.2020 rather he has

been separated from service on 30.04.2020, as such, the petitioner has

become ineligible in terms of the conditions stipulated as under condition

no.10.2 of the advertisement. The second ground has been taken that the

fact about separation from service although was on 30.04.2020 but the

petitioner has shown the separation from service from 31.03.2020, as such,

the fact has been suppressed.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid order by

filing another original application being O.A. No. OA/051/00265/2023

wherein the following prayer was made:

“(A) For quashing and setting aside the order as contained in Order No.

RRB/RNC/CC dated 22.03.2023 issued under the signature of Member

Secretary, Railway Recruitment Board, Ranchi, by which the candidature

of the applicant against the posts advertised vide Employment Notice No.

CEN No. 01/2019 (ΝΤPC) has not been considered in terms of para 10.2

and 15.3(h) of CEN No. 01/2019 (NTPC) and also Railway Board's letter

No. 2023/E(RRB)/0/01 dated 21.02.2023.

(B) For quashing and setting aside the Letter as contained in

2023/E(RRB)/0/01, dated 21.02.2023 issued under the signature of

Director Estt. (RRB), Railway Board, Govt. of India, New Delhi to the

extent that the same has withdrawn the earlier Letter No.

2023/E(RRB)/06/01 dated 07.02.2023 issued by the same Authority, De.

Director Establishment (RRB) Railway Board, i.e. Respondent No. 4.

(C) For direction upon the respondents to consider the candidature of the

applicant for appointment/empanelment to Level-5 posts after relaxing the

cut-off date, i.e. 30.03.2020 for relieving order of Ex-Service men as has

been done in case of Mukesh Anand.

AND

(D) The applicant prays for allowing the cost of litigation incurred in filing

the instant application upon the respondents.

(E) The applicant prays for relief/relief(s), direction/direction(s) as this

Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit for doing conscionable justice to the

Applicant under the facts and circumstances of the instant case."

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10. The written statement was filed defending the decision so taken by the

respondent. The learned Tribunal has passed the order by dismissing the

original application on the ground that the petitioner has not been found

to come under the criteria of condition as stipulated under condition

no.10.2 of the advertisement since the said condition stipulates that in

order to get the benefit of ex-servicemen category, a candidate must be

separated from service up to 31.03.2020.

11. The aforesaid order is under challenge in this writ petition.

Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner:

12. Ms. Bharti V. Kaushal, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the

following grounds:

(i) The petitioner has fulfilled the criteria as stipulated under condition

no.10.2 of the advertisement.

(ii) Even admitting the fact that the petitioner has been separated from

service after 31.03.2020 then the same would have been taken for

consideration of the rejection of all the candidates who have

participated in the process of selection conducted by different

railway recruitment boards, i.e., Guwahati and Bilaspur.

(iii) It has been contended that the specific pleading had been made in

the original application to the effect that the candidates who have

been the benefit of ex-serviceman category, have got the said

benefit, even though they have been separated from service after

31.03.2020, by the Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment

Board but the aforesaid parameter has not been adopted so far as the

case of the present petitioner is concerned.

(iv) It has been submitted that the specific plea since has been taken to

the effect of hostile discrimination by treating discriminately the

case of the petitioner to that of the other candidates who have

participated in the process of selection which fact has not been

disputed but even then, there is no consideration by the learned

Tribunal of the said issue as would be evident from the face of the

order impugned herein.

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(v) Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the fact

about subjecting the petitioner with discrimination has been

considered by this Court while passing the order dated 24.07.2025

and based upon that the supplementary counter affidavit has been

filed herein since the respondent has made out a new case by

applying the condition as stipulated under condition no.10.4 of the

notice inviting application even though the other ground was not

available before the learned Tribunal.

(vi) Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has submitted that it

is not available for the respondent to make out absolutely a new case

by improving the finding even though no such finding is available

in the reasoned order.

(vii) It has been submitted that this Court since has passed an order on

24.07.2025 during pendency of the instant writ petition by which

the respondent has only been directed to come out with the

instructions regarding the issue of acceptance of candidature of the

candidates namely, Mukesh Anand, Nayak and other identical

placed candidates who have participated in the process of selection

conducted by the railway recruitment board of Guwahati and

Bilaspur and while answering the said issue, the case has been

moulded in different directions by taking the ground that in the

meanwhile, the petitioner since has joined his service in Delhi

Police, as such, No Objection Certificate is required to be submitted

as per the condition stipulated under condition no.10.4 but the

respondent cannot be allowed to travel beyond the pleading which

was there before the tribunal in the written statement but herein, the

entire case has been tried to be moulded in a case where the

respondents are defending the order passed by the learned Tribunal

which is not available to do so far as the case herein in concerned.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has

submitted that the impugned order, therefore, needs interference.

Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent:

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14. Per contra, Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned ASGI appearing for the

respondent-Railway has taken the following grounds:

(i) It has been argued that the issue of consideration of the candidature

of the other candidates whose candidature has been considered by

the railway recruitment board of Guwahati and Bilaspur and their

candidatures have been accepted even though they have been

separated from service after 31.03.2020 but as per the reason

assigned in the reasoned order dated 22.03.2023 the petitioner has

not furnished his actual position of separation from service,

therefore, the respondent while passing the order by negating the

claim of the petitioner has come out with the reason that the fact of

separation from service has been suppressed.

(ii) However, learned counsel for the respondent has admitted the fact

that the separation from service after 31.03.2020 of the candidates

who have participated in the process of selection conducted by

Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment Board have also not

been disclosed and as such, virtually he has admitted the fact to this

extent that the case of the petitioner is identical to that of the

candidates who have participated in the process of selection

conducted by Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment Board

including the case of Mukesh Anand, Nayak.

(iii) It has been submitted by referring to the order passed by this Court

dated 24.07.2025 and while examining the issue, the respondents

have passed that the petitioner is to be looked into on the basis of

the criteria as stipulated under condition no.10.4 of the

advertisement in the backdrop of the fact that the petitioner after

being separated from of the armed forces has joined the service in

Delhi Police and in such circumstances, he ought to have placed the

NOC. Learned counsel, therefore, has submitted that the condition

as provided under condition no.10.4 of the advertisement being not

followed is also against the criteria of the candidature of the

petitioner.

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15. Learned counsel for the respondents, based upon the aforesaid grounds

has submitted that the order passed by the learned Tribunal, therefore,

needs no interference.

Response:

16. In response, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the

ground which is now being taken for applicability of the condition

stipulated under condition no.10.4 that cannot be allowed to be made out

only on the garb of the order passed by this Court dated 24.07.2025 since

the object and intent of the order passed by this Court was to come out

with the instructions based upon the admitted fact before the Tribunal as

to what is the basic difference in between the candidature of the present

petitioner and other candidates who have participated in the process of

selection conducted by Guwahati and Bilaspur Railway Recruitment

Board. But herein, the respondents have tried to mould the issue entirely

contrary to the pleading made in the original application.

17. Learned counsel, therefore, has submitted that the legality and propriety

of the order impugned is to be assessed only on the basis of the material

put forth before the Tribunal on the issue of discrimination as per the

specific pleading made before the Tribunal and the same has not been

disputed in the written statement.

Analysis

18. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the

finding recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order.

19. This Court, before proceeding to deal with the aforesaid ground to

consider the legality and propriety of the order passed by the Tribunal,

needs to first discuss the power which is to be exercised by this Court

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and

Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 261.

20. The power which is to be exercised as per the position of law is to look

into the legality and propriety of the order passed by the learned Tribunal

only in a case error apparent on the face of the order or in a case of

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perversity of finding in exercise of power conferred under the power of

judicial review as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph-

99 in the aforesaid judgment. The said paragraph is being referred as

under:

“99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of

Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude

the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles

226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the

Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations

enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same

extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High

Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article

32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our

Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and

Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers

conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals

created under Article 323-A and Article 323- B of the Constitution are

possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory

provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be

subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose

jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless,

continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law

for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for

litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they

question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation

which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the

jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and

constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.”

21. This Court, in order to assess as to whether two grounds placed before this

Court, i.e., error apparent on the face of the order or element of perversity,

has thought it proper to refer the power of judicial review which has also

been deliberated by the Hon'ble Apex Court, which is to be considered

while exercising the said power only to the extent that if any order is being

passed found to be having error on the face of the order or without

jurisdiction or suffers from perversity. The error apparent on the face of

the order means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then

only the power of judicial review is to be exercised.

22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of West Bengal Central School

Service Commission vs. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39, has held at

paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised by the

Court after determining that the impugned is vitiated by an error apparent

on the face of the record and not the same has been established by a

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process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid judgment is being

referred as under:

"30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether

the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to

determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of

the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or

whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an

error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where

there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on

the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan

Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [Satyanarayan

Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC

137] . ---."

23. In the case of T.C. Basappa vs. T. Nagappa and Anr., (1955) 1 SCR 250,

their Lordship have held that the patent error in a decision can be corrected

when it is manifested by the error apparent on the face of the proceedings.

The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:

"11. ... An error in the decision or determination itself may also be

amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent

on the face of the proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or

disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which

can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. ...."

24. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled legal position it is evident that

the power of judicial review can be exercised, if error on the face of the

order impugned, challenged under the Article 226 of Constitution of

India, appears to be there.

25. The Tribunal since has also been conferred with the power to exercise

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and as such, the

adjudication is to be made as a court of equity having extraordinary

jurisdiction therein also as a court of first instance under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India to follow the principle of strict pleading as per the

mandate as propounded in the case of Shivaji Balaram Haibatti vs.

Avinash Maruthi Pawar, (2018) 11 SCC 652 wherein at paragraph-26 it

has been held which is being reproduced as under:

“26. … It is a settled principle of law that the parties to the suit cannot

travel beyond the pleadings so also the court cannot record any finding on

the issues which are not part of pleadings. In other words, the court has to

record the findings only on the issues which are part of the pleadings on

which parties are contesting the case. Any finding recorded on an

issue dehors the pleadings is without jurisdiction. Such is the case here.”

26. The admitted case herein is that in pursuance of the advertisement, the

petitioner claiming to be a member of ex-serviceman has made application

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for consideration of his candidature as per the condition stipulated under

condition no.10.2. The said condition is being reproduced as under:

“10.2 Persons serving in the Armed Forces of the Union, who on

retirement from service would come under the category of Ex-Servicemen

are eligible to apply for re-employment one year before the completion of

the specific terms of engagement and avail themselves of all concessions

available to Ex-Servicemen but such persons shall not be permitted to

leave the uniform until they complete the specific terms of engagement in

the Armed Forces of the Union.

Accordingly, such serving Defence personnel to be released within one

year from the closing date of ONLINE Registration of applications for the

CEN (i.e. on or before 31.03.2020) can also apply, both for vacancies

earmarked for Ex-Servicemen and for posts not reserved for them.

However, they should possess the prescribed educational qualifications as

on the closing date of registration of online applications for this CEN i.e.

31.03.2019.”

27. It is evident from the aforesaid condition that the benefit of ex-servicemen

category is to be obtained by one or the other candidates under this

category if separated from the service of the armed forces up to

31.03.2020. The writ petitioner has made the application but he was not

separated till 31.03.2020 rather he got separated from service of the armed

forces on 30.04.2020.

28. The reference of the decision so taken by the respondent as on 07.02.2023

has been taken, appended as Annexure-8, that the period of separation

from service of the armed forces has been decided to be accepted if not

relieved up to the cut-off date of 31.03.2020. Subsequently, the aforesaid

letter after lapse of about two weeks, the decision so taken was recalled

with the decision that the RRBs should follow the procedure they have

been following before issuing of these instructions.

29. It is thus evident that the issue of extension as per the policy decision dated

07.02.2023 since has been recalled, hence, the condition stipulated under

condition no.10.2 was strictly to be adhered to.

30. The case of the petitioner has been rejected to be considered under the

category of ex-servicemen on the ground that he has not been separated

from service of the armed forces by 31.03.2020 rather on 30.04.2020.

31. The candidature of the petitioner was orally rejected which led the

petitioner to approach the tribunal by filing O.A. No. 16 of 2023. The said

original application was disposed of directing the respondents to

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considered and pass a reasoned order. The reasoned order was passed on

22.03.2023 and again the candidature of the petitioner to be considered

under the category of ex-servicemen was rejected by citing the following

reason(s):

“4. While verifying your documents produced on the date of Document

Verification it is found that your original date of discharge was

30.04.2020, which has been admitted by you also, which means that you

have been discharged after the cut off date of discharge i.e. 31.03.2020 as

mentioned at Para 10.2 which interalia states that “such serving Defence

personnel to be released within one year from the closing date of ONLINE

Registration of applications for the CEN (i.e. on or before 31.03.2020) can

also apply, both for vacancies earmarked for Ex-Servicemen and for posts

not reserved for them. However, they should possess the prescribed

educational qualifications as on the closing date of registration of online

applications for this CEN i.e. 31.03.2019.” Further, you have mislead the

Railway Administration regarding the date of your discharge as

20.03.2020 in your Online Application.

Since, your date of discharge was 30.04.2020 which was beyond the

cut off date of 31.03.2020, your candidature could not be considered in

terms of Para 10.2 and 15.3 (h) of CEN No. 01/2019 and also Railway

Board’s letter No. 2023/E(RRB)/06/01 dated 21.02.2023”

32. The same has again been assailed before the learned Tribunal by filing OA

No. OA/051/00265/2023. The written statement was filed.

33. The specific pleading was taken before the learned Tribunal that the

petitioner has been subjected to hostile discrimination since the other

regional recruitment board have accepted the candidature of such

candidates under the ex-servicemen category who even got separated from

service after 31.03.2020. The specific name of such candidate has also

been given. For ready reference, the pleading to that effect as made under

para-17 is being reproduced as under:

“2. … Applicant has also referred to a similar case of one Mukesh Anand,

Nayak in the defence Forces, who was relieved from services w.e.f.

31.05.2020 but his candidature was considered and he was appointed in

Guwahati, RRB. ….”

34. The written statement was filed on behalf of the respondent. The fact about

subjecting the petitioner with hostile discrimination has not been disputed

as would be evident from the response furnished on behalf of the

respondent in the written statement in response to the statement made by

the petitioner in the original application.

35. The learned tribunal has decided the issue against the petitioner by

considering the non-compliance of the condition stipulated under

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condition no.10.2 of the advertisement, i.e., the ground of taking the

benefit of ex-servicemen even though he has not been separated from

service of the armed forces up to 31.03.2020 rather he got separated from

service on 30.04.2020. The tribunal has also taken the ground that the

aforesaid fact has been suppressed by the petitioner.

36. The question of hostile discrimination was the specific issue raised before

the tribunal subjecting the petitioner of violation of Article 14 of the

Constitution of India.

37. The Article 14 is having two contexts, i.e., based upon the classification.

One is reasonable classification and other is unreasonable classification.

If the classification is based upon rationality said to be reasonable one then

Article 14 will not be of any aid but certainly if the classification is

unreasonable, then Article 14 will of aid to the litigant concerned to

protect his fundamental right. Reference in this regard be made to the

judgment rendered in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali

Sarkar [AIR 1952 SC 75] wherein it has been held that differentia

between the basis of classification and the object of the things are two

different things. It is important that there must be nexus between the basis

of classification with the object of the Act.

38. In Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors Vs. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar &

Ors [AIR 1958 SC 538], the Hon’ble Apex Court, taking into

consideration catena of judgments rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, has

held that Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable

classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the

test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely,

(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia

which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from

others left out of the group, and (ii) that differentia must have a rational

relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The

classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or

according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that

there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of

the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of

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this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a

substantive law but also by a law of procedure. Paragraph 11 of the said

judgment is quoted as under:

“11. ...

(a). That a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single

individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons

applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may

be treated as a class by himself;

(b). That there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality

of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that

there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles;

(c). That it must be presumed that the legislature understands and

correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed

to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are

based on adequate grounds;

(d). That the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may

confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the

clearest;

(e). That in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court

may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of

common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of

facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and

(f). That while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the

part of a legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of

the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court

on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the

presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always

holding that there must be some undisclosed and un-known reasons for

subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating

legislation....”

39. The aforesaid principle can further be found in RE The Special Courts

Bill, 1978, which contains that:

➢ The basic principle of Article 14 is that the persons in similar

circumstances shall be treated similarly both in privileges conferred and

liability imposed.

➢ The State shall have the power to determine with regard to the process

of classification, which should be regarded as a class for the purpose of

legislation and in relation to a law enacted on a particular subject.

➢ The classification does not mean arbitrary application of law to certain

person instead it means segregation in classes which had a systematic

relation, usually found common property and characteristics.

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➢ The law can make and set apart the classes according to the needs and

exigencies of the society and suggested by experience. It can even

recognize ‘degrees of evil’ but the classification should never be arbitrary,

or artificial.

40. In R.K. Garg Vs. Union of India & Ors [(1981) 4 SCC 675], the Hon’ble

Apex Court has held that Article 14 forbids class legislation but does not

forbid reasonable classification.

41. It is, thus, evident that Article 14 prohibits discriminatory legislation

against an individual or against a class of individual but it does not prohibit

reasonable classification. Reference in this regard be made to the

judgment rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court in D.S. Nakara & Ors. v.

Union of India [(1983) 1 SCC 305], wherein at paragraph 11, it has been

held as under:-

“11. The decisions clearly lay down that though Article 14 forbids class

legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of

legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification,

two conditions must be fulfilled viz. (i) that the classification must be

founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things

that are grouped together from those that are left out of the group; and (ii)

that that differentia must have a rational relation to the objects sought to

be achieved by the statute in question (see Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice

S.R. Tendolkar [AIR 1958 SC 538 : 1959 SCR 279, 296 : 1959 SCJ 147]

). The classification may be founded on differential basis according to

objects sought to be achieved but what is implicit in it is that there ought

to be a nexus i.e. causal connection between the basis of classification and

object of the statute under consideration. It is equally well settled by the

decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only

by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.”

42. This Court is now proceeding to examine as to whether the issue of

discrimination which has been raised on behalf of the petitioner is under

reasonable or unreasonable criteria.

43. The fact regarding the condition as available under condition no.10.2 of

the advertisement floated by the Ranchi Railway Recruitment Board is

admitted to be the same advertisement floated by the Guwahati and

Bilaspur Railway Recruitment Board. The candidates who have sought for

the benefit of ex-servicemen category in the railway recruitment of

Guwahati and Bilaspur have been given the benefit of ex-servicemen even

thought they have been separated from service of the armed forces after

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31.03.2020. The name of one of the candidates has also been disclosed,

i.e., Mukesh Kumar, Nayak.

44. The fact about the identical condition to consider the candidature of one

or the other candidates under the ex-servicemen category in all the

advertisement issued by the railway recruitment board either it is

Guwahati or Bilaspur or Ranchi, have not been disputed.

45. The question would be that when the ex-servicemen category is being

considered for one or the other candidates as per the condition stipulated

under condition no.10.2 on the basis of separation from service of armed

forces up to 31.03.2020 then it should have been restricted to the said

condition strictly without giving any premium to any other candidate who

have made application to other regional railway recruitment board having

the same conditions in the advertisement floated.

46. The aforesaid consideration of the candidature by two regional railway

recruitment board and no consideration of the candidature of the present

petitioner is admittedly not under the reasonable classification rather it is

under the fold of unreasonable classification since the nodal body said to

be the apex body of all the recruitment is the Railway Board under the

Ministry of Railways.

47. This Court, therefore, is of the view that whatever recruitment has been

allowed to be made by the regional recruitment board that is under the

authority of the Railway Board controlled by the ministry of railways and

as such, all the parameters of the appointments is required to be followed

uniformly and it cannot be allowed to be based on the basis of the region

as the facts of the present case is.

48. The aforesaid pleading has specifically been made before the tribunal but

the aforesaid fact has not been answered by the tribunal.

49. Before appreciating the aforesaid issue, it needs to be considered by this

Court that the additional ground has been taken by the respondent with

respect to the condition no.10.4 as available in the advertisement.

50. The condition no.10.4 is with respect to such candidates who after getting

the status of ex-servicemen and before appointment in terms of the

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advertisement got the appointment which is civil in nature then in such

circumstances, declaration is to be furnished along with NOC from the

civil employer during the document verification failing which they will

not get the benefit of ex-servicemen category. For ready reference,

condition no.10.4 is being reproduced as under:

“10.4 If an Ex-Serviceman applies for various vacancies before joining

any civil employment, he/she can avail the benefit of reservation as Ex-

Serviceman for any subsequent employment, subject to the condition that

an Ex-Serviceman as soon as he/she joins any civil employment, should

give self-declaration/undertaking to the concerned employer about the

date wise details of application for various vacancies, including this CEN,

for which he/she had applied for, before joining the initial civil

employment. The acknowledged copy of this declaration along with no

objection certificate (NOC) from the civil employer should be produced

during document verification, failing which they will not get benefit of

reservation for Ex-Servicemen. Further, this benefit would be available

only in respect of vacancies which are filled on direct recruitment and

wherever reservation is applicable to the Ex-Servicemen.”

51. The admitted fact as has been admitted by the learned ASGI is that the

rejection of the candidature of the present petitioner for consideration

under the ex-servicemen category as per the reasoned order is totally based

upon the applicability of the condition no.10.2 and there is no reference of

the applicability of the condition no.10.4.

52. It is also admitted position as has been admitted by the learned ASGI that

the applicability of the condition no.10.4 has also not been pleaded by the

respondent in the written statement before the Tribunal.

53. Further, it has been submitted that the applicability of the condition

no.10.4 has been taken into consideration in the light of the order passed

by this Court on 24.07.2025 and in course of delving with the issue, it has

been found that the petitioner has got appointment in Delhi Police and in

view of the examination, condition no.10.4 is required to be considered,

i.e., NOC from the civil employer to be placed at the time of document

verification.

54. This Court after going through the condition no.10.4 and making out an

additional ground as per the decision taken by the authority in the reasoned

order dated 22.03.2023 which has been passed in pursuance of the order

of command issued by the learned Tribunal in exercise of power conferred

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and if the applicability of

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the condition as contained under condition no.10.4 was at all there, then it

should have been referred in the said reasoned order while rejecting the

candidature of the petitioner for consideration of his case under the ex-

servicemen category.

55. But the same has not been done as per the admitted case as has been

referred hereinabove rather it has been submitted that the applicability of

the condition as under condition no.10.4 has been considered in the light

of the interim order passed by this Court and hence, the same cannot be

said to be a reasoned consideration. But this Court, is not in agreement

with the same reason being that whatever order has been passed by this

Court, the same is in the pretext of the fact that the argument was advanced

on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has been subjected to hostile

discrimination by not giving the said benefit as was given to Mukesh

Anand, Nayak who was relieved from service w.e.f. 31.05.2020 and he

has been appointed. For ready reference, the order dated 24.07.2020 is

being reproduced as under:

“1. Heard.

2. It is a specific case of the petitioner that a similar situated employee

namely Sri Mukesh Anand, Nayak, who was relieved from service with

effect from 31.05.2000 was not only considered but thereafter appointed

in Guwahati Railway Recruitment Board whereas, the petitioner alone

was singled out since 10 other similarly situated persons have been

appointed in Railway Recruitment Board, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh vide

order dated 03.11.2023.

3. It needs to be noticed that the contention of Sri Anand being appointed

was already considered before the learned Tribunal as is evident from

perusal of para-2 of the order passed by the learned Tribunal, but this

question was not at all dealt with by the learned Tribunal.

4. In the given circumstances, we deem it appropriate to direct the

respondents to file a supplementary affidavit regarding the appointment

given to Sri Mukesh Anand and how his case is different from the

petitioner. We further direct the respondents to file an affidavit explaining

how the cases of 10 other ex-servicemen, who have been given

appointment vide order dated 03.11.2023, is different from that of the

petitioner.

5. List after two weeks.”

56. This Court is of the view that the context of passing the order on

24.07.2025 by this Court was in the context of the issue of discrimination

and therefore, this Court has passed an order that how the case of Mukesh

Anand, Nayak is different to that of the case of the present petitioner. As

also, it is the admitted case that the NOC has subsequently been furnished

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on behalf of the petitioner to the appointing authority and as such, there is

no element of misrepresentation on the part of the petitioner.

57. Further, the respondent has been directed to file an affidavit explaining

how the case of 10 other ex-servicemen who have been appointed in

Railway Recruitment Board, Bilaspur, Chattisgarh vide order dated

03.11.2023 is different to that of the petitioner.

58. The aforesaid intent of the said order cannot be considered that the

respondent have been given further liberty to make improvement in the

decision already taken in the reasoned order rather the intend of the order

is to disclose the issue of discrimination by assigning the reason.

59. The fact about the case of the petitioner along with Mukesh Anand, Nayak

and other 10 candidates who have been considered in the ex-servicemen

category has been admitted to be not different to that of the case of the

present petitioner.

60. This Court in the aforesaid since is to be consider as to whether the

respondents have got any right to improve the reasoned order which has

already been taken on the basis of the order of passed by the learned

Tribunal. This Court is further of the view that if the respondent will be

allowed to improve the impugned order will it not amount to improving

the order during pendency of the lis. Further will it not be contrary to the

law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh

Gill and another v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and

others, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 405. Relevant paragraph of the said

judgment is being reproduced as under:

“8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary

makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the

reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the

shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning

may, by the time it comes to Court on account of a challenge, get validated

by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the

observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji:

“Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot

be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer

making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what

he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to

have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of

those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with

reference to the language used in the order itself.”

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Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.”

61. It is evident from the aforesaid pronouncement as rendered by the Hon’ble

Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief

Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others (supra) that the order

passed by the authority cannot be allowed to be improved by way of

counter affidavit and exactly the case herein is. The reason which has been

assigned in the impugned is being sought to be improved by inserting

another reason in the garb of the order passed by this Court.

62. This Court has passed the order with the intend to seek justification of the

decision so taken as contained in the reasoned order dated 22.03.2023. The

fact about discriminatory attitude although has been pleaded but has not

been taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal, hence, this Court is

of the view that the order passed by the learned Tribunal suffers from

perversity.

63. This Court needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse”

as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there

is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble

Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented by the Public

Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing

the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact

is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into

consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies

logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being

perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,

i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of

cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court

observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the

subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on

record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural

irregularity.

25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR

1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a

finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether

against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994

Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is

not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are

based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable

person would have arrived at those findings.

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26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the

Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading

and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]

the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined

as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether

against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court

defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from

the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct,

etc.

27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries

in the following manner:

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th

Edn.

“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way

that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International

Edn.

Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and

reasonable.

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the

direction of the judge on a point of law.

4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English

Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected

behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is

not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the

evidence.””

64. Thus, a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only

against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.

Further “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are

not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the

law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

65. The consideration on the issue of parity with the case of Mukesh Anand,

Nayak and other identical placed candidates who have participated in the

process of selection conducted by the railway recruitment board of

Guwahati and Bilaspur since has not been considered even though the

same has been taken note in the impugned order passed by the Tribunal,

as such, according to our considered view, the aforesaid non-consideration

of the issue of parity comes under the fold of perversity.

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66. This Court in view of the aforesaid after having exercising the power of

judicial review in view of the law laid down in the case of L. Chandra

Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) is of the view that the

impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal needs interference.

67. Accordingly, the order dated 23.10.2024 passed in O.A.

No.OA/051/00265/2023 by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal,

Patna Bench, Circuit Bench, Ranchi is hereby quashed and set aside.

68. In consequence thereof, the instant writ petition stands allowed.

69. This Court intends to remit the matter before the learned Tribunal but no

purpose would be served as it is a matter of recruitment and further if the

fact about the discrimination would have been disputed then the matter

would have been remitted to the Tribunal to adjudicate the issue but that

is not the fact herein, rather the fact about discrimination has been

admitted as has been referred hereinabove, then, the question is that for

what purpose the matter is to be remitted.

70. This Court, therefore, is of the view that it is not a case where the case is

to be remitted rather this Court is of the view that the command is to be

issued upon the respondents in exercise of power under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India to come out with the appointment letter in favour of

the petitioner.

71. Accordingly, the concerned respondent is directed to issue appointment

letter in favour of the petitioner within a period of four weeks from the

date of receipt/production of the order.

72. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

I agree,

(Deepak Roshan, J.) (Deepak Roshan, J.)

06

th

April, 2026

Saurabh/-

A.F.R.

Uploaded on: 07.04.2026