2026 INSC 792 Page 1 of 32

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 13055 OF 2025

(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 28149 OF 2023)

RUPESH R. GAONKAR & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF GOA & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

THE CHALLENGE

1. The present Civil Appeal, arising out of leave granted by

this Court, has been preferred by Rupesh R. Gaonkar and other

similarly situated persons (hereinafter referred to as “the

appellants”), being aggrieved by the judgment and final order

dated 28.07.2023 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court

of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No. 95 of 2021, along with the

Page 2 of 32

connected Writ Petition No. 147 of 2021. By the impugned

judgment, the High Court declined to give effect to the order dated

07.02.2014 passed by the Principal Chief Engineer, Public Works

Department (for short “PWD”), Government of Goa, which had

granted the appellants temporary status and recognised their

entitlement to be absorbed in the establishment of the PWD as

and when vacancies arose. The High Court non-suited the

appellants principally on the ground that the order dated

07.02.2014 suffered from the absence of the concurrence of the

Government, and accordingly, dismissed both the writ petitions,

while granting liberty to the appellants to participate in future

selection processes, with sympathetic consideration of age

relaxation.

2. The appellants are members of the PWD Labour Supply

Society (“the Society”), a body constituted by the respondent-State

itself, headed by the Principal Chief Engineer, PWD, with the

specific and avowed object of putting an end to the exploitation of

contract labour engaged in the PWD and ensuring the eventual

regularisation of their services. It is the case of the appellants that

despite the State having, over a period spanning more than a

Page 3 of 32

decade, taken repeated and consistent steps towards their

absorption, including the grant of “temporary status” with parity

in pay and emoluments with regular employees, the State has now

sought to resile from its own commitment on a purely technical

and self-created ground, after having taken the benefit of the

appellants’ labour for decades.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The appellants were originally engaged, between the

years 1967 and 2003, as workmen belonging to the unskilled,

semi-skilled, skilled and highly skilled categories, by private

contractors executing works for the PWD of the Government of

Goa. To obviate exploitation of such contract labour by

intermediary contractors, the respondent-State constituted the

PWD Labour Supply Society, a society which supplies requisite

workers to establishments operated by the PWD and which is,

significantly, headed by the Principal Chief Engineer of the PWD

himself, a senior functionary of the State Government.

4. On 27.07.2012, the office of the Chief Minister resolved

to formulate a policy for absorption of the members of the Society

Page 4 of 32

into the establishments of the PWD. Pursuant thereto, a

Committee was constituted to examine the eligibility of the

members of the Society, which categorised them variously as

Meter Readers, Work Assistants, Pump Attendants, Watchmen,

Helper-Plumbers, Electricians, and the like. This exercise,

undertaken at the instance of the State itself, necessarily involved

scrutiny of the eligibility of the members for placement in the

respective categories.

5. A note dated 04.09.2013 approved by the Finance

Department and the Chief Minister, recommended, inter alia, a

freeze on all direct recruitment in the PWD pending regularisation

and absorption of the members of the Society, coupled with a

stipulation that the Society would not recruit fresh members and

would stand dissolved once all its members were regularised.

6. Notwithstanding the said recommendation, an

advertisement dated 06.09.2013 was issued by the Principal Chief

Engineer, PWD, inviting applications for direct recruitment to

certain posts, an act that, as will be noticed, sits uneasily with

the State’s own contemporaneous resolve to first absorb the

members of the Society.

Page 5 of 32

7. On 04.12.2013, a proposal for the grant of “temporary

status” to 1,399 members of the Society who had completed eight

years of service as on 01.04.2013 was approved by the Minister

for PWD as well as the Chief Minister.

8. In furtherance of the above, an order dated 07.02.2014

was issued by the Principal Chief Engineer, PWD/Additional

Secretary to the Government, conveying that the Government had

accorded sanction for the grant of temporary status to the

members of the Society and that such workers would be entitled

to absorption in the establishments of the PWD as and when

vacancies arose and were available.

9. Significantly, the order dated 07.02.2014 was placed

before the High Court of Bombay at Goa on 09.04.2014, in Writ

Petition No. 307 of 2006 preferred by a Trade Union of which the

appellants were members. On the basis of the said order and a

categorical statement made by the then learned Advocate General

for the State that the workers of the Society would be entitled to

absorption in the establishments of the PWD as per the vacancies

arising, on the terms of the order dated 07.02.2014, the said writ

petition came to be disposed of.

Page 6 of 32

10. Despite the aforesaid statement made before the High

Court on behalf of the State, the respondents proceeded to issue

fresh advertisements dated 16.10.2014 and 02.12.2014 for direct

recruitment to posts in the PWD, without reference to the pending

claims of the appellants for absorption.

11. On account of the continued failure of the State to

regularise the members of the Society, the appellants, along with

others, addressed a representation dated 23.11.2018 to the Chief

Secretary, seeking regularisation of their services. By

communication dated 30.11.2018, the Principal Chief Engineer,

PWD, forwarded the said representation for consideration by the

High-Level Empowered Committee (HLEC), constituted by the

Government.

12. Apprehending that the State would proceed to fill

available vacancies by way of direct recruitment, in derogation of

the order dated 07.02.2014 (which was taken on record by the

High Court on 09.04.2014), the appellants instituted Writ Petition

No. 95 of 2021 before the High Court of Bombay at Goa on

09.02.2021, this being the first writ proceeding instituted by the

appellants in their own, personal capacity (as distinct from the

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earlier trade union proceeding of 2006). It was specifically averred

therein that the appellants fulfilled all the requisite criteria and

qualifications for the posts in question and, having worked for

periods extending up to seventeen years and beyond, possessed

the requisite experience to discharge the duties of such posts.

13. The respondents filed their reply dated 12.08.2021

resisting the writ petition principally on the grounds that the

order dated 07.02.2014 had not received the requisite sanction of

the Government for regularization; that the appellants, being

members of a Society registered under the Societies Registration

Act, 1860, were not Government employees and could claim no

right of absorption; that no sanctioned posts existed against

which the appellants could be absorbed; and that the decision of

this Court in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3)

1

precluded the

grant of such relief. The appellants filed their rejoinder on

25.08.2021, controverting the aforesaid contentions.

14. By the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2023, the High

Court dismissed both the writ petitions. The material findings of

the High Court, in brief, were that: the initial engagement of the

1

(2006) 4 SCC 1.

Page 8 of 32

appellants through the contractors and thereafter in the Society

was without following due process and was, therefore, not merely

irregular but illegal; the grant of temporary status together with

parity in pay and emoluments demonstrated that, save for

regularisation, the appellants were treated at par with their

counterparts in the regular establishment, but this did not by

itself entitle them to regularisation; the prayer for creation of

posts to accommodate the appellants could not be countenanced

as being contrary to the constitutional scheme; and the statement

of the learned Advocate General in the earlier writ proceedings,

being founded only on file notings which never culminated into a

formal Government order issued in accordance with law, could

not bind the State. The High Court accordingly dismissed both

the petitions while granting liberty to the appellants to participate

in future selection processes, subject to eligibility, with

sympathetic consideration for age relaxation.

15. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants preferred Special Leave

Petition (Civil) No. 28149 of 2023 before this Court. Leave was

granted on 28.10.2025, and the appeal was renumbered as Civil

Appeal No. 13055 of 2025. We have heard learned counsel for the

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appellants and learned counsel for the respondent -State at

length.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

16. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants

advanced submissions which may be summarised, inter alia, as

follows:

Firstly, it was submitted that the PWD Labour

Supply Society was itself a creature of the State,

constituted with the specific object of preventing

exploitation of contract labour and ensuring its eventual

regularisation; that the Society was headed by no less a

functionary than the Principal Chief Engineer, PWD; and

that this very constitution of the Society was

demonstrative of a clear and abiding intention on the part

of the State to absorb its members in due course.

Secondly, the order dated 07.02.2014 was not a

stand-alone or unauthorised act, and had received the

imprimatur of the High Court itself in its order dated

09.04.2014 in Writ Petition No. 307 of 2006, on the basis

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of a categorical statement made by the State ’s own

Advocate General.

Thirdly, relying upon T.R. Dhananjaya v. J.

Vasudevan

2

, it was submitted that the State could not,

years later, be permitted to truncate or resile from a

solemn statement made through its Advocate General

before a Constitutional Court, merely by raising a

technical defect never disclosed to the appellants at the

relevant time.

Fourthly, the High Court’s reliance on Umadevi

(supra) was misplaced, since this Court has, in State of

J&K v. Distt. Bar Assn., Bandipora

3

, clarified that

Umadevi (supra) does not denude the State of the power

to frame a scheme for regularisation, and has, in Sheo

Narain Nagar v. State of U.P.

4

, deprecated the practice

of States mechanically invoking Umadevi (supra) to deny

regularisation to workmen.

2

(1995) 5 SCC 619.

3

(2017) 3 SCC 410.

4

(2018) 13 SCC 432.

Page 11 of 32

Fifthly, it was clarified that the appellants did not

rest their claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation

simpliciter, but on a concrete policy decision and scheme

of regularisation formulated by the State itself, a

distinction recognised by this Court in Distt. Bar Assn.,

Bandipora (supra) as taking a claim outside the strict

rigour of Umadevi (supra).

Sixthly, the High Court’s own finding, at paragraph

53 of the impugned judgment, that the appellants were

“considered at par with their counterparts working in the

regular establishment”, was itself a finding of

qualification and suitability, and could not

simultaneously coexist with a finding that the appellants

were unfit for regularisation.

Lastly, the appellants had, by the time of filing of the

writ petition, rendered continuous and unbroken service

extending up to twenty years and more, performing

duties indistinguishable from those of regular employees

of the PWD; more than a decade had elapsed since the

grant of temporary status in 2014.

Page 12 of 32

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-State resisted the appeal on the following grounds:

Firstly, reliance was placed on the binding

Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi (supra), to

submit that regularisation of appointments made without

following the process of open, merit-based recruitment

mandated by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and

not against duly sanctioned posts, was impermissible. It

was further submitted that paragraph 53 of Umadevi

contemplated, as a one -time measure, only the

regularisation of irregular (and not illegal) appointments

of duly qualified persons made against duly sanctioned

posts, and that the appellants’ case did not fall within

that limited exception.

Secondly, it was submitted that the appellants were

never government employees; they were engaged by and

were members of the Society, a body registered under the

Societies Registration Act, 1860, and no direct

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relationship of employer and employee ever came into

existence between the appellants and the State.

Thirdly, the order dated 07.02.2014 was, on the

respondents’ own showing, issued without the

concurrence of the Finance Department and without the

approval of the Chief Minister and the Minister-in-Charge

for PWD as contemplated under Article 166 of the

Constitution, and was consequently not a valid or binding

decision of the Government.

Fourthly, relying upon Uptron India Ltd. v.

Shammi Bha n

5

, it was submitted that a wrong

concession made by counsel, including the Advocate

General, on a question of law, is not binding on the State.

Fifthly, placing reliance upon Union of India v.

Ilmo Devi

6

, it was pleaded that the relief sought in the

writ petition, i.e., the creation of posts, is ex facie

untenable being in contravention of Art. 309.

5

(1998) 6 SCC 538.

6

(2021) 20 SCC 290.

Page 14 of 32

Sixthly, it was submitted that as many as 291

members of the Society approached this Hon’ble Court,

and that the creation of posts to accommodate such a

large body of contractual workers would set an

unsustainable precedent, impose an unbearable

administrative and financial burden upon the State, and

open the floodgates to similar claims by thousands of

contractual and temporary workers across the State, a

consequence expressly cautioned against in Umadevi

(supra).

Seventhly, regularisation, it was submitted, could

only take place against sanctioned vacant posts and by

following the applicable recruitment rules, and since the

appellants were never appointed against any sanctioned

post, they were ineligible for regularisation.

Lastly, reliance was placed on Official Liquidator

v. Dayanand

7

to submit that continued invocation of the

theory of legitimate expectation by temporary employees

7

(2008) 10 SCC 1.

Page 15 of 32

undermines the established legal framework set forth in

Umadevi.

ANALYSIS

18. We have given our anxious and careful consideration to

the submissions advanced on both sides, and have perused the

record placed before us, including the Cabinet notes, the order

dated 07.02.2014, the order dated 09.04.2014 passed in Writ

Petition No. 307 of 2006, and the impugned judgment.

19. At the very outset, it is necessary to observe that the

PWD Labour Supply Society is not an ordinary or private labour

contractor’s arrangement with which the State has only an

incidental or arm’s-length connection. It is a body constituted by

the State itself, headed by the Principal Chief Engineer of the

PWD, a senior government functionary, and was brought into

being for the specific and declared purpose of ending the

exploitation of contract workers and ensuring that their services

would, in due course, be regularised. The very existence and

design of the Society is, in our view, the clearest possible index of

governmental intention. A State does not ordinarily constitute an

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entire institutional apparatus, headed by its own senior officer,

merely to perpetuate a class of workers in permanent

temporariness; it does so to formalise, and to work towards the

regularisation of, a body of labour whose services it requires and

fully utilized.

20. It is also pertinent to note that it is not the case of the

respondent-State that the appellants were employees of an

independent non-governmental organisation, or that the Public

Works Department had merely outsourced its work to such an

entity. The consistent stand of the State has been that the

appellants were initially engaged through private contractors and

thereafter continued to work through the PWD Labour Supply

Society. Throughout, the appellants rendered services for the

Public Works Department. The real controversy, therefore, is not

whether the State derived the benefit of their services, but

whether, after availing those services continuously over a long

period and thereafter conferring temporary status upon them, the

State can legitimately deny them consideration for absorption in

accordance with its own policy decisions.

Page 17 of 32

21. The intention of the State, in matters such as the present,

is not to be gathered from any single document read in isolation,

but from the totality of its conduct over a sustained period of time.

Viewed thus, the decisions of 27.07.2012 and 04.12.2013, the

constitution of a Committee to categorise and assess the

suitability of the members of the Society, the freeze recommended

on direct recruitment pending regularisation, grant of temporary

status with parity of pay and emoluments as on 01.04.2013, and,

finally, the order dated 07.02.2014 recording the Government’s

sanction and the entitlement of the members to absorption as and

when vacancies arise, each of these steps, taken cumulatively,

permits of only one reasonable inference that the State intended,

and continues to require, the services of the appellants and also

to confer benefits. This act of the State does not indicate that at

any stage before the matter reached the High Court, the State did

not intend to or take away conscious decision as to regularise

their services.

22. Once the State has taken the definite and considered

step of conferring “temporary status” upon a class of workers,

with equal pay for equal work, and parity with regular employees

Page 18 of 32

in other emoluments, the only logical conclusion that can follow

is that the State itself regarded the services of such workers as

necessary, and their work as equivalent in value and quality to

that rendered by its regular employees. Temporary status, so

conferred after a structured administrative exercise involving

Cabinet decisions, categorisation, and assessment of suitability,

is not to be treated as an empty administrative label devoid of

legal consequence. It is the outward manifestation of the State’s

own considered intention to absorb the workers.

23. We are conscious of the well-settled position that the

doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the

State to act in violation of a statute or of the constitutional

discipline, and that even the celebrated enunciation of the

doctrine in M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v.

State of U.P.

8

cannot be pressed so far as to override an express

statutory or constitutional bar. To that extent, we are unable to

accept the submission that promissory estoppel, in its strict

contractual sense, can by itself found a claim for regularisation

contrary to Articles 14 and 16.

8

(1979) 2 SCC 409.

Page 19 of 32

24. That, however, does not conclude the matter against the

appellants. The unavailability of strict promissory estoppel is not

the end of the equitable enquiry in a case of this description. This

is a welfare State, and a welfare State that has, for decades, in

some cases since the 1960s, and at the very least since the grant

of temporary status in 2014 taken the benefit of the labour, skill,

and continuous attendance of the appellants, cannot in fairness

and good conscience now cast them aside on the strength of an

internal file infirmity of its own creation, an infirmity that was

never disclosed to the appellants at the time the order dated

07.02.2014 was passed, acted upon, and placed before the High

Court itself. It would be a travesty of justice, and inconsistent with

the very idea of the State as a model employer, to permit the State

to approbate the benefit of long, uninterrupted service and

simultaneously reprobate the commitment that induced and

sustained that very service.

25. The grant of temporary status in the year 2014 is, in our

view, itself the surest indicator that the services of the appellants

were, and continue to be, required by the State. More than a

decade has since elapsed. During this period, the appellants have

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continued to render service in the establishments of the PWD,

discharging duties indistinguishable from those performed by

regularly appointed employees. It would, in these circumstances,

be manifestly unfair to deny the appellants the benefit of

regularisation at this distance of time, on the ground that their

initial engagement suffered from some procedural infirmity for

which they bore no responsibility whatsoever.

26. It requires to be emphasised that the appellants are not

persons possessing rare or highly specialised skills who might,

without undue difficulty, seek and obtain alternative avenues of

livelihood, or who could realistically be expected to compete

afresh, at this stage of their working lives, in an open and general

selection. They are workers drawn predominantly from the

unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled categories, engaged on a

contractual basis by the State’s own instrumentality, who have

rendered long and continuous service, several of them for well

over a decade and a half, and some for periods extending over

decades. To deny regularisation to such workers, after having

taken the benefit of their labour for so long, is itself symptomatic

Page 21 of 32

of the very exploitation that the Society was constituted to

prevent, and cannot be countenanced by a constitutional court.

27. We may now turn to the jurisprudence surrounding

Umadevi (supra), upon which the High Court, and learned

counsel for the respondent-State, have placed considerable

reliance. It is true that the Constitution Bench in Umadevi

(supra) struck a necessary balance between the constitutional

guarantee of equality of opportunity in public employment under

Articles 14 and 16, and the practice of backdoor entry into public

service through irregular and, at times, illegal appointments, on

the other. But this Court has, in the years since, repeatedly

cautioned against the mechanical and formulaic invocation of

Umadevi (supra) to defeat the legitimate claims of long-serving

employees performing essential and perennial duties.

28. In Distt. Bar Assn., Bandipora (supra)

9

, this Court has

held in terms that Umadevi (supra) does not denude the State or

its instrumentalities from framing a scheme for regularisation.

Consequently, it is not authority for the proposition that the

executive cannot frame a policy of regularisation for its long-

9

para 11.

Page 22 of 32

serving temporary employees. In Sheo Narain Naga r (supra),

this Court deprecated the practice of States denying long-serving

workmen the benefit of regularisation by taking recourse to a

mechanical reading of Umadevi (supra).

29. More recently, this Court, in Jaggo v. Union of India

10

,

underscored whether the duties performed by long -serving

temporary employees are integral to the day-to-day functioning of

the organisation concerned, clarifying that Umadevi (supra) was

directed against illegal backdoor appointments, and was never

intended to penalise employees who, though irregularly engaged,

have rendered long service in essential, perennial roles. This

Court has further, in Vinod Kumar v. Union of India

11

and

Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziaba d

12

, cautioned against a

mechanical and blind reliance on Umadevi (supra) to deny

regularisation to temporary employees, holding that Umadevi

(supra) cannot be employed as a shield to legitimise exploitative

engagements continued for years together without the employer

undertaking legitimate recruitment. This body of precedent,

10

2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826.

11

(2024) 9 SCC 327.

12

2025 SCC OnLine SC 221.

Page 23 of 32

distinguishing and refining Umadevi (supra) rather than

displacing it, squarely governs the facts of the present case. In

Shripal v. Nagar Nigam

13

, this Court has held as follows:

“14. The Respondent Employer places reliance

on Umadevi (supra) to contend that daily-wage or temporary

employees cannot claim permanent absorption in the absence

of statutory rules providing such absorption. However, as

frequently reiterated, Uma Devi itself distinguishes between

appointments that are “illegal” and those that are “irregular,”

the latter being eligible for regularization if they meet certain

conditions. More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a

shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting for years

without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment.

Given the record which shows no true contractor -based

arrangement and a consistent need for permanent

horticultural staff the alleged asserted ban on fresh

recruitment, though real, cannot justify indefinite daily-wage

status or continued unfair practices.

15. It is manifest that the Appellant Workmen continuously

rendered their services over several years, sometimes

spanning more than a decade. Even if certain muster rolls

were not produced in full, the Employer's failure to furnish

such records—despite directions to do so—allows an adverse

inference under well-established labour jurisprudence. Indian

labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily -wage or

contractual engagements in circumstances where the work is

permanent in nature. Morally and legally, workers who fulfil

ongoing municipal requirements year after year cannot be

dismissed summarily as dispensable, particularly in the

absence of a genuine contractor agreement. At this juncture, it

would be appropriate to recall the broader critique of indefinite

“temporary” employment practices as done by a recent

judgment of this court in Jaggo v. Union of India

3

in the

following paragraphs:

“22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment

contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader

systemic issue that adversely affects workers' rights and

job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig

economy has led to an increase in precarious employment

13

2025 SCC OnLine SC 221

Page 24 of 32

arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job

security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been

criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour

standards. Government institutions, entrusted with

upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an

even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative

employment practices. When public sector entities engage

in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the

detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also

sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in

governmental operations.

………

25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary

employees, particularly in government institutions, often

face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the

foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have

been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have

increasingly become a mechanism to evade long -term

obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest

in several ways:

• Misuse of “Temporary” Labels: Employees engaged for

work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the

functioning of an institution are often labelled as

“temporary” or “contractual,” even when their roles mirror

those of regular employees. Such mis classification

deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits

that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing

identical tasks.

• Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are

frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in

the present case. This practice undermines the principles

of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of

constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration

of their service.

• Lack of Career Progression: Temporary

employees often find themselves excluded from

opportunities for skill development, promotions, or

incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their

roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and

their regular counterparts, despite their contributions

being equally significant.

• Using Outsourcing as a Shield: Institutions

increasingly resort to outsourcing roles performed by

temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of

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exploited workers with another. This practice not only

perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a

deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular

employment.

• Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary

employees are often denied fundamental benefits such

as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid

leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack

of social security subjects them and their families to

undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement,

or unforeseen circumstances.”

30. Tested on the touchstone of this line of authority, the

present is manifestly a case falling within, and not outside, the

one-time measure contemplated by paragraph 53 of Umadevi

(supra) itself, which recognises that irregular, as distinct from

illegal appointments of duly qualified persons, continued for ten

years or more without the intervention of any court order, may be

regularised on a one-time basis. The appellants' engagement was

not the product of a clandestine or illegal backdoor entry; it was

the outcome of a structured process, constitution of a Society by

the State, a Cabinet-approved categorisation exercise, and the

grant of temporary status undertaken by the State itself, with full

knowledge and active participation of its highest executive

authorities, including the Chief Minister and the concerned

Minister.

Page 26 of 32

31. In view of the above, we find that the High Court fell into

error in treating the appellants’ engagement as vitiated at the

threshold for want of due process while, in the very same breath,

observing in paragraph 53 of the impugned judgment that, save

for regularisation, the appellants had been treated at par with

their counterparts in the regular establishment by the grant of

temporary status together with parity in pay and emoluments.

These two findings sit uneasily with one another. The grant of

temporary status was preceded by a process of scrutiny and

categorisation undertaken at the instance of the State itself, and

reflects a conscious governmental decision that the appellants

should continue to discharge the functions assigned to the

respective posts. It also demonstrates that the State did not

regard the appellants as lacking the requisite eligibility to

continue in service. In such circumstances, the principal

irregularity, if any, lay in the manner of their initial engagement

rather than in any subsequent recognition of their utility or

eligibility by the State. It is this distinction that paragraph 53 of

Umadevi (supra) requires the Court to keep in view while

considering claims for one-time regularisation.

Page 27 of 32

32. As regards the plea that the order dated 07.02.2014

lacked the concurrence of the Finance Department and the

requisite approvals under the Rules of Business, we are of the

view that this objection, even assuming it exists, is not available

to the respondent-State at this belated stage. The said order was

placed before the High Court on 09.04.2014 and formed the basis

on which Writ Petition No. 307 of 2006 came to be disposed of

upon the statement made by the learned Advoca te General.

Thereafter, the State continued to avail itself of the services of the

appellants, extended to them temporary status and even

forwarded their representation dated 23.11.2018 for

consideration by the High-Level Empowered Committee by

communication dated 30.11.2018, without raising the objection

that the order dated 07.02.2014 lacked the requisite concurrence

or approval. In these circumstances, the State cannot now be

permitted to rely upon its own alleged procedural deficiency to

defeat the legitimate expectation generated by its consistent

conduct over a prolonged period. Such a course is inconsistent

with the obligation of the State to act as a model employer, a

principle repeatedly emphasised by this Court.

Page 28 of 32

33. We are equally unable to accept the submission that the

oral concession of the learned Advocate General in the 2006

proceedings can simply be brushed aside as an incorrect

concession on a question of law not binding on the State, within

the meaning of Uptron India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan (supra). The

Advocate General did not merely concede a proposition of law; he

placed before the Court, and relied upon, an executive order dated

07.02.2014 that had itself emerged from a structured and

approved process. The statement was thus one of fact and

executive policy, not a bare concession on a contested question of

law, and the principle in Uptron India Ltd. (supra) has no

application to such a case.

34. The apprehension voiced on behalf of the State, that

regularising the appellants would open the floodgates to similar

claims by other contractual workers across the State cannot by

itself defeat a case that is otherwise made out on facts,

particularly where, as here, relief is confined strictly to the

appellants before this Court and is not extended as a matter of

general policy to workers who are not parties to these proceedings.

The floodgates concern in Umadevi (supra) was addressed to the

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indiscriminate regularisation of illegal appointments at large; it

was never intended to shut the door on a case-specific, one-time

measure confined to identified and named claimants whose facts

have been fully examined by the Court.

35. For all the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered

opinion that the appellants have made out a case for

regularisation of their services in the establishment of the PWD,

Government of Goa, and that the impugned judgment of the High

Court, insofar as it declines such relief, warrants interference.

CONCLUSION

36. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is

allowed, and we direct as follows:

(i) The judgment and final order dated

28.07.2023 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa

in Writ Petition No. 95 of 2021, along with the connected

Writ Petition No. 147 of 2021, is set aside.

(ii) The appellants are held entitled to

regularisation of their services in the establishment of

the Public Works Department, Government of Goa, in

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the posts/categories to which they were assigned

pursuant to the categorisation exercise undertaken by

the State in 2013 and given temporary status.

(iii) The respondent-State shall, within a period of four

months from today, frame an appropriate scheme to give

effect to the regularisation directed herein. The scheme

so framed shall be strictly limited to, and shall enure

only for the benefit of, the members of the society who

were members of the society at the time of institution of

the writ petition, WP(C) No. 95 of 2001 on 09.02.2021,

and shall not be treated as a precedent for, or extended

to, any other worker who were not member s of the

society on the date of the filing of the writ petition on

09.02.2021.

(iv) In the event sufficient sanctioned vacant posts

are not presently available to accommodate all the

appellants/workers as mentioned above , the

respondent-State shall create supernumerary posts, on

a one-to-one basis, to the extent necessary to absorb the

appellants/workers. Such supernumerary posts shall

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be personal to the appellants concerned, shall stand

automatically abolished upon the retirement,

resignation, death or cessation of service of the

incumbent appellant/workers, and shall not enure for

the benefit of any successor or be treated as a

sanctioned addition to the regular cadre strength for any

other purpose.

(v) The appellants/workers shall be deemed to

have been regularised in service with effect from

09.02.2021, being the date of institution of Writ Petition

No. 95 of 2021, the first writ proceeding instituted by the

appellants/workers in their own right, and shall be

entitled to all consequential and attendant benefits of

regularisation, including seniority and pensionary and

retiral benefits, reckoned with effect from the said date.

(vi) Notwithstanding clause (v) above, monetary

arrears of pay and allowances consequent upon such

regularisation shall not be payable for any period prior

to the date of this judgment.

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37. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. Pending

applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

.................................J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

…………………… .................................J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 04, 2026.