As per case facts, the dispute involved a civil suit for property partition, where a preliminary decree was passed in 1959 and a final decree in 2003 for a portion ...
2024 INSC 544 1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO S. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19647 -48 OF 2022]
S. TIRUPATHI RAO … APPELLANT
VERSUS
M. LINGAMAIAH & ORS …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO S. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19748-19749 OF 2022 ]
J U D G M E N T
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19647 -48 OF 2022]
Leave granted.
2. These appeals assail the common judgment and order dated 27
th
April,
2022
1
of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad
2
allowing
1
impugned order, hereafter
2
High Court, hereafter
2
Review I.A. No. 1/2020 in LPA 1/2018 and Review I.A. No. 3/2020 in CA
33/2017
3
preferred by the first respondent. The impugned order of the High
Court recalled the order under review and dismissed a contempt appeal as
well as a letters patent appeal of the appellant.
3. The present dispute emerges from a complex and interwoven set of legal
proceedings, involving myriad parties and decisions rendered by both
judicial and quasi-judicial authorities. The factual matrix, to the extent
relevant for adjudication of these civil appeals, is noticed hereunder:
I. Ms. Sultana Jahan Begum, daughter of Nawab Moin -ud-Dowla Bahadur,
instituted Original Suit 130/1953
4
(since renumbered as Civil Suit
07/1958 upon its transfer to the High Court) before the City Civil Court,
Andhra Pradesh, seeking partition of her father’s properties known as
‘Asman Jahi Paigah’.
II. On 06
th
April, 1959, a preliminary decree was passed by the High Court
on the basis of a compromise entered into by and between the parties
to the civil suit. The schedule of properties included within it Raidurg
village
5
.
III. Notably, it is recorded therein that the plaintiff chose to withdraw her
claim against, inter alia, the defendant no. 48 in the suit, i.e., the
Secretary, Finance Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh.
Resultantly, the suit stood dismissed against the State unconditionally.
3
review petitions, hereafter
4
civil suit, hereafter
5
subject land, hereafter
3
IV. During the pendency of the civil suit, Nawab Zaheer Yar Jung, son of
Nawab Moin-ud-Dowla Bahadur, filed a claim petition before the Nazim-
e-Atiyat, claiming the subject land as jagir land. This claim was
negatived by the Nazim-e-Atiyat vide an order dated 28
th
October, 1968
upon verification of sanad, which revealed that there did not exist any
document granting paigah with respect to the subject land to the
claimant’s father.
V. The order passed by the Nazim-e-Atiyat, upon appeal, was confirmed by
the Board of Revenue vide an order dated 29
th
December, 1976, which
held that the subject land stood escheated to the Government.
VI. Meanwhile, on 01
st
October, 2003, the decree holders in the civil suit
executed a deed of assignment in favour of the first respondent herein
in respect of land measuring more or less Ac 143.00 guntas forming part
of certain survey numbers of the subject land.
VII. On 26
th
December, 2003, the High Court passed the final decree and
judgment in the civil suit in favour of the first respondent, with respect
to land measuring more or less acres 84.30 guntas
6
forming part of
Survey No. 46 of the subject land.
VIII. Pursuant thereto, the first respondent had approached the Tahsildar with
a prayer for mutation of his name in respect of the decretal property in
the revenue records which proved abortive. Consequently, the first
respondent invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court by preferring
6
decretal property
4
Writ Petition 1729/2009
7
, seeking direction for effecting mutation in
terms of the final decree in the civil suit. The respondent’s writ petition
was heard with a connected matter being Writ Petition 581/2009.
IX. On 05
th
March, 2009, a Single Judge of the High Court vide a common
order disposed of both the writ petitions at the admission stage itself,
with the following order:
“A partial final decree was passed by this Court on 26.12.2003 in
Application No.1409 of 2003 in C.S. No. 7 of 1958, directing
several steps. One of the steps is that the names of the decree
holders be mutated in respect of the property mentioned in the
decree. It appears that the persons, who have purchased part of
the property from the parties to the decree, have also approached
the respondents for mutation of their names. Having regard to the
fact that there was a specific direction in the decree, Acviving (sic,
requiring) authorities first to implement the decree by effecting
mutation in the only (sic) after the initial step is complied with.
Hence, the writ petitions are disposed of, directing that the Deputy
Collector / Tahsildar, Serilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy
District, shall effect necessary mutations in the revenue records
strictly in accordance with the decree, dated 26.12.2003, in
Application No.1409 of 2003 in C.S.No.7 of 1958 passed by this
Court, after issuing notices to the affected parties. The subsequent
purchasers, if any, shall be entitled to pursue their remedies after
this step. There shall be no order as to costs.”
X. Thereafter, one Syed Azizulla Husaini challenged only the decision in Writ
Petition 581/2009. In exercise of appellate jurisdiction, a Division Bench
of the High Court, vide order dated 18th August 2009, modified the
order dated 05th March, 2009 as follows:
“Heard the learned advocates. The learned advocates appearing
for the respondents have no objection if the objections which have
been filed by the appellant before the Deputy Collector / Tahsildar,
Srilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District are also considered
along with the other objections which have been filed by the
affected parties.
7
writ petition, hereafter
5
In the circumstances, the order dated 05-03-2009 passed in Writ
Petition No. 581 of 2009 is modified to the effect that while
considering the objections of the affected parties, the Deputy
Collector / Tahsildar, Srilingampally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District
shall also consider the objections which have already been filed by
the present appellant viz. Syed Azizullah Hussaini.”
XI. However, the appellant (the Tahsildar) did not carry the order of disposal
of the writ petition of the first respondent in appeal and, thus, between
the appellant and the first respondent, the order dated 05
th
March, 2009
became final and binding.
XII. In view of the Tahsildar’s inaction in effecting mutation, as ordered, the
first respondent instituted Contempt Case 217/2014
8
before the High
Court on 10
th
February, 2014.
XIII. The Single Judge, vide order dated 04
th
October, 2017, allowed the
contempt petition. The State’s contention that the petition was barred
by limitation was rejected on the ground that the Tahsildar’s failure to
obey the order of the Court, till mutation was effected, would constitute
a continuing wrong. Consequently, the Tahsildar was directed to mutate
the name of the first respondent in terms of the final decree, and was
also sentenced to simple imprisonment for a term of two months ,
together with a fine of Rs 1500/- (Rupees fifteen hundred only).
XIV. This decision of the Single Judge was challenged by the appellant in two
separate appeals – (i) Contempt Appeal 33/2017
9
, presented against
the punishment imposed on the appellant and (ii) Letters Patent Appeal
8
contempt petition, hereafter
9
contempt appeal, hereafter
6
01/2018
10
, presented against the direction for mutation of the name of
the first respondent in the revenue records qua the decretal property.
XV. A Division Bench of the High Court
11
, vide a detailed judgment and order
dated 16
th
August, 2018, allowed both the appeals and set aside the
order under challenge for two primary reasons – (i) the contempt
petition was barred by limitation, the failure of the Tahsildar to effect
the mutation constituting a single act and not a continuing wrong; and
(ii) the preliminary decree recorded that the civil suit was withdrawn as
against the State Government. Thus, there did not exist any decree
which could have been executed against the Government by the civil
court. Thus, as a legal and logical corollary, the State could not be bound
to effect mutation in the revenue records in terms of a decree which was
unenforceable against it. Consequently, the first respondent’s attempt
to seek a direction of mutation against the State, on the strength of such
a decree, was held to be fraudulent in nature.
XVI. Challenge laid by the first respondent to the judgment and order dated
16
th
August, 2018 by presenting special leave petitions
12
before this
Court was not entertained resulting in its dismissal vide order dated 29
th
October, 2018. A petition seeking review
13
of such order of dismissal
was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 08
th
January, 2019.
XVII. This Court having spurned his aforesaid challenges, the first respondent
knocked the doors of the High Court once again by filing review petitions
10
letters patent appeal, hereafter
11
Division Bench (original), hereafter
12
SLP (C) 24646-24647/2018
13
R.P. (C) 3973/2018
7
against the common judgment and order dated 16
th
August, 2018
(allowing the letters patent appeal and the contempt appeal).
XVIII. As noted at the beginning of this judgment, vide the impugned order,
another Division Bench
14
of the High Court allowed the review petitions.
IMPUGNED ORDER
4. The Division Bench (review) noted at the outset that the merits of the
matter need not be looked into, and then went on to undertake an
exhaustive examination of precisely the same.
4.1 The High Court adversely observed that the State had not yet obtained any
decree against the first respondent or his predecessors-in-interest to the
effect that the subject land belonged to it. The State was noted to have filed
OSA (Sr) No. 2116/2011, challenging the final decree proceedings dated
26
th
December, 2003 but the same stood dismissed vide order dated 24
th
August, 2011, with an observation that the State ought to initiate separate
proceedings in accordance with law. However, no such proceedings were
thereafter initiated by the State.
4.2 The High Court further observed that the State sought to set up title to the
subject land based on the concept of escheat without invoking the
provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Escheats and Bona Vacantia Act, 1974.
This led to admonition of the State authorities for taking mutually
inconsistent pleas of ‘absolute title’ and ‘right by escheat’.
14
Division Bench (review), hereafter
8
4.3 The State was further held to have suppressed material information and
approached the Court with unclean hands inasmuch as the stand taken by
them was not supported by any documentary evidence.
4.4 The State, on its part, had argued that the contempt action was itself barred
by limitation, as per section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
15
read
with rule 21 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Writ Proceedings Rules,
1977
16
. Such argument was rejected by the Division Bench (review) by
relying on the decision in Pallav Seth v. Custodian
17
, wherein it was held
that the period of limitation would only commence upon the date from the
discovery of fraud played by the party on the Court/opposite party; the
State having acted fraudulently by suppressing information, the contempt
petition would not be barred by limitation.
4.5 With respect to the contempt alleged, the Division Bench (review) examined
the conduct of the State in remaining silent on the matter of mutation and
held that such silence could not be interpreted to be a refusal on the part
of the State to act upon the representations. In view thereof, coupled with
the State’s periodic representations made before the Court that they would
implement the direction for mutation, it was held that such acts constituted
a continuing wrong so as to ensconce the contempt petition within the ambit
of the period of limitation.
4.6 In such review proceedings, the first respondent had brought on record
additional documents in the nature of sale deeds, orders by revenue
15
the Act, hereafter
16
the Writ Rules, hereafter
17
(2001) 7 SCC 549
9
authorities and governmental memos, to which allegedly access was
obtained only after the disposal of the contempt appeal, to argue that the
subject land was the self-acquired private property of the first respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest. The Division Bench (review) undertook a detailed
examination of the same to definitively conclude, with the aid of section 79
of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that the property belonged to the
predecessor-in-interest of the first respondent. The State’s objection to
such documents was overruled as the same were held to come within the
purview of “new and important matter or evidence” as provided in Order
XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure
18
.
4.7 In summation, the Division Bench (review) reviewed and reversed the
judgment and order dated 16
th
August, 2018 and confirmed the order dated
04
th
October, 2017 of the Single Judge passed on the writ petition. The
appellant’s sentence of imprisonment was modified to four months, and a
direction was issued to implement the order passed in the writ petition
within a period of four weeks.
SUBMISSIONS
5. Mr. C.S. Vaidyanathan, learned senior counsel for the appellant , while
seeking our interference with the impugned order, submitted as under:
a) The Division Bench (review) of the High Court erred in allowing the
review petitions, without affording a hearing to the appellant on
merits.
18
CPC, hereafter
10
b) The Division Bench (review) set aside the reasoned judgment of the
Division Bench (original) in the contempt appeal and while
substituting its own reasoning for that in the order under review, did
not disclose the error that was apparent on the record; instead, it
proceeded to decide the review as if it were sitting in appeal over
the earlier decision.
c) The Division Bench (review) placed undue reliance on the additional
documents produced by the first respondent, which were accepted
on face value, without giving an opportunity to the appellant to rebut
the same.
d) The Division Bench (review), in exercise of its review jurisdiction,
went beyond the order of the Single Judge passed in the writ
petition. It is settled law that a writ court cannot adjudicate on title,
since the same falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a civil court.
e) The Division Bench (original) had rightly set aside the order of the
Single Judge, as the order had been obtained by playing fraud on
the Court and the proceedings in the suit were itself fraudulent in
nature.
f) The civil suit was dismissed as against the State Government and,
thus, there could not have been an executable decree as against the
State.
g) The Division Bench (original) had rightly allowed the appellant’s
appeal on the ground that the failure to mutate the names of the
11
first respondent was not a continuing wrong and , therefore, the
contempt petition was barred by limitation.
6. Mr. C. A. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing for an intervenor, who
disputed the title of the first respondent, adopted the submissions of Mr.
C.S. Vaidyanathan. In addition, he contended that there cannot be a more
egregious mistake as the one committed by the Division Bench (review) in
exercise of its review jurisdiction. He invited our attention to the grounds of
review forming part of the review petition and contended that none of the
grounds can be said to be within the parameters of section 114 read with
Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC; hence, the Division Bench (review) assumed
a jurisdiction which it could not have more particularly after the
unsuccessful misadventures of the first respondent before this Court.
7. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Mr. Vipin Sanghi and Mr. R. Anand
Padmanabhan, learned senior counsel appearing for the various
respondents, in support of upholding the impugned order, submitted as
under:
a) The appellant had not approached this Court with clean hands since
the Government Pleader, during the pendency of the contempt
proceedings, had avowed that the process of mutation had already
commenced, while the counter affidavit filed in the same
proceedings stated that the contempt petition itself was barred by
limitation.
b) The State had submitted in the contempt proceedings that there was
serious dispute with respect to the question of title which could only
12
be adjudicated in a civil suit; however, during the course of the
review proceedings, the senior counsel appearing for the State
categorically stated that no civil suit had been filed till date.
c) During the period 1968 to 2022, the appellant had consistently taken
the plea of absolute title having been escheated to the Government,
but in course of consideration of the review petitions, undertook a
mutually inconsistent plea of the subject land being Government
land on the basis of revenue entries.
d) The appellant did not raise objections with respect to fraud and
fabrication when the additional documents were produced by the
first respondent before the High Court; having acquiesced to the
same, the appellant was now estopped from raising such pleas.
e) The first respondent relied on a multitude of orders by both judicial
and administrative authorities to prove that the subject land was
privately purchased, and constituted self-acquired lands of the first
respondent’s predecessor in interest.
ANALYSIS
8. The present lis confronts us primarily with two inter-related legal issues.
The first one requires us to examine whether the parameters set out in
Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC for exercising the power of review, as
interpreted by this Court in its numerous judgments, were at all satisfied
for the High Court to embark on an exercise of review. The second issue
requiring our consideration is the terminus a quo for commencement of the
point of limitation in matters of contempt, in the light of provisions of section
13
20 of the Act read with Article 215 of the Constitution and rule 21 of the
Writ Rules. This would, in turn, require us to examine whether the contempt
petition could have been held to be maintainable by the High Court on the
ground of the appellant having continued to observe the order (directing
mutation to be effected) in the breach; in other words, whether there was
a continuing wilful breach of the order of the Single Judge dated 5
th
March,
2009, amounting to civil contempt. These being preliminary legal issues are
proposed to be dealt with at the outset. Needless to observe, hardly any
other issue would survive for decision should any of these issues be
answered in favour of the appellant and against the first respondent.
9. We are not too inclined to examine the contention raised on behalf of the
appellant that he was not extended reasonable and adequate opportunity
of hearing, once the Division Bench (review) allowed the review petitions
and proceeded to reverse the decision of the Division Bench (original) on
merits. There are other formidable grounds of challenge, which would
necessarily fall for our examination and succeeding on one of such grounds
would render the contention raised redundant.
10. The Division Bench (review) extensively discussed the grounds which need
to exist so as to validate the invocation and exercise of the Court’s power
of review. In the impugned order, it held that the State suppressed certain
title documents, which were for the first time produced before the Court by
the first respondent as additional documents. The additional documents
constituted, inter alia, an order of the Board of Revenue, Andhra Pradesh
dated 19
th
November, 1959, which confirmed that the subject land is private
land and not inam or Government land. The first respondent justified the
14
production of these documents on the ground that access to such
documents was obtained only after the Division Bench (original) had
rendered the judgment and order dated 16
th
August, 2018. It was argued
that if the Division Bench (original) had the benefit of examination of such
additional documents, it would not have set aside the order dated 04
th
October, 2017 passed on the contempt petition. The Division Bench (review)
held that since the first respondent had discovered new evidence which was
unavailable at the earlier stage of proceedings, the threshold for
maintainability of a review petition was satisfied.
11. While proceeding to determine the correctness of the impugned order vis-
à-vis the exercise of review jurisdiction, we ought to remind ourselves of
certain cardinal principles. The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an
inherent power given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically
conferred by law. In civil proceedings, review jurisdiction is governed by
section 114 read in conjunction with order XLVII of the CPC and the court
has to be certain that the elements prescribed therein are satisfied before
exercising such power. This Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati
19
has
succinctly observed that:
“19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be
strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.”
(emphasis ours)
12. That the provisions contained in section 114 and Order XLVII of the CPC
relating to review of an order or decree are mandatory in nature and any
19
(2013) 8 SCC 320
15
petition for review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot be entertained
ex debito justitiae, by a court of law, is trite.
13. There is a plethora of decisions analysing the statutory provisions governing
the exercise of review jurisdiction; however, we would be referring to a few
of them for the purpose of the present exercise. Suffice it to note that
despite legal proceedings having commenced with institution of the civil suit
as far back as in 1953, the present controversy has, as its source, a writ
petition between the first respondent and the Tahsildar preferred in 2009.
Although the explanation to section 141 of the CPC makes it clear that
provisions of the CPC would not apply to proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution, there is authority in abundance that the principles flowing
from the CPC may safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but
to the extent the same can be made applicable.
14. To put it plainly, Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC provides three grounds for
review:
1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the
exercise of due diligence was not within the applicant’s knowledge
or could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the
decree was passed, or order made; or
2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
3) for any other sufficient reason, which must be analogous to either of
the aforesaid grounds.
16
15. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar
Paulose Athanasius
20
, this Court approved the view that the third ground
– “any other sufficient cause” must mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at
least analogous to the first two grounds. The same view has been reiterated
in a recent decision of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi
Steels Ltd.
21
. This Court affirmed that the scope of the third ground had to
be narrowly construed so as to not traverse beyond the orbit of the first two
grounds.
16. Since the Division Bench (review) invoked the first clause, we hasten to
emphasize that an applicant seeking review on the basis of discovery of new
evidence has to demonstrate: first, that there has been discovery of new
evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge or that it could not be
produced at the time the decree was passed or the order made despite due
diligence; and secondly, that the new evidence is material to the
order/decree being reviewed in the sense that if the evidence were
produced in court when the decree was passed or the order made, the
decision of the court would have been otherwise. Ultimately, it is for the
court to decide whether a review sought for by an applicant, if granted,
would prevent abuse of the process of law and/or miscarriage of justice.
17. When the ground for review sought is that of discovery of new evidence,
this Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta
22
has clarified that
20
AIR 1954 SC 526
21
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1090
22
(2008) 8 SCC 612
17
the same must be evidence which should be materially important to the
decision taken. The following passage is instructive:
“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is
sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such
matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character
that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the
judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter
or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not
only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional
matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the
exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the
court earlier.”
(emphasis ours)
18. In the light of the legal position crystalised by the above discussion, we
proceed to discern the rationale of the High Court in allowing the review
petition.
19. The proceedings of these civil appeals, as noted, have the writ petition as
its genesis and not the civil suit, which was decreed in 2003. It is of utmost
importance to bear in mind that the Division Bench (review) was called upon
to review the judgment and order dated 16
th
August, 2018 of the Division
Bench (original), which allowed the contempt appeal and the letters patent
appeal and not any other final decree or order. The Division Bench (review),
in our opinion, has fundamentally confused both its remit and the subject
matter of the review; whilst passing the impugned order, it has merged the
two proceedings (the civil suit and the writ petition) into one to ostensibly
create necessary grounds of review. The additional documents discovered
by the first respondent could have constituted a ground to review any other
decree/order but, most certainly, were of no consequence for the purpose
18
of the review petitions, which were decided by the impugned order. This,
we hold, for the reasons that follow.
20. This Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma
23
while clarifying the ambit of the review jurisdiction has categorically held
that a decision cannot be reviewed merely because it is erroneous on
merits, since that would fall squarely within the province of a court
exercising appellate jurisdiction.
21. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
24
, this Court affirmed
the ratio in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra) and further expounded
that review proceedings were not by way of an appeal, and would have to
be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the
CPC. It was further held that an error apparent on the face of the record
must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking of the record,
obviating the need for long-drawn reasonings on two possible opinions. This
Court in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik
25
, while reiterating the decisions
in Meera Bhanja (supra) and Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra), drew
out the narrow contours within which review jurisdiction of this Court had
to be exercised and held that Order XLVII, CPC does not allow for the
rehearing of a dispute merely because a party had not highlighted all
aspects of the case.
22. The Division Bench (original) had held that the decree was not enforceable
against the State; this, because the State, though a party defendant
23
(1979) 4 SCC 389
24
(1995) 1 SCC 170
25
(2006) 4 SCC 78
19
originally, did not suffer any decree owing to the dismissal of the civil suit
against the State vide judgment and preliminary decree dated 06
th
April,
1959. The said Division Bench in its judgment and order dated 16
th
August,
2018 categorically noted that the first respondent committed fraud on the
Court by obtaining a direction of mutation in the writ proceedings on the
strength of a final decree rendered in a suit which had been given up against
the State Government. The Division Bench (original) set aside the direction
to mutate the name of the first respondent in the revenue records on three
technical but fundamental grounds – first, that a non-party to a suit could
not be bound by the decree; secondly, the decision on the title of the subject
land not having been rendered upon hearing the version of the State, no
direction of the nature made by the Single Judge could have validly been
made; and thirdly, that the contempt petition was barred by limitation.
23. In the light of the present controversy, the additional documents purporting
to validate the title of the subject land [even if obtained by the first
respondent belatedly and not in course of the proceedings before the
Division Bench (original) and howsoever clinching the same might appear
to be for the lis to be decided in his favour] can neither be considered
material nor relevant to the central issue, i.e., contempt, if any, of the
direction contained in the order of disposal of the writ proceedings.
24. As noted earlier, the Division Bench (original) inter alia proceeded to
dismiss the contempt petition as time-barred. We propose to consider the
averments made in the contempt petition in greater depth a little later.
However, what stands out is that a decision having been rendered by the
Division Bench (original) upon consideration of the pleadings in the
20
contempt petition vis-à-vis the law relating to limitation contained in the
Act, such decision was not open to a review on the basis of alleged
discovery of new evidence since the same did not have any relation with
the finding that the contempt petition was time -barred. The first
respondent failed to present any new evidence countering the reasoning of
the Division Bench (original) that a time-barred contempt petition had been
entertained by the Single Judge; furthermore, the title documents or orders
of the Board of Revenue had no bearing on either the factum of the State
not being a party to the civil suit, or on the question of limitation. Quite
apart the ground of discovery of new evidence, the decision of the Division
Bench (original) which was rendered upon an exhaustive analysis of the
materials on record including the pleadings did not suffer from any error,
much less any error apparent on the face of the record, warranting a
review. Even if any error were present, such error could have been rectified
only in exercise of the court’s appellate jurisdiction and not the review
jurisdiction.
25. The grounds of review that the first respondent had urged in the review
petition have been meticulously looked into by us . They numbered in
excess of 90 (ninety). The general impression is that more the number of
grounds, less the likelihood of existence of a case for review. To succeed
in a motion for review, viewed through the prism of ‘error apparent on the
face of the record’, it does neither require long-drawn arguments nor an
elaborate process of reasoning as these may be required, in a given case,
when exercising the power of merit review. An error apparent on the face
of the record has to be self-evident. Where, conceivably, two opinions can
21
be formed in a given set of facts and circumstances and one opinion of the
two has been formed, there is no error apparent on the face of the record.
However, disabusing our mind of such an impression, we have looked into
each of the grounds. Not a single ground deserved consideration to embark
on an exercise to review the judgment and order dated 16
th
August, 2018
even on the basis of discovery of new and important matter or evidence .
We are constrained to observe that there has been usurpation of the power
of review by the Division Bench (review) to overturn a well-considered and
well-crafted decision of the Division Bench (original).
26. No other legitimate cause for review having been made out in the review
petition before the High Court as well as before us by the first respondent
and bearing in mind the above, we unhesitatingly hold that there was no
valid, legal and/or proper ground for the Division Bench (review) to reverse
the judgment and order under review on the basis of the additional
documents brought on record by the first respondent during the review
proceedings.
27. The first legal issue is, thus, answered in favour of the appellant.
28. Having held that the review jurisdiction was not available to be exercised
by the Division Bench (review), reversal of the impugned order is the
solitary conceivable outcome. However, the importance of the second legal
issue cannot be over-emphasized. The purpose of the law of contempt is to
secure public respect and confidence in the judicial process. We have found
the law on the question of applicability of the principle of “continuous
wrong/breach/offence” for the purpose of section 20 of the Act not too
22
certain; hence, we feel it expedient to give a brief overview of the law of
contempt and how such law has evolved and developed as well as chart out
the course of action to be followed by the high courts while exercising
contempt jurisdiction not only generally but also on the face of an objection
as to maintainability of a time-barred action initiated by a party for civil
contempt.
29. The power of the Supreme Court and a high court to punish for breach of
its orders is expressly recognised by Article s 129 and 215 of the
Constitution, respectively. It is an inherent power, distinguishable from a
power derived from a statute. In R.L. Kapur v. State of Tamil Nadu
26
,
this Court pointed out that the inherent power or jurisdiction was neither
derived from the statutory law relating to contempt nor did such statutory
law affect such inherent power or confer a new power or jurisdiction. In
view of the recognition of such power by the Constitution itself, they partake
the character of constitutional power and consequentially no law made by
legislature could take away the jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court
and the high courts.
30. In Aligarh Municipal Board v. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union
27
, this Court
observed as follows:
“5. *** Contempt proceeding against a person who has failed to
comply with the Court’s order serves a dual purpose: (1) vindication
of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous conduct and
(2) coercion to compel the contemner to do what the law requires of
him. The sentence imposed should effectuate both these purposes.
***”
26
(1972) 1 SCC 651
27
(1970) 3 SCC 98
23
31. This Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly
28
, held
that:
11.*** It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the
jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original
or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the
parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question
whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of
the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have
committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising
contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which
have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order,
violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to
consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to
consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have
contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court
exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the
question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to
have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions
in the judgment or order.
(emphasis ours)
32. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra
29
is a decision where, referring to Article
129, this Court observed that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
contempt as well as to award punishment for it being constitutional, it
cannot be controlled by any statute.
33. Despite such a power being conferred by the Constitution, what would
constitute contempt - civil and criminal - and also, what would be the
procedure for initiating action and how to punish for contempt is provided
by the Act. The source of power to enact the Act can be traced to Items 77
and 14 of Lists I and III, respectively, of the Seventh Schedule appended to
the Constitution.
28
(2002) 5 SCC 352
29
(1995) 2 SCC 584
24
34. In L.P. Misra (Dr.) v. State of U.P.
30
, this Court set aside the order under
challenge (punishing the appellant for criminal contempt committed on the
face of the court but without extending to him any opportunity to show
cause). In the process, a three-Judge Bench of this Court had the occasion
to observe that it “is true that the High Court can invoke powers and
jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but
such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law”.
35. In Pallav Sheth (supra) too, a three-Judge Bench of this Court noticed L.P.
Misra (Dr.) (supra) and reiterated that “the power under Article 129 and/or
Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a
validly enacted law”.
36. Yet again, this Court in Ashok Kumar Aggarwal v. Neeraj Kumar
31
overturned the decision of the high court under challenge which passed an
order in contempt proceedings solely on merits disregarding the procedural
objections (including that of limitation). This Court reiterated that high
courts were obliged to examine whether procedure prescribed by law had
been complied with when a petition under Article 215 was presented before
the court. Such examination would also include a scrutiny of whether
limitation, as prescribed by section 20, was attracted to the facts of the
case.
37. The ‘procedure prescribed by law’ or a ‘validly enacted law’ referred to in
the aforementioned decisions is the one the Act envisages. Proceedings for
30
(1998) 7 SCC 379
31
(2014) 3 SCC 602
25
contempt being quasi-criminal in nature, no punishment can be ordered by
any court without strictly adhering to the stringent provisions therefor,
however needless they may appear to be when a contempt is committed on
the face of a high court and such court has no two opinions that following
the course prescribed by the Act to punish for contempt would eventually
turn out to be a useless formality.
38. Much water has flown under the bridge since the aforesaid decided cases.
Having regard to some extreme cases of exercise of contempt power
increasing over a period of time, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State
of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Supreme Court & High
Court Judges
32
speaking through the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India had
to devise a Standard Operating Procedure
33
for being followed by the high
courts while summoning public officials, alleged to be in contempt, to be
physically present in court. Deeply concerned with the lack of self-restraint
shown in the exercise of contempt power in certain cases, the Bench
directed framing of rules by all the high courts in terms of the SoP, as
devised. This Court noted in such decision that mandating the physical
presence of a contemnor, specifically in the case of public officials, comes
at a cost to the public interest and efficiency of public administration, and
thus ought not to be resorted to at the drop of a hat.
39. We wish to add to this by way of clarification that concomitantly, there lies
a bounden duty on the contemnor to comply with the court’s order without
any delay, in a case where legal recourse has not been taken to set
32
(2024) 3 SCC 1
33
SoP, hereafter
26
aside/review/vacate the order which is alleged to have been breached. A
public official against whom an allegation of contempt is levelled, upon
being noticed either by issuance of a rule for contempt or by court notice,
must work out his remedy in accordance with law if he wishes not to comply
with the court’s direction. He must not wait for compliance to be secured
only upon all the phased steps to be taken by the high courts in terms of
paragraph 44 of State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), forming part of the SoP,
are complete. A public official who is arrayed as a contemnor is as much
bound by an unchallenged order of a high court as a private party is, and
cannot consider himself not bound by the law by virtue of the office he
holds. Being under a duty to comply with a final and binding order of a high
court, the contemnor ought not to drag his feet in doing the same until the
coercive measure of summoning the contemnor to be physically present is
resorted to by the high court. We are reminded at this stage of what this
Court in Aligarh Municipal Board (supra) said:
“5. *** It must also be clearly under stood in this connection that to
employ a subterfuge to avoid compliance of a court’s order about
which there could be no reasonable doubt may in certain
circumstances aggravate the contempt.***”
(emphasis ours)
Deliberate delay in effecting compliance with an order could be seen as
aggravating the contempt resulting in a degree of punishment higher than
what the court earlier thought of imposing. Be that as it may.
40. Axiomatically, not only any order imposing punishment for proved contempt
must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Act but
initiation of the proceedings too has to be in accordance with the three
modes that the Act envisages. One of these is by presentation of a petition
27
for civil contempt before a high court complaining of wilful and deliberate
refusal by a person obliged to comply with its final and binding order – a
situation with which we are concerned.
41. In Pallav Sheth (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court had the
occasion to consider whether the view taken by a two-Judge Bench in Om
Prakash Jaiswal v. D.K. Mittal
34
was correct. In Om Prakash Jaiswal
(supra), the Bench had taken the view that filing of an application or petition
for initiating proceedings for contempt does not amount to initiation of
proceedings by the court and initiation under section 20 of the Act can only
be said to have occurred when the court forms the prima facie opinion that
contempt has been committed and issue s notice to the contemner to show
cause why he should not be punished. Such view did not find favour with
the Bench in Pallav Sheth (supra). It was observed that a provision like
section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the
situation, and that, too narrow a view of section 20 had been taken in Om
Prakash Jaiswal (supra) which did not seem to be warranted; the view
taken would not only cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice.
Relevant passages from the decision in Pallav Sheth (supra) read thus:
“39. … When the judicial procedure requires an application being filed
either before the court or consent being sought by a person from the
Advocate-General or a Law Officer, it must logically follow that
proceedings for contempt are initiated when the applications are made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking
cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating
the proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon
of refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only
steps following or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a
civil contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of the court
34
(2000) 3 SCC 171
28
is necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a
litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this
background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of
the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship
to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of
the inaction on the part of the court, a contemner cannot be made to
suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr
Venugopal would mean that the court would be rendered powerless to
punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of
the contempt having been committed and the same having been
brought to the notice of the court soon after the committal of the
contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20,
therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an
anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by placing
a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt.
An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the
appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the courts
nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt,
successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the
contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being
in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid
interpretation must therefore be avoided.
42. … if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the
High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own
motion or the filing of an application before an Advocate-General for
permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by
the court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation
would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish
for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is
enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of
Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the courts
to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution.
43. ***
44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that
initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on
the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would
necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it
is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other
cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our
opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20
must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application
or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year
from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been
committed.”
29
42. Interpretation of section 20 of the Act, which formed the crux of the
discussion in Pallav Sheth (supra), has the marginal note ‘limitation for
actions for contempt’. Section 20 ordains that:
“20. No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its
own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from
the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”
43. The vires of section 20 of the Act has been upheld by Division Benches of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, High Court of Karnataka and the High
Court at Calcutta in Advocate General v. A.V. Koteswara Ra o
35
, High
Court of Karnataka v. Y.K. Subanna
36
and Arthur Branwell &
Company Ltd. v. Indian Fibres Ltd.
37
, respectively.
44. In upholding the vires of section 20, the High Court of Karnataka in Y.K.
Subbanna (supra) traced the legislative history of section 20 of the Act. It
is considered profitable to read the relevant passages therefrom, which are
as follows:
“79. The Act for the first time, by enacting Section 20, introduced a
period of limitation. The Sanyal Committee examined the question
as to whether any period of limitation should be prescribed in respect
of contempt proceedings and observed in Paragraph 8 of Chapter X
of its Report, as under:
‘8. Limitation:— Contempt procedures are of a summary
nature and promptness is the essence of such proceedings.
Any delay should be fatal to such proceedings, though there
may be exceptional cases when the delay may have to be over
looked but such cases should be very rare indeed. From this
point of view we considered whether it is either necessary or
desirable to specify a period of limitation in respect of
contempt proceedings. The period, if it is to be fixed by
statute, will necessarily have to be very short and provision
may also have to be made for condoning delay in suitable
cases. We feel that on the whole instead of making any hard
35
1984 Cri. LJ. 1171
36
1989 SCC OnLine Kar 404
37
1993 (2) CLJ 182
30
and fast rule on the subject the matter may continue to be
governed by the discretion of the Courts as hithertofore.’
80. The Joint Select Committee of Parliament on Contempt of Court
(Bhargava Committee) after examining the Report of Sanyal
Committee on the question of limitation, thought that the contempt
procedures by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as
early as possible and considered it necessary and desirable that
period of limitation should be specified in respect of actions for
contempt and, therefore, laid down in the new clause (Clause 20) a
period of one year at the expiration of which no proceedings for
contempt should be initiated. The reasons given by the Joint Select
Committee for introducing Clause 20 in the Bill, as reported by it are
these:
‘The Committee are of the opinion that contempt procedures
by their very nature should be initiated and dealt with as early
as possible. It was brought to the notice of the Committee that
in some cases contempt proceedings have been initiated long
after the alleged contempt had taken place. The Committee
therefore consider it necessary and desirable that a period of
limitation should be specified in respect of actions for
contempt and have accordingly laid down in the new clause a
period of one year at the expiration of which no proceedings
for contempt should be initiated.’
81. This is the legislative history of Section 20.”
45. We can safely affirm, drawing from our joint experience on the Bench, that
in the vast majority of cases seeking invocation of the provisions of the Act
for an alleged civil contempt, institution of proceedings is through a petition
or an application containing information made available by a party alleging
that the facts disclosed by him do constitute contempt of court and, thus,
provide the court the premise for initiating proceedings to commit for
contempt. The role of such a party, who brings a petition for contempt and
activates the court’s machinery, is merely that of an informer. Despite such
a party figuring in the memo of parties as a petitioner, the matter relating
to entertainment of his petition and the punishment to be imposed, in case
of a proved contempt, relate to the exclusive jurisdiction and authority of
the high courts to punish for contempt and is substantially a matter between
31
the court and the alleged contemnor. Whether or not to take the assistance
of the petitioning informer is a question which invariably must be left
entirely to the discretion of the court seized of the proceedings.
46. In exercising its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, the courts in India do
keep in mind the benefit that could accrue to the petitioning informer (if he
is a party to the parent proceedings out of which the contempt arises) upon
implementation of the order alleged to have been wilfully disobeyed; but
more than anything else, the endeavour is to uphold the majesty, dignity
and prestige of the courts. Indubitably, the jurisdiction to punish for
contempt is exercised when the alleged contemnor, by his action(s), shows
extreme lack of solicitude in complying with an order of court, which has
attained finality and is binding on him. So long a final order passed by a
court is not set aside in appeal/revision or recalled in exercise of review
jurisdiction or an interim order is vacated at a subsequent stage of the
proceedings, it continues to bind the parties to the proceedings and it would
amount to subversion of the rule of law if any party , in breach, were
encouraged to continue such breach. An order of a court has to be complied
with and it would not amount to a valid defence that in the contemnor’s own
understanding or because of legal opinion tendered to him, the order did
not warrant compliance being erroneous. This Court in Commissioner,
Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah
38
has held that once a
direction has been issued by a competent court, it has to be obeyed and
implemented without reservation; the order of the court cannot be rendered
38
(2007) 7 SCC 689
32
ineffective on the specious plea that no such direction could have been given
by the court. A party, though perceiving an order to be erroneous, allowing
it to attain finality by reason of acceptance thereof cannot escape the
rigours of compliance. He has to pursue his appellate or other remedy to
escape the consequences that can visit him, should the high court hold him
guilty of contempt. Such a compliance is insisted upon for securing the
majesty, dignity and prestige of the court.
47. Insofar as an interim order is concerned, despite an element of contempt
being involved, if a defence appearing to be valid in law and having
substance is raised before the high court by a party in default which shakes
the very foundation of the order alleged to have been violated and upon the
high court reaching a satisfaction of such a defence being valid to the extent
that the subject order ought not to have been passed, it would always be
open to the said court, depending on the nature of order and the breach
alleged, to first secure compliance of the order by allowing the contemnor
to purge the contempt without prejudice to his rights and contentions and,
after such compliance, to revisit the order as per law and the circumstances
present before it and then pass appropriate orders. There could be
exceptional situations where the consequences of complying with an interim
order, apparently erroneous or without jurisdiction and which has attained
finality, could bring about irretrievable consequences. In such a case, where
the high court is satisfied that securing compliance of its order would cause
more injustice than justice, notwithstanding the finality attached to such
order, the high court’s authority ought to be conceded to pass such order
as the justice of the case before it demands.
33
48. Lord Denning in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson
39
had observed:
“The court would only refuse to hear a party to a cause when the
contempt impeded the course of justice by making it more difficult
for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce its orders and there
was no other effective means of securing his compliance. The court
might then in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment
was removed or good reason was shown why it should not be
removed.”
49. This decision was followed by the House of Lords in X Ltd. v. Morgan-
Grampian Ltd.
40
which also observes that the court will proceed with the
contempt where a contemnor not only fails willfully and contumaciously to
comply with an order of the court, albeit makes it clear that he will continue
to defy court’s authority. The courts in such circumstances may decline to
entertain an appeal or hear a party unless they purge themselves.
50. It will be appropriate here to also quote from Halsbury’s Laws of
England
41
, which states:
“Thus a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt, he may
apply with a view to setting aside the order in which his contempt is
founded, and in some cases he may be entitled to defend himself
when some application is subsequently made against him. Even the
plaintiff in contempt has been allowed to prosecute his action, when
the defendant had not applied to stay the proceedings. Probably the
true rule is that the party in contempt will not be heard only on those
occasions when his contempt impedes th e course of justice and
there is no other effective way of enforcing his obedience.”
51. This Court In the Matter of Anil Panjwani
42
has observed that it is no
rule of law and certainly not a statutory rule that a contemnor cannot be
heard unless the contempt is purged. It has only developed as a rule of
practice for protecting the sanctity of the court proceedings and the dignity
39
1952 (2) All ER 567
40
1990 (2) All ER 1
41
Volume 8, Third Edition
42
(2003) 7 SCC 375
34
of the court that a person who is prima facie guilty of having attacked the
court may be deprived of the right of participation in the hearing lest he
should misuse such an opportunity unless he has agreed to disarm himself.
The court would not be unjust in denying hearing to one who has shown his
lack of worth by attacking the court unless he has agreed to beat a retreat
and the court is convinced of the genuineness of such retreating. It lies
within the discretion of the court to tell the contemner charged with having
committed contempt of court that he will not be heard and would not be
allowed participation in the court proceedings unless the contempt is
purged. This is a flexible rule of practice and not a rigid rule of law. The
discretion shall be guided and governed by the facts and circumstances of
a given case. Where the court may form an opinion that the contemner is
persisting in his behaviour and initiation of proceedings in contempt has had
no deterrent or reformatory effect on him and/or if the disobedience by the
contemner is such that so long as it continues it impedes the course of
justice and/or renders it impossible for the court to enforce its orders in
respect of him, the court would be justified in withholding access to the
court or participation in the proceedings from the contemner. On the other
hand, the court may form an opinion that the contempt is not so gross as
to invite an extreme step as above, or where the interests of justice would
be better served by concluding the main proceedings instead of diverting to
and giving priority to hearing in contempt proceeding the court may proceed
to hear both the matters simultaneously or independently of each other or
in such as it may deem proper.
35
52. Therefore, it would be correct to state that the court’s power when dealing
with the question of contempt, in a sense, is discretionary. It cannot be
gainsaid that even in cases where disobedience of the order of the court is
not disputed, the court may also accept a defence, if raised, of impossibility
to comply with an order and come to the conclusion that since it is
impossible to enforce its order, action to punish may not be initiated. That
apart, refusal may be justified by grave concerns of public policy. Much
would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the
contempt under enquiry, etc., which would enable the court to exercise its
discretion either way. However, to demonstrate his bona fide, the contemnor
ought to bring any valid defence for his disability to comply with the court’s
direction to its notice without wasting any time. Whatever be the position
before it, nothing stands in the way of the high court from passing an order
to ensure that nothing impedes the course of justice.
53. Reverting to the point of limitation, even in case of a petition disclosing facts
constituting contempt, which is civil in nature, the petitioner cannot choose
a time convenient to him to approach the Court. The statute refers to a
specific time limit of one year from the date of alleged contempt for
proceedings to be initiated; meaning thereby, as laid down in Pallav Sheth
(supra), that the action should be brought within a year, and not beyond,
irrespective of when the proceedings to punish for contempt are actually
initiated by the high court.
54. An action for contempt - though instituted through a petition or an
application – is essentially in the nature of original proceedings, as held by
this Court in High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Raj Kishore
36
Yadav
43
; a fortiori, a prayer for condonation of delay in presenting the
petition/application alleging contempt would not be maintainable. The
express negative phraseology used in section 20 of the Act, as a legislative
injunction, places a fetter on the court’s power to initiate proceedings for
contempt unless the petition/application is presented within the time-frame
stipulated therein. However, since section 20 also uses the expression “date
on which the contempt is alleged to be committed” as the starting point of
the period of one year to be counted for reckoning whether t he
petition/application has been presented within the stipulated period, the
high courts ought to be wary of crafty and skilful drafting of
petitions/applications to overcome the delay in presentation thereof.
55. The Act, which is a special law on the subject of contempt, does not
expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability of sections 4
to 24 of the 1963 Act. This Court, in State of West Bengal v. Kartick
Chandra Das
44
has held that in terms of section 29(2) of the 1963 Act,
provisions contained in section 5 of the 1963 Act can be called in aid by a
party who seeks condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal under
section 19(1) of the Act. Similarly, in exceptional cases, provisions like
sections 12, 14, 17, 22, etc. of the 1963 Act could be invoked to seek
exemption from the law of limitation, which is distinct from condonation of
delay. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the party who has not
petitioned the court within the period of one year, as stipulated in section
20 of the Act, to seek exemption from the law of limitation in line with the
43
(1997) 3 SCC 11
44
(1996) 5 SCC 342
37
principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6, CPC
45
, by showing the ground upon
which such exemption is claimed. We have no hesitation to hold that in a
case where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a
“continuing wrong/breach/offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies
the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud
merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year
as in section 20 of the Act. Applicability of the principle underlying Order
VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just and proper having
regard to the object and purpose for which the jurisdiction to punish for
contempt is exercised by the courts if, of course, the court is satisfied that
benefit of such an exemption ought to be extended in a given case. At the
same time, it must be remembered that the court cannot grant exemption
from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship.
Inspiration in this regard may be drawn from the decision of the Privy
Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh
46
. However, as
observed earlier, contempt proceedings being in the nature of original
proceedings, akin to a suit, application of section 5 of the 1963 Act to seek
condonation of delay is excluded.
56. A caveat needs to be added here. For a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”
to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt,
45
Grounds of exemption from limitation law. - Where the suit is instituted after the expiration
of the period prescribed by the law limitation, the plaint shall show the ground upon which
exemption from such law is claimed:
Provided that the Court may permit the plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on
any ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out
in the plaint.
46
AIR 1935 PC 85
38
the party petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the phrase
actually means but would also be required to show, from his pleadings, the
ground resting whereon he seeks exemption from limitation. Should the
party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also,
the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a
“continuing wrong/breach/offence” ought not to be entertained, having
regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which
has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against
a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the
proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is
committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such
commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground
that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to
wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey
of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is mechanically accepted whenever it
is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption , an applicant may knock
the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for
contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of
limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the
court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach
continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public
by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate
proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate
against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision
not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a
39
dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be
rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case
of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including
imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the
breach.
57. Having thus held, we move on to examine the objection as to maintainability
of the contempt action initiated by the first respondent upon the inaction of
the appellant in effecting mutation of the decretal property in his favour in
the revenue records and also as to whether a case of “continuing
wrong/breach/ offence” was at all shown by the first respondent in the
contempt petition.
58. To recapitulate, the Single Judge had allowed the writ petition of the first
respondent on 05
th
March, 2009 with a direction to the Tahsildar to effect
the necessary mutation in the revenue records in accordance with the final
decree dated 26
th
December, 2003. Pertinently, the direction issued to the
appellant vide the order of disposal of the writ petition did not specifically
mention a time-frame within which the order was to be implemented.
59. In view of the absence of a time-frame in the order, much would turn on
rule 21 of the Writ Rules
47
. Having read the relevant rule, we presume that
the learned Single Judge was aware of such a rule and, hence, refrained
from stipulating a time-frame for compliance of the Court’s order.
Irrespective of any time-frame fixed in an order, the direction contained
47
Unless the court otherwise directs, the direction or order made or the rule absolute issued
by the High Court shall be implemented within two months of the receipt of the order.
40
therein would require compliance within the period stipulated in rule 21 if
the person responsible for such compliance has notice of it even aliunde.
60. The question of the contempt petition being barred by limitation has to be
decided keeping section 20 of the Act and rule 21 of the Writ Rules in mind
together with what constitutes a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”.
Undisputedly, the contempt petition was instituted on 04
th
October, 2014,
more than 5 (five) years after the order (of which contempt had been
alleged) was passed, i.e., on 05
th
March, 2009. Notably, the appellant had
not carried the order dated 05
th
March, 2009 (disposing of the writ petition)
in appeal. Therefore, question of operation of the said order remaining
suspended did not arise and the principle embodied in section 15 of the
1963 Act was not attracted. The said order required the appellant to effect
mutation in terms of the decree of the civil court. No time -frame for
compliance of such order having been stipulated by the Single Judge, it
would stand to reason that the same required compliance at least by the
end of the time-frame stipulated by rule 21.
61. The appellant has asserted before us that the contempt action was time-
barred in view of the fact that limitation for initiation of contempt action
commenced on 04
th
May, 2009, i.e., when the two-month period stipulated
by rule 21 expired and ended on 03
rd
May, 2010, i.e., in accordance with
section 20 of the Act. However, the first respondent has contended that the
contempt petition was not barred by limitation since the act of the appellant
in not implementing the direction for effecting mutation was in the nature
of a continuing wrong.
41
62. The date on which service of the order dated 05
th
March, 2009 disposing
of the writ petition was effected on the appellant is not stated anywhere
in the contempt petition by the first respondent. No such date is also
reflected in the representations that the first respondent claims to have
made on 11
th
May, 2009, 12
th
September, 2009, 22
nd
October, 2010, 16
th
August, 2012 and 05
th
February, 2014. It is also not seen from the
appellant’s counter affidavit that he pleaded non-service of such order. We
are, thus, inclined to the view that the appellant had notice aliunde of the
order dated 05
th
March, 2009. Proceeding on the premise that the order
must have been served immediately after the same was passed by the
Single Judge and in the light of rule 21 of the Writ Rules, the appellant had
2 (two) months’ time from receipt of the order dated 05
th
March, 2009, i.e.,
say till the end of May, 2009 to implement the direction. The appellant failed
to effect mutation, as directed, within the aforesaid time-frame and was,
thus, in breach of the said order dated 05
th
March, 2009, say from June,
2009. There does not appear to be any explanation proffered in the
contempt petition worthy of consideration as to why the contempt petition
was delayed and not presented within the period of a year of commission
of the breach when it first occurred, i.e., at least by the end of May, 2010.
63. The learned Single Judge deciding the contempt petition, vide order dated
04
th
October, 2017, was impressed by the arguments advanced by the first
respondent and while holding that there has been a continuing wrong and
also that the appellant is in contempt, allowed the contempt petition.
64. The Division Bench (review) held in favour of the first respondent observing
that the inaction of the Government officials was a continuing wrong since
42
they did not outrightly refuse to implement the order, rather, till as late as
2017, assured that they would implement it but failed to do so.
Furthermore, what weighed with the High Court was the alleged
misrepresentation with respect to the title of the subject land; such
misrepresentation being in the nature of fraud, would entitle the High Court
to recall the primary order on merits. The State authorities were held to
have misrepresented the title of the suit land inasmuch as they took
mutually contradictory stands, i.e., on the one hand it was argued that the
subject land was escheated land, and on the other, it was argued, on the
strength of revenue entries, that the subject land always belonged to the
State. The High Court then went on to examine and interpret docum ents
produced by the respondents for the first time and accorded title in favour
of the respondents.
65. For reasons more than one, the impugned order allowing the contempt
petition is indefensible.
66. First, having read the impugned order, we are quite convinced that
submissions that were advanced before the Division Bench (review) of the
order dated 05
th
March, 2009 being in the process of implementation had
the undesirable effect of shifting the focus of the High Court from adjudging
the maintainability of the contempt petition as on date the same was
presented, i.e., 04
th
October, 2014, to the unacceptable fact of actual non-
compliance of the order of 05
th
March, 2009 despite indication of
compliance. No doubt, compliance of an order of the court has to be insisted
upon but within the four corners of the contempt petition. Non-compliance
coupled with an assurance in court to comply, after the court has issued
43
notice on the contempt petition, is not sufficient to attract the principle of
“continuing wrong/breach/offence”. A contemnor on pain of suffering
consequences for contempt may well give up available defences before the
court and proceed to obey the order/direction, of which he is alleged to be
in contempt; but if the jurisdiction to punish is otherwise barred, there is
no law that prohibits the court from first proceeding to ascertain whether
the jurisdiction is at all available to be exercised; and, when an objection of
maintainability based on limitation is raised, it becomes all the more
essential for the court to decide the objection leaving aside other
considerations. The Division Bench (review), unfortunately, missed the
woods for the tree.
67. Proceeding ahead, we find that as complex as the issues surrounding the
title of the subject land are, the impugned order of the Division Bench
(review) is unsustainable in law, for, it has exceeded its contempt
jurisdiction, which indubitably is limited and finite in the sense that every
court exercising power to punish for contempt ought to keep itself within
the boundaries specified by the Act and the judicial pronouncements in this
behalf. The laborious exercise undertaken to unravel the web of deeds and
documents so as to determine the question of title was akin to an exercise
undertaken by a court of first instance or first appeal and, thus, wholly
unwarranted. It is of the utmost importance to remember that none of the
documents produced by the first respondent answered the question as to
whether the contempt petition was barred by limitation, which is the
question the Division Bench (review) ought to have confined itself to, since
it was only tasked with exercising review, and not appellate, jurisdiction.
44
68. In our considered view, it further becomes imperative to undertake an
examination of the contempt petition itself. This exercise reveals that the
primary grounds taken for the contempt petition being filed belatedly, inter
alia, were the pendency of collateral proceedings and the continuous filing
of representations before the Tahsildar by the applicants. Law is well-settled
that the issue of limitation has to be considered with reference to the
original cause of action. The period of limitation does not stand extended to
the last of repeated representations made by a party , if filing of
representation is not statutorily provided. The contempt petition is,
however, entirely bereft of any pleading to the effect that the breach
committed by the Tahsildar is in the nature of a continuing wrong or breach
or offence, so as to overcome the bar of limitation set by section 20 of the
Act read with rule 21 of the Writ Rules.
69. Despite the absence of any pleading as to “continuing wrong/breach/
offence”, the Single Judge by placing reliance on the decision in Firm
Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram
48
proceeded to hold that the
Tahsildar’s inaction constituted a continuing wrong, thereby saving the
petition from being barred by limitation. The Division Bench (review)
approached the matter in a similar manner, and concluded that the
contumacious conduct alleged was in the nature of a continuing wrong.
70. While we are not in disagreement with the view expressed in Firm Ganpat
Ram Rajkumar (supra) because of the special facts and circumstances
48
1989 Supp (2) SCC 418
45
obtaining therein, the decision of the Division Bench (review) affirming that
of the Single Judge is wholly unsustainable in law for a few other reasons.
71. First, it is trite that the court cannot traverse beyond the pleadings and
make out a case which was never pleaded, such principle having originated
from the fundamental legal maxim secundum allegata et probate, i.e., the
court will arrive at its decision on the basis of the claims and proof led by
the parties. The assertion of the contumacious conduct being in the nature
of a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is factual and has to be borne from
the pleadings on record. Law is, again, well-settled that when a point is not
traceable in the pleas set out either in a plaint or a written statement,
findings rendered on such point by the court would be unsustainable as that
would amount to an altogether new case being made out for the party .
Absent such pleading of there being a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”,
the finding returned by the Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division
Bench (review), cannot be sustained in law.
72. Even if a point of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is traceable in the
pleadings, the court ought not to accept it mechanically; particularly, in
entertaining an action for contempt, which is quasi-criminal in nature, the
court should be slow and circumspect and be fully satisfied that there has
indeed been a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”.
73. This takes us to the other infirmity in the decision of the High Court
inasmuch as it held that the disobedience of the mutation order by the
appellant was in the nature of a continuing wrong. A reference to section
22 of the 1963 Act would be prudent at this stage. It reads:
46
“22. Continuing breaches and torts - In the case of a continuing breach
of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of
limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the
breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues.”
74. While proceeding to examine the nature of the contumacious conduct in
question, it is considered apposite to commence th e discussion with a
reference to Halsbury’s Laws of India (Damages; Deeds and Other
Instruments)
49
reading thus:
“[115.032] When cause of action is single and continuing - A cause of
action may be either single or continuing. When an act is final and
complete and becomes a cause of action for injury to the plaintiff, it is
single, arises once and for all and the plaintiff is entitled to sue for
compensation at one time, for al l past, present and future
consequences of the wrongful act. But if there is repetition of a
wrongful act or omission, it will comprise a continuing cause of action,
and if an action is brought by the plaintiff, it will be restricted to
recovery of damages which have accrued up to the date of suit. In such
cases the cause of action is said to arise ‘de die in diem’ (from day to
day). It is inaccurate strictly to speak of a ‘continuing cause of action’,
but the phrase refers to a cause of action which arises from the
repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind as that for which the
action was brought.”
75. The English Court of Appeals in National Coal Board v.
Galley
50
distinguished between the two scenarios by observing that neither
do repeated breaches of continuing obligations constitute a continuing
wrong nor intermittent breaches of a continuing obligation; rather there has
to be present an element of continuance in both, the breach and the
obligation.
76. This Court too, as far back as in 1958, with reference to the Limitation Act
of 1908, discussed in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree
49
Volume 9, First Edition
50
[1958] 1 All ER 9
47
Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan
51
what would constitute a continuing
wrong. The relevant passage reads thus:
“20. *** s. 23 refers not to a continuing right but to a continuing
wrong. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act
which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the
act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the
wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing
wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue.
If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused
by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In
this connection it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury
caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of
the said injury. It is only in regard to acts which can be properly
characterised as continuing wrongs that s. 23 can be invoked.***
As soon as the decree was passed and the appellants were
dispossessed in execution proceedings, their rights had been
completely injured, and though their dispossession continued, it cannot
be said that the trustees were committing wrongful acts or acts of tort
from moment to moment so as to give the appellants a cause of action
de die in diem. We think there can be no doubt that where the wrongful
act complained of amounts to ouster, the resulting injury to the right
is complete at the date of the ouster and so there would be no scope
for the application of s. 23 in such a case.***”
(emphasis ours)
77. The decision of this Court in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari (supra) was
endorsed by this Court in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhumi Temple -5 J.) v.
Suresh Das
52
wherein, while concluding that the ouster of shebaitship was
a single incident and did not constitute a continuing wrong, this Court
further observed as follows:
“343. The submission of *** is based on the principle of continuing
wrong as a defence to the plea of limitation. In assessing the
submission, a distinction must be made between the source of a legal
injury and the effect of the injury. The source of a legal injury is
51
AIR 1959 SC 798
52
(2020) 1 SCC 1
48
founded in a breach of an obligation. A continuing wrong arises where
there is an obligation imposed by law, agreement or otherwise to
continue to act or to desist from acting in a particular manner. The
breach of such an obligation extends beyond a single completed act or
omission. The breach is of a continuing nature, giving rise to a legal
injury which assumes the nature of a continuing wrong. For a
continuing wrong to arise, there must in the first place be a wrong
which is actionable because in the absence of a wrong, there can be no
continuing wrong. It is when there is a wrong that a further line of
enquiry of whether there is a continuing wrong would arise. Without a
wrong there cannot be a continuing wrong. A wrong postulates a
breach of an obligation imposed on an individual, where positive or
negative, to act or desist from acting in a particular manner. The
obligation on one individual finds a corresponding reflection of a right
which inheres in another. A continuing wrong postulates a breach of a
continuing duty or a breach of an obligation which is of a continuing
nature. …
…
Hence, in evaluating whether there is a continuing wrong within the
meaning of Section 23, the mere fact that the effect of the injury
caused has continued, is not sufficient to constitute it as a continuing
wrong. For instance, when the wrong is complete as a result of the act
or omission which is complained of, no continuing wrong arises even
though the effect or damage that is sustained may enure in the future.
What makes a wrong, a wrong of a continuing nature is the breach of
a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist. The breach
of such a duty creates a continuing wrong and hence a defence to a
plea of limitation.”
(emphasis ours)
78. The order on the writ petition directed the appellant to effect mutation in
the revenue records in favour of the first respondent, in accordance with
the final decree. The direction for mutation having been issued on 05
th
March, 2009, the appellant had a period of 2 (two) months therefrom to
effect such mutation, as stipulated by the Writ Rules, which we shall assume
the appellant failed or neglected to comply without just reason. From 04
th
May, 2009, i.e., the starting point for the limitation period for initiation of
contempt action to commence, till 10
th
February, 2014, i.e., the date of the
filing of the contempt petition, the appellant failed to effect mutation, as
49
ordered by the Single Judge. Could it be said that every day thereafter that
the appellant did not effect mutation gave rise to a fresh cause of action so
as to constitute a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”? To our minds, the
answer is a clear and unequivocal ‘NO’. Upon application of the test laid
down by this Court in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari (supra) and M. Siddiq
(supra), it is evident that when, by 04
th
May, 2009, the appellant failed to
implement the direction of the High Court, the act of disobedience was
complete as on that date itself. Every day thenceforth, the name of the first
respondent continued to be absent from the revenue records but such
absence could not be characterised as the injury or wrongful act itself; it
was merely the damage which flowed from the standalone act of breach
committed by the appellant – that of not effecting the mutation. The injury
was not repetitive or in other words, did not arise de die in diem, but rather,
it was the effect of the injury which continued till the date the first
respondent presented the contempt petition on 10
th
February, 2014.
79. Having held that the nature of breach or offence committed by the
appellant was not in the nature of a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”, the
bar of limitation was rightly pressed by the Division Bench (original) to halt
the claim of the first respondent at the threshold itself, since the period of
limitation to initiate the contempt action ended at least by May end of 2010.
The decision of the Division Bench (original) in dismissing the first
respondent’s contempt petition as time-barred was unexceptionable and the
Division Bench (review) acted illegally in reversing the same assuming the
jurisdiction to review which, on facts and in the circumstances, was not
available to be exercised.
50
80. The contempt petition was, thus, barred by limitation and no case for
claiming exemption having been set up, the same deserved outright
dismissal.
EPILOGUE
81. Having answered the two legal issues and before recording our conclusion,
we cannot resist reflecting on the point of fraud having vitiated the
proceedings. This point, in turn, emerges because the Division Bench
(review) erroneously held the State to have practised fraud; and this
discussion is necessitated since, to the contrary, there seems to be sufficient
reason to hold the first respondent responsible therefor. The writ petition,
in the form the same had been presented by the first respondent, does
evince clear suppression of a material fact bordering on fraud on court and
having the potential to render it not maintainable. But to this too, there is
a caveat. This question, though quite fundamental in nature, does not
appear to have been argued by the appellant before the High Court and also
before us. Thus, argument on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition
not having been advanced before us by the parties, whatever we observe
and record hereafter is merely an indication of the direction our decision
would have taken, if such point were raised or argued. We may not be
misunderstood of having decided a point without calling upon the parties to
address on it.
82. The effect of suppression of a material fact on maintainability of a writ
petition is too well known. But what is important is, whether suppression of
51
a material fact in a writ petition amounts to fraud on court and whether an
issue of maintainability based on suppression can be examined if the
judgment and/or order of disposal of the writ petition has attained finality
by reason of no appeal being carried therefrom.
83. This Court in Meghmala v. G. Narasimha Reddy
53
observed that
suppression of any material fact/document amounts to a fraud on the court
and every court has an inherent power to recall its own order obtained by
fraud as the order so obtained is non est.
84. Quite recently, in K. Jayaram v. BDA
54
, this Court held:
“10. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction exercised by the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is extraordinary,
equitable and discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner
approaching the writ court must come with clean hands and put
forward all facts before the court without concealing or suppressing
anything. A litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant to
the litigation. If he withholds some vital or relevant material in order
to gain advantage over the other side then he would be guilty of
playing fraud with the court as well as with the opposite parties
which cannot be countenanced.”
(emphasis ours)
85. It is also settled law that fraud is an extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates
the most solemn of proceedings including judicial acts and that a plea of
fraud can be set up even in a collateral proceeding. We are reminded of
what this Court said in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath
55
:
“The principle of ‘finality of litigation’ cannot be pressed to the extent
of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands
of dishonest litigants.”
53
(2010) 8 SCC 383
54
(2022) 12 SCC 815
55
(1994) 1 SCC 1
52
86. The Division Bench (original) noted that the civil suit having been withdrawn
against the State, the first respondent could not have validly attempted to
obtain a direction, through the medium of the writ petition, on the strength
of a decree passed in such a suit where the State was no longer a party,
yet, the Division Bench (review) held the State to have practised fraud.
87. A perusal of the averments in the writ petition do not reveal any mention of
the civil suit having been withdrawn against the State Government.
Suppression of a material fact on the part of the first respondent is indeed
discernible which, if pleaded, could have altered the outcome of the writ
petition. A very innocuous prayer was, however, made for effecting mutation
in terms of the final decree, without disclosing that mutation was being
asked for in respect of a piece of land over which the State itself had been
claiming title and that the civil suit was withdrawn faced with such a claim
of the State. A writ court being a court of equity, it is needless to observe
that the parties are bound to approach the court with clean hands.
Inasmuch as the aforesaid fact of withdrawal was not brought to the writ
court’s notice, an egregious breach of such principle is noticed. Suppression
of such a material fact, as in the present case, could legitimately be argued
to amount to a fraud on court. There can hardly be two opinions that such
breach would strike at the very root of the matter and since a point of fraud
can be raised even collaterally, if the point of fraud had been raised, the
writ petition itself could have been held non-maintainable.
53
88. However, since our decision is premised on the reasons assigned while
answering the issues formulated in paragraph 8 (supra), we wish to say no
more.
CONCLUSION
89. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the High Court exceeded both
its review and contempt jurisdiction. The impugned order is, thus, set aside,
and the judgment and order of the Division Bench (original) in the contempt
appeal and the letters patent appeal is restored.
90. The appeals succeed and are allowed. All pending applications stand
disposed of. Parties shall, however, bear their own costs.
91. Determination of the title to the subject land, adjudication on the validity of
the decrees in favour of the respondents, or decision on any other
contentious issue are left open for a forum of competent jurisdiction to
embark upon, if approached by any of the parties. None of the observations
of this Court, or of the High Court in the impugned order should be treated
as an expression of opinion in any particular matter or on any factual aspect
whatsoever.
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. ___________ OF 2024
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NOS. 19748 -19749 OF 2022]
92. Leave granted.
54
93. These appeals assail the common judgment and order dated 26
th
September, 2022 of the High Court dismissing petitions
56
preferred by the
appellant, seeking recall of the judgment and order dated 27
th
April, 2022
of the Division Bench (review). The High Court held that the recall petitions
were review petitions in disguise; thus, the impugned judgment and order
was upheld in view of the specific statutory bar of Order XLVII Rule 9, CPC.
94. The judgment and order 27
th
April, 2022 having been set aside for the
reasons assigned above while allowing the civil appeals arising out of SLP
(Civil) Nos. 19748-19749 of 2022, the order of the High Court dated 26
th
September, 2022 assailed in these appeals upholding the same can no
longer stand. Resultantly, the impugned order is set aside. The present
appeals succeed and are allowed on the same terms as the appeals decided
hereinabove.
……………………………………J .
(SANJIV KHANNA)
……………………………………J .
(DIPANKAR DATTA)
New Delhi;
22
nd
July, 2024.
56
I.A. No. 3/2022 in Review I.A. No. 1/2020 in LPA 1/2018 and I.A. No. 10/2022 in Review I.A.
No. 3/2020 in CA No. 33/2017
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