REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 527 of 2002

Sahdeo @ Sahdeo Singh …Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …Respondents

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 531 of 2002

Liladhar …Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. & Ors. …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1.The present appeals have been filed against the judgment and order of

the Allahabad High Court dated 20.12.2001 passed in Criminal Contempt

No. 69 of 1997, convicting the appellants for not complying with the

directions issued by this Court in D.K. Basu Vs. State of West Bengal

AIR 1997 SC 610, and sentencing them for six months’ imprisonment and

also imposing a fine to the tune of Rs.2000/- each. Further, direction has

been issued to the State Government to terminate the services of the

appellants after holding disciplinary proceedings.

2.The facts and circumstances giving rise to the present appeals are that

one Ramwati lodged an FIR dated 01.06.1997 in the Police Station Kotwali

Ghaziabad with an allegation that her son Tej Veer Singh @ Pappu, a man

of absolutely clear antecedents, never involved in any criminal case, who

was running a sweet mart shop, was going to Allahabad by Prayagraj

Express on 29.05.1997. He was apprehended by Deep Chand, Sub-Inspector

of Police, posted at Police Station, Sector 24, Noida and Constable Ramesh

Chandra, posted in the office of Superintendent of Police (R.A.) Ghaziabad

along with some other policemen, from Shyamal Chauk, Sibbanpura,

Ghaziabad. Tej Veer Singh was carrying a briefcase containing clothes and

Rs. 40000/- in cash apart from the ticket. At the time of apprehending,

neither the reason for his arrest nor the destination, where he was being

taken to, was disclosed to him. His family members ran from pillar to post

to know his whereabouts but in vain. On 30.05.1997, telegraphic

information regarding abduction of Tej Veer Singh @ Pappu by police was

sent to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad and Inspector

General of Police, Meerut Zone.

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3.No action was taken on the aforesaid FIR, thus Smt. Ramwati, mother

of Tej Veer Singh made complaint to the Senior Suptd. of Police,

Ghaziabad, Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India and the Chairman, National

Human Rights Commission, New Delhi. The case was registered only on

04.06.1997 under Section 364 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called

IPC). However, no progress was made in the investigation. Being

aggrieved, a Habeas Corpus petition, being numbered as Crl. Misc. (Habeas

Corpus) Writ Petition No. 20040 of 1997, was filed in June, 1997 by one M.

C. Verma, being next friend of the detenu Tej Veer Singh before the

Allahabad High Court. In the said petition, allegations had been made that

the respondent therein, Deep Chand, Sub-Inspector of Police and Constable

Ramesh Chandra had detained Tej Veer Singh illegally since 29.5.1997 and

his whereabouts were not known.

4.As the High Court could not get any information from the State

regarding the whereabouts of Tej Veer Singh, the Court, vide order dated

30.07.1997, directed the District Judge, Ghaziabad to hold an inquiry

regarding the allegations made in the Habeas Corpus petition. The purpose

of holding an inquiry was to find out as to whether the police was

responsible for his arrest and thereafter, his disappearance.

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5.The District Judge submitted his report dated 03.12.1997 wherein it

was mentioned that Yashpal, the elder brother of Tej Veer Singh, was a

hardened criminal, and was wanted in large number of criminal cases. The

police had taken away Tej Veer Singh alongwith one Jagdish Kumar to

know the whereabouts of Yashpal to Murad Nagar Police Station, where

they were beaten up. However, no information could be gathered from either

of them about Yashpal. It was found that Jagdish Kumar was released by

the police from its custody at 4.00 AM on 30.05.1997 but Tej Veer Singh

remained under detention and still remained untraceable. Sub-Inspector

Deep Chand was the mastermind in abducting Tej Veer Singh and Constable

Ramesh Chandra had participated in illegal detention. Sub-Inspectors R. P.

Singh and Satya Veer Singh, who were allegedly participated in abduction,

were exonerated. However, Sahdeo Singh, Lila Dhar (appellants) and one

Sujan Singh, Constable, were found to have participated in abduction. Sub-

Inspector Deep Chand, had died in a car accident on 20.08.1997. After

receiving the report from the District Judge, the High Court on 4.12.1997

issued notices to the four indicted persons initiating proceedings for

criminal contempt suo motu. Sujan Singh submitted an application before

the High Court that during the inquiry by the District Judge, no

notice/opportunity of hearing was given to him. The High Court asked the

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District Judge, Ghaziabad to provide an opportunity of hearing to the said

applicant-Sujan Singh and submit a supplementary report. The said report

was submitted on 10.07.1998 exonerating Sujan Singh from any criminal

liability. Sahdeo Singh and Ramesh Chandra submitted their replies to the

said Show Cause Notices dated 4.12.1997. Lila Dhar did not submit any

reply.

As the whereabouts of Tej Veer Singh could not be known, the High

Court disposed of the Habeas Corpus petition vide judgment and order dated

20.12.2001 transferring the investigation to the Central Bureau of

Investigation (hereinafter called, “CBI”). In contempt case, the Court came

to the conclusion that taking the said Tej Veer Singh into custody, was in

violation of the directions issued by this Court in D. K. Basu (supra) and

held all the three alleged contemnors guilty. Constable Ramesh Chandra was

sentenced for six months’ imprisonment and a fine of rupees one lakh was

imposed. In addition, Rs. 5000/- was imposed as costs. The appellants

were imposed the punishment of six months’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs.

2000/- each. Further direction was issued to the State to terminate their

services after holding disciplinary proceedings. Hence, these appeals.

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6.Sh. Jitendra Mohan Sharma and Sh. P.K. Jain, learned counsel

appearing for the appellants, have submitted that the High Court had

committed an error as while disposing of the Habeas Corpus petition it

observed that Tej Veer Singh had died and, therefore, no purpose would be

served in continuing with the Habeas Corpus petition. There was not even

prima facie evidence against the appellants in contempt proceedings. The

court did not adopt the fair procedure. Even charges had not been framed.

The enquiry conducted by the District Judge, at the most, could be treated to

be a preliminary enquiry. The High Court erred in placing reliance on a

preliminary enquiry report and convicting the appellants without furnishing

the copy thereof to them. More so, the contempt proceedings are quasi-

criminal in nature. The Court while deciding the criminal case does not

have competence to issue any direction affecting the civil rights of the

parties. Therefore, the judgment and order impugned is liable to be set

aside.

On the contrary, Sh. R.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the

State of U.P. and Sh. K.C. Lamba, learned counsel appearing for Smt.

Ramwati, the mother of Tej Veer Singh, defended the impugned judgment

and order contending that a fair trial had been conducted. The appellant Lila

Dhar did not even submit the reply to the Show Cause Notice issued by the

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High Court. Therefore, no fault could be found with the impugned judgment

and order. The appeals are liable to be dismissed.

We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7.The impugned judgment and the record of the case reveal that as no

progress was likely to be made in the Habeas Corpus petition, the District

Judge, Ghaziabad, was directed to conduct an inquiry in the allegations

made in the petition and also taking note of the contents of the FIR dated

4.6.1997 lodged by Smt. Ramwati, the mother of Tej Veer Singh. The

District Judge submitted his report after recording evidence of the witnesses,

particularly, the family members and friends of Tej Veer Singh, and also

hearing the appellants and other police officials. On the basis of the report

submitted by the District Judge, the Habeas Corpus petition was disposed of

vide Order dated 20.12.2001 presuming that Tej Veer Singh was dead.

8.Section 108 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter called

‘Evidence Act’) provides for presumption of a person being dead in case he

has not been heard of for seven years. In the instant case, only a period of

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4½ years had elapsed. Therefore, we are not able to understand as under

what circumstances, such a presumption could be drawn by the High Court.

9.The proceedings of contempt are quasi-criminal in nature. In a case

where the order passed by the court is not complied with by mistake,

inadvertence or by mis-understanding of the meaning and purport of the

order, unless it is intentional, no charge of contempt can be brought home.

There may possibly be a case where disobedience is accidental. If that is

so, there would be no contempt. (Vide B.K. Kar Vs. Hon’ble the Chief

Justice and his companion Justices of the Orissa High Court & Anr.,

AIR 1961 SC 1367).

10.Similarly, in Debabrata Bandopadhyay & Ors. Vs. The State of

West Bengal & Anr., AIR 1969 SC 189, this Court has observed as under:-

“A question whether there is contempt of court or not is

a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as

the judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act

with as great circumspection as possible making all

allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising

from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is

only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not

explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be

punished……… Punishment under the law of Contempt

is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in

disregard of one’s duty and in defiance of authority. To

take action in an unclear case is to make the law of

contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be

encouraged.”

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The same view has been re-iterated by this Court in Aligarh

Municipal Board & Ors. Vs. Ekka Tonga Mazdoor Union & Ors., AIR

1970 SC 1767; Dushyant Somal (Capt.) Vs. Smt Sushma Somal & Ors.,

AIR 1981 SC 1026; M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar &

Ors., AIR 1988 SC 127; Niaz Mohammed & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana

& Ors, (1994) 6 SCC 332; and Manish Gupta & Ors. Vs. Gurudas Roy,

(1995) 3 SCC 559.

11.The Constitution Bench of this Court, in The State of Bihar Vs.

Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR 1961 SC 221, held that the provisions of

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short ‘the Act, 1971’) deal with the wilful

defiance of the order passed by the Court. Order of punishment be not

passed if the Court is satisfied that the party was, in fact, under a

misapprehension as to the scope of the order or there was an unintentional

wrong for the reason that the order was ambiguous and reasonably capable

of more than one interpretation or the party never intended to disobey the

order but conducted himself in accordance with the interpretation of the

order.

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12.In Sukhdev Singh Vs. Hon'ble C.J.S. Teja Singh & the Hon'ble

Judges of the Pepsu High Court at Patiala, AIR 1954 SC 186, this Court

placing reliance upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Andre Paul

Terence Ambard Vs. The Attorney - General of Trinidad and Tabago,

AIR 1936 PC 141, held that the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts

Act are quasi-criminal in nature and orders passed in those proceedings are

to be treated as orders passed in criminal cases.

13.In S. Abdul Karim Vs. M.K. Prakash & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 859,

Chhotu Ram Vs. Urvashi Gulati & Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 530; Anil Ratan

Sarkar & Ors. Vs. Hirak Ghosh & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 1405; Daroga

Singh & Ors. Vs. B.K. Pandey, (2004) 5 SCC 26; and All India Anna

Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Vs. L.K. Tripathi & Ors. AIR 2009 SC

1314, this Court held that burden and standard of proof in contempt

proceedings, being quasi-criminal in nature, is the standard of proof required

in criminal proceedings, for the reason that contempt proceedings are quasi-

criminal in nature.

Similarly, in Mrityunjoy Das & Anr. Vs. Sayed Hasibur Rahaman

& Ors., AIR 2001 SC 1293, this Court placing reliance upon a large number

of its earlier judgments, including, V.G. Nigam & Ors. Vs. Kedar Nath

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Gupta & Anr., AIR 1992 SC 215; and Murray & Co. Vs. Ashok Kumar

Newatia & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 833, held that jurisdiction of the contempt

has been conferred on the Court to punish an offender for his contemptuous

conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, but in the case of quasi-

criminal in nature, charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and

alleged contemnor becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. It would be very

hazardous to impose sentence in contempt proceedings on some

probabilities.

14.In Dr. L.P. Misra Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1998 SC 3337, this Court

dealt with an untoward incident i.e. ex-facie contempt in Allahabad High

Court wherein, the High Court passed certain orders without following the

procedure prescribed in the Rules applicable in such proceedings. This

Court held that power of the High Court even under Article 215 of the

Constitution has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure prescribed

by law. The Court observed as under :

“12. ……… we are of the opinion that the Court while

passing the impugned order had not followed the

procedure prescribed by law. It is true that the High

Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it

under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a

jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the

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procedure prescribed by law. It is in these circumstances

the impugned order cannot be sustained.” (Emphasis

supplied)

15.In Three Cheers Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs. C.E.S.C. Ltd. AIR

2009 SC 735, this Court held that in contempt proceedings the court must

conclude the trial and complete the proceedings “in accordance with the

procedure prescribed by law”. However, for enforcing the order passed by

the Court “a roving enquiry is not permissible”. The proceedings had to be

completed most expeditiously and the court has to permit the parties to

cross-examine the witnesses to enable the court to reach a particular finding.

16.The Court should not punish an alleged contemnor without any

foundation merely on conjectures and surmises in criminal contempt. (Vide

T.R. Dhananjaya Vs. J. Vasudevan, AIR 1996 SC 302; Afzal & Anr. Vs.

State of Haryana & Ors, AIR 1996 SC 2326; Contemnor: In re,

Arundhati Roy, AIR 2002 SC 1375; Prem Surana Vs. Additional Munsif

& Judicial Magistrate, AIR 2002 SC 2956; Radha Mohan Lal Vs.

Rajasthan High Court AIR 2003 SC 1467; and S.R. Ramaraj Vs. Special

Court, Bombay, AIR 2003 SC 3039).

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17.In R.K. Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court (2009) 8 SCC 106,

this Court while dealing with the same issue held as under:

“140. ………Now, it is one thing to say that the standard

of proof in a contempt proceeding is no less rigorous

than a criminal trial but it is something entirely

different to insist that the manner of proof for the two

proceedings must also be the same.

141. It is now well settled and so also the High Court

has held that the proceeding of contempt of court is sui

generis. In other words, it is not strictly controlled by the

provisions of CrPC and the Evidence Act. What,

however, applies to a proceeding of contempt of court

are the principles of natural justice and those principles

apply to the contempt proceeding with greater rigour

than any other proceeding. This means that the court

must follow a procedure that is fair and objective; that

should cause no prejudice to the person facing the

charge of contempt of court and that should allow

him/her the fullest opportunity to defend

himself/herself.” (Emphasis added)

18.This Court In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (the alleged contemnor)

(1995) 2 SCC 584, has observed that a contempt amounts to an offence but

it is an offence sui generis and hence for such an offence, the procedure

adopted both under the common law and the statute law has always been

summary. The Court held that in spite of the fact that it is a summary

procedure, there must be an opportunity to the alleged contemnor of meeting

the charge. The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated

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depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific

allegation is made clear or otherwise the contemnor is aware of the specific

allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge. So long as the

contemnor's interest is adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity

of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of

contempt cannot be found fault with.

19.In Daroga Singh (supra), this Court observed that in case, the alleged

contemnor feels that there is a necessity to cross-examine the witnesses i.e.

deponents of affidavits filed against him, the alleged contemnor must be

given an opportunity to cross-examine the said witnesses provided it is so

asked by him. This Court observed that in Contempt proceedings, a

summary procedure is to be adopted for the reason that matter is to be

disposed of most expeditiously and it is for this reason that in spite of the

fact that proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, the procedure under

Cr.P.C. or Evidence Act is not made applicable.

20.In view of the above, the law can be summarised that the High Court

has a power to initiate the contempt proceedings suo motu for ensuring the

compliance of the orders passed by the Court. However, contempt

proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the same standard of proof is

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required in the same manner as in other criminal cases. The alleged

contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are

provided in the Criminal Jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt.

There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by

a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the said

provision. The alleged contemnor is to be informed as what is the charge, he

has to meet. Thus, specific charge has to be framed in precision. The alleged

contemnor may ask the Court to permit him to cross-examine the witnesses

i.e. deponents of affidavits, who have deposed against him. In spite of the

fact that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, provisions of

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called, “Cr.P.C.”) and

Evidence Act are not attracted for the reason that proceedings have to be

concluded expeditiously. Thus, the trial has to be concluded as early as

possible. The case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. There

must be clear and reliable evidence to substantiate the allegations against the

alleged contemnor. The proceedings must be concluded giving strict

adherence to the statutory Rules framed for the purpose.

21. The instant cases are required to be examined in view of the aforesaid

settled legal proposition. The contempt proceedings had been initiated under

the Act, 1971. Section 23 of the Act 1971 enables the High Court to frame

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rules providing for a procedure in contempt cases. In view thereof, the

Allahabad High Court framed the rules by adding chapter XXXV-E in the

Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 (hereinafter called the ‘Rules 1952’) vide

amendment published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette, Part II dated 12.2.1977. As

per the said rules, a criminal contempt is to be dealt with by the Division

Bench and a detailed procedure to file the application etc. has been laid

down therein. Once the Court is prima facie satisfied that there is a case to

proceed with the contempt against a person concerned, the Division Bench

in such case has to proceed giving strict adherence to the procedure

prescribed under the Rules 1952. Rule 5 of the Chapter XXXV-E reads as

under:-

“5. Issuance of notice. – Such allegations contained in

the petition as appears to the Court to make out a prima

facie case of contempt of Court against the person

concerned, shall be reduced into charge or charges by

the Court against such person, and notice shall be

issued only with respect to those charges. (Emphasis

added).

Rule 6 thereof provides mandatorily that the show cause notice issued

under Rule 5 must be accompanied with material documents. The Rule

reads as under:-

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“6. Documents accompanied notice. – Where an order

has been made directing that notice be issued to any

person to show cause why he should not be punished for

contempt of Court, a date shall be fixed for the hearing

and a notice thereof in the prescribed form given to the

person concerned. The notice of a criminal contempt

shall also be served on the Government Advocate. The

notice shall be accompanied by copies of the

application, motion and the affidavit or a copy of the

reference by a subordinate court as the case may be, and

a copy of the charge or charges as framed by the Court,

and shall require the person concerned to appear, unless

otherwise ordered, in person before the Court at the time

and on the date specified therein to show cause why he

should not be punished for Contempt of Court. Notice of

every proceeding under Section 15 of the Act shall be

served personally on the person charged, unless the

Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise.”

(Emphasis added)

Thus, it is evident that while initiating contempt proceedings the

Court has to frame the charge (s) and serve the same alongwith other

relevant material upon the alleged contemnor. This is a mandatory

requirement under the Rules 1952.

22.The question does arise as to whether the contempt proceedings had been

concluded in conformity with the aforesaid Rules? The enquiry entrusted

to the District Judge was to find out as what was the truth in the

allegations made in the Habeas Corpus Petition about kidnapping of Tej

Veer Singh. After submission of both the reports by the District Judge,

Ghaziabad, the Court suo motu initiated the contempt proceedings. The

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appellants ought to have been told clearing as for what offence they were

being tried. We have examined the original record of the case and to our

utter surprise, we find that show cause notices for suo motu contempt

dated 20.2.1998 had been issued in a case, titled as “State of UP Vs.

Ramesh Chandra & Ors.”. The notice reads as under:

“IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD

QUASI CRIMINAL SIDE

NO.48- NOTICE

In the matter of Crl. Miscellaneous Contempt Case No.69/97

Between

State of U.P. ..Applicant

And

Ramesh Chandra & Ors. ..Opposite Party

Sri Lilidhar Constable Police Station Muradnagar,

District Ghaziabad.

To,

WHEREAS the abovenamed applicant has represented to

this Court that you have committed contempt of court.

AND WHEREAS the 31

st

day of March, 1998 has been

fixed for the hearing of the said case:

NOTICE is hereby given to you calling upon you to

appear in person in this Court on the above mentioned date at

10 O’ clock in the forenoon to show cause why you should not

be punished for contempt of court.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Court,

This 20

th

day of February, 1998.

Deputy Registrar

Allahabad”

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23.The notices had been served upon the appellants and other alleged

contemnor. There was no case filed by the State of U.P. before the High

Court in respect of abduction of Tej Veer Singh nor any application for

initiating contempt proceedings was ever filed by any person. Admittedly,

the proceedings were initiated by the High Court suo motu. The notice itself

remains incomplete, inaccurate and mis-leading. The Registry of the High

Court issued the “dotted lines notice” without any sense of responsibility.

The notice did not mention as what was the allegation/accusation against

either of them. It did not contain any charge(s) against either of them. In

D.K. Basu (supra) this Court has issued as many as eleven directions to the

police authorities inter-alia, furnishing the information of the person arrested

to his relatives; the person should be arrested only by the police officials

with clear identification marks; a memo of arrest is to be prepared at the

time of arrest, which should be attested at least by some person from the

locality; the time, place of arrest and venue of custody must be disclosed etc.

etc. This Court further observed that non-observance of any of the

directions issued therein would make the Police personnel liable for

departmental action and render them liable to be punished for Contempt of

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Court and proceedings for Contempt of Court would be initiated in the High

Court having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.

24.The notice did not make any reference to the judgment of this Court in

D.K.Basu (supra). Neither the report of the District Judge nor any evidence

collected by him during that inquiry, nor any other document relevant to the

case was annexed with the said notice. Rather, considering the reply of

Constable Ramesh Chandra and Sahdeo Singh, the impugned judgment and

order has been passed. The aforesaid Rules 1952 provide for a specific

procedure to hold the trial in contempt cases. The Rules 1952 mandatorily

require the framing of charge(s) and furnishing the copy of the documents to

the alleged contemnor on the basis of which, the charges have been framed.

In the instant cases, there has been no compliance of these mandatory

provisions contained in the Rules. In absence of the charge(s), a

delinquent/accused/alleged contemnor may not be able to furnish any

defence as he is not aware as to what charge(s) he is required to meet. Every

statutory provision requires strict adherence, for the reason that the Statute

creates rights in favour of persons concerned. The impugned judgment

suffered from non-observance of the principles of natural justice and not

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ensuring the compliance of Statutory Rules, 1952. Thus, the trial itself

suffered from material procedural defect and stood vitiated.

The impugned judgment and order, so far as the conviction of the

appellants in Contempt proceedings are concerned, is liable to be set aside.

25.By the impugned judgment and order, Constable Ramesh Chandra

was convicted and punished with imprisonment for six months. Further, a

fine of Rs. 1 lakh and costs of Rs. 5000/- were also imposed on him. We are

told that during the pendency of his appeals, i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos. 530

& 532 of 2002, Constable Ramesh Chandra has died and those appeals have

been disposed of accordingly. Appellants were, however, convicted and

imposed punishment as referred to hereinabove.

26.In the instant cases, the record reveals that the Habeas Corpus petition

was taken by the High Court on 30.07.1997 and directed the District Judge,

Ghaziabad to hold the inquiry on the allegations made in the Habeas Corpus

petition. The District Judge submitted the report on 03.12.1997. The Court

considered the case on 4.12.1997 and initiated contempt proceedings against

appellants and others suo motu. Matter was remanded to the District Judge

for further inquiry in view of the fact that Sujan Singh was not heard in the

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earlier inquiry. The District Judge, Ghaziabad, submitted the supplementary

inquiry report on 12.07.1998. After hearing the parties the judgment was

reserved on 12.03.1999. Thereafter, it was listed on 14.12.2001 i.e. after 2

years and 9 months for fresh arguments. However, the counsel for the

parties stated that nothing more was required to be submitted except what

had been argued earlier. The judgment was pronounced on 20.12.2001. It is

apparent from the order sheets itself that the matter remained pending before

the Court, so far as the contempt proceedings are concerned, for more than

three years which itself is in contravention of the true spirit of the purpose of

initiation of the contempt proceedings.

27.In view of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that

contempt proceedings had been concluded without ensuring the compliance

of the mandatory provisions of the Rules 1952. The appellants had never

been informed as what were the charges against them. The relevant

documents on the basis of which the High Court had taken a prima facie

view while initiating the contempt proceedings suo motu, had not been made

available to them. The notice itself was not only defective, but inaccurate

and totally mis-leading. The facts and circumstances of the case warrant

reversal of the aforesaid judgment and order.

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This Court, while entertaining these appeals, granted interim relief to

the appellants. Thus, State could not initiate disciplinary proceedings

against either of them.

The appeals stand allowed. The judgment and order dated 20.12.2001

passed by the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Contempt No.69 of 1997 is

hereby set aside.

…………………………………J.

(J.M. PANCHAL)

New Delhi, …………………………………J.

February 23, 2010 (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

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