The instant Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226, read with227 of the Constitution of India, by the Petitioner herein i.e. Sasakawa-IndiaLeprosy Foundation challenging the constitutional validity of the ...
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 1 of 33
$~22
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 01
st
AUGUST, 2022
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ W.P.(C) 1273/2021 & CM APPLs. 3544/2021, 8050/2021,
16374/2021, 27429/2021 & 33701/2021
SASAKAWA INDIA LEPROSY FOUNDATION ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rony John, Mr. Piyush Swami,
Mr. Arshdeep Singh, Advocates
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Anurag Ahluwalia, CGSC with
Mr. Danish Faraz Khan, Advocate for
R-1 & R-2
Mr. Parag P. Tripathi, Senior
Advocate with Mr. Ramesh Babu,
Ms. Manisha Singh, Ms.Sanya
Panjwani, Ms. Nisha Sharma,
Ms.Mishika Bajpai, Advocates for
R-3 & R-4/RBI
Mr. H. S. Parihar, Mr. Kuldeep Singh
Parihar and Ms Ikshita Parihar,
Advocates for NHB.
Mr. Raunak Dhillon, Ms. Madhavi
Khanna and Ms. Niharika Shukla,
Advocates for R-7 & R-8
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 2 of 33
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
J U D G M E N T
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
1. The instant Writ Petition has been filed under Articles 226, read with
227 of the Constitution of India, by the Petitioner herein i.e. Sasakawa-India
Leprosy Foundation challenging the constitutional validity of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial
Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2019
(hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Rules”) and Notification No. S.O.
4139 (E) dated 18.11.2019, notified by the Central Government in exercise
of its powers under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter
referred to as the “IBC”), on the ground that they are ultra vires Articles 14,
19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution, Chapter III-B of the Reserve Bank of
India Act, 1934 (hereinafter referred to as the “RBI Act”) and Section 36A
of the NHB Act.
2. The Petitioner herein is a Public Charitable Trust engaged in
providing education, livelihood opportunities, and advocating for the rights
of individuals affected by leprosy. Between March 2017 to January 2018,
the Petitioner opened four fixed deposit accounts with various branches of
Dewan Housing Finance Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as
“DHFL”) in Delhi, to the tune of Rs. 7,56,07,000/. These FDs were non-
cumulative deposits, under yearly interest schemes, and were to mature only
after 03.12.2019.
3. However, in the interim, insolvency proceedings were initiated
against DHFL under the IBC. In exercise of powers conferred under Section
227 read with Section 239(zk) of the IBC, the Central Government brought
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 3 of 33
out the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings
of Financial Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating Authority)
Rules, 2019. These rules were to apply to such financial providers as were to
be notified by the Government. In sum and substance, the financial
providers which were unable to pay their debts were brought under the
scope of the IBC, and in the facts and circumstances of the present case the
DHFL being such a financial service provider, was also resolved under the
IBC. Subsequently, after following the procedure laid down under the
Impugned Rules, several meeting of the Committee of Creditors (hereinafter
referred to as “COC”) were convened. As per the Impugned Rules,
depositors such as the Petitioner herein were being represented by an
authorised representative during the course of the COC meetings.
Thereafter, the COC approved the plan floated by one, Piramal Capital and
Housing Finance Limited, with an exceeding majority of 93.65% votes in its
favour. It is pertinent to note that under the successful Resolution Plan, the
Petitioner Trust is entitled for a refund of about 20-25% of the admitted
claim amount. Upon being entitled for a refund of only a miniscule sum, the
Petitioner Trust is aggrieved by the initiation of the insolvency process
under the Impugned Rules, as opposed to the process envisaged under the
RBI Act.
4. The contention of the Petitioners herein is that as the Impugned Rules
brought financial service providers within the ambit of the IBC, small
depositors and financial service providers were hit inasmuch as they were
unable to recover their investment. It is also the contention of the Petitioners
that in the present case, the State Bank of India has more than 90% stake in
the Committee of Creditors and Resolution Plan is only under the dictum of
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 4 of 33
SBI and the approved plan does not take into account the grievances of the
small scale creditors in such NBFCs which are going through a corporate
insolvency process. It is, therefore, the contention of the Petitioners that
these rules have been framed in violation of the rules guaranteed to such
public depositors which though are in large number but have very small
amounts in the NBFCs under the various provisions of RBI Act and the
National Housing Bank Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “NHB Act”).
5. It is the principal contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner
that the effect of the rules which are impugned in this Writ Petition is that it
nullifies the rights of depositors guaranteed under Section 45-QA of the RBI
Act and Section 36-A of the NHB Act which assures that the depositors are
to be repaid the value of their deposits. It is contended that the process
envisaged under IBC takes away the “vested rights” of public depositors.
6. It has further been contended by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner
that as the insolvency process results in the imposition of a moratorium
under Section 14 of the IBC, depositors are debarred from initiating
proceedings against the Corporate Debtor. It is further contended that the
grievances of small financial creditors are never heard during the
proceedings.
7. It is also the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner that
Section 45MBA of the RBI Act would prevail over provisions of the IBC in
light of the non-obstante clause in Section 45MBA of the RBI Act. The
Petitioner has contended that since Section 45MBA of the RBI Act was
enacted “later in time”, it would prevail over the provisions of the IBC. In
this regard, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has placed reliance upon
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 5 of 33
the Integrated Finance Company Limited v. Reserve Bank of India, (2015)
13 SCC 772.
8. Reliance has been placed upon by the judgments titled Lord Krishna
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1960) 1 SCR 39, and Cellular Operators
Assn. of India v. TRAI, (2016) 7 SCC 703 to argue that while adjudging
the constitutionality of a subordinate legislation, the Court ought to take into
account the relative restrictions and advantages of laws which form part of a
single scheme.
9. Per contra, learned Counsel for the Reserve Bank of India i.e
Respondent Nos. 3 and 4, has stated that the RBI is the primary statutory
authority which is entrusted with the responsibility of regulating the banking
sector. The counsel for Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 has stated that although
RBI has issued various guidelines to ensure that NBFCs have adequate
capital base to repay deposits, the deposits made with NBFCs still do not fall
within the purview of the Deposit Insurance And Credit Guarantee
Corporation Act, 1961. This implies that deposits with NBFCs are riskier
than those in banks. Hence, it is the contention of Respondent Nos. 3 and 4
that Section 45-QA of the RBI Act and Section 36-A of the NHB Act simply
underscores the contractual liability of the NBFC to its depositors.
10. The Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 have further argued that a perusal of
Section 45MBA of the RBI Act indicates that it is simply an enabling
section and is not mandatory in nature. It is submitted that since RBI is the
primary regulator for banking, it had the discretion to invoke the insolvency
under the provisions of the IBC, which envisage a more detailed and
comprehensive resolution process.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 6 of 33
11. It has further been contended by the counsel for the Respondent Nos.
3 and 4 that the laws related to economic activities are to be given greater
latitude as there exists no straight jacket formula to deal with economic
issues. Further, due deference is supposed to be given to the judgment of
experts, and that Courts should refrain from substituting their judgment in
place of experts. In this regard, reliance has been placed upon the following
judgments:-
i. R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1981) 4 SCC 675;
ii. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited v.
Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 2 SCC 343;
iii. Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd. and Another v. Union of India
andOrs., (1990) 3 SCC 223;
iv. Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 1296;
v. P.T.R. Exports (Madras) (P.) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR1996
SC 346; Balco Employees' Union (Regd) v. Union of India,
(2002) 2 SCC 333; Bhavesh D. Parish v. Union and India,
(2000) 5 SCC 471.
12. DHFL i.e. Respondent No. 6 and Mr. R. Subramaniakumar i.e. the
administrator of DHFL (hereinafter referred to as “Respondent No. 7”)
raised the preliminary objection that although the Petitioner has challenged
constitutionality of the Impugned Rules and Notification, the real intent of
the Petitioner was otherwise. It is the submission of the Respondent Nos. 6
and 7 that the instant Writ Petition is an oblique method of challenging the
approved resolution plan, for which the NCLAT is the appropriate forum.
13. The learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 have brought to
the attention of this Court that 97 deposit holders had also approached the
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 7 of 33
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinay Kumar Mittal & Ors. v. Dewan Housing
Finance Corporation Ltd. Mumbai & Ors., (2020) 11 SCC 288 where the
Hon’ble Supreme Court on 30.01.2020 upheld the CIRP process of DHFL/
Respondent No. 6.
14. Learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 6 and 7 also pointed out
that the Petitioner can approach the NCLT, under Section 60(5) of the
NCLT, if it is aggrieved by the manner in which its claims have been dealt
with under the approved Resolution Plan. It is stated that Section 60(5) of
the IBC ensures that only the NCLT has jurisdiction over proceedings by or
against a corporate debtor. In this regard, the reliance has been placed upon
Arcelor Mittal India (P) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1.
15. Learned Counsel for Respondent No. 8 i.e. the COC has sought to
argue that the Impugned Rules and Notification are neither bad in law, nor
in conflict with the provisions of the RBI Act or the NBH Act. In this
regard, the learned Counsel has placed reliance upon the report dated
October 4, 2019, of the Sub-Committee of the Insolvency Law Committee
for Notification of Financial Service Providers under Section 227 of the
Code (hereinafter referred to as the “ILC Report”). A perusal of the ILC
report indicates that the Impugned Notification and Rules were enacted after
careful consideration, and after duly considering the pre-existing regulations
of the RBI Act.
16. Learned Counsel for Respondent Nos. 3 and 4 added that the assertion
that the no-objection granted by the RBI will result in the depletion in the
value of public deposits is baseless and ought to be outrightly rejected. It is
argued that the RBI gave its approval to a resolution plan which had been
approved by 93.65% of the COC, and is binding upon all stakeholders,
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 8 of 33
including dissenting creditors. In this regard, reliance is placed upon
Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta
&Ors., (2020) 8 SCC 531.
17. The learned Counsel has also pointed out that the Petitioner has failed
to challenge Section 227 of the IBC but has only challenged the Impugned
Rules and the Impugned Notification, which is untenable in law. The
counsel for Respondent No. 8 has also argued that the deposit holders do not
have a right to claim to full repayment. In this regard, attention is drawn to
Section 12 of the Banning of Unregulated Deposit Schemes Act, 2019 which
categorically makes the repayment of deposits subject to the rigours of inter
alia the IBC.
18. The learned Counsel for the Union i.e. Respondent No. 1, after going
through the scheme of the IBC, submitted that the objective of the Impugned
Rules and Notification was to provide a framework for the insolvency of
Financial Service Providers, and that due process was followed in the
formulation of the same.
19. In his rejoinder, the ld. Counsel for the Petitioner has reiterated that
the depositors will only get a refund of about 20-25% of their claim amount,
and that this indicates an abdication of administrative discretion by the RBI.
It has been argued that this abdication of power is more evident from the
RBI’s submissions that deposits in NBFCs are riskier. It has also been
highlighted that while the RBI’s role under the IBC is relegated to being a
mere spectator, it plays the primary role of ensuring regulatory oversight
under the RBI Act, and NHB Act.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 9 of 33
20. The Petitioner further submitted that the ILC Committee had
categorically discussed the non-viability of resorting to the IBC for
systematically important entities such as DHFL.
21. Heard the arguments advanced by the counsel for the Petitioner, and
Respondents, and perused the material on record.
22. The legal matrix, as relevant to the instant Writ Petition, spans three
principal legislations namely, the RBI Act, the NHB Act and the IBC. The
law governing NBFCs at various points in time has been delineated below:-
a. On 01.12.1964, Chapter III-B titled ‘Provisions Relating to Non-
Banking Institutions Receiving Deposits and Financial
Institutions’ was inserted in the RBI Act. Vide this amendment,
the RBI gained supervisory authority over, inter alia, non-banking
financial institution (hereinafter referred to as “NBFIs/NBFCs”),
as defined under Section 45-I (a) of the RBI Act.
b. On 09.01.1997, as the previous amendments were considered to
be inadequate to regulate NBFIs, Sections 45-IA (Requirement of
registration and net owned fund), 45-IB (Maintenance of
percentage of assets), 45-IC (Reserve Fund), 45-JA (Power of
Bank to determine policy and issue directions), 45-MB (Power of
Bank to prohibit acceptance of deposit and alienation of assets),
45- NC (Power of Bank to exempt) and 45-QA (Power of
Company Law Board to order repayment of deposit) were also
inserted in Chapter III-B of the RBI Act.
c. On 18.06.1997, vide Notification DFC (COC) No. 112/ED(SG)-
97, the RBI exempted NBFIs, as defined in Section 2(d) of the
NHB Act from the application of Chapter III-B of the RBI Act.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 10 of 33
d. On 12.06.2000, certain Sections namely, Sections 29-A
(Requirement of registration and net owned fund), 29-B
(Maintenance of percentage of assets), 29-C (Reserve Fund) and
36-A (power to order repayment of deposit) were inserted in the
NHB Act. It is pertinent to note that these Sections were
analogous to Sections 45-IA, 45-IB and 45-IC, Section 45-QA of
RBI Act. Hence, the regulatory power as had previously existed
with the RBI was now to be exercised under the NHB Act.
e. Thereafter, on 28.05.2016, the Central Government notified the
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC/Code”) to
consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and
insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and
individuals in a time-bound manner. The provisions of the IBC, as
relevant to the instant Writ Petition are as follows:-
“Section 227 - Power of Central Government to notify
financial service providers, etc
[Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 2[contained
in this Code] or any other law for the time being in
force, the Central Government may, if it considers
necessary, in consultation with the appropriate
financial sector regulators, notify financial service
providers or categories of financial service providers
for the purpose of their insolvency and liquidation
proceedings, which may be conducted under this
Code, in such manner as may be prescribed.]
[Explanation. -- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby
clarified that the insolvency and liquidation
proceedings for financial service providers or
categories of financial service providers may be
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 11 of 33
conducted with such modifications and in such manner
as may be prescribed.]”
“238. Provisions of this Code to override other laws.
The provisions of this Code shall have effect,
notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law for the time being in force
or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such
law.”
“239. Power to make rules.
(1) The Central Government may, by notification, make
rules for carrying out the provisions of this Code.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the
provisions of sub-section (1), the Central Government
may make rules for any of the following matters,
namely,
xxx
(zk) the manner of conducting insolvency and
liquidation proceedings under Section 227.”
(emphasis supplied)
f. The IBC did not regulate the insolvency of NBFIs when it was
enacted. However, Section 227, read with Section 239 of the IBC
gave the Central Government the power to notify ‘financial
service providers’ to carry out their insolvency under the IBC, and
enact Rules to regulate the procedure as well.
g. On 01.08.2019, the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 came into force.
Thereafter, on 09.08.2019, vide Chapter VI of the Finance Act,
2019, Section 45MBA was notified under Chapter III-B of the
RBI Act. Pertinently, Section 45MBA(2) gave the RBI the power
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 12 of 33
to frame schemes for the reconstruction of NBFCs. The relevant
Section reads as under:-
“45MBA. Resolution of non-banking financial
company.--
(1) Without prejudice to any other provision of this Act
or any other law for the time being in force, the Bank
may, if it is satisfied, upon an inspection of the Books
of a non-banking financial company that it is in the
public interest or in the interest of financial stability so
to do for enabling the continuance of the activities
critical to the functioning of the financial system, frame
schemes which may provide for any one or more of the
following, namely:--
***
(b) reconstruction of the non-banking financial
company;.'
h. Thereafter, on 15.11.2019, the Central Government in exercise of
its powers under Section 227 read with Section 239(zk) of the
IBC, notified the Impugned Rules to govern the insolvency
resolution and liquidation of Financial Service providers/NBFCs.
The Impugned Rules were to apply to such categories of financial
service providers, as may be notified by the Central Government
under section 227.
i. On 18.11.2019, the MCA/Respondent No. 1 under exercise of its
power under section 227 of the IBC, notified one such financial
service provider i.e NBFCs, having assets of Rs. 500 crore or
more. The relevant excerpt of the notification is set out below:-
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 13 of 33
“S.O. 4139(E).—In exercise of the powers conferred by
section 227 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 (31 of 2016), the Central Government in
consultation with the Reserve Bank of India hereby
notifies as under:
The insolvency resolution and liquidation proceedings
of the following categories of financial service
providers shall be undertaken in accordance with the
provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code,
2016 read with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
(Insolvency and Liquidation Proceedings of Financial
Service Providers and Application to Adjudicating
Authority) Rules, 2019 (in this notification referred to
as the ‘Rules’) and the applicable Regulations....”
j. By virtue of the above, insolvency and liquidation proceedings of
NBFIs, with asset size of Rs.500 crore or more, could be
undertaken under the Impugned Rules.
k. On 19.11.2019, vide Notification No. DOR.047/CGM(MM)-2019,
the earlier notification dated 18.06.1997 (which exempted housing
finance institutions from Chapter III-B of the RBI Act) was
withdrawn. This implies that inter alia Section 45MBA of the RBI
Act could be exercised to govern NBFCs, such as DHFL.
23. NBFC has been defined under both, the NHB Act, and the RBI Act.
Further, as they are banking institutions, the RBI is the primary regulator for
NBFCs. The Impugned Rules have been formulated under the IBC and seek
to subject financial service providers including NBFCs, to the resolution
process as envisaged under the IBC. The Petitioner has challenged the
Impugned Rules on the ground that they are in the teeth of certain sections
of the RBI Act and NHB Act, and consequently that they take away certain
vested rights of depositors, such as the Petitioners herein.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 14 of 33
24. It is trite law that the Impugned Rules being subordinate legislation,
can be challenged on certain well established principles. The Supreme Court
in State of T.N. v. P. Krishnamurthy, (2006) 4 SCC 517, has laid down the
parameters of judicial review of subordinate legislation as under:-
“15. There is a presumption in favour of
constitutionality or validity of a subordinate legislation
and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that
it is invalid. It is also well recognised that a
subordinate legislation can be challenged under any of
the following grounds:
(a) Lack of legislative competence to make the
subordinate legislation.
(b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under
the Constitution of India.
(c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of
India.
(d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is
made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by
the enabling Act.
(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any
enactment.
(f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an
extent where the court might well say that the
legislature never intended to give authority to make
such rules).
25. The judicial pronouncements made it clear that while there exists a
presumption of constitutionality in favour of the Impugned Rules, a
successful challenge to them can be levelled on grounds such as, the lack of
legislative competence, violation of fundamental rights, repugnancy to the
other laws and manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness.
26. The primary challenge of the Petitioner is that the Impugned Rules are
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 15 of 33
repugnant to the RBI Act, and the NHB Act. The ld. Counsel for the
Petitioner draws attention to Section 45Q of the RBI Act which contains a
non-obstante clause to the effect that Chapter III of the RBI Act would have
effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in any other law.
Further reliance has been placed upon Section 45MBA of the RBI Act
which categorically states that without prejudice to any other provision, the
RBI is empowered to make regulations for the reconstruction of inter alia
NBFCs. It is the contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner that RBI
Act which contains a non-obstante clause, and is the special statute
governing NBFCs must prevail over the IBC, which is a general statute.
Therefore, it is argued that the Impugned Rules are inconsistent with Section
45Q of the RBI Act, and are ultra vires.
27. The Impugned Rules have been framed under the powers granted
under Section 227 read with Section 239 (2) (zk) of the IBC. Section 239 (2)
of the IBC gives the Central Government the power to make rules to govern
the insolvency process. Under Section 227, the Central Government has
categorically been empowered to notify appropriate financial service
providers to enable their insolvency process to be carried out under the
Code.
28. It is pertinent to reproduce the observations in the ‘Report Of The
Sub-Committee Of The Insolvency Law Committee For Notification Of
Financial Service Providers Under Section 227 of The Insolvency And
Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which reads as under:-
“FRAMEWORK FOR FACILITATING THE
RESOLUTION OF FSPs
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 16 of 33
In light of the critical services provided by many FSPs
and the impact that their failure can have on the
economy, resolution frameworks, particularly for
certain kinds of FSPs, such as NBFCs and HFCs,
assume great significance. As per the latest financial
stability report of the RBI released on June 27, 2019
(FSR)20, NBFCs are the largest net borrowers of
funds from the financial system with gross payables of
around INR 8,446 billion and gross receivables of
around INR 723 billion as at March-end 2019. The
highest funds have been received from scheduled
commercial banks, followed by AMC-MFs and
insurance companies. The FSR further notes that
NBFCs depend largely on public funds which account
for seventy percent of the total liabilities of the sector.
Bank borrowings, debentures and commercial papers
are the major sources of funding for NBFCs
Recently, the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 has conferred
certain additional resolution powers on the RBI in
relation to NBFCs by amending the Reserve Bank of
India Act, 1934. Such powers include: (i) removal of
directors of NBFCs on grounds of public interest, to
prevent the affairs from being conducted in a manner
detrimental to the interests of depositors or creditors,
in the interest of financial stability or for securing
proper management; (ii) supersession of the board of
directors on the grounds specified in (i) and
appointment of an administrator for a specified
period; and (iii) framing schemes which may provide
for amalgamation, enabling creation of a bridge
institution for transferring the viable part of the
business to it, reconstruction of the NBFC, etc. These
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 17 of 33
schemes may be prepared in public interest, in the
interest of financial stability or enabling the
continuance of the activities if it is critical to the
functioning of the financial system.
In light of the factors mentioned above and the
possibility of a contagion effect in case of failure of
NBFCs and HFCs, the resolution framework for such
entities needs to be re-evaluated. As highlighted
earlier, currently, India does not have a specialized
and consolidated resolution framework for FSPs.
The Finance (No. 2) Act, 2019 has also amended the
National Housing Bank Act, 1987 and conferred
certain powers for regulation of HFCs with the RBI.
After reviewing the regulatory framework applicable to
HFCs, the RBI will issue revised regulations in due
course. Till the RBI issues a revised framework, HFCs
must comply with the directions and instructions issued
by the National Housing Bank.
While the recent amendments might help the RBI in
resolving at least some FSPs under distress, the
resolution framework for FSPs in general remains
uncomprehensive, with disparate powers conferred
on various financial sector regulators across several
statutes. Even the recent amendments to the Reserve
Bank of India Act, 1934 remain untested. Further,
post enactment of the IBC, an event of default is no
longer a ground for filing an application for winding
up under the Companies Act, 2013. Consequently, the
stakeholders of FSPs are left with no effective remedy
against a defaulting FSP.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 18 of 33
Comparatively, the resolution framework for non-FSPs
under the IBC is working reasonably well. Since the
Parliament in its wisdom has provided the flexibility
for the IBC to be used for insolvency resolution of
FSPs and even the FRDI Bill had envisaged the
application of the IBC to certain categories of FSPs
while formulating a dedicated framework for
resolution of FSPs, there is a clear case for allowing
some FSPs to be resolved under the IBC to the extent
possible, as under:
1. Where the business and regulation of an FSP is not
different from that of a corporate debtor currently
being resolved under the IBC, the FSP should be
resolved under the normal process of the IBC;
2. Where the business and regulation of an FSP is
fairly different from that of a corporate debtor
currently being resolved under the IBC, the FSP
should be resolved under the IBC with appropriate
modifications; and
3. Where the business and regulations of an FSP is
substantially different from that of a corporate debtor
currently being resolved under the IBC, the FSP may
be not resolved under the IBC.” (emphasis supplied)
29. In light of the foregoing, it is abundantly evident that the Central
Government had the occasion to go through, and extensively evaluate the
powers granted to the RBI under Section 45MBA of the RBI Act. It is only
after carefully considering the pre-existing framework under the RBI Act,
and noting its various shortcomings, did the legislature in its wisdom enact
the Impugned Rules and Notification, and decide to subject a NBFC to the
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 19 of 33
rigours of the IBC. Hence, this Court finds no force in the argument of the
Petitioner that the provisions of the RBI would prevail over the IBC.
30. As it appears, this Court needs to examine the scheme of the statutes
in the context of the controversy presented before it. The IBC is a special
statute to streamline and consolidate the insolvency process of various
companies and institutions and also to ensure that the assets of the Corporate
Debtor are maximized. While there is no doubt that the RBI Act principally
governs financial institutions, including NBFCs, it is by no stretch of
imagination a special statue in respect of insolvency.
31. The legislative intent in introducing the IBC can be gathered from the
Statements of Objects and Reasons of the IBC, as reproduced below:-
"Statement of Objects and Reasons.—There is no
single law in India that deals with insolvency and
bankruptcy. Provisions relating to insolvency and
bankruptcy for companies can be found in the Sick
Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985,
the Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, the Securitisation and
Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interest Act, 2002 and the Companies Act,
2013. These statutes provide for creation of multiple
fora such as Board of Industrial and Financial
Reconstruction (BIFR), Debts Recovery Tribunal
(DRT) and National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT)
and their respective Appellate Tribunals. Liquidation
of companies is handled by the High Courts. Individual
bankruptcy and insolvency is dealt with under the
Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, 1909, and the
Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and is dealt with by
the Courts. The existing framework for insolvency and
bankruptcy is inadequate, ineffective and results in
undue delays in resolution, therefore, the proposed
legislation.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 20 of 33
2. The objective of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2015 is to consolidate and amend the laws
relating to reorganization and insolvency resolution of
corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in
a time bound manner for maximization of value of
assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship,
availability of credit and balance the interests of all the
stakeholders including alteration in the priority of
payment of government dues and to establish an
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund, and matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto. An effective
legal framework for timely resolution of insolvency and
bankruptcy would support development of credit
markets and encourage entrepreneurship. It would also
improve Ease of Doing Business, and facilitate more
investments leading to higher economic growth and
development.
3. The Code seeks to provide for designating the
NCLT and DRT as the Adjudicating Authorities for
corporate persons and firms and individuals,
respectively, for resolution of insolvency, liquidation
and bankruptcy. The Code separates commercial
aspects of insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings from
judicial aspects. The Code also seeks to provide for
establishment of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board
of India (Board) for regulation of insolvency
professionals, insolvency professional agencies and
information utilities. Till the Board is established, the
Central Government shall exercise all powers of the
Board or designate any financial sector regulator to
exercise the powers and functions of the Board.
Insolvency professionals will assist in completion of
insolvency resolution, liquidation and bankruptcy
proceedings envisaged in the Code. Information
Utilities would collect, collate, authenticate and
disseminate financial information to facilitate such
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 21 of 33
proceedings. The Code also proposes to establish a
fund to be called the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Fund
of India for the purposes specified in the Code.
4. The Code seeks to provide for amendments in the
Indian Partnership Act, 1932, the Central Excise Act,
1944, Customs Act, 1962, Income Tax Act, 1961, the
Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993, the Finance Act, 1994, the
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets
and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Repeal
Act, 2003, the Payment and Settlement Systems Act,
2007, the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008, and
the Companies Act, 2013.
5. The Code seeks to achieve the above objectives."
32. The objective of the legislature in enacting the Code was to streamline
and consolidate the various laws that existed in relation to insolvency and
bankruptcy for companies and other financial institutions. The Apex Court
in Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2019) 4
SCC 17, has held as under:-
“11. As is discernible, the Preamble gives an insight
into what is sought to be achieved by the Code. The
Code is first and foremost, a Code for reorganization
and insolvency resolution of corporate debtors.
Unless such reorganization is effected in a time-
bound manner, the value of the assets of such
persons will deplete. Therefore, maximization of
value of the assets of such persons so that they are
efficiently run as going concerns is another very
important objective of the Code. This, in turn, will
promote entrepreneurship as the persons in
management of the corporate debtor are removed and
replaced by entrepreneurs. When, therefore, a
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 22 of 33
resolution plan takes off and the corporate debtor is
brought back into the economic mainstream, it is able
to repay its debts, which, in turn, enhances the viability
of credit in the hands of banks and financial
institutions. Above all, ultimately, the interests of all
stakeholders are looked after as the corporate debtor
itself becomes a beneficiary of the resolution scheme -
workers are paid, the creditors in the long run will be
repaid in full, and shareholders/investors are able to
maximize their investment. Timely resolution of a
corporate debtor who is in the red, by an effective legal
framework, would go a long way to support the
development of credit markets. Since more investment
can be made with funds that have come back into the
economy, business then eases up, which leads, overall,
to higher economic growth and development of the
Indian economy. What is interesting to note is that the
Preamble does not, in any manner, refer to liquidation,
which is only availed of as a last resort if there is
either no resolution plan or the resolution plans
submitted are not up to the mark. Even in liquidation,
the liquidator can sell the business of the corporate
debtor as a going concern. [See ArcelorMittal (supra)
at paragraph 83, footnote 3].”
33. Furthermore, in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank and Ors.,
AIR 2017 SC 4084 the Apex Court held as under:-
13. One of the important objectives of the Code is to
bring the insolvency law in India under a single unified
umbrella with the object of speeding up of the
insolvency process. As per the data available with the
World Bank in 2016, insolvency resolution in India
took 4.3 years on an average, which was much higher
when compared with the United Kingdom (1 year),
USA (1.5 years) and South Africa (2 years). The World
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 23 of 33
Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index, 2015, ranked
India as country number 135 out of 190 countries on
the ease of resolving insolvency based on various
indicia.
52. On the other hand, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 is an Act to consolidate and amend the
laws relating to reorganization and insolvency
resolution, inter alia, of corporate persons. Insofar as
corporate persons are concerned, amendments are
made to the following enactments by Sections 249 to
252 and 255:
…
253. It is settled law that a consolidating and
amending act like the present Central enactment forms
a code complete in itself and is exhaustive of the
matters dealt with therein…”
34. As has been noted by the Apex Court in Swiss Ribbons (supra), the
IBC sought to effect the resolution in a time bound manner to ensure that the
value of the assets of the Corporate Debtors does not deplete. The Code was
enacted as a beneficial legislation and was intended to put the Corporate
Debtor back on its feet, and is not a mere recovery legislation for aggrieved
creditors. Furthermore, as was categorically noted in Swiss Ribbons (Supra),
the moratorium imposed under Section 14 of the IBC is in the utmost
interest of the Corporate Debtor, and is imperative to protect the distressed
entity till such time a resolution is arrived at. Considering the objective of
the IBC, this Court finds no force in the argument of the Petitioner that the
Impugned Rules and Notification have extinguished the jurisdiction of the
NCLT thereby causing prejudice to the Petitioners.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 24 of 33
35. Further, the RBI has been the primary regulator of NBFCs under
Chapter III-B of the RBI Act since 1964. Being the primary regulator for
NBFCs, the RBI in its ‘Summary of Recommendations of The Task Force
On NBFCs’ noted that the existing legislative and regulatory framework
governing the insolvency of NBFCs required further refinement and
improvement because of the rising number of defaulting NBFCs, and also as
there was an urgent need for an efficient redressal mechanism for individual
depositors. It was also noted that the insolvency process for NBFCs
remained deficit as it was unable to prevent the Corporate Debtor’s assets
from depleting and also did not adequately benefit creditors. This discretion
accorded to the RBI has been underscored in the wording of Section
45MBA itself. The word “may” as opposed to ‘shall’ appears in Section 45
MBA of the RBI Act. This indicates that the Section is merely
enabling/directory and not mandatory in nature.
36. As has been noted above, the RBI is the primary regulator of NBFCs
and hence was well within its powers to apply its discretion to initiate the
insolvency process under the Impugned Rules or invoke the newly added
provisions under the RBI Act.
37. The Petitioner has argued that Section 45QA of the RBI Act read with
Section 36A of the NHB Act bestow upon depositors, such as the Petitioner,
the “vested right” to claim the entirety of their deposits. It is argued that the
Impugned Rules have extinguished these “vested rights” of depositors, such
as the Petitioner. In this regard, the relevant Sections reads as follows:-
“Section 45-QA of the Reserve Bank of India Act,
1934
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 25 of 33
45QA. (1) Every deposit accepted by a non-banking
financial company, unless renewed, shall be repaid in
accordance with the terms and conditions of such
deposit.
(2) Where a non-banking financial company has failed
to repay any deposit or part thereof in accordance with
the terms and conditions of such deposit, the Company
Law Board constituted under section 10E of the
Companies Act, 1956 may, if it is satisfied, either on its
own motion or on an application of the depositor, that
it is necessary so to do to safeguard the interests of the
company, the depositors or in the public interest,
direct, by order, the non-banking financial company to
make repayment of such deposit or part thereof
forthwith or within such time and subject to such
conditions as may be specified in the order:
Provided that the Company Law Board may, before
making any order under this sub-section, give a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the non-
banking financial company and the other persons
interested in the matter.
Section 36-A of the NHB Act
36-A. Power to order repayment of deposit. —(1)
Every deposit accepted by a housing finance
institution which is a company unless renewed, shall
be repaid in accordance with the terms and
conditions of such deposit.
(2) Where a housing finance institution which is a
company has failed to repay any deposit or part
thereof in accordance with the terms and conditions of
such deposit, such officer of the National Housing
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 26 of 33
Bank, as may be authorised by the Central Government
for the purpose of this section (hereinafter referred to
as the “authorised officer”) may, if he is satisfied,
either on his own motion or on any application of the
depositor, that it is necessary so to do to safeguard the
interests of the housing finance institution, the
depositors or in the public interest, direct, by order,
such housing finance institution to make repayment of
such deposit or part thereof forthwith or within such
time and subject to such conditions as may be specified
in the order:
Provided that the authorised officer may, before
making any order under this sub-section, give a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the housing
finance institution and the other persons interested in
the matter. (emphasis supplied)
38. Upon a perusal of the abovementioned Sections, it is evident that
these Sections lay down the procedure for repayment of deposit by a NBFC.
Section 45QA(1) directs that every deposit accepted by a NBFC, unless
renewed, shall be repaid in accordance with the terms and conditions of such
deposit. Section 45QA(2) states that in case a NBFC has failed to repay the
deposit, the Company Law Board shall, on its own motion or on an
application of the depositor, direct, the NBFC to repay such deposit or part
thereof forthwith. Section 36A of the NHB Act is analogous to Section
45QA of the RBI and is similarly worded.
39. In the considered opinion of this Court, the true import of the Sections
is not to create a “vested right” in favour of the depositors to necessarily
receive a full repayment of their deposits. A plain reading of Section 45-QA
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 27 of 33
of the RBI Act and Section 36-A of the NHB Act indicates that they simply
underscore the contractual liability of the NBFC and provide for a redressal
mechanism for depositors to claim their money. Further, although the RBI
has issued various guidelines to ensure that NBFCs have adequate capital
base to repay deposits, the deposits made with NBFCs still do not fall within
the purview of the ‘Deposit Insurance And Credit Guarantee Corporation
Act, 1961’, thereby making them riskier.
40. In this regard, the Supreme Court in Kanaya Ram and Ors. v.
Rajender Kumar and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 371 has noted the following with
regard to a vested/accrued right:-
“... It has been held ever since the leading case of
Abbot v. Minister for Lands LR (1895) AC 425 that a
mere right to take advantage of the provisions of an
Act is not an accrued right. Abbot's case has been
followed by this Court in a number of decisions. In
such a situation, the Court is bound to take into
consideration the subsequent events and mould the
relief accordingly.”
(emphasis supplied)
41. Further, the Supreme Court in Howrah Municipal Corpn. and Ors. vs.
Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Ors., [2003]Supp 6 SCR 1212 has observed as
under:-
37. The argument advanced on the basis of so-called
creation of vested right for obtaining sanction on the
basis of the Building Rules (unamended) as they were
on the date of submission of the application and the
order of the High Court fixing a period for decision of
the same, is misconceived. The word 'vest' is normally
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 28 of 33
used where an immediate fixed right in present or
future enjoyment in respect of a property is created.
With the long usage the said word 'vest' has also
acquired a meaning as "an absolute or indefeasible
right" [See K.J. Aiyer's 'Judicial Dictionary' (A
complete Law Lexicon), Thirteenth Edition].
The context in which respondent - company claims a
vested right for sanction and which has been accepted
by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right
in relation to 'ownership or possession of any property'
for which the expression 'vest' is generally used. What
we can understand from the claim of a 'vested right' set
up by the respondent-company is that on the baas of
Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date
of making an application for sanction and the fixed
period allotted by the court for its consideration, it had
a 'legitimate' or 'settled expectation' to obtain the
sanction. In our considered opinion, such 'settled
expectation', if any, did not create any vested right to
obtain sanction. True it is that the respondent-
company which can have no control over the manner
of processing of application for sanction by the
Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during
pendency of its application for sanction, if the State
Government, in exercise of its rule making power,
amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions
on the heights of buildings on G.T. Road and other
wards, such 'settled expectation' has been rendered
impossible of fulfillment due to change in law. The
claim based on the alleged 'vested right' or 'settled
expectation' cannot be set up against statutory
provisions which were brought into force by the State
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 29 of 33
Government by amending the Building Rulesand not
by the Corporation against whom such 'vested right'
or 'settled expectation' is being sought to be enforced.
The 'vested right' or 'settled expectation' has been
nullified not only by the Corporation but also by the
State by amending the Building Rules. Besides this
such a 'settled, expectation' or so-called 'vested right'
cannot be countenanced against public interest and
convenience which are sought to be served by
amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution
of the Corporation issued thereupon.
(emphasis supplied)
42. In Manish Kumar vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., (2021) 5 SCC
1, the Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“361. However, we cannot also lose sight of the fact that
the Legislature has power to impair and take away vested
rights. The limitation that flows, however, is from both
Article 14 and 19 read with Article 21. It flows from the
Doctrine that the action of the State must be fair and
reasonable. The question, as to validity of the
retrospective law, is a matter to be judged on a
consideration of the facts, the period of time, over which
the retrospective law operates, the impact of the law on the
vested rights, the public interest, the nature of the right,
which is the subject matter of the law and the terms of the
law.
362. The nature of the right involved in this case, is the
right of the financial creditors to move an application
Under Section 7. Though, Section 7 confers a right upon
the financial creditor to file the application, the
proceedings are one in rem. We have already dealt with
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 30 of 33
the scope of the Code and the consequences it can produce
on the stakeholders and also the real estate project. The
Legislature was faced with the situation, where it felt that
the requirement, as to maintainability of the application
Under Section 7, must, in regard to pending applications,
be modified in the manner done. There is a determining
principle, namely, the perception from experience about
how the entire object of the Code would stand jeopardised
if applications already filed could go on even when a fair
and reasonable number of kindred souls are not available
to support it. Once there is a principle, it cannot be
capricious, excessive or disproportionate unless we find
the time given under the proviso is manifestly arbitrary. A
vested right under a statute can be taken away by a
retrospective law. A right given under a statute can be
taken away by another statute. We cannot ignore the fact
that there was considerable public interest behind such a
law. The sheer numbers, in which applications
proliferated, combined with the results it could produce,
cannot be brushed aside as an irrational or capricious
aspect to have been guided by in making the law. Being
an economic measure, the wider latitude available to the
Law Giver, cannot be lost sight of.”
(emphasis supplied)
43. It emerges that the mere right to take advantage of certain provisions
of an Act does not by itself create a vested right. Further, the legislature is
well within its right to create subsequent laws which may take away vested
rights. It also appears from a reading of Manish Kumar (Supra) that greater
latitude is to be awarded to the legislature in dealing with economic policies.
Considering this, this Court finds no force in the argument of the Petitioner
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 31 of 33
that the impugned rules violate the Petitioner’s ‘vested rights’ supposedly
created under Section 45-QA(1) of the RBI Act or Section 36-A of the NHB
Act.
44. It also cannot be accepted that the Impugned Rules are
unconstitutional as they unjustly curtail the jurisdiction of the NCLT, and
the Board under NHB Act after the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC
is imposed.
45. Further, it is trite law that the scope of judicial review in matters
relating to the financial and economic policies governed by special bodies,
such as the RBI, is narrow. In Peerless General Finance and Investment Co.
Limited and Ors. v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors., (1992) 2 SCC 343, the
Supreme Court has observed as under:-
“35. Before examining the scope and effect of the
impugned paragraphs 6 and 12 of the directions of
1987, it is also important to note that Reserve Bank of
India which is bankers' bank is a creature of Statute.
It had large contingent of expert advice relating to
matters affecting the economy of the entire country
arid nobody can doubt the bonafides of the Reserve
Bank in issuing the impugned directions of 1987. The
Reserve Bank plays an important role in the economy
and financial affairs of India and one of its important
functions is to regulate the banking system in the
country...
36. The function of the Court is to see that lawful
authority is not abused but not to appropriate to itself
the task entrusted to that authority. It is well settled
that a public body invested with statutory powers must
take care not to exceed or abuse Its power. It must keep
within the limits of the authority committed to it. It
must act in good faith and it must act reasonably.
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 32 of 33
Courts are not to interfere with economic policy which
is the function of experts. It is not the function of the
Courts to sit in Judgment over matters of economic
policy and it must necessarily be left to the expert
bodies. In such matters even experts can seriously and
doubtlessly differ. Courts cannot be expected to decide
them without even the aid of experts. "
(emphasis supplied)
46. It is a well-established principle that this Court ought not to interfere
in matters of economic policy, for which competent and specialised bodies
such as RBI have been created. This Court can only strike down the
directions issued by the RBI upon being satisfied that the directions were
wholly unreasonable or violative of the Constitution or provisions of a given
statute. In the considered opinion of this Court, the MCA in consultation
with the RBI has taken a considered decision to resolve the financial
defaults of DHFL under the Impugned Rules. Hence, this Court finds no
reason to interfere with discretion exercised by the RBI.
47. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the Impugned Rules operate
in their own sphere, and are not repugnant to or in the teeth of the provisions
of the RBI Act or NHB Act. Further, Section 45MBA is only directory in
nature, and does not mandate that the insolvency of an NBFC is carried out
under the RBI Act. In light of this, it cannot be said that both the Impugned
Rules and the Acts cannot be reconciled. Further, for matters concerning
insolvency, the IBC may prevail unless anything to the contrary is expressly
laid down by the RBI.
48. The Impugned Notification is simply procedural in nature, and lays
down the threshold of Rs. 500 Crore or more, as the asset value of a NBFC
W.P.(C) 1273/2021 Page 33 of 33
for the Impugned Rules to apply. The Central Government has issued this
Notification in pursuance of its powers under Section 227 of the Code, and
there is no infirmity in the same. Hence, this Court does not find occasion to
interfere with the Impugned Rules or Notification as the Petitioner has failed
to dislodge the presumption of constitutionality existing in their favour.
49. With these observations, the petition is dismissed, along with pending
application(s), if any.
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
AUGUST 1, 2022
hsk
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