CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 1 of 31

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Reserved on: 22.07.2026

Pronounced on: 07.09.2026

Uploaded on: 07.09.2026

+ CRL.A. 312/2003

SATISH KUMAR .....Appellant

Through: Mr.Anand Kr. Pandey,

Ms.Theepa Murugesan,

Ms.Sanya Bhatia, Ms.Sabina,

Mr.Kaushal Kishore, Ms.Prerna

Sehrawat, Advs. along with the

appellant in person.

versus

STATE OF DELHI .....Respondent

Through: Mr.Aman Usman, APP with

Mr.Manvendra Yadav, Adv.

along with Insp. Prakash Chand

Mandiwal.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA

J U D G M E N T

NAVIN CHAWLA, J.

1. The present appeal has been filed by the appellant, challenging

the judgment of conviction dated 05.04.2003 and the order of sentence

dated 17.04.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge

(hereinafter referred to as the “learned Trial Court”) in Sessions Case

No. 108/2000 arising out of FIR No. 410/2000; Police Station Malviya

Nagar; under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 2 of 31

referred to as „IPC‟), finding the appellant guilty of the offence under

Section 302 of the IPC, while acquitting him of offence under

Sections 323/201/34 of the IPC, and sentencing him to life

imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, and in default of payment of

fine, directing that the appellant shall undergo simple imprisonment

for 15 days.

BRIEF CASE OF THE PROSECUTION:

2. The brief facts of the case of the prosecution are as under:

a. A complaint was lodged by one Smt. Shakuntala @

Darshna (PW-6) stating that, in the year 1983, she was married to

Sh. Hanumant Singh (hereinafter referred to as the „deceased‟)

and had three children from her wedlock, that is, two daughters

and one son. The deceased used to stay at home and used to

milch cows and buffalo and sell their milk. The deceased had

three brothers. The eldest brother is named Krishan Kumar (PW-

4), who worked in the Delhi Transport Corporation. PW-

4/Krishan Kumar and his family resided in the ancestral house of

his father in the middle of the village. The second brother,

namely Ashok Kumar, was a driver of a Blue Line bus service

and resided on the second floor of the house where the deceased

used to reside. The wife of Ashok Kumar is Asha, who was also

the real younger sister of PW-6/Shakuntala. The youngest

brother of the deceased is Satish Kumar, the appellant herein,

who also resided with his family on the ground floor of the house

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 3 of 31

where the deceased used to reside. He was employed as a driver

of a private vehicle. Shri Chhote Lal, father-in-law of PW-

6/Shakuntala, resided along with the eldest son Krishan Kumar.

The complaint alleged that he had a liking for his two sons,

namely Krishan Kumar and the appellant, and always

discriminated between the deceased and Ashok Kumar.

b. PW-6/Shakuntala further alleged that the deceased, on

numerous occasions, had asked his father and brothers, Krishan

Kumar and the appellant, to partition the property; however, the

same was refused by Chhote Lal and the appellant.

c. She stated that outside the house of the deceased, there

were three shops occupied by tenants, and the rent of all these

shops was taken either by Chhote Lal or Krishan Kumar. She

stated that she had not received any share in the rental income

from the said shops.

d. She stated that on 27.05.2000, at about 8.30 PM, the

deceased asked Chhote Lal and the appellant to partition the

property in a fair manner and without delay. As a response to

this, Chhote Lal and the appellant became furious and started

abusing the deceased, who was standing on the main road outside

his house. During this quarrel, Smt. Kamlesh, wife of the

appellant, also came outside and started abusing the deceased.

The deceased said that he would get the property partitioned so

that the daily quarrel regarding the same would come to an end.

On hearing this, the appellant, Smt. Kamlesh, and Chhote Lal

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became angry and said that „today they will put an end to the

quarrel forever‟ and started beating the deceased while also

pushing him inside the house from the main road. She states that

she tried to intervene to save the deceased and started shouting.

Lots of persons gathered there, and at that time, the appellant

threw the deceased on a cot lying outside and after that, the

appellant, Smt. Kamlesh, and Chhote Lal pushed the deceased

inside their house.

e. PW-6/Shakuntala states that while crying, she also

entered the house to try and save her husband. In the meanwhile,

the appellant went inside his bedroom and came out with a

wooden bat/thapki. Thereafter, Chhote Lal and Smt. Kamlesh

caught hold of the deceased while the appellant gave two blows

with the said wooden bat on the head and face of the deceased, as

a result of which the deceased fell on the ground inside the

courtyard of the house.

f. PW-6/Shakuntala states that on seeing this, she also fell

unconscious due to fear while shouting and crying, and when she

regained consciousness, she found that the deceased had been

taken to the hospital, where he died as a result of his injuries. She

handed over the wooden bat/thapki to the police officials and, in

her complaint, stated that Chhote Lal, the appellant, and Smt.

Kamlesh had cleaned the blood spilled over at the courtyard and

that they had injured the deceased with an intention to kill him.

She also stated that even her body was aching with pain and she

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should also be sent for her medical check-up.

3. On this complaint, FIR bearing No. 410/2000 was registered at

Police Station Malviya Nagar under Sections 302/323/201/34 of the

IPC.

4. The accused persons were arrested from the house in question

on 28.05.2000.

5. On completion of the investigation, a challan was filed naming

the appellant, Chhote Lal and Smt. Kamlesh as the accused.

6. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 12.01.2001, framed

the following charges against the appellant and other accused

persons:-

“That on 27.5.2000 at about 8/8.30 pm at

H.No. 58A Village Adhchini New Delhi within

the jurisdiction of P.S. Malviya Ngr. all of you

in furtherance of your common intention

committed murder of Hanumant Singh by

intentionally causing his death and you all

thereby committed an offence punishable U/s

302 read with section 34 IPC and within the

cognizance of this court.

Secondly, afore-said date, time and place all

of you in furtherance of your common

intention voluntarily caused simple hurt by

blunt object on the person of Mrs. Shakuntala

Devi and thereby committed an offence

punishable U/s 323 read with notion 34 IPC

and within the cognizance of this court.

Thirdly, on the afore-said date, time and place

all of you, knowing and having reasons to

believe that an offence of murder has been

committed by you cleaned the blood lying in

the courtyard, and caused the evidence of the

commission of murder to disappear with the

intention of screening yourself from legal

punishment and you all thus committed an

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offence punishable U/s 201 IPC and within the

cognizance of this court.”

7. The appellant and others pleaded not guilty to the aforesaid

charges and claimed trial.

8. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 19

witnesses. Statement of the accused was recorded under Section 313

of the Cr.P.C., and they examined 3 witnesses in their defence.

IMPUGNED ORDER OF CONVICTION AND ORDER ON

SENTENCE:

9. The learned Trial Court observed that the presence of the

eyewitness, PW-6/Shakuntala, at the scene of the occurrence could not

be doubted. The learned Trial Court also rejected the contention that

her conduct was unnatural due to her failure to accompany the

deceased to the hospital or raise immediate alarm.

10. The learned Trial Court held that the statement of PW-

6/Shakuntala was corroborated by the testimonies of PW-5/Ishwar

Singh, PW-7/Smt. Asha, and police officials present at the spot. PW-

6/Shakuntala‟s account that she fainted upon witnessing the brutal

assault, and only regained consciousness after her husband had been

rushed to the hospital, was found to be completely credible.

Furthermore, the defence evidence adduced through DW-1/Ashok

Kumar and DW-3/Krishan Kumar was discredited as DW-1 had

departed prior to the incident and DW-3/Krishan Kumar‟s assertions

regarding the absence of PW-6/Shakuntala was held to be

uncorroborated and as an afterthought.

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 7 of 31

11. The learned Trial Court held that the minor delay in recording

the FIR and transmitting the special report to the learned Metropolitan

Magistrate, was neither fatal to the prosecution‟s case nor sufficient to

cast doubt on its authenticity. It held that a brief delay in lodging an

FIR is understandable when a spouse has suffered the extreme shock

of witnessing a severe assault on her husband. It was held that since

the special report was dispatched within eleven hours of the

registration of the FIR and on the very same day, and the core

testimonial evidence remained trustworthy and unshaken, the delay

did not erode the foundation of the prosecution's case.

12. Regarding the exact spot of the incident, the learned Trial Court

found that while PW-6/Shakuntala asserted that the deceased was

dragged inside the house and beaten, this specific narrative was

uncorroborated by medical and forensic evidence. The post-mortem

report revealed an absence of dragging injuries or friction abrasions on

the deceased, nor were any injuries found on PW-6/Shakuntala.

Furthermore, the crime team‟s inspection, photographs, and blood-

stain recoveries were strictly concentrated outside the house around a

blood-stained cot. Treating PW-6/Shakuntala‟s statement regarding

the assault continuing inside the house as an exaggeration, the learned

Trial Court extended the benefit of reasonable doubt to co-accused

Chhote Lal and Smt. Kamlesh, thereby acquitting them of all charges,

while finding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 of

the IPC.

13. The learned Trial Court emphasised that minor discrepancies,

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 8 of 31

normal errors of perception by witnesses, do not warrant the complete

rejection of their testimony.

14. The learned Trial Court held that the prosecution successfully

proved motive arising out of an ongoing ancestral property dispute.

The medical evidence (Ext. PW-1/A) established that the deceased

sustained severe blunt-force trauma to vital organs, including scalp

contusions, a fractured right mandible, and dislodged teeth caused by

a heavy wooden bat/thapki (Ext. P-1) bearing AB group human blood

matching the deceased.

15. The learned Trial Court opined that repeatedly striking a vital

region like the head with extreme force demonstrated a clear

determination to inflict injuries sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause death.

16. Lastly, the learned Trial Court rejected the plea of self-defence

by the appellant seeking mitigation under Exception 4 to Section 300

of the IPC, and held that a "sudden fight" presupposes mutual combat

between two parties. Given that the appellant suffered no injuries

whatsoever, there was no record of mutual combat; rather, the

appellant acted in a cruel and unusual manner against an unarmed

victim.

17. Consequently, the learned Trial Court convicted the appellant

under Section 302 of the IPC, while acquitting him of charges under

Sections 323, 201, and 34 of the IPC.

18. Aggrieved by the conviction and the Order on Sentence passed

by the learned Trial Court, the appellant has preferred the present

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appeal before this Court.

19. This Court, vide its order dated 27.04.2004, had suspended the

sentence of the appellant during the pendency of the present appeal.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE

APPELLANT:

20. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the

appellant‟s conviction rests entirely on the ocular testimony of PW-

6/Shakuntala, who falls into the category of a witness who is "neither

wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable". Citing the principles in

Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; and

Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2003) 1 SCC 465, the learned counsel for

the appellant contends that a conviction cannot be sustained on the

uncorroborated testimony of a single witness whose evidence is ridden

with material exaggerations and contradictions. Given that the learned

Trial Court explicitly disbelieved PW-6/Shakuntala regarding the

involvement of co-accused Chhote Lal (A-2) and Smt. Kamlesh (A-3),

the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant is

entitled to acquittal on the ground of parity, as the quality and nature

of the ocular evidence against all three accused persons remains

identical.

21. He submits that there is a major contradiction between the

version of PW-6/Shakuntaka and the objective physical evidence

regarding the place of occurrence. While PW-6/Shakuntaka asserted

that all three accused persons dragged the deceased into the house and

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assaulted him there, the post-mortem report (PW-1/A) revealed a

complete absence of injuries in form of friction abrasions, or bodily

harm on the deceased caused by alleged dragging, other than facial

and head trauma. Furthermore, PW-6/Shakuntaka herself bore no

injuries despite claiming to have intervened. The Crime Team

inspection report (PW-11/A), photographic evidence (PW-12/1 to

PW-12/5), and independent statements of spot witnesses, confirm that

blood samples were found exclusively outside the house near a cot. He

also contends that the finding of the learned Trial Court that the

narrative of beating inside the house was an exaggeration, exposes the

unreliability of PW-6/Shakuntala on a material aspect of the

prosecution's case. He submits that neither PW-19/SI K.P. Singh/the

Investigating Officer nor the Crime Team investigated the courtyard

of the house, which is stated to be the place of the incident as per the

Complainant/ PW-6/Shakuntala. He submits that PW-10/Constable

Ashok Kumar, in his cross-examination, stated that when he reached

the place of incident, there were many people at the spot who

informed him that the incident took place where the cot was lying.

PW-11/SI Begha Ram, who had inspected the spot of the incident and

prepared a report (Ex. PW-11/A), in his statement under Section 164

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as

„Cr.P.C.‟), had stated that he was informed about the incident by the

Investigating Officer. The statement further suggested that he was not

informed of the exact spot of the crime and he did not inspect the

premises of the house where the incident allegedly took place, which

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raises a doubt on the exact spot of the incident.

22. The learned counsel submits that the recovery and forensic link

of the weapon of offence (thapki) are fundamentally flawed and fail to

establish appellant‟s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The weapon was

not recovered pursuant to any disclosure statement or discovery made

by the appellant; rather, as per the testimonies of PW-6/Shakuntala,

PW-10/Constable Ashok Kumar, and PW-19/SI K.P. Singh, it was

handed over to the police by PW-6/Shakuntaka from a public place.

The Seizure Memo (Ext. PW-6/B) fails to document that the „thapki‟

was blood-stained at the time of seizure, raising a strong probability of

subsequent tampering or planting prior to its examination by the

Forensic Science Laboratory. Moreover, the prosecution never

submitted the weapon to the doctor who conducted the post-mortem

(PW-1) to obtain an expert opinion as to whether the fatal injuries

could have been caused by that specific object, rendering the forensic

blood-group match of AB group to the blood group of the deceased,

insufficient to connect the appellant to the crime.

23. He further submits that the prosecution failed to establish the

essential element of motive or mens rea. While the prosecution relied

on PW-7/Smt. Asha and PW-5/Ishwar Singh, to allege the ongoing

enmity over ancestral property, this claim was directly contradicted by

DW-1/Ashok Kumar, husband of PW-7/Smt. Asha, who confirmed

that the property had already been divided by mutual agreement and

that the deceased occupied a larger share, including a shop and a store.

Furthermore, PW-5/Ishwar Singh, PW-6/Shakuntala, and PW-7/Smt.

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 12 of 31

Asha are close blood relatives who stand to financially gain from the

property distribution upon the appellant‟s conviction. Relying on Anil

Phukan v. State of Assam, (1993) 3 SCC 282 and Mohd. Rojali Ali v.

State of Assam, (2019) 19 SCC 567, the appellant argues that the

testimony of such interested witnesses cannot be accepted without

independent and neutral corroboration.

24. He also submits that PW-5/Ishwar Singh was examined as a

witness only due to his relationship, being the father-in-law of the

deceased, and for identifying the deceased's body (Ex. PW-5/A). His

testimony does not address the motive or intention behind the

deceased getting murdered.

25. He submits that the alleged incident occurred on a main road in

a commercial area lined with shops at around 8:30 PM. The

prosecution failed to examine a single independent public witness.

PW-10/Constable Ashok Kumar admitted in cross-examination that

approximately 25 to 30 people had assembled at the spot upon his

arrival; however, none of these potential independent witnesses were

examined. Relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State

of Rajasthan v. Teja Singh, (2001) 3 SCC 147, the learned counsel

for the appellant submits that the deliberate non-examination of

available independent witnesses from the neighbourhood warrants a

strong adverse inference against the prosecution, as neutral testimony

would have disproved the prosecution's version.

26. He submits that conviction cannot be based on mere suspicion;

the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 13 of 31

accused alone committed the crime. The prosecution has failed to

meet this burden, and the learned Trial Court should have considered

other evidence before determining the appellant's guilt. Reliance in

this regard is placed on the case of Mustkeem Alias Sirajudeen v.

State of Rajasthan, (2011) 11 SCC 724 and Raja Naykar v. State of

Chhattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481.

27. He submits that even if the prosecution‟s version is accepted in

its entirety, the offence does not attract Section 302 of the IPC and

falls, at most, under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The altercation

arose spontaneously without premeditation, and during a sudden

verbal dispute over property. The weapon used was an ordinary

household wooden bat/thapki, rather than a conventional deadly

weapon. The post-mortem report identified a single fatal impact zone

on the head. The appellant himself took the deceased to AIIMS

hospital, New Delhi for medical treatment immediately after the

incident. Under these circumstances, the appellant lacked the requisite

mens rea or intention to cause murder, entitling him to be acquitted of

Section 302 of the IPC.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED ADDITIONAL

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR:

28. Per Contra, Mr. Aman Usman, the learned APP, submits that

the behaviour of the appellant following his brother's death and upon

returning home, was to wash his own clothes rather than to inform his

neighbours, perform rituals, or mourn his brother‟s death. He submits

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 14 of 31

that the appellant failed to provide any explanation for the bloodstains

on his clothes and, in fact, in his statement under Section 313 of the

Cr.P.C., denied that these were his clothes. He submits that therefore,

the explanation given by the counsel for the appellant during oral

arguments, directly contradicts the statement of the appellant during

trial and raises an adverse inference against the appellant.

29. He submits that the weapon (thapki) had light brown stains on

it, which is evident from the FSL report (Parcel No. 6). He submits

that the Investigating Officer had seized the weapon (thapki) at night

and that is why the presence of bloodstains on it might have been

missed by him visually. He submits that if the Investigating Officer

intended to frame the appellant, then he would have noted in the

Seizure Memo the presence of the bloodstains on the weapon from the

start.

30. He submits that the chain of custody of the weapon remained

intact, as it was transferred in a sealed condition to the MHCM and

was delivered sealed to the FSL, eliminating any possibility of

tampering or planting of evidence.

31. He submits that the minor discrepancies by the Investigating

Officer in preparing the site plans are merely indicative of a "faulty

investigation", which should not automatically benefit the appellant or

undermine the core eyewitness testimony.

32. He submits that PW-6/Shakuntala is a natural eyewitness who

resided at the scene of the crime. Arguments questioning her presence

at the spot of offence cannot be accepted. He submits that during trial,

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the defence never directly challenged her presence at the spot.

33. Placing reliance on State of Gujarat v. Bharwad Jakshibhai

Nagribhai, 1990 Cri LJ 2531 (Gujarat HC); Ranjit Singh v. State of

Punjab, (2013) 16 SCC 752; Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa,

(2002) 8 SCC 381; Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8

SCC 127; and Acchar Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 5

SCC 543, he submits that the testimony of PW-6/Shakuntala cannot

be discarded merely because the learned Trial Court acquitted the co-

accused. He submits that minor exaggerations or embellishments do

not render the entire testimony unreliable, and the court must separate

the credible portion from the exaggerated part unless both are

inseparably intertwined.

34. He submits that the property dispute between the deceased, the

appellant, his other brothers, and the father of the deceased, served as

a strong motive to commit the murder of the deceased. He submits

that the testimony of PW-7/Smt. Asha had proved the existence of

long-standing enmity and property disputes between the parties.

35. He further submits that the appellant even tried to tamper with

the evidence as the floor of the house where the deceased was killed

had been washed before the arrival of the police. It is for this reason

that the FIR was registered under Section 201 of the IPC.

36. He submits that PW-6/Shakuntala could not immediately report

the matter to the police because she had fainted due to shock. She

gave her statement to the police as soon as she regained consciousness

and found that the deceased had been shifted to the hospital. The Asal

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Tehrir was prepared at 11:45 PM that same night, and the FIR was

registered at 12:05 AM, ruling out any possibility of a false case being

cooked up against the appellant.

37. He submits that the Appellate Court ought not to interfere with

the findings of the learned Trial Court merely because another view is

possible. He also submits that interference is warranted only where the

findings are perverse, manifestly illegal or based on a misreading of

the evidence, which is not the case herein.

38. He submits that the appellant has failed to establish his plea of

alibi. He further submits that the burden to prove such plea rested

upon the appellant, which remained undischarged, particularly when

the testimony of PW-6 stood corroborated by the surrounding

circumstances and the material collected during investigation.

ANALYSIS:

39. We have considered the submissions made by the counsels for

the parties and perused the record of the learned Trial Court.

40. In the present case, the star witness for the prosecution is PW-

6/Shakuntala, who is stated to be the eyewitness to the offence being

committed by the appellant.

41. In a case where the prosecution sets out a sole eyewitness, the

testimony of such witness must inspire confidence and must be

„wholly reliable‟ so as to record a conviction on that basis. It must also

be tested on the touchstone of the evidence tendered by other

witnesses and other circumstantial evidence proved on record by the

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prosecution. This is more so where the alleged eyewitness is an

„interested witness‟. To fortify this proposition, reliance may safely be

placed upon the following decisions, which we shall be discussing

hereinunder.

42. In Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC

13, the Supreme Court held that though conviction can be based even

on the testimony of a single eyewitness; there being no necessity in

law to have multiple witnesses to bring home the charge against the

accused, at the same time, the testimony of such witness should be

tested with caution and if the same is found by a court to be entirely

reliable, there is no legal impediment to convict the accused on such

testimony. Where such testimony is found to be wholly unreliable, the

Court equally has no difficulty in disregarding such testimony. It is

only where the testimony is neither wholly reliable nor wholly

unreliable that the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for

corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or

circumstantial. We quote from the judgment as under:

“11. In view of these considerations, we have

no hesitation in holding that the contention

that in a murder case, the court should insist

upon plurality of witnesses, is much too

broadly stated. Section 134 of the Indian

Evidence Act, has categorically laid it down

that “no particular number of witnesses shall,

in any case, be required for the proof of any

fact”. The legislature determined, as long ago

as 1872, presumably after due consideration

of the pros and cons, that it shall not be

necessary for proof or disproof of a fact, to

call any particular number of witnesses. In

England, both before and after the passing of

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 18 of 31

the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, there have

been a number of statutes as set out in

Sarkar's Law of Evidence — 9

th

Edn., at pp.

1100 and 1101, forbidding convictions on the

testimony of a single witness. The Indian

Legislature has not insisted on laying down

any such exceptions to the general rule

recognized in Section 134 quoted above. The

section enshrines the well recognized maxim

that “Evidence has to be weighed and not

counted”. Our Legislature has given statutory

recognition to the fact that administration of

justice may be hampered if a particular

number of witnesses were to be insisted upon.

It is not seldom that a crime has been

committed in the presence of only one witness,

leaving aside those cases which are not of

uncommon occurrence, where determination

of guilt depends entirely on circumstantial

evidence. If the legislature were to insist upon

plurality of witnesses, cases where the

testimony of a single witness only could be

available in proof of the crime, would go

unpunished. It is here that the discretion of the

presiding judge comes into play. The matter

thus must depend upon the circumstances of

each case and the quality of the evidence of

the single witness whose testimony has to be

either accepted or rejected. If such a testimony

is found by the court to be entirely reliable,

there is no legal impediment to the conviction

of the accused person on such proof. Even as

the guilt of an accused person may be proved

by the testimony of a single witness, the

innocence of an accused person may be

established on the testimony of a single

witness, even though a considerable number of

witnesses may be forthcoming to testify to the

truth of the case for the prosecution. Hence, in

our opinion, it is a sound and well-established

rule of law that the court is concerned with the

quality and not with the quantity of the

evidence necessary for proving or disproving a

fact. Generally speaking, oral testimony in this

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 19 of 31

context may be classified into three categories,

namely:

(1) Wholly reliable.

(2) Wholly unreliable.

(3)Neither wholly reliable nor wholly

unreliable.

12. In the first category of proof, the court

should have no difficulty in coming to its

conclusion either way — it may convict or may

acquit on the testimony of a single witness, if it

is found to be above reproach or suspicion of

interestedness, incompetence or subornation.

In the second category, the court equally has

no difficulty in coming to its conclusion. It is in

the third category of cases, that the court has

to be circumspect and has to look for

corroboration in material particulars by

reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial.

There is another danger in insisting on

plurality of witnesses. Irrespective of the

quality of the oral evidence of a single witness,

if courts were to insist on plurality of witnesses

in proof of any fact, they will be indirectly

encouraging subornation of witnesses.

Situations may arise and do arise where only a

single person is available to give evidence in

support of a disputed fact. The court naturally

has to weigh carefully such a testimony and if

it is satisfied that the evidence is reliable and

free from all taints which tend to render oral

testimony open to suspicion, it becomes its

duty to act upon such testimony. The law

reports contain many precedents where the

court had to depend and act upon the

testimony of a single witness in support of the

prosecution. There are exceptions to this rule,

for example, in cases of sexual offences or of

the testimony of an approver; both these are

cases in which the oral testimony is, by its very

nature, suspect, being that of a participator in

crime. But, where there are no such

exceptional reasons operating, it becomes the

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 20 of 31

duty of the court to convict, if it is satisfied

that the testimony of a single witness is

entirely reliable. We have therefore, no

reasons to refuse to act upon the testimony of

the first witness, which is the only reliable

evidence in support of the prosecution.”

43. In Joseph v. State of Kerala, (2003) 1 SCC 465, the Court

reiterated the above principles, and held that where there is a sole

witness to the incident, the testimony of such witness has to be

accepted with an amount of caution and after testing it on the

touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or evidence as

recorded. While it is permissible for a Court to record and sustain a

conviction on the evidence of a solitary eyewitness, however, at the

same time, such a course can be adopted only if the evidence tendered

by such witness is cogent, reliable, in tune with probabilities, and

inspires implicit confidence. Where the prosecution case rests mainly

on the sole testimony of an eyewitness, it should be wholly reliable.

Even where the witness is an injured witness, and his presence may

not be seriously doubted, when his evidence is in conflict with other

evidence, it would be unsafe to convict the accused on his sole

testimony. We quote from the judgment as under:

“13. To our mind, it appears that the High

Court did not follow the aforesaid standard

but went on to analyse evidence as if the

material before them was given for the first

time and not in appeal. Section 134 of the

Indian Evidence Act provides that no

particular number of witnesses shall in any

case be required for the proof of any fact and,

therefore, it is permissible for a court to

record and sustain a conviction on the

evidence of a solitary eyewitness. But, at the

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 21 of 31

same time, such a course can be adopted only

if the evidence tendered by such witness is

cogent, reliable and in tune with probabilities

and inspires implicit confidence. By this

standard, when the prosecution case rests

mainly on the sole testimony of an eyewitness,

it should be wholly reliable. Even though such

witness is an injured witness and his presence

may not be seriously doubted, when his

evidence is in conflict with other evidence, the

view taken by the trial court that it would be

unsafe to convict the accused on his sole

testimony cannot be stated to be

unreasonable.”

44. We now proceed to test the testimony of PW-6/Shakuntala on

the above touchstone.

45. As noted hereinabove, PW-6/Shakuntala had stated that there

was an ongoing property dispute between the deceased, his father and

his brothers. Though the prosecution would allege that this is the

motive for the crime, however, as held in Aslam @ Imran v. State of

Madhya Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 670, motive is a double-

edged weapon; while it can give a hint on why the crime was

committed, it can also give a reason why the witness is falsely

testifying and is wanting to implicate the accused in the crime. We

therefore, have to scrutinise the statement of PW-6/Shakuntala with

that caveat.

46. PW-6/Shakuntala, while narrating the incident, states that on a

verbal duel originating between the deceased, his father, and the

appellant on the distribution of the property, the father of the deceased

and the appellant became furious and started abusing the deceased,

and in the meantime, the wife of the appellant, namely Kamlesh, who

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 22 of 31

was also an accused in the case along with the father of the deceased,

became furious and started beating the deceased. She states that she

tried to rescue the deceased from the assailants and also raised an

alarm, due to which a crowd had gathered there, but the accused

persons continued to beat the deceased.

47. We pause here again because, in spite of the above assertion of

PW-6/Shakuntala that there was a large crowd which had gathered

and who had witnessed the incident, and it being an admitted case of

the prosecution that the incident had happened on the main road where

there were many shops, there is no other independent eyewitness

produced by the prosecution to sustain its case against the appellant.

48. Moving further, while PW-6/Shakuntala states that she tried to

intervene and save her husband, her own MLC (Ex.PW-3/A) does not

support this assertion.

49. Proceeding further with the testimony of PW-6/Shakuntala, she

states that while beating the deceased, the appellant threw the

deceased on a cot lying nearby, whereafter all the three accused

persons dragged the deceased inside the house. Though she does not

state that the deceased was taken into the house on the cot, the learned

APP, when confronted with the submissions of the learned counsel for

the appellant that there were no drag marks or injuries on the body of

the deceased, sought to contend that the deceased was, in fact, taken

into the house on the cot. In the absence of any such positive evidence,

we find it hard to accept this explanation.

50. Still proceeding further with the testimony of PW-6/Shakuntala,

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 23 of 31

she states that once inside the house and in the courtyard of the said

house, the father of the deceased/Chhote Lal and the wife of the

appellant/Kamlesh caught hold of the deceased while the appellant

picked up a thapki and gave blows with the same on the head and face

of the deceased due to which he sustained injuries and fell down. The

place of the incident is, therefore, stated to be a courtyard inside the

house. At this stage itself, we would note that interestingly there are

two site plans before the learned Trial Court, one is scaled and the

other is rough. To show the discrepancy, we would reproduce both

hereinunder:

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 24 of 31

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 25 of 31

51. The two site plans do not match at all. The place of beating the

deceased inside the house is totally different in the two site plans,

raising further doubt on the case of the prosecution.

52. More interestingly, according to the prosecution, PW-

6/Shakuntala has given the above version even in her initial statement

on the basis of which rukka is recorded, and asal tehrir was sent at

11:45 P.M. for registration of the F.I.R.; however, PW-11/SI Begha

Ram, who is stated to have reached the spot between 1 A.M. and 2

A.M. along with a photographer, prepared a report (Ex.PW-11/A).

The spot inspected by him is situated outside the main road and not in

the courtyard where the actual offence is stated to have taken place.

He states that he did not even know at that time what the mode of

committing the crime was, though the IO PW-19/SI K. P. Singh was

also present there and it is SI K. P. Singh who is stated to have

recorded the rukka. On being asked, he confirms that he did not

inspect the house from inside. He mentioned in his report the date of

occurrence as 27.05.2000 and states that the time of occurrence was

not known.

53. PW-19/SI K. P. Singh, the IO of the case, who claims to have

recorded the statement of PW-6/Shakuntala, admitted that the site plan

prepared by him did not mention that the floor inside the house was

wet. It also did not show the presence of PW-6/Shakuntala or the

accused persons. He also admitted that it did not show any trail of

blood and admitted that, in fact, there was none.

54. For non-examination of any independent public person, he

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 26 of 31

volunteered that all shops were closed. This contradicts the stand of

PW-6/Shakuntala who has stated that many people had gathered at the

spot when the commotion began.

55. He admitted that the crime team had taken the photographs of

the scene of crime, however, all these photographs are from outside

the house, and no photograph is taken from inside the house where the

actual crime is stated to have been committed.

56. The above testimonies clearly cast a doubt not only on the

version of PW-6/Shakuntala but also on the timing of her first

complaint. If one is to believe the prosecution on the timing of the

complaint and her statement, there is no possible explanation with the

prosecution for the crime team or PW-19/K. P. Singh not investigating

the inside of the house where the actual crime took place and

confining all its investigation only to the outside of the house and the

main road where allegedly the body of the deceased was found.

57. In fact, as far as PW-6/Shakuntala is concerned, for the other

accused, namely Chhote Lal and Kamlesh, even the learned Trial

Court has not believed her. The learned Trial Court had also not

believed her version of the deceased being dragged inside the house.

We quote from the Impugned Judgment as under:

“49. It is pertinent to mention that deceased

Hanumant Singh had no injury mark or not

even a scratch mark on any other part of his

body except injuries on his face and head. No

dragging injuries on the person of deceased

Hanumant Singh had been proved. If,

statement of Shakuntala (PW6) is to be totally

believed, deceased was beaten black and blue

by accused Satish Kumar, with the aid of

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 27 of 31

accused Chotey Lal and Smt. Kamlesh and

was dragged inside house No. 58-A, village

Adichini, New Delhi, then in such

circumstances deceased must have had some

injuries on other parts of his body or at least

scratch marks. Interestingly Smt. Shakuntala

(PW6) when medically examined, no external

injury was found on her body. Even MLC Ext.

PW 3/A do not show any bodily injury on the

person of Smt. Shakuntala (PW6) though she

was examined by a Doctor with alleged history

of assault by punch on her back. Smt.

Shakuntala Devi neither in her complaint Ext.

PW 6/A nor in her statement as P.W 6 stated

that she was beaten by accused persons. It

cannot be believed that three persons, were

dragging deceased Hanumant Singh inside

their house beating and Shakuntala (PW 6)

trying to save her husband, did not receive any

beatings. Thus the allegation that all accused

persons dragged deceased Hanumant Singh

inside their room is not corroborated by

medical evidence viz. PW 3/A and PW 1/A and

other facts on record. Further S.I. Begha Ram

(PW 11) Incharge Crime Team did not inspect

the premises from inside house no. 58-A

Adichini village, New Delhi in addition to

inspecting the place outside the said house

where a cot with blood stains was lying. S.I.

Begha Ram (PW11) had also not mentioned in

his report that he inspected the premises from

inside. If the incident had taken place inside

the premises then it was a pious duty of the

investigating officer to inform Crime Team

Incharge to inspect the place from inside the

premises. Further Ct. Ajay Kumar (PW12)

during his cross examination stated that he

took photographs of the place outside house

No. 58-A Adichini village, New Delhi where a

cot with blood stains was lying. PW 12 further

stated that many persons present at the spot,

including family members and investigating

officer, had informed him that incident took

place at a spot where cot with blood stains

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 28 of 31

was lying. Though scaled site plan Ext. PW

15/A show the place of alleged beating of

Hanumant Singh at point B i.e. inside house

No. 58-A Village Adichini, New Delhi but it

cannot be ignored that the said site plan was

prepared at the pointing out of Smt.

Shakuntala (PW6). SI K.P.Singh (PW 19) also

had deposed that Crime Team inspected the

place of incident and prepared a report Ext.

PW 11/A. Even photographer had taken

photographs Ext. PW 12/1 to PW 12/5 of the

place of incident outside house NO. 58-A,

Adichini village, New Delhi. The blood was

also lifted from floor near the place where a

cot was lying. Thus, if the incident had taken

place inside house of accused Satish Kumar

then what had prevented the investigating

officer to get the said room photographed or

got it inspected by crime team or to seize

exhibits from inside the room. Investigation

shows that place of incident was outside house

bearing No. 58-A village Adichini, New Delhi,

and to that extent the statement of Smt.

Shakuntala (PW 6) that beating continued

inside the house No.58-A village Adichini can

only be said to be an exaggerated statement.”

58. We have already examined the law relating to the acceptance of

testimony of a sole eyewitness and have noted the distinction between

a wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, and the witness who is neither

wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. As the learned Trial Court itself

has found PW-6/Shakuntala to be not wholly reliable, she, at best, can

fall in the category of neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable.

Her testimony is, therefore, required to be subjected to further scrutiny

and is to be corroborated by other circumstances. The very fact that

the actual place of commission of crime is not inspected by the crime

team or by the IO, leaves her testimony to be uncorroborated by any

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 29 of 31

other piece of evidence. It is the scene of crime which would have lent

support to her statement.

59. It is not a case of mere faulty investigation, but may also be a

case where either the version of PW-6/Shakuntala was not found

substantiated by the IO, because of which he did not pursue it further,

or the version of PW-6/Shakuntala was set up later out of the soiled

relationships between the accused and the deceased. Either way, it is

sufficient to create a doubt on the case of the prosecution and in

favour of the appellant.

60. The other important piece of evidence in the present case is the

weapon of offence/thapki. It is the case of the prosecution that the

same was handed over by PW-6/Shakuntala to PW-19/SI K. P. Singh,

the IO at the time of recording of her initial statement. Though as per

the FSL Report dated 12.01.2001 (Ex.PW-19/F), the thapki was found

to have human blood of the blood group of the deceased, its Seizure

Report (Ex.PW-6/B) did not mention the presence of blood on the

same when it was seized. It only mentioned that it had some white

colour stains. The IO, even if it was night, cannot miss out the blood

stains on the weapon of offence while writing the Seizure Memo.

61. Even otherwise, it is now settled law that mere recovery of a

blood-stained weapon, even bearing the same blood group of the

deceased, would not be sufficient to prove the charge of murder. We

may refer to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Raja Nayakar v.

State of Chattisgarh, (2024) 3 SCC 481; and State of Rajasthan v.

Hanuman, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1387.

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 30 of 31

62. This now further takes us to the recovery of the clothes of the

appellant which had been washed and which, as per the FSL Report

(Ex. PW19/F), did not contain human blood.

63. Though it is correct that the appellant, in his statement recorded

under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., denied that these were his clothes,

however, the fact remains that the FSL Report (Ex. PW19/F)

explicitly confirms that no human blood was detected on these

garments. Therefore, the recovery of these clothes cannot be used to

incriminate the appellant in the offence.

64. We therefore, have a case where the sole eye-witness does not

inspire much confidence and has, in fact, been disbelieved to some

parts by the learned Trial Court itself. We also do not find any

corroboration to her testimony nor a complete chain of circumstantial

evidence that would lead us to conclude that it could be appellant

alone who could have and did cause the murder of the deceased. It is a

settled position of law that the accused cannot be convicted only on

the basis of a strong suspicion; the prosecution must travel the

distance between „strong suspicion‟ to a stage of „beyond reasonable

doubt‟, which, in the present case, the prosecution has failed to do.

The appellant is therefore, entitled to the benefit of doubt.

65. We accordingly set aside the Order of Conviction dated

05.04.2003 and the Order of Sentence dated 17.04.2003 passed by the

learned Trial Court.

66. The appellant shall stand acquitted of the charges framed

against him.

CRL.A. 312/2003 Page 31 of 31

67. The appeal is allowed.

68. The bail bond and the sureties of the appellant shall remain

valid for a period of six weeks from today in terms of Section 481 of

the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (erstwhile Section

437A of the Cr.P.C.).

69. A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court and

Jail Superintendent for necessary information and compliance.

NAVIN CHAWLA, J

RAVINDER DUDEJA, J

SEPTEMBER 07, 2026/sg/as