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PETITIONER:

SEVAKA PERUMAL, ETC.

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF TAMIL NADU

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/05/1991

BENCH:

RAMASWAMY, K.

BENCH:

RAMASWAMY, K.

AHMADI, A.M. (J)

CITATION:

1991 AIR 1463 1991 SCR (2) 711

1991 SCC (3) 471 JT 1991 (2) 546

1991 SCALE (1)914

ACT:

Indian Penal Code, 1860: Section 302 read with section

34 and section 120-B, 364 and 392 read with section 397-

Enticing yound boys to bring cash and jewellery-Murdering

them for gain and throwing into well etc.-Recovery of dead

body-Whether absolutely necessary to convict accused-Benefit

of doubt-Whether a relevant factor in imposing sentence.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973: Sections 114 and 133-

Evidence of approver-Nature of corroboration required.

Penology: Award of sentence-Showing undue sympathy

harmful to justice system-Would undermine public confidence-

Hence courts to award proper sentence having regard to the

nature of the offence and the manner in which it was

executed.

HEADNOTE:

According to the Prosecution, appellants 1 and 2 have

been friends and were in the habit of selling ganja and

spending money lavishly. They attempted to commit theft in

their locality, but were no successful. Therefore, they

hatched a conspiracy to entice boys from affluent families

to bring cash and jewellery and murder them after taking

away the cash and jewellary. Likewise, they killed 4 boys,

in a span of about 5 years.

Both of them were charged with offences under section

120B read with section 34 IPC, section 364 and 392 read with

section 397 IPC in all the four cases filed against them,

and were convicted by the Sessions Court. However, in one

case, on appeal, they were acquitted by the High Court. In

another case, the death sentence imposed by the Sessions

Court is pending confirmation by the High Court.

In the other two cases, both the appellants were

sentenced to

712

death by the Sessions Court and on appeal the High Court

confirmed the sentence in one case and in the other, the

High Court confirmed the death sentence passed against

appellant No. 1 and acquitted appellants No. 2 of all the

charges.

The appellants preferred the present appeals

challenging the said order of the High Court confirming the

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sentences against them by contending that there was no

proper identification of the dead body and that the approver

was not a reliable witness and since his evidence did not

receive corroboration, it cannot form the basis for

convicting the appellants. It was also contended that the

extreme penalty of death sentence imposed was not justified.

Dismissing the appeals, this Court,

HELD: 1.1 In a trial for murder it is not an absolute

necessity or an essential ingredient to establish corpus

delicti. The fact of death of the deceased must be

established like any other fact. Corpus delicti in some

cases may not be possible to be traced or recovered. If a

murder was committed and the dead body was thrown into

flowing tidal river or stream or burnt out, it is unlikely

that the dead body may be recovered. If recovery of the

dead body, therefore, is an absolute necessity to convict an

accused, in many a case the accused would manage to see that

the dead body is destroyed etc. and that would afford a

complete immunity to the guilty from being punished and the

accused would escape even when the offence of murder is

proved. What, therefore, is required to base a conviction

for an offence of murder is that there should be reliable

and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder, like any

other factum, of death was committed and it must be proved

by direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body

may not be traced. [717A-D]

1.2 In the instant case, the evidence of PWs. 7 to 10

would establish that they have seen the dead body of the

deceased in the well and brought it out and the photograph

was taken at the time of inquest. It was identified to be

that of the deceased by no other than the mother of the

deceased. Thus there is no doubt as regards the identity of

the dead body. Also the medical evidence establishes that

the deceased died due to stabbing with sharp edged weapon

like knife. [717E]

2. Law is settled that an approver is a competent

witness against the accused person. But the court, to

satisfy its conscience, insists as caution and prudence to

seek, as a rule, corroboration to the evidence

713

of the approver, a particips criminis from independent

evidence occular or circumstantial, of general particulars

regarding the story spoken of by the approver of the

commission of the crime and the part played by the accused

therein to find whether it is true and worthy of acceptance.

The reliability of the evidence of an approver should be

considered from totality of the facts and circumstances. In

one of the two trials there is no dispute that such a

corroborative evidence connecting both the appellant is

available which was minutely considered by the trial court

and the High Court and was accepted. There is infirmity in

that regard. In the other trial appellant No. 2 was

acquitted on the ground that his extra-judicial confession

made to PW 23, the only corroborative evidence, was

disbelieved by the High Court. Both the Courts below gave

categorical finding that PW 1 is a reliable witness. The

evidence of the approver received corroboration from

independent evidence. The canopy of the material evidence

from independent sources sufficiently corroborates the

approver's evidence. He is a reliable witness. No

infirmity has been pointed out to disbelieve his evidence.

[719D-H; 720A]

Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, [1952] SCR 377; S.

Swaminathan v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 340; Sarwan

Singh v. The State of Punjab, , [1957] SCR 953; B.D. Patil

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v. State of Maharashtra, [1963] 3 SCR 830; Md. Hussan Umar

Kochra etc. v. K.S. Dalipsinghji & Anr., [1970] 1 SCR 130;

Ram Narain v. State of Rajasthan, [1973] 3 SCC 805 and Abdul

Sattar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, [1985] (Suppl.) SCC

599, relied on.

King v. Baskervilli, [1916] 2 K.B. 658 (C.A.) and

Mahadeo v. The King, AIR 1936 P.C. 242, referred to.

3. In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence

that the accused indulged in illegal business of purchase

and sale of ganja. They conspired to entice innocent boys

from affluent families, took them to far flung places where

the dead body could not be identified. The letters were

written to the parents purporting to be by the deceased to

delude the parents that the missing boy would one day come

home alive and that they would not give any report to the

police and the crime would go undetected. Four murders in a

span of five years were committed for gain in cold blooded,

premeditated and planned way. In this case the trial of the

murder relating to the two deceased practically took place

simultaneously by which date the appellants were convicted

for the murder of two other boys. Therefore, the reference

of conviction and sentence by the Sessions Court to those

two cases also are relevant facts. One of the deceased is no

other than the nephew of appellants No. 1. This

714

would establish his depravity and hardened criminality. No

regard for precious lives of innocent young boys was shown.

They adopted the crime of murder for gain as a means to

living. As such there is no infirmity in the sentence

awarded by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High

Court. [721D-G]

4. The doctrine of benefit of doubt only would operate

in proof of the commission of the offence. If there is any

reasonable doubt, not the doubt of vacillating mind of a

Judge, the accused is entitled to that benefit and be

acquitted. The benefit of doubt again does not enter in the

area of consideration of imposing sentence. [720C]

5.1. Undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would

do harm to the justice system to undermine the public

confidence in the efficacy of law and society could not long

endure under serious threats. If the courts did not protect

the injured the injured would then resort to private

vengeance. It is, therefore, the duty of every court to

award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the

offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed

etc. [721C]

5.2. The compassionate grounds such as the accused

being young bread-winners of the family etc. would always be

present in most casts and are not relevant for interference

with the sentence. [722D]

6. Under section 235(2) when the accused has been given

right to be heard on the question of sentence it is a

valuable right. To make that right meaningful the procedure

adopted would be suitably moulded and the accused given an

opportunity to adduce evidence on the nature of the

sentence. The hearing may be on the same day if the parties

are ready or to a next date but once the court after giving

opportunity, proposes to impose appropriate sentence again

there is no need to adjourn the case under section 235(2) to

next date. In the present matters the counsel was directed

by the High Court to show any additional grounds on the

question of sentence, but the counsel was unable to give any

additional ground. [722B-C]

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JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.

345-346 of 1991.

From the Judgement and Order dated 14.6.1990 of the

Madras High Court in Referred Trial Nos. 4/89 and 5/89 and

Crl. Appeal Nos. 593/89 and 594 of 1989.

715

Raju Ramachandran, Jaga Rao, Alok Agarwal, Ms. Malini

Bhat and S. Ravindra Bhatt for the appellants.

V.R. Karthikeyan and V. Krishnamurthy for the

respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

K. RAMASAWAMY, J. Special leave to appeals granted.

Heard the learned counsel, Sri Raju Ramachandran amicus

curiae for the appellants and Sri V. Krishnamurthy, the

learned Standing Counsel for the State. The appellants

Sevaka Perumal and Isakkimuthu for short 'A-1' and 'A-2' in

Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1842/90 are accused

in Sessions Case No. 283 of 1986 on the file of the Addl.

Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli Sessions Division and appellants

in Criminal Appeal No. 594 of 1989 and R.T. No. 4 of 1989 by

judgment, dated June 14, 1990 of the High Court of Madras.

Criminal Appeal arise out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 1841/90;

Sessions Case No. 284 of 1986 of the same Sessions Division

and Criminal Appeal No. 593 and R.T. No. 5 of 1989 dated

June 14, 1990 of the Madras High Court respectively, A-1 is

the appellant. In each case the Sessions Court convicted

them under ss. 120B, 364, 392 read with s. 397; s. 302 read

with s. 34 I.P.C. and sentenced to death. In Crl. Appeal

No. 594 of 1989 and R.T. No. 4 of 1989, the High Court

confirmed the conviction and sentence of death of both the

appellants. In Crl. Appeal No. 593 of 1989 and R.T. No. 5

of 1989, the High Court confirmed the conviction and

sentenced of death of the A-1 and acquitted A-2 of all the

charges.

The case of the prosecution in brief is that the

appellants and PW-1, the approver belonged to kidarakulam

village and became friends. A-1 used to bring money form

the timber shop of his brother-in-law (PW-4) in Sessions

Case No. 284/86 in whose shop A-1 had worked. They used to

go to various places. A-1 used to purchase ganja from

chenglapatai and other places and A-1 and A-2 used to sell

them. Yet they did not have enough money to spend lavishly.

They attempted to commit theft in the localities but became

impracticable. Therefore, they conspired to entice boys

from affluent families to bring cash and jewellery from

their houses; take them to far away places; take their money

or jewellery and to murder them for gain. Pursuant thereto

in 1978 they murdered one Athippan; in 1981 one Chelladurai;

in March, 1982 one Hariramachandran and in 1983 one

Christodas. In Sessions Case No. 283/86, the deceased boy

is Athiappan. In

716

Sessions Case No. 284/86, the deceased boy is

Hariramachandran. Sessions Case No. 282/86 on the file of

the Sessions Court. Madurai Division relates to deceased

Chelladurai. Therein also we are informed that the

appellants were convicted but on appeal they were acquitted.

In sessions Case relating to the death of Christodas, it

also ended in conviction and sentence of death was imposed

on the appellants and is pending confirmation in the High

Court.

It is sufficient to set out the material fact leaving

out the minor details in Sessions Case No. 284/86 to meet

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the points raised by the counsel for the appellants. A-1

enticed the deceased, Hariramachandran, his nephew (elder

sister PW-2' son) to bring jewellery from the house of PW-2

and PW-4. The appellants and PW-1 took him to Madurai. On

the way the deceased went to the house of PW-3 and handed

over one chain to be delivered to his mother and took M.O. 1

chain with him. A-1 had taken a room in the lodge at

Madurai run by PW-16. On coming to know that they were

staying in Madurai, PW-2, PW-4, her husband and PW-3 went to

the lodge and the deceased was found threat. He informed

them that the chain was with A-1 and he would come in the

evening at 8.00 p.m. After waiting for some time and when

it was getting dark, the ladies went away asking PW-4 to get

the chain and the deceased after A-1's arrival. While PW-4

was waiting the deceased went down stairs and after A-1's

arrival told him of his mother's coming etc. and from there

they went away to Madras, and having come to know that they

left the place PW-4 left to his village. On the next day

they returned to Madurai. From there they went to

Usilampatti and A-1 then purchased a knife at the Bus Stand

without the knowledge of the deceased and proceeded to

Peraiyar road. They sat near a jungle stream. While A-1

and the deceased Harirmachandran were sitting near a stone

on the southern side of the road, A-2 and PW-1 were standing

at a distance, A-1 stabbed Harirmachandran in his stomach

with a knife and the deceased collapsed on the stone. A-1

threw away the knife in the river. He threw the deceased in

the nearby well and washed his hands and legs in the stream.

They returned to Usilampatti Bus Stand. From there they

came to Madurai. A-1 sold M.O. 1 chain to PW-24 and gave

one hundred rupees each to PW-1 and A-2. This evidence of

PW-1 received sufficient corroboration from the evidence of

prosecution witnesses.

Sri Raju Ramachandran contended that the dead body was

admittedly found in a highly decomposed condition. There is

no proper identification of the dead body to be of the

deceased. The

717

mother PW-2 identified only with reference to the photograph

taken of the dead body. There is evidence that the deceased

wrote a letter of leaving to unknown destination. Unless

there is proof that the dead body belongs to

Hariramachandran, it is not safe to convict to A-1 to a

capital punishment of death sentence. We find no force in

the contention. In a trial for murder it is not an absolute

necessity or an essential ingredient to establish corpus

delicti. The fact of death of the deceased must be

established like any other fact. Corpus delicti in some

cases may not be possible to be traced or recovered. Take

for instance that a murder was committed and the dead body

was thrown into flowing tidal river or steam or burnt out.

It is unlikely that the dead body may be recovered. If

recovery of the dead body, therefore, is an absolute

necessity to convict an accused, in many a case the accused

would manage to see that the dead body is destroyed etc. and

would afford a complete immunity to the guilty from being

punished and would escape even when the offence of murder is

proved. What, therefore, is required to base a conviction

for an offence of murder is that there should be reliable

and acceptable evidence that the offence of murder, like any

other factum, of death was committed and it must be proved

by direct or circumstantial evidence, although the dead body

may not be traced. In this case the evidence of PWs.-7 to

10 would establish that they have seen the dead body of the

deceased Hariramachandran in the well and brought it out and

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the photograph was taken at the time of inquest. It was

identified to be that of the deceased by no other than his

mother, PW-2. Thus we have no hesitation to hold that there

is no doubt as regards the identity of the dead body and

that the medical evidence establishers that the deceased

died due to stabbing with sharp edged weapon like knife.

It is next contended that PW-1 being an approver, his

evidence must be reliable and must receive corroboration on

all material particulars from independent evidence. PW-1 is

neither a reliable witness nor did his evidence receive such

corroboration. Therefore, his evidence cannot form the

basis to convict the appellants. It is his contention that

in Hariramachandran's death case the evidence of PW-1 was

not accepted as regards the complicity of A-2 and he was

acquitted. Therefore, PW-1 is not a reliable witness. This

contention too is devoid of any force. PW-1 had given

wealth of details of commission of the crimes. Under s. 133

of the Evidence Act 1 of 1872, an accomplice shall be a

competent witness against an accused person; and a

conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon

the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Section 114

illustration (b) postulates that an accomplice is unworthy

of credit, unless he is corroborated in mate-

718

rial particulars. In King v. Baskervilli, [1916] 2 K.B. 658

(C.A.) Lord Reading, CJ, laid the test that the

corroboration need not be direct evidence that the accused

committed the crime. It is merely circumstantial evidence of

his connection with the crime. The nature of the

corroboration will depend and vary according to the

particular circumstances of each case. What is required is

some additional evidence rendering it probable that the

story of the accomplice is true and that it is reasonably

safe to act upon. In Mahadeo v. The King AIR 1936 P. C. 242

the judicial committee held that the evidence of an accesory

must be corroborated in some material particulars not only

bearing upon the facts of the crime but upon the accused's

implication in it. This Court in Rameshwar v. The State of

Rajasthan, [1952] S.C.R. 377 held that it is not necessary

that there should be independent confirmation of every

material circumstance in the sense that the independent

evidence of the case, apart from the testimony of the

complainant or its accomplice should in itself be sufficient

to sustain conviction. All that is necessary is that there

should be independent evidence which will make it reasonably

safe to believe that the witness's story that the accused

was the one that committed the offence could be acceptable.

The corroboration need not be direct evidence that the

accused committed the crime. It is sufficient if it is

merely circumstantial evidence of his connection with the

crime. In S. Swaminathan v. State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC

340 this Court held that corroboration of approver's

evidence need not be of a kind which prove the offence

against the accused. It is sufficient if it connects the

accused with the crime when the accused had been charged for

the offences of conspiracy and of cheating, a specific

instance of cheating proved beyond doubt against one of the

accused would furnish the best corroboration of the offence

of the conspiracy. In Sarwan Singh v. The State of Punjab,

[1957] S.C.R. 953 relied by Shri Raju Ramachandran, this

Court held that the approver must be a reliable witness and

the evidence must receive sufficient corroboration. In

that case the corroboration of minor particulars was

accepted to be sufficient to hold the approver to be

reliable witness. In B.D. Patil v. State of Maharashtra,

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[1963] 3 S.C.R. 830 this Court held that the conviction of

an accused on the testimony of an accomplice cannot be said

to be illegal, yet the courts will, as a matter of practice

do not accept the evidence of such a witness without

corroboration in material particulars. There should be

corroboration of the approver in material particulars and

must be qua each accused. In Md. Hussain Umar Kochra etc.

v. K.S. Dalipsinghji & Anr., [1970] 1 S.C.R. 130 it was

held that the combined effect of ss. 133 and 114(b) is that

though a conviction based upon accomplice evidence is legal

the court will not accept such evidence unless it is

719

Corroborated in material particulars. The

corroboration must be from an independent source. If

several accomplices simultaneously and without previous

concert giving consistent account of the crime implicating

accused, the court may accept the several statements as

corroborating each other. In Ram Narain v. State of

Rajasthan, [1973] 3 S.C.C 805 this Court held that s. 114(b)

strikes a note of warning, cautioning the court that an

accomplice does not generally deserve to be believed unless

corroborated in material particulars. In other words, the

rule is that the necessity of corroboration is as matter of

prudence except when it is safe to dispense with such

corroboration must be clearly present to the mind of the

Judge. In Abdul Sattar v. Union Territory, Chandigarh,

[1985] (Suppl.) S.C.C. 599 this Court further held that it

is not safe to convict an accused on the charges like murder

upon the evidence of uncorroborated testimony of the

approver.

Thus the settled law is that an approver is a competent

witness against the accused person. But the court, to

satisfy its conscience, insists as caution and prudence to

seek, as a rule, corroboration to the evidence of the

approver, a particips criminis from independent evidence

occular or circumstantial, of general particulars regarding

the story spoken off by the approver of the commission of

the crime and the part played by the accused therein to find

whether it is true and worthy of acceptance. The

reliability of the evidence of an approver should be

considered from totality of the facts and circumstances. In

the trial of Athiappan murder there is no dispute that such

a corroborative evidence connecting both the appellants is

available which was minutely considered by the trial court

and the High Court and was accepted. We find no infirmity

in that regard. In the trial of the death of

Hariramachandran, A. 2 was acquitted on the ground that his

extra-judicial confession made to P.W. 23, the only

corroborative evidence,was disbelieved by the High Court.

Both the courts below gave categorical finding that P.W. 1

is a reliable witness. the evidence of the approver

received corroboration from independent evidence on general

prosecution case, namely, P.W. 16 spoke that the deceased

was brought by the accused and stayed in the lodge. P.Ws 2

to 4 spoke of A-1 working in their shop, previous theft by

A-1 and M.O. 1 being missing, their attempt to take back the

deceased and M.O, 1, the deed body was found in the well and

was taken out as spoke to by P. Ws. 7to 10. The medical

evidence establishes the stabbing with the knife and death

was due to it. P.W. 24 corroborates A. 1 of selling M.O. 1

chain and taking the money. The canopy of the material

evidence from independent sources sufficiently corroborates

the approver' evidence.

720

PW-1 is a reliable witness. No infirmity has been pointed

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out to disbelieve his evidence.

It is next contended that the courts below were not

justified in imposing the extreme penalty of death sentence

under s. 302, I.P.C. and strongly relied upon the judgment

of Bachan Singh's case. It is contended that the acquittal

of A. 2 giving the benefit of doubt in Hariramachandran's

death trial introduces an element of doubt which should be

extended to convert the death sentence of A. 1 to life

imprisonment. We find no susbstance in the contention. The

doctrine of benefit of doubt only would operate in proof of

the commission of the offence. If there is any reasonable

doubt, not the doubt of vacillating mind of a Judge, the

accused is entitled to the benefit and acquitted. The

benefit of doubt again does not enter in the area of

consideration of imposing sentence.

The law regulates social interest, arbitrates

conflicting claims and demands. Security of persons and

property of the people is an essential function of the

State. It could be achieved through instrumentality of

criminal law. Undoubtedly, there is a cross cultural

conflict where living law must find answer to the new

challenges and the courts are required to mould the

sentencing system to meet the challenges. The contagion of

lawlessenss would undermine social order and lay it in

ruins. Protection of society and stamping out criminal

proclivity must be the object of law which must be

achieved by imposing appropriate sentence. Therefore, law

as a corner-stone of the edifice of order should meet the

challenges confronting the society. Friedman in his "Law in

Changing Society" stated that, "State of criminal law

continues to be-as it should be-a decisive reflection of

social consciousness of society". Therefore, in operating

the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective

machinery or the deterrence based on factual matrix. By

deft modulation of sentencing process be stern where it

should be, and tempered with mercy where it warrants to be.

The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature

of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and

committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the

conduct of the accused and all other attending circumstances

are relevant facts which would enter into the area of

consideration. For instance a murder committed due to deep

seated personal rivalry may not call for penalty of death.

But an organised crime or mass murders of innocent people

would call for imposition of death sentence as deterrence.

In Mahesh v. State of M.P., [1987] 2 S.C.R. 710 this Court

while refusing to reduce that death sentence observed thus:

721

`It will be a mockery of justice to permit the

accused to escape the extreme penalty of law when

faced with such evidence and such cruel acts. To

give the lesser punishment for the accused would be

to render the justicing system of the country

suspect. The common man will lose faith in courts.

In such cases, he understands and appreciates the

language of deterrence more than the reformative

jargon'.

Therefore, undue sympathy to impose inadequate

sentence would do more harm to the justice system to

undermine to public confidence in the efficacy of law and

society could not long endure under serious threats. If the

courts did not protect the injured, the injured would then

resort to private vengeance. It is, therefore, the duty of

every court to award proper sentence having regard to the

nature of the offence and the manner in which it was

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executed or committed etc.

It is clear from the evidence that the accused indulged

in illegal business of purchase and sale of ganja. They

conspired to entice innocent boys from affluent families

took them to far flung places where the dead body could not

be identified. The letters were written to the parents

purporting to be by the deceased to delude the parents that

the missing boy would one day come home alive and that they

would not give any report to the police and the crime would

go undetected. Four murders in a span of five years were

committed for gain in cold blooded , pre-meditated and

planned way. It is undoubted that if the trial relating to

Athiappan murder had taken place and concluded earlier to

the trial and conviction of other three murders, the

subsequent murders are not relevant facts to be considered.

But in this case the trial of the murder relating to

Athiappan and Hariramachandran practically took place

simultaneously by which date the appellants were convicted

for the murder of Chelladurai and Christodas. Therefore ,the

reference of conviction and sentence by the Sessions Court

to those two cases also are relevant facts. The deceased

Hariramachandran is no other than the nephew (elder sister's

son) of A-1. This would establish his depravity and hardened

criminality. No regard for precious lives of innocent young

boys was shown. They adopted the crime of murder for gain as

a means to living.

Undoubtedly under section 235(2) of Code of Criminal

Procedure, the accused is entitled to an opportunity to

adduce evidence and if need be the case is to be adjourned

to another date. It is illegal to convict, an accused and to

impose sentence on the same day. It is true

722

as contended for the State that under s. 309, third proviso

brought by Amendment Act, 1978 that no adjournment should be

granted for the purpose only of enabling the accused person

to show cause against sentence to be imposed upon him. Under

s. 235(2) when the accused has been given right to be heard

on the question of sentence it is a valuable right. To make

that right meaningful the procedure adopted should be

suitably moulded and the accused given an opportunity to

adduce evidence on the nature of the sentence. The hearing

may be on the same day if the parties are ready or be

adjourned to a next date but once the court after giving

opportunity propose to impose appropriate sentence again

there is no need to adjourn the case any further thereon. No

doubt the Sessions Judge needed to adjourn the case under s.

235(2) to next date but in the High Court the counsel was

directed to show any additional grounds on the question of

sentence . The High Court observed that the counsel was

unable to give any additional ground. It is Further

contended that the appellants are young men. They are the

bread winners of their family each consisting of a young

wife. minor child and aged parents and that, therefore, the

death sentence may be converted into life. We find no force.

These compassionate grounds would always be present in most

cases and are not relevant for interference. Thus we find no

infirmity in the sentence awarded by the Sessions Court and

confirmed by the High Court warranting interference. The

appeals are accordingly dismissed.

G.N. Appeal dismissed.

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