Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:34230

A.F.R.

RESERVED

Court No. – 38

Case :- WRIT - B No. - 1841 of 2019

Petitioner :- Shiv Charan And 3 Others

Respondent :- Board Of Revenue And 3 Others

Counsel for Petitioner :- Harish Chandra Singh,Sri Dharampal Singh, Sr.

Advocate

Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C., Ajay Kumar Singh,Ashish Kumar

Singh,Punit Kumar Gupta

Hon'ble Syed Qamar Hasan Rizvi, J.

1. Heard Sri D.P. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Harish

Chandra Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners; Sri S.N. Srivastava,

learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State-respondents no.1 to

3 and Sri Punit Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent no.4.

2. By means of this writ petition the petitioners/Defendants have challenged

the Order dated 16.04.2019 (Annexure-19) passed by the Board of Revenue

U.P. at Allahabad in Second Appeal No.422 of 2019 (Shiv Charan and

others versus Shekh Sauduzzuma; the judgment/order dated 20.11.2018

(Annexure-16) passed by the Learned Commissioner, Chitrakoot Dham

Division, Banda in Case No.01600 of 2018 - Computerized Case

No.C201807000001600 (Shiv Charan and others versus Shekh

Sauduzzuma), and the judgment/decree dated 24.08.2018 (Annexure- 14)

passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Baberu (Banda) in Case No. 1648 of

2016 - Computerized No. T201607110111648 (Shekh Sauduzzuma versus

Shiv Charan and others).

3. The controversy involved in this case pertains to the plots of land having

Gata Nos. 4335, 4336, 4341, 4344 and 4334 measuring 1.518 hectare,

situated at Village Ladakapurva, Tehsil and District Banda.

4. The facts in nutshell that culled out from the pleadings as available on

record are that the Respondent No. 4/Plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment

under section 171 & 172 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 against the

1

petitioners/defendants in the Court of Assistant Collector First-Class,

Banda, on the ground that the they are changing the nature of the land

and are also trying to unlawfully transfer the same.

5. The averments in the plaint were to the effect that the

Respondent/plaintiff are the Co-Zamindar and Lambardar of Khata

Kewat Patti No. 1, Muhal Yusuf Zama, duly appointed by Collector

Banda vide order dated 14.07.2015 and the land in question that situates

in ‘non-ZA area’, was given on lease to defendants’ father namely

Kandhilal whose name stood recorded in Ziman 8 and consequent upon

his death the names of defendants came to be mutated in the Khatuani in

Ziman 8 (hereditary tenant with non-transferable rights).

6. A Written Statement was filed by the defendants pleading therein that

the Zamindari stands abolished by the UP Urban Areas Zamindari

Abolition and Land Reforms Act 1956 and the land stood vested with the

State Government by virtue of section 8 thereof. It was also alleged that

the United Provinces Tenancy Act 1939 stands repealed by section 84 of

the said Act of 1956 as such the suit is not maintainable.

7. The application for interim injunction filed by the respondent/plaintiff

is said to have been allowed by the trial Court vide order dated

28.04.2017 against which the petitioners/defendants filed a Revision

before the Court of Commissioner (Respondent No. 2), however, the

Revision preferred by the petitioners/defendants was dismissed by the

Court of Commissioner on 20.12.2017 which is said to have not been

challenged further.

8. The learned trial court framed six Issues including issue No. 3 to the

effect as to whether Zamindari in the area in question has been abolished,

as stated in Paragraphs No. 7, 12 and 13 of the Written Statement. The

issues as framed by the court below are reproduced here under:

1- Neutruatl tCiton.-2t04:AtH3au:At-FtRE.Ct-utSVD:au:t–D8s-trtW4tHC3au:

4ItHIWut.-truatl t-Ftsu:ut1 Cit-TSt.-eutBeut4I?

2- Neut–12ruaAtBft9u:ut-uP2-u:At-2hved/o1s-u:dt-ut.rOREOtCitpgn,St.-eu

Beut4ItHmt.-t-u:ft–12ruaABftsu:u-171-172 यूOlAOtcjSj8WAtyNct-j to82Bh2

बेदखल होने योग्य है?

3- Neut.rOREOt-FtHC3au:AtWCubt-FtHutQz-Ft4ItHIWut.-t–12ruatl t-Ftsu:u-7

एव धारा-12-13 CitJ;jlt.-eutBeut4Ite.at4uwt2mt/W-ut–Rur

2

4- Neut.rOREOt-FtDur2t-m6truat4j2ztp(lxtS43t4JtHIWut.-t–12ruatl t-Ftsu:u

15 में आक्षेप है?

5- Neut–12ruaABft.r0j)t4HuhtruaAtWjtluSjt-j to1s-u:At4UtHIWut.-t–12ruatl t-F

धारा-17 -j tJ;jlt4I

6- क्या वाद पोषणीय है"

9. The trial court of Sub-Divisional Officer, Baberu decreed the suit on

24.08.2018. While deciding Issue No. 3 negatively against the defendants

it recorded a categorical finding that Zamindari with respect to the land

in dispute has not been abolished. The court below also returned a

finding that the allegation that zamindari has been abolished vide

notification dated 24.06.1961 as relied upon by the defendants is not

substantiated by any evidence as such the suit is maintainable under the

provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act. The extract of the relevant finding is

quoted below:

“…….इसलिलये उपरोक्त किववेचना और वर्णिणत किबन्दुओंt-j t–-u0tCitruat.D8aु 03 एवं वाद

नं0 6 –12ruaABft-j t.rZMtS-u:u(C-t.SfY2t.-eutHu2ut4It7:tejtorsuq:2t.-eu

Hu2ut4It.-t.rru.a2tRE.CtHmtr2hCuStCitRAtySOtHj‘OyOtCitaHht4ItHCA8au:At-FtRE.Ct4I’

प्रतितवादीगण जिजमन 8 -j t-uP2-u:t:4jt4It7:tpLtruateूOlAOtcASj8WAtyNct-j to82Bh2

पोषणीय है। इस सम्बन्ध में 2001 (92) आर डी पेज 48 किहन्दी भी स्पष्ट है।........”

10. The learned trial court, while deciding Issue No.1 recorded a finding

that the Respondent No. 4/Plaintiff was appointed as Lambardar vide

order dated 14.07.2015 passed by the Collector, Banda. The extract of the

relevant finding recorded by the trial court is quoted below:

“…..rru.a2tRE.Ct]uCtG”u-ulz:rutySOHj‘OytOtCm4uGteूसुफ जमा जिजमन 8 में

–12ruaABft-uP2-u:ton.-2t4ItruaAtSjtWSR t1417- 1420 फ0 -FtS-GtKjrc

QSWuGu t ]uC t G”u-ulz:ru t Cm4uG t eूWzX t HCu t -F t –…2z2 t -F t 4I’ t Kjrc t Cit on.-2

HCASau:uSt-j tSuCton.-2t4It7:t1420 XOtCit24WAGau:tDuwaut-j tCz0 नं0 312 ता०

फै0 05.02.2013 CitJaj0t.r:uW2taHht4It.-t0jKt4uHAtpTCutlz tCWEatpTCut-u

SuCtKuq:Ht-:-j t/W-j t…TuStl:truq:Wt0jKtWUatpTCutlz t0jKt4uaAtpTCut.SruWA

DGKV‘ASu-utDuwaut-utSuCtD:uW2StaHht4I, /WWjt…l[t4It.-truaAtW4tHCASau:tCm4uG

यूWzXtHCut-ut4I’tl urGAtCitruaAt9u:ut–…2z2t-FtB6tS-GtXI WGut“HGu1s-u:A t/

-GjNc: t Duwau t su:u- 45 यू०पी० लैण्ड रेवेन्यूt y- t SuS t Hj‘ t yq:eu t .Sfhe t 12WT

14.07.2015 -j toSzWu:truaAt-mt]uCtG”u-ulz:rutCm4uGteूफुफ जमा पट्टी नं० 1 एवं

ग्राम भवानीपुरवा मोहाल यूसुफ जमा पट्टी नं० 1 -utGVD:au:t.SeुLt.-eutBeut4It7:

न्यायालय ने यह आदेश आयुLtC4maet-j tolAGAetJaj0t09.05.2013 -utWCua:

-:2j t 4ुej t pl“HGu1s-u:A t Duwau t/ 24WAGau: t Duwau t -F t Wn…2z12t JYeu

09.06.2015/03.06.2015 -utW8aRhtGj-:t.-eut4I’tpl:mLtoWRGjKAetWuZetWj

वादी वाद किबन्दु नं० 1 -mt“WMt-:SjtCitWXGt4It.-truaAtW4HC3au:tyrntGVD:au:tRAt4I’

तदानुसार वाद किबन्दुtW-u:u(C-tZltWjt2et.-eutHu2utgSA**

3

11. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgement and decree dated

24.08.2018 the petitioners/defendants preferred an appeal under Section

265 of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 in the Court of Commissioner,

Chitrakoot Dham, Banda Division which was registered as Case No.

01600/2018. The First Appellate court affirmed the judgement passed by

the trial court by declining to interfere with the same. The said appeal

was finally dismissed vide judgement and order dated 20.11.2018.

12. The first appellate court while deciding the appeal vide judgment and

order dated 20.11.2018 returned a categorical finding to the effect that

despite sufficient opportunity having been given to the defendants to

adduce evidence to establish the alleged abolition of zamindari, have

failed to substantiate the said allegations. The findings recorded by the

first appellate court in this regard are as under:

“….अधीनस्थ न्यायालय में प्रश्नगत वाद में 06 वाद किबन्दुt.S\C2t.-ejtBejtHmtruaA

–12ruaABft-j t-TSdt-j tJsu:tl:t.SfY2t.-ejtBej’truat-j tlm)fAe2ut.D8aु पर अवर

8eueuGet9u:ut.rrjQSut-FtBeAt4It.-te.at.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHC3au:AtWCubt4mSutCuS

kGeutHuet2mtolAG-2uhBft-mtBuwrWRuteut:u]etW:-u:tWjtlXut-Ft-uehru4At4m2At7:

pW-j tkGytJrncStl urGAt-utW^HSt.-eutHu2u’tolAG-2uhBft-mt:u]etW:-u:tr

BuwrWRut-Ft&:tWjt-m6t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-utlXutS43t.-eutBeutNed.-t/WtWVD8stCi

olAG-2uhBft9u:ut-m6tWuZet–…2z2tS43t.-eutBeu’t/WWjt…l[t4It.-t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-u

lXutolAG-2uhBft-mtHC3au:t9u:ut–a_t.-eutBeutTu’tHSWEQSuto1s-u:tWjt–ub

WEQSut-j tJsu:tl:t.rru.a2tRE.CtHC3au:tWjtlXjt-j t`ltCit–ubt4ुई थी जिजसपर

olAG-2uhBft“HCS-8 CS`WAt-uP2-u:t-j t`ltCitaHhtQGjtJt:4jt4U’t/WWjt…l[t4It.-

01 जुलाई 1961 -mt.rru.a2tRE.Ct-ृ.)tem'etS43tTAtDab-tHC3au:AtRE.CtTA, “HW-j

Jsu:tl:tRE.Ct:uH…rtoWRGjKdtCitSuStHj‘Otyq:eut-FtK2SSAtCitaHht4I’te.at.rru.a2

RE.Ct-FtHC3au:AtWCubt4mtBeAt4m2At2mt–[B2tRE.CtHj‘Oyq:eut-FtK2SSAtCitaHht-F

जाती। अधीनस्थ न्यायालय में संलग्न राजस्व परिरषद, pO–OtGKSUt-j tlq:)auaj0t.aSun-

15 जून 2012 Cit…l[t.-eutBeut4It.-tSuSOHj‘Oyq:eut-FtHC3au:AtWCubt.-ejtHuSj

-j tXG…r`lto:Dmt`leut–12-:t-j t`ltCit.aeutHuSut4mBu’t/WAtd.[t-mteeuStCit:K2j

हुytSB:t;j dt-FtHC3au:AtSt2m‘jtHuSjt-ut.SfhetkGeutBeut4I....”

13. Assailing the judgment passed by the first appellate court a Second

Appeal was preferred by the petitioners/defendants before the Board of

Revenue at Allahabad as Second Appeal No. 422 of 2019. The said

Second Appeal preferred by the petitioners/defendants was also

dismissed by the Board of Revenue vide its judgement/order dated

16.04.2019.

14. While deciding the Second Appeal, the learned Board of Revenue

considered the questions of a lease having admittedly been granted by the

zamindar in favour of late Kandhilal which came to be recorded vide

4

order dated 08.09.1961, whereas the date of abolition of zamindari is

stated to be 24.06.1961 and observed that as a natural corollary of the

aforesaid pleadings/admission on the part of the appellants, the lease

would either be rendered void, as the zamindar could not have been

competent to grant the lease after 24.06.1961 i.e. the date of alleged

abolition of zamindari or it would amount to an admission on the part of

the appellants that zamindari existed after the date of alleged abolition of

zamindari, otherwise there would have been no occasion for the

zamindar to grant lease in favour of their father namely Khandi son of

Babu Lal. The relevant portion of the findings recorded by the learned

Board of Revenue are extracted below:

“.....pS-ute4tRAt-TSt4It.-tolAGuTYt9u:utolSjt…r(rt-utJsu:tr4tlXutD2ueu

Hu2u t 4It “HW-j t aukKG t Kuq:H t -u t Jaj0 t .aSun- t08.09.1961 -m t 2(-uGAS

l:BSu1s-u:Ataru:ut.-eutBeut7:t:uH…rtoWRGjKdtCiton-St.aSun-t18.11.1961

-mt4ुJ’tpS-ute4t2-h t4It.-tolAGuTYt9u:ut.-WAtRAt…2:tl:tHC3au:t9u:utlXut–auS

.-ytHuSjt-j t2fetWjt/8-u:tS43t.-eutBeut4I, HDt.-tolAGuTYtaru:ut…rnet4At–[B2

WVl12tWjtWnDn1s2tH3au:At-utp8CEGSt.aSun-t24.06.1961 -mt4mSutD2ueutHut:4u

है, o2gte.at2-h t4j2ztolAG-2uhBft-FtDu2t…rA-u:t-:tGAtHuejt2mt…rnetp843t-j t2-h

-j toSzWu:tpS-j t.l2uwt-n ,Atlz tDuDEtGuGt-mtHC3au:t9u:utHC3au:Atp8CEGSt4mtHuSjt-j

pl:u82tlXut–auSt4mtS43t.-eutHutW-2utTutyrntiWAtlq:a…T12tCitolAGuTYt-j tl;tCi

.Sjlu.a2tlXjt-mt.r1st0E8eta…2urjHt-j tZltCitWnku.S2t-:Sut4mBu, “HW-j tXG…rZl

olAG-2uht -j t …r(r t WnDnsA t /8luH t -u t Jsu: t 4A t WCubt 4m t HuejBu, इसलिलए

olAG-2uhBftaru:ut–…2z2t.-eutBeut2-h t.S2u82tmuC-tyrnt…rnetolAG-2uhtaru:u

.SVSt8eueuGedt-j tWC;t.-ytByt-TSt-j t.r`Mt4mSjt-j t-u:ft…rA-u:t.-ytHuSjtem'e

S43t4I’tpS-ute4tRAt-TSt4It.-t–12l;At9u:ut–[B2tWVlk_t-ut…rZltDaGt-:

.rnet.-ejtHuSjtWVD8sAt–euWdt-j tDur2truatl tCit.-ejtBejtoWRrQSdt-j t.rl:A2t-m6

-TSt–12ruaABft9u:utolSjt–12ruatl tCitS43t.-eutBeut4ItDab-t…rent-mt–[B2

WVlk_t-utru…2.r-tRE-स्वामी/ RE.Cs:t4mSjt-ut-TSt-:t…rent-mtWRAto1s-u:t–ub

4mSutD2ueutBeut4ItHmt.-t…l[tZltWjtojfAt8 -j tCSZWAt-uP2-u:tWVD8sAt.SeCdt-j

.rl:A2t4mSjt-j t-u:ftolAGuTYt-j t.rl:A2torsu:fut.-ejtHuSjt4j2ztleuhbt4I’.....”

15. The learned Board of Revenue also considered the question of the

impact of a notification issued under Section 8 of the U.P. Urban Areas

Zamindari Abolition Act, 1956 that vests with State all agricultural areas

falling under the urban areas. The Board of Revenue also recorded a

finding that since the land in question stands recorded as ‘non-ZA area’

the burden of proving the fact of there being an

identification/demarcation as per Section 5 of the Act of 1956 prior to

coming into operation of Section 8 of the Act of 1956 lied upon the

appellants but they failed in adducing any evidence in this regard despite

having been granted sufficient opportunity. The Board of Revenue

5

recorded a categorical finding that the provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act

1939 are applicable in the area in question and the appellants cannot be

taken to be anything more than a hereditary tenant of Ziman-8. The

findings recorded by the learned Board of Revenue in this regard are as

under:

“………….. o2gtl;mt-j tCeetCEGt.rruat/WtJ0et-ut4It.-t–[B2tWVlk_tl:

p_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC, 1939 -j t–u.rsuStr2hCuStCitGuBEt4ItoTrutS43’

ep.ltpLt–[ty-t2feu(C-t–[t4It7:t2feu(C-t–[mtl:t.92AetolAGAet8eueuGe

9u:utWuCu8e2gt.rQu:tS4At.-eutHu2ut4I, l:82ztr2hCuSt–-:ftCitpLt2feu(C-t–[

-ut.rqj)ft/Wt8eueuGet9u:ut.-eutHuSut8eue.42tCitJrPe-t–2A2t4m2ut4I’

उत्तर प्रदेश शहरी क्षेत्र जमीदारी किवनाश एवं भूकिम व्यवस्था अतिधकिनयम, 1956 में किदये गये

–u.rsuSdt-j toSzWu:to1s.SeCt-Ftsu:ut8 -j to82Bh2t-ृ.)t;j t-ut1Q84un-St…TGtl:

-:Sjt-j tpl:u82tpWjtsu:ut5 में आयुLt9u:utlz[t.-eutHuejBut“HW-j tpl:u82t:u]e

W:-u:t9u:uto1s-uq:-tBHctCit–-u0St.-ejtHuSjt-Ft12WTtWjt4:tr4t;j tHmt.-tsu:u

5 -j to82Bh2tlErhtCit–-uW02t4mtQz-ut4m, WjtHCAau:AtWCubt4m-:tWVDa8s2t-ृकिष क्षेत्र

WRAto1sRu:mtWjtCzLt4m-:t:u]etW:-u:tCit.S.42tCuSutHuejBu’to1s.SeCt-Ftsu:ut8

e4t…l[tZltWjt–u.rsu.S2t-:2At4It.-to1s.SeC, 1956 -j t–u.rsuSt“WXh tp84A

RE.Cedtl:tGuBEt4mBjtHmt.-t…TGtl:t-ृ.)t;j t-j tZltCit.rCuSt4mt2TutRE.Ct-u

1Q84un-Stsu:ut4 Cit.-ejtHuSjt-j tpl:u82tWVDa8s2t-ृ.)t;j t-ut–-u0Stsu:ut5 में

Jlk_edt-j t.S…2u:ft-j tpl:u82t.-eutBeut4m’to1s.SeC, 1956 -Ftsu:ut3 से 5

2-tCit.-WAtRAt04:AtWVlk_, Hmt.-tpLto1s.SeCt–-uW02t4mSjt-Ft12WTtl:t-ृकिष

;j t:4At4mt7:tpWtWVlk_t-j tUl:tp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC, 1939 -j

प्राकिवधान लागू रहे हो, -j t.Ssuh:f, 1Q84un-S, WACun-Styrnt–-u0St-Ft.SVSt–.-eu

बतायी गयी है।

अतिधकिनयम 1956 -Ftsu:ut3 -j to82Bh2t:u]etW:-u:t9u:utBHctCit–-uW02t.-ej

HuSjt-j tpl:u82tWrh–TCtWACun-St(‘ACu-r 0S) o1s-u:At.Ssuhq:2t–.-eut-j toSzWu:

04:At;j t-FtWVlEfhtRE.Ct-utl:A;ft-:Sjt-j tpl:u82tpStRE.Cedt-ut1Q84un-S t/

.Ssuh:ft-:jButHmt.-t-ृ.)tRE.Ct-j tZltCitplGsst4mt7:tsu:ut2(1) (स) -j t–TC

l:82z-t2Tutsu:ut2(1) (द) WjtJtuu.a2tSut4m’t2aml:u82tWACun-St(‘ACu-r 0S)

o1s-u:Atsu:ut3 -Ftplsu:ut1 -j tosAS, o1sWEQSut–-uW02t4mSjt-Ft12WTtWjt3

C4ASjt-j to8a:, oTrutiWAtDvu6tBeAtor1st-j tRA2:t“HWjt:uHetW:-u:t.-WAtCuCGj

Cit.S1w2t-:j, -u:ftD2u2jt4ुytolSjtWACun-St–…2urmt-mtJeुLt-j tWC;t–…2z2

-:jBu’tsu:ut4(1) -j tosASt–ubtpLt–…2urtl:tJrPe-tWn0msSml:u82tJeुक्त द्वारा

.r.42t–uZltl:t0uW-Fet:u]etl tCitoTrut.-WAto8et:A12tWjtHmt:u]etW:-u:

.S1w2t-:i, /Wt–uZltCit–-uW02t-:uyBut.-tWACun-Sto1s-u:At9u:ut.aeutBeu

–…2urt“HWt-ृ.)t;j t-j tWACun-StWjtWVDa8s2t4Ityrnt“HWt-ृ.)t;j t-j tWACun-Stlwu2

RE.Cedt-mtWE1Q2t.-eutBeut4m, उक्त नोकिटस में किनर्मिदष्ट स्थानो पर किनरीक्षण हेतु उपलब्ध

-:ueutHuejBu’tpLtSm.cWt–-uW02t4mSjtl:to1s.SeC, 1956 -Ftsu:ut4 उपधारा

(3) -j to82Bh2tWE. 2tWVlk_tCit.42t:KSjtruGut-m6tRAtve.LtoTrut…TuSAe

–u1s-u:Atplsu:ut(2) -j tosAStSm.cWt–-uW02t4mSjt-Ft12WTtWjt3 CuWt-j tRA2:tiWj

o1s-u:AtoTrut–u1s-u:At-j tWC;, 7:tiWAt:A12tWjtHmt.r.42t-FtHuej, उक्त

–-uW02t–…2urtl:tJlk_t–…2z2t-:tW-j Bu’t2aml:u82to1s.SeCt-Ftsu:ut4(3) -j

o82Bh2t–…2z2tJlk_edt-uteTm1Q2t.S…2u:ft.-ejtHuSjt-j tpl:u82t1Q84ua8-2t;j m

-utoa82Ct–-u0Sto1s.SeC, 1956 -Ftsu:ut5 -Ftplsu:ut(2) -j to82Bh2tJeुक्त

9u:ut0uW-Fet:uHtl tCitoTrutiWAt:A12tWjtHmt.r.42t-FtHuej, /WtJ0et-FtSm.cW

-ut–-u0St.-eutHuejBut.-tWE. 2t-ृ.)t;j mt-utoa82CtZltWjtWACun-St4mtBeut4I’

आयुLt9u:ut.-ejtBejtoa82Ct.Ssuh:f t/ –-u0St-j t.DZ9t:uH…rtlq:)atCitolAG

em“H2t.-ejtHuSjt-Ftver…TutaAtBeAt4It7:t1Q84u82St/ WACun-StWVD8sAtJlk_ed

-j tJsu:tl:t:uH…rtlq:)at9u:utJeुLt-j t.Sfhet-ut8eu1e-t.rrjQSt.-ejtHuSjt-j

pl:u82t1Q84un-St/ WACu-St-j tWVD8stCitJeुLt9u:ut.-eutBeut.Sfhetoa82CtCuSu

HuejBu’to1s.SeSt-Ftsu:u t8 -j to82Bh2tWVDa8s2t“HGjt-ut–-u0St4mtHuSjt-j

उपरान्त आयुLt9u:ut.-eutBeut1Q84u-StWRAtl:tDuee-u:At–Rurt:KjBut7:t/W

–-u:tWVDa8s2t;j t-FtpStRE.CedtWjt“HS-ut1Q84u-n Stoa82CtZltWjtsu:ut5 -F

6

उपधारा (2) -j to82Bh2t4mtQz-ut4m, -j tWVD8stCitp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC,

1939 .S:“W2t4m-:t–Rur4AStCuSutHuejBu’

r2hCuSt–-:ftCitolAGuTY9u:utolSjt…r(rt-mto1s.SeCt1956 -j to82Bh2tlq:lNr

4mSutD2ueutHut:4ut4ItHD.-tl urGAtl:tplGsst–[B2tWVl122tWjtWVDa8s2t:uH…r

oWRGjKdtCitpLtWVlk_tSxStHj‘tyOt-j tZltCitaHht4Ito2gt–[B2tWVlk_tWj

WVDa8s2t1Q84un-St/ WACun-St-Ft-uehru4At1961 Cit.-ejtBejtsu:ut8 -j t–-u0St-j

lErhtoCGtCitGueutHuSutWu.D2t-:Sjt-utRu:t–12ruaA/ अपीलाथHगण पर माना जायेगा।

/WtWVD8stCit.r1st-ute4tWz…Tu.l2t“WMu82t4It.-tWuZet–…2z2t-:Sjt-utRu:tpW

ve.Lt-j t-n smtl:t4m2ut4ItHmt.-t.-WAtDu2toTrut2fet-j toa…2(rtCit4mSjt-ut-TS

-:2ut4I’t/WAt2:4t8eueuGet-j t;j u1s-u:t-j tWVD8stCit-m6tJlk_t-j tDur2R

माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय द्वारा (ए०आई०आर०, 1966 Wz–ACt-mchtl^zt1718) में

e4t…l[tZltWjtorsuq:2t.-eutBeut4It.-tWuZet–…2z2t-:Sjt-utRu:tpWtl;tl:

suq:2t4m2ut4ItHmt.-t.-WAto1s.SeCtCit–u.rsu.S2t8eu1e-t.rqj)ft-Ft–.-eut-j

GuBEtSt4mSjt-j tWVD8stCitoTrut.-WAt8eueuGet-j t;j u1s-u:tplGsstSt4mSjt-j

WVD8stCit-TSt-:2ut4I’tr2hCuSt–-:ftCitolAGuTYt9u:ut–[B2tWVlk_tl:

अतिधकिनयम, 1956 -j tGuBEt4mSjt-j tJsu:tl:tor:t8eueuGet-mt;j u1s-u:t–ubtS

4mSj t -u t -TS t .-eu t Hu t :4u t 4I t o2g t e4 t olAGuTYt -j t kGy t JrPe- t 4I t .-

वहअतिधकिनयम 1956 -Ftsu:ut3 से धारा 5 2-tolSueAtBeAt–.-eutCit–[B2tWVlk_

WaVCkG2t4mSjtWVD8sAtWuZet8eueuGet-j tWC;t–…2z2t-:2jtl:82ztolAGuTYt9u:u

iWut-m6tRAtoWRGjKAetWuZetor:t8eueuGet-j tWC;tl urGAtl:tplGsstS43

-:ueutBeut4I’t/WtW8aRhtCitCuSSAetpy2Ct8eueuGet9u:ut–12lu.a2t.r1s-t“W9u82

" महन्त दुजदास बनाम उदासीन पंचायती बड़ा अखाड़ा (ए०आई०आर० 2008

(सप्ली०) Wz–ACt-mchtl^zt1867) -utW8aRhtJrPe-t4mtHu2ut4It“HWCitWCuSt.r)e

r…2zt-j tWVD8stCitluq:2t.Sfhet-j t–…2:t15 में माननीय उच्चतम न्यायालय द्वारा किनम्न

.r1s-tC2torsuq:2t.-eutBeut4I-

“15- ...............................”

o2gtCuSSAetpy2Ct8eueuGet9u:utaAtB6tpLt8eu1e-tver…Tut-j toSznCtCit–[B2

WVlk_t-mto1s.SeCt1956 WjtJtuu.a2tS4AtCuSutHutW-2u’t/Wt–-u:tolAGuTY

-ute4t-TSt.-tpS-j to1s-u:tHCAau:AtcूcSjt-j tXG…rZltlq:lNrt4mtQz-j t4I,

oTh4ASt4mtHu2ut4It7:tolAGuTYt9u:ut/Wt8eueuGet-j tWC;t–…2u.r2t.-ejtBej

Wu:ruSt.r1s-t–[t…rentCit4AtoTh4ASt4mtHu2jt4I’tQEw.-toWRGjKmtWjte4t“WMt4It.-

–[B2tWVlk_tl:tp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeCt1939 -j t–u.rsuStlE:At2:4tGuBE

4m2jt4Ito2gtolAGuTYt-j to1s-u:tojfAt8 -j tCSZWAt-uP2-u:tWjto1s-tS4AtCuSjtHu

W-2jt4U’tp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeCt-j tWzWnB2t–u.rsuSmt-j to82Bh2tosAS…T

8eueuGet9u:ut.aejtBejt.SfhedtCit.-WAt–-u:t-Ft2feu(C-toTrut.r1s-t z.c

परिरलतिक्षत नही होती है. 7:tr2hCuSt.92AetolAGtCit.-WAto8etWu:ruSt.r1s-t.D8aु

-ut.S.42t4mSut–2A2tS4At4m2ut4Ito2gtr2hCuSt.92AetolAGtDG4ASt4mSjt-j t-u:f

किनरस्त होने योग्य प्रतीत होती है।…..”

16. Being aggrieved by the aforementioned orders passed by the Trial

Court, the Court of Commissioner and the Board of Revenue, i.e. the

Respondents No. 1 to 3, the petitioners have preferred the instant writ

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

17. One of the grounds taken in the writ petition is that the Petitioners

were not afforded adequate opportunity of adducing evidence to the

effect that the land in dispute was in fact demarcated under section 5 of

the Act though the same is a question of fact which could have been

proved only if an opportunity to lead evidence in this regard was given.

18. It has also been pleaded by the petitioners that they had filed an

application dated 26.05.2017 (Annexure No. 5) under the provisions of

7

Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure but the same was not

decided by the Sub Divisional Officer on merits.

19. The Respondent No. 4 filed a Counter Affidavit stating therein that

the application dated 26.05.2017 was misconceived as a distinctive issue

had been framed by the Trial Court in this regard and the decision on the

issue rendered the said application redundant.

20. It has also been stated in the counter affidavit filed by the Respondent

No. 4 that it is petitioners’ own admission in the written statement filed in

the Suit that they are occupying an area in Mohal Yusuf Zaman itself

amounts to an admission of zamindari of the respondent/plaintiff and that

it is well-settled in law that admission is the best piece of evidence.

21. Before delving into the merits of the case it would be apt to address

the question raised by this court vide order dated 19.08.2019 that whether

after enforcement of the U.P. Revenue Code, w.e.f. 11.03.2016, the

present Suit that was filed in the month of May 2016, under the U.P.

Tenancy Act is maintainable. The more precise statement of the question

would be whether upon enforcement of the U.P. Revenue Code, does the

U.P. Tenancy Act survive, though not repealed, because the U.P. Urban

Areas Zamindari Abolition Act, 1956 has been repealed by the Code.

22. The appropriate answer to the above question is to be found in the

observations made by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of

M.P. versus Kedia Leather & Liquor Ltd. reported in (2003) 7 SCC 389

wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to observe that

there is a presumption against repeal by implication. This is based on the

view that while enacting laws on a particular subject, the Legislature has

a thorough knowledge of the laws that are already in force on that

subject; therefore, the absence of a repealing provision in the subsequent

law would imply the intention of the Legislature that the existing

provision should not be repealed. Moreover, the Legislature would never

intend to create confusion by retaining conflicting provisions. The

relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgement is being extracted below:

“…………13. There is presumption against a repeal by

implication; and the reason of this rule is based on the theory

that the legislature while enacting a law has complete

8

knowledge of the existing laws on the same subject-matter, and

therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, the

intention is clear not to repeal the existing legislation.

[See : Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph [AIR 1963 SC

1561] , Northern India Caterers (P) Ltd. v. State of

Punjab [AIR 1967 SC 1581] , Municipal Corpn. of

Delhi v. Shiv Shanker [(1971) 1 SCC 442 : 1971 SCC (Cri)

195] and Ratan Lal Adukia v. Union of India [(1989) 3 SCC

537 : AIR 1990 SC 104] .] When the new Act contains a

repealing section mentioning the Acts which it expressly

repeals, the presumption against implied repeal of other laws is

further strengthened on the principle expressio unius (persone

vel rei) est exclusio alterius. (The express intention of one

person or thing is the exclusion of another), as illuminatingly

stated in Garnett v. Bradley [(1878) 3 AC 944 : (1874-80) All

ER Rep 648 : 48 LJQB 186 : 39 LT 261 (HL)] . The

continuance of the existing legislation, in the absence of an

express provision of repeal being presumed, the burden to show

that these has been repeal by implication lies on the party

asserting the same. The presumption is, however, rebutted and

a repeal is inferred by necessary implication when the

provisions of the later Act are so inconsistent with or repugnant

to the provisions of the earlier Act that the two cannot stand

together. But, if the two can be read together and some

application can be made of the words in the earlier Act, a repeal

will not be inferred. (See : A.G. v. Moore [(1878) 3 Ex D

276] , Ratan Lal case [(1989) 3 SCC 537 : AIR 1990 SC 104]

and R.S. Raghunath v. State of Karnataka [(1992) 1 SCC 335 :

1992 SCC (L&S) 286 : (1992) 19 ATC 507 : AIR 1992 SC

81] .)…..”

23. Further, in the case of M/s Gammon India Ltd. versus Spl. Chief

Secretary and Others reported in (2006) 3 SCC 354 the Hon’ble Supreme

Court has been please to observe that if the legislative intent to supersede

the earlier law is manifested by the enactment of provisions as to affect

such supersession, then it would amount to a repeal, notwithstanding the

absence of the word ‘repeal’ in the later statute. In other words, the

intention of the Legislature has to be inferred from the later statute to see

if it proposed to preserve, modify, or completely obliterate the rights and

liabilities attached to the earlier statute. This applies to both express as

well as implied repeal. Thus, an analysis of the relevant authorities and

case laws makes it clear that whenever an enactment is repealed and is

accompanied by a simultaneous re-enactment, then the re-enacted statute

9

is a reflection of a modified version of the earlier legislation, through

express or implied repeal, as the case may be. Since Section 230 of the

Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006 repeals enactments specified in the

First Schedule thereof and the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 does not find place

in the said First Schedule there is no express repeal nor the two

enactments are shown to be irreconcilable so as to bring the former law

within the sweep of implied repeal.

24. It has also been contended on behalf of the petitioner that the first

appellate court has erred in law while deciding the first appeal without

framing the points of determination. Refuting the aforesaid plea it has

been submitted on behalf of the respondent that a first appeal under

Section 265 of the U. P. Tenancy Act or under Section 207 of the U.P.

Revenue Code not being an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil

Procedure would not be applicable as it does not necessarily require the

judgement of the first appellate court to state the points for

determination. This court finds substance in the said arguments advanced

on behalf of the respondent.

25. Further, Sri D.P. Singh, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that since the affidavit

filed by the respondent/plaintiff by way of evidence was not in

accordance with the provisions of the U.P. Revenue Court Manual as the

same was not verified hence is not admissible in evidence. He drew the

attention of the Court to Rules 112, 113 and 118 of Chapter III of the U.P.

Revenue Court Manual. In support of his contention he placed reliance

on the judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of

A.K.K. Nambiar vs. Union of India and another reported in AIR 1970

Supreme Court 652 and State of Rajasthan versus M/s Sindhi Film

Exchange reported in AIR 1974 Rajasthan 31 (V 61 C11) wherein it has

been held that in the absence of proper verification, affidavits cannot be

admitted in evidence and the same is no affidavit in the eye of law.

26. However, during the course of argument Sri Puneet Gupta, learned

counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff has placed before

10

the Court a certified copy of the affidavit in question which bears the

verification clause at the back of it. Although the same has been strongly

objected to by Sri D.P.Singh the learned Senior Counsel for the

petitioners, contending that the respondent has no right to file the same at

this belated stage. Confronting the said objection, Sri Puneet Gupta

learned counsel for the respondent no. 4 submitted that since this aspect

of the matter challenging the irregularity in the ‘form’ of the affidavit was

never raised by the petitioner earlier therefore there was no occasion for

the respondents to bring the certified copy of the affidavit on record.

27. In any case, the certified copy of the affidavit as produced by the

respondent bears a verification on the back side of it, the allegation of

there being no verification of the contents of the affidavit does not appeal

to the reason. It is also well-settled in law that a mere infirmity in the

format of the affidavit would not render the same nullified. Further, the

fact of no such objection as to the legality of the affidavit having been

raised by the petitioner before the courts below would amount to

acquiescence on their part. There is nothing on record to show that the

plea as to flaw in the affidavit was ever raised by the petitioner/defendant

before the courts below or even in the present writ petition. It is well-

settled principle of law that the arguments cannot go beyond the

pleadings of the parties and a party while entering into a case should

know in advance the basic idea of the case they will have to face and one

should not be allowed to be taken by surprise. The object and purpose of

pleading are to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to

meet.

28. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kashi Nath (Dead)

through L.Rs. versus Jaganath reported in (2003) 8 SCC 740, has been

pleased to hold that where the evidence is not in line with the pleadings

and is at variance with it, the evidence cannot be looked into or be

depended upon. At the point where the facts necessary to make out a

particular claim, or to seek a particular relief, are not found in the plaint,

the court cannot concentrate its own attention or the attention of the

parties thereon. Along these lines, it is said that no amount of evidence,

11

on a plea that is not suggested in the pleadings, can be looked into to

grant any relief.

29. The facts of A.K.K. Nambiar (Supra) and M/s Sindhi Film Exchange

(Supra) as relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner are

quite different from that of the present case and were decided on a

different premise, as such the same are not attracted in the present factual

matrix.

30. Moreover, as the petitioners are not shown to be deprived of any

opportunity to rebut the averments made in the said affidavit, as such in

substance, no prejudice has been caused to them. In view of what has

been discussed in the preceding paragraphs, it is not open for the

petitioners to raise the issue in respect of any flaw in the affidavit for the

first time at the stage of final hearing of the writ petition.

31. Another ground taken by the petitioners in the Writ Petition is that

the Board of Revenue committed a manifest error of law in

deciding/dismissing the Second Appeal without framing a substantial

question of law.

32. This Court in a recent judgment passed in the case of Awadhesh

Singh versus State of UP and others, reported in 2023 (12) ADJ 554 has

dealt with the issue of non-framing of substantial question of law by the

second appellate court and has held that the reversal of the final order

and decree passed in appeal by the court below in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Section 208 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 is

impermissible without formulating substantial question of law and a

decision on such question, however, in the event of concurrence with the

court below the formulation of substantial question of law is not a sine

qua non and the same will not render the judgment of the second

appellate court vitiated.

33. Shri S.N.Srivastava, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel

appearing for the State-respondents raised objection regarding the

entertainability of the present writ petition by contending that the

petitioner has basically disputed the findings of fact which have been

affirmed by the first and the second appellate courts and as such the

12

concurrent findings of fact cannot be interfered by this Court in exercise

of its Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In

support of his contention, the learned Standing Counsel has relied upon

the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case

of State of Jharkhand and others versus Linde India Limited and another,

reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1660; Chandrika (Dead) by LRS.

versus Sudama (Dead) Thr. LRS. and others, reported in (2019) 5 SCC

790 and Bansraj versus Ram Naresh and another, reported in (2020) 5

ADJ 10.

34. The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel further submitted that

there is no infirmity or irregularity in the impugned orders passed by the

learned trial court as well as the learned appellate courts. Further, the

courts below, at all stages afforded full opportunity of hearing to the

parties and decided the matter by passing detailed and reasoned orders,

after taking into consideration all the grounds pleaded by the parties.

35. Having heard the rival contentions raised by the learned counsels for

the parties and having perused the material available on record; the issue

for consideration, at the first instance, before this Court is as to whether

in the present case, the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the three

Revenue Courts below warrants any interference by this Court in

exercise of its powers, qua, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

36. Before entering into the merits of the case, it would be apt to consider

the legal context of “concurrent findings of fact” and reiterate the law in

relation to the extent of interference by the Writ Courts in concurrent

findings of the fact under Article 226 of the Constitution.

37. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan versus

Shiv Dayal reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, page 639 has succinctly

described the expression “concurrent findings of fact” in the following

manner:

“15. It is a trite law that in order to record any finding on the facts,

the trial court is required to appreciate the entire evidence (oral

and documentary) in the light of the pleadings of the parties.

Similarly, it is also a trite law that the appellate court also has the

13

jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence de novo while hearing the

first appeal and either affirm the finding of the trial court or

reverse it. If the appellate court affirms the finding, it is called

“concurrent finding of fact” whereas if the finding is reversed, it is

called “reversing finding.””

38. Further, it is also a settled legal proposition that the first appellate

court is the final court of fact, as has been dealt with in detail by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gurvachan Kaur and others

versus Salikram (Dead) through LRS, reported in (2010) 15 SCC 530 and

Santosh Hazari versus Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by LRS. reported

in (2001) 3 SCC 179.

39. Consequently, it can be affirmatively alluded that the concurrent

findings of fact are to be considered as settled facts of the case and the

High Court should ordinarily restrain itself from interfering with the

concurrent findings of fact. The said restrain is on a much higher footing

in cases where the High Court is not the appellate court, rather, it is

exercising its Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Abdul

Razak (D) through LRS. and others versus Mangesh Rajaram Wagle and

others, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 432 as reiterated in the case of State of

Jharkhand and others versus Linde India Limited and another (Supra) has

held that the High Court in exercise of its Writ jurisdiction is not an

appellate court against the findings recorded on appreciation of facts and

the evidence on record. Further, in the case Chandrika (Dead) by LRS.

versus Sudama (Dead) Thr. LRS. and others (Supra) the Hon’ble Apex

Court has been pleased to observe that the concurrent findings of fact are

not only binding on the High Court but is also binding upon the Hon’ble

Supreme Court. For ready reference, extract of Paragraph No. 12 of the

aforesaid judgment in extracted hereinbelow,

“12. In our considered opinion, the finding impugned in this

appeal being concurrent finding of fact and was rightly held by the

High Court as binding on the High Court in its writ jurisdiction, it

is also binding on this Court, calling for no interference therein…”

40. It may also be elucidated that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of

Union Bank of India versus Chandrakant Gordhandas Shah reported in

14

(1994) 6 SCC 271 at page 274 has briefly explained the reason for non-

interference with the concurrent findings of fact by observing that it is

the trial court and the appellate court which is entrusted with the duty of

recording the findings on questions of fact and it is not proper for the

Writ courts to interfere with or disturb those findings. For a ready

reference, extract of paragraph no. 11of the said judgment is quoted

hereinbelow,

“11. It is trite that if the trial court and the appellate court, who are

entrusted with the duty of investigating into questions of fact

record concurrent findings thereon on a proper discussion and

appreciation of the materials placed before them, the High Court

should not interfere with or disturb those findings while sitting in

judgment over the same in its writ jurisdiction…”

41. However, it would not be out of place to discuss the other aspect of

the issue, that the High Court still has the discretionary power to interfere

in the concurrent findings of fact while exercising its powers under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India, but the discretion must be

exercised on sound judicial principles particularly, where the concurrent

findings of fact is perverse in law in the sense that no reasonable person

properly instructed in law should have come to such a finding or there is

misdirection in law or a view on fact has been taken in the teeth of

preponderance of evidence or the finding is not based on any material

evidence or it has resulted in manifest injustice. The Hon’ble Apex Court

in the case of Babubhai Muljibhai Patel versus Nandlal Khodidas Barot,

reported in (1974) 2 SCC 706, at page 715, has observed that,

“10. … The High Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction to

entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution merely

because in considering the petitioner's right of relief, questions of

fact may fall to be determined. In a petition under Article 226 the

High Court has jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law.

Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the

discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When

the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their

determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that

account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not

appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may

decline to try a petition…. If, however, on consideration of the

nature of the controversy, the High Court decides … that it should

go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by

the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with

15

judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with

the order made by the High Court in this respect.”

42. Furthermore, in order to decide whether a particular case requires the

High Court to enter into a disputed question of fact depends upon the

facts and circumstances of that case, as this ordinary restrain on the

interference on concurrent findings of fact should not be put in a routine

and mechanical manner in the system of administration of justice. The

purposes of interfering in the concurrent findings of fact, the question of

perversity of an order passed by an authority must be determined by

considering whether the said order is not supported by the evidence

brought on record or it is against the law or it suffers from vice of

procedural irregularity, as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

the case of Gaya Din (dead) thr. L.Rs. versus Hanuman Prasad (dead) thr.

L.Rs. reported in 2001 (43) ALR 226 (SC).

43. In the instant case the findings recorded by the Sub Divisional Officer

(respondent no.4) with regard to the question of abolition of zamindari in

the area in question, has been upheld by the first appellate court, i.e., the

learned Court of Commissioner, Chitrakoot Dham Division, Banda and

the learned Board of Revenue also concurred with the same in Second

Appeal.

44. In the case of State of U.P. versus Lakshmi Sugar & Oil Mills Ltd.,

reported in (2013) 10 SCC 509 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been

pleased to observed that the concurrent findings of fact could not have

been reversed by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The extract of

paragraph 20 the said judgement is reproduced as under:

“20. The order passed by the District Consolidation Director/Collector,

Hardoi also concurred with the view taken by the officers below and

held that there was no evidence on record to show that the subject land

was ever held or occupied for agricultural purposes or that any

agricultural activity was ever carried out on the same. These concurrent

findings of fact, in our opinion, could not have been reversed by the

High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The High Court obviously failed to

appreciate that it was not sitting in appeal over the findings recorded by

the authorities below. It could not reappraise the material and hold that

the land was held or occupied for cultivation and substitute its own

finding for that of the authorities. Inasmuch as the High Court did so, it

committed an error. It is noteworthy that the revenue record clearly

16

belied the assertion of the respondent Company and described the land

as “parti kadim tilla” which meant that the land has not been cultivated

for a long time and is in the form of a hillock.”

45. In view of the settled legal position on the subject of ‘concurrent

findings of fact’, it has become imperative to determine as to whether the

facts and circumstances of the present case warrant any interference by

this Court in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Sub

Divisional Officer as concurred by the Commissioner and also by the

Board of Revenue, in the Second Appeal.

46. For a ready reference the findings recorded by the trial court as to the

question of abolition of Zamindari with respect to the area where the

property in suit situates are as under:

“....... वाद किबन्दु संख्या - ३ - Neut.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHC3au:AtWCubt-FtHu

Qz-Ft4ItHIWu.-t–12ruatl8 t-Ftsu:u- 12-13 CitJ;jlt.-eutBeut4I,

e.at4unt2mt/W-u प्रभाव:

दोनों वाद किबन्दु 3 व 6 y-taूW:jtWjtWVra8s2t4UtNed.-te.at.rru.a2tRE.C

-FtHC3au:AtWCubt4mtQz-Ft4Ut2mtruat:uH…rtWn.42ut2006 -j to82Bh2

lm)fAet4mBu’te.atHCA8au:AtDa…2E:t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-Ft-ueCt4It2mtrua

यूOlAOtcjSj8WAtyNct-j to82Bh2tlm)fAet4I’

–12ruaABf t l: t olSj t J;jl t -m t “WMt -:Sj t -u t Ru: t 4I’

–12ruaABft9u:utolSjt–12ruatl t-j t.r8aु सं0- 12 एवं 13 में उ0प्र0

नगरीय क्षेत्र जमींदारी किवनाश एवं भूकिम व्यवस्था अतिधकिनयम 1956 -Ftsu:u-

64 -utpgjKt.-eutBeut4Ityrnt-4utBeut4I, .-tSB:Aet;j tCitHCA8au:A

टूcSjt-j tlwu2Rteू०पी० टीनेन्सी एक्ट लागू नहीं होगा और किनरस्त समझे

जायें। धारा- 65 -utpgjKt-:t-4utBeut4It.-tpO–OtSB:Aet;j

जमीन्दारी किवनाश एवं भूकिम व्यवस्था अतिध0 1956 Cit“HWtRE.Ct-F

जमींदारी समाप्त हो जायेगी तो उ०प्र० जमीदारी किवनाश एवं भू० व्यवस्था

अतिधकिनयम UPZA & LR Act. एवं भू राजस्व अतिध0 1901 जमीन्दारी

टूcSjt-j tlwu2RtGuBEt4dBj’

प्रतितवादीगण द्वारा प्रस्तुत शासनादेश 24 जून, 1961 -j tnCun-

108 -mt/n.B2t.-eutBeut.-tDuwautVeूकिनल्किस्पलटी में भी जमीदारी 24 जून,

1961 -mtcूcAtTAtHD.-t0uWSuaj0tCit…l[t4It.-t"all agricultural

areas in the following urban areas of State, which

have been demarcated under sec. 5 of aforesaid

Act, shall vest in state of Uttar Pradesh. All such

agricultural areas shall stand, transferred to and

vest, except as provided in the said Act, in the State

free from all encumbrances."

17

ejtDu2t…l[t4It.-t24 जून, 1961 -j t0uWSuaj0tWjtGuBE

उ०प्र० नगरीय क्षेत्र जमींदारी अतिधकिनयम 1956 -j to82Bh2t-j rGtpS

Hm2AtDm6t-ृ.)tRE.Ct-FtHCA8au:AtDuwautCitWCubt-FtB6tTA|

–12ruaABftSjtiWut-m6toWRGjKt1368फ0 -utl urGAtCi

.rru.a2tRE.CtCit“H8WtDmejt4mSjt-utKW:ut–…2z2tS43t.-eu, iWut-m6

Wrrtq:-u‘htRAt–12ruaABftSjtl urGAtCit–…2z2tS43t.-eut4I, .-

.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHC3au:At2m”jtHmSjt7:tpW-ut–12-:tZamindari

Abolition Bond HCASau:uSt-mt.rru.a2tRE.Ct-j tWVD8stCit–ubt4m

Qz-ut4I’t/WkGejt–12ruaAtolSAt/WtDu2t-mtWu.D2t-:SjtCitlE:At2:4

किवफल है, कि किववाकिदत भूकिम ी ज़मींदारी 1368 XOtCitWCubt4mtQz-F

है।

pgjKSAete4t4It.-t–12ruaABftSjt…rent4At:“H…c:tCuG-uS

Cit on.-2 t Jaj0 t auO t Kuq:H t nCun-- 286 100

08.09.61/18.11.61 olSjt.l2ut-8sAtlz tDuDEGuGt-utSuCt“HCS

8 में खतौनी सन् 1368 XOtCitaHht4mSjt-ut–…2z2t.-eut4I’

–12ruaABftSjtolSjt-mt“HCSt8 -j t-uP2-u:t4mSjt-FtK2SSAtNZA

-FtoTuh2RtHC3au:AtHCASt-Ft–…2z2t-Ft4I’tKW:dtWjtBucut1334

:-Dut0.088 हे० NZA ruaAt-FtRE.CtC2Z-t4mSutlu6tHu2At4ItHm

DuaAt-j tCz4uGteूWzXtHCut-j tDnH:tKu2jtCitaHht-FtHuSutHZ:At4I’

प्रतितवादीगण द्वारा सन् 1413 फ० लगायत 1410 XOt-j

KW:jt.rru.a2tRE.Ct-j tWVD8stCit]uCtG”u-ulz:rut(नान जेड ए) -j tlj0

.-ejtBejt4U, HmtHC3au:AtRE.Ct-j tKW:jt4U’t/WtKW:dtWjt1368 XOt-F

a…T12t-mtHm”-:tS4AtajKutHutW-2ut4I’

उल्लेखनीय है, .-t–12ruaABftSjt/Wtl urGAtCit8eueuGet9u:u

luq:2to82q:Ct.S)jsukutJaj0t-j t.rZMtCuOtJeुLtC4maet-j tWC;

/84AtJ;jlmt-mtCzYetJsu:tDSueutTut.-t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHCA8au:A

टूctQz-Ft4It/WkGejteूOlAOtcASj8WAtyNct-Ft-uehru4Atlm)fAetS4At4I’

e4t.-tor:t8eueuGetSjt/W-j tDurHEateूOlAOtcjSj8WAtyNctruat-m

lm)fAetCuS-:t.S)jsukutluq:2t-:taAt4I, जो गलत है। इस किनगरानी में

मा० न्यायालय आयुLt1Q -ूट मण्डल ने 20-12-2017 -mtBzftam)

l:t.Sfhet.aeut.-t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHCA8au:AtWCubtS4At4ुयी है।

किववाकिदत भूकिम नान जेड एरिरया खतौनी में दज' है इसलिलए किनयमानुसार

यूOlAOtcjSj8WAtyNct-j to82Bh2t-uehru4Atlm)fAet4It7:t/Wt8eueuGe

द्वारा पारिरत आदेश 28 - 4 -2017 -mtD4uGt:Kut7:t.SB:uSAt.S:…2

-:taAtBeA’

प्रतितवादीगण ने आयुLt-j t.Sfhet20-12-2017-j t.rZ9tS

ही राजस्व परिरषद, न ही माननीय उच्च न्यायालय में भी चुनौती दी गयी।

ऐसी दशा में, /Wt8eueuGetCitlm)fAe2ut-j t.D8aुt-mt–…2z2t-:Su

न्याय उतिचत नही है।

18

इसलिलये उपरोक्त किववेचना और वर्णिणत किबन्दुओंt-j t–-u0tCitrua

किबन्दु 03 एवं वाद नं0 6 –12ruaABft-j t.rZMtS-u:u(C-t.SfY2

.-eutHu2ut4It7:tejtorsuq:2t.-eutHu2ut4It.-t.rru.a2tRE.CtHm

r2hCuS t Cit RA t ySO t Hj‘OyO t Cit aHht 4It HCA8au:A t -Ft RE.Ct 4I’

प्रतितवादीगण जिजमन 8 -j t-uP2-u:t:4jt4It7:tpLtruateू०पी० टीनेन्सी

yNct-j to82Bh2tlm)fAet4I’t/WtWVD8stCit2001 (92) आर डी पेज

48 किहन्दी भी स्पष्ट है।........”

47. The finding returned by the First Appellate Court affirming the

findings of the trial court regarding the question of abolition of zamindari

is extracted below:

BeAt4It.-te.at.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHCAau:AtWCubt4mSutCuStkGeutHuet2m

olAG-2uhBft-mtBuwrtWRuteut:u]etW:-u:tWjtlXut-Ft-uehru4At4m2A

7:tpW-j tkGytJrncStl urGAt-utW^HSt.-eutHu2u’tolAG-2uhBft-m

:u]etW:-u:trtBuwrtWRut-Ft&:tWjt-m6t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-utlXutS4At.-eu

BeutNed.-t/WtWVD8stCitolAG-2uhBft9u:ut-m6tWuZet–…2z2tS43

.-eutBeu’t/WWjt…l[t4It.-t.rru.a2tRE.Ct-utlXutolAG-2uhBft-m

HCAau:tWjtlXjt-j tZltCit–ubt4ु6tTAt“HWtl:tolAG-2uhBft“HCS-8

CS`WAt-uP2-u:t-j tZltCitaHhtQGjtJt:4jt4U’t/WWjt…l[t4It.-t01

जुलाई 1961 -mt.rru.a2tRE.Ct-ृ.)tem'etS4AtTAtDab-tHCAau:AtRE.C

थी, “HW-j tJsu:tl:tRE.Ct:uH…rtoWRGjKdtCitSuStHj‘Otyq:eut-F

K2SSAtCitaHht4I’te.at.rru.a2tRE.Ct-FtHCAau:AtWCubt4mtBeAt4m2At2m

–[B2tRE.CtHj‘Otyq:eut-FtK2SSAtCitaHht-FtHu2A’tosAS…Tt8eueuGe

में संलग्न राजस्व परिरषद, pO–OtGKSUt-j tlq:)auaj0t.aSun-t15 जून

2012 Cit…l[t.-eutBeut4It.-tSuSOtHj‘tyq:eut-FtHCAau:AtWCubt.-ej

HuSjt-j tXG…rZlto:DmtZleut–12-:t-j tZltCit.aeutHuSut4mBu’t/WA

d.[t-mteeuStCit:K2jt4ुytSB:t;j dt-FtHCAau:AtSt2m‘jtHuSjt-ut.Sfhe

लिलया गया है।…….”

48. The findings recorded by the Board of Revenue in the Second Appeal

as to the abolition of zamindari and applicability of the U.P. Tenancy Act

1939 are as under:

“………….. o2gtl;mt-j tCeetCEGt.rruat/WtJ0et-ut4It.-t–[B2

WVlk_tl:tp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC, 1939 -j t–u.rsuStr2hCuS

CitGuBEt4ItoTrutS43’tep.ltpLt–[ty-t2feu(C-t–[t4It7:t2feu(C-

–[mtl:t.92AetolAGAet8eueuGet9u:utWuCu8e2gt.rQu:tS4At.-eutHu2u

है, l:82ztr2hCuSt–-:ftCitpLt2feu(C-t–[t-ut.rqj)ft/Wt8eueuGe

9u:ut.-eutHuSut8eue.42tCitJrPe-t–2A2t4m2ut4I’

19

उत्तर प्रदेश शहरी क्षेत्र जमीदारी किवनाश एवं भूकिम व्यवस्था अतिधकिनयम,

1956 Cit.aejtBejt–u.rsuSdt-j toSzWu:to1s.SeCt-Ftsu:ut8 -j to82Bh2

-ृ.)t;j t-ut1Q84un-St…TGtl:t-:Sjt-j tpl:u82tpWjtsu:ut5 में आयुक्त

9u:utlz[t.-eutHuejBut“HW-j tpl:u82t:u]etW:-u:t9u:uto1s-uq:-

BHctCit–-u0St.-ejtHuSjt-Ft12WTtWjt4:tr4t;j tHmt.-tsu:ut5 -j

o82Bh2tlErhtCit–-uW02t4mtQz-ut4m, WjtHCAau:AtWCubt4m-:tWVDa8s2

-ृ.)t;j tWRAto1sRu:mtWjtCzLt4m-:t:u]etW:-u:tCit.S.42tCuSu

HuejBu’to1s.SeCt-Ftsu:ut8 e4t…l[tZltWjt–u.rsu.S2t-:2At4It.-

अतिधकिनयम, 1956 -j t–u.rsuSt“WXh tp84AtRE.Cedtl:tGuBEt4mBjtHmt.-

…TGtl:t-ृ.)t;j t-j tZltCit.rCuSt4mt2TutRE.Ct-ut1Q84un-Stsu:ut4 में

.-ejtHuSjt-j tpl:u82tWVDa8s2t-ृ.)t;j t-ut–-u0Stsu:ut5 में आपलित्तयों

-j t.S…2u:ft-j tpl:u82t.-eutBeut4m’to1s.SeC, 1956 -Ftsu:ut3 से

5 2-tCit.-WAtRAt04:AtWVlk_, Hmt.-tpLto1s.SeCt–-uW02t4mSj

-Ft12WTtl:t-ृ.)t;j t:4At4mt7:tpWtWVlk_t-j tUl:tp_:t–aj0

-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC, 1939 -j t–u.rsuStGuBEt:4jt4m, -j t.Ssuh:f,

1Q84un-S, WACun-Styrnt–-u0St-Ft.SVSt–.-eutD2ueAtBeAt4I’

अतिधकिनयम 1956 -Ftsu:ut3 -j to82Bh2t:u]etW:-u:t9u:utBHctCi

–-uW02t.-ejtHuSjt-j tpl:u82tWrh–TCtWACun-St(‘ACu-r 0S) o1s-u:A

.Ssuhq:2t–.-eut-j toSzWu:t04:At;j t-FtWVlEfhtRE.Ct-utl:A;ft-:Sjt-j

pl:u82tpStRE.Cedt-ut1Q84un-St/ .Ssuh:ft-:jButHmt.-t-ृ.)tRE.Ct-j

रूप में उपलब्ध हो और धारा 2(1) (स) -j t–TCtl:82z-t2Tutsu:ut2(1)

(द) WjtJtuu.a2tSut4m’t2aml:u82tWACun-S t(‘ACu-r 0S) o1s-u:A

धारा 3 -Ftplsu:ut1 -j tosAS, o1sWEQSut–-uW02t4mSjt-Ft12WTtWjt3

C4ASjt-j to8a:, oTrutiWAtDvu6tBeAtor1st-j tRA2:t“HWjt:uHe

W:-u:t.-WAtCuCGjtCit.S1w2t-:j, -u:ftD2u2jt4ुytolSjtWACun-S

–…2urmt-mtJeुLt-j tWC;t–…2z2t-:jBu’tsu:ut4(1) -j tosASt–ubtpL

–…2ur tl: tJrPe- tWn0msSml:u82tJeुक्त द्वारा किवकिहत प्रारूप पर

0uW-Fet:u]etl tCitoTrut.-WAto8et:A12tWjtHmt:u]etW:-u:t.S1w2

-:i, /Wt–uZltCit–-uW02t-:uyBut.-tWACun-Sto1s-u:At9u:ut.aeutBeu

–…2urt“HWt-ृ.)t;j t-j tWACun-StWjtWVDa8s2t4Ityrnt“HWt-ृ.)t;j t-j

WACun-Stlwu2tRE.Cedt-mtWE1Q2t.-eutBeut4m, उक्त नोकिटस में किनर्मिदष्ट

…TuSmtl:t.S:A;ft4j2ztplGsst-:ueutHuejBu’tpLtSm.cWt–-uW02t4mSj

पर अतिधकिनयम, 1956 -Ftsu:ut4 उपधारा (3) -j to82Bh2tWE. 2tWVlk_

Cit.42t:KSjtruGut-m6tRAtve.LtoTrut…TuSAet–u1s-u:Atplsu:ut(2)

-j tosAStSm.cWt–-uW02t4mSjt-Ft12WTtWjt3 CuWt-j tRA2:tiWjto1s-u:A

oTrut–u1s-u:At-j tWC;, 7:tiWAt:A12tWjtHmt.r.42t-FtHuej, उक्त

–-uW02t–…2urtl:tJlk_t–…2z2t-:tW-j Bu’t2aml:u82to1s.SeCt-F

धारा 4(3) -j to82Bh2t–…2z2tJlk_edt-uteTm1Q2t.S…2u:ft.-ejtHuSj

-j tpl:u82t1Q84ua8-2t;j mt-utoa82Ct–-u0Sto1s.SeC, 1956 -F

धारा 5 -Ftplsu:ut(2) -j to82Bh2tJeुLt9u:ut0uW-Fet:uHtl tCi

oTrutiWAt:A12tWjtHmt.r.42t-FtHuej, /WtJ0et-FtSm.cWt-ut–-u0S

.-eutHuejBut.-tWE. 2t-ृ.)t;j mt-utoa82CtZltWjtWACun-St4mtBeut4I’

आयुLt9u:ut.-ejtBejtoa82Ct.Ssuh:ft/ –-u0St-j t.DZ9t:uH…rtlq:)a

20

CitolAGtem“H2t.-ejtHuSjt-Ftver…TutaAtBeAt4It7:t1Q84u82S t/

WACun-StWVD8sAtJlk_edt-j tJsu:tl:t:uH…rtlq:)at9u:utJeुLt-j

.Sfhet-ut8eu1e-t.rrjQSt.-ejtHuSjt-j tpl:u82t1Q84un-St/ WACu-St-j

सम्बन्ध में आयुLt9u:ut.-eutBeut.Sfhetoa82CtCuSutHuejBu’to1s.SeS

-Ftsu:ut8 -j to82Bh2tWVDa8s2t“HGjt-ut–-u0St4mtHuSjt-j tpl:u82

आयुLt9u:ut.-eutBeut1Q84u-StWRAtl:tDuee-u:At–Rurt:KjBut7:t/W

–-u:tWVDa8s2t;j t-FtpStRE.CedtWjt“HS-ut1Q84u-n Stoa82CtZltWj

धारा 5 -Ftplsu:ut(2) -j to82Bh2t4mtQz-ut4m, -j tWVD8stCitp_:t–aj0

-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC, 1939 .S:“W2t4m-:t–Rur4AStCuSutHuejBu’

r2hCuSt–-:ftCitolAGuTY9u:utolSjt…r(rt-mto1s.SeCt1956 -j

o82Bh2tlq:lNrt4mSutD2ueutHut:4ut4ItHD.-tl urGAtl:tplGss

प्रश्नगत सम्पतितत से सम्बल्किन्धत राजस्व अथिभलेखों में उक्त सम्पलित्त नॉन जेड

yOt-j tZltCitaHht4Ito2gt–[B2tWVlk_tWjtWVDa8s2t1Q84un-S t/

WACun-St-Ft-uehru4At1961 Cit.-ejtBejtsu:ut8 -j t–-u0St-j tlErh

oCGtCitGueutHuSutWu.D2t-:Sjt-utRu:t–12ruaA/ अपीलाथHगण पर

CuSutHuejBu’t/WtWVD8stCit.r1st-ute4tWz…Tu.l2t“WMu82t4It.-tWuZe

–…2z2t-:Sjt-utRu:tpWtve.Lt-j t-n smtl:t4m2ut4ItHmt.-t.-WAtDu2

oTrut2fet-j toa…2(rtCit4mSjt-ut-TSt-:2ut4I’t/WAt2:4t8eueuGe

-j t;j u1s-u:t-j tWVD8stCit-m6tJlk_t-j tDur2RtCuSSAetpy2C

न्यायालय द्वारा (ए०आई०आर०, 1966 Wz–ACt-mchtl^zt1718) में यह

…l[tZltWjtorsuq:2t.-eutBeut4It.-tWuZet–…2z2t-:Sjt-utRu:tpW

l;tl:tsuq:2t4m2ut4ItHmt.-t.-WAto1s.SeCtCit–u.rsu.S2t8eu1e-

.rqj)ft-Ft–.-eut-j tGuBEtSt4mSjt-j tWVD8stCitoTrut.-WAt8eueuGe

-j t;j u1s-u:tplGsstSt4mSjt-j tWVD8stCit-TSt-:2ut4I’tr2hCuS

–-:ftCitolAGuTYt9u:ut–[B2tWVlk_tl:to1s.SeC, 1956 -j tGuBE

4mSjt-j tJsu:tl:tor:t8eueuGet-mt;j u1s-u:t–ubtSt4mSjt-ut-TS

.-eutHut:4ut4Ito2gte4tolAGuTYt-j tkGytJrPe-t4It.-tr4o1s.SeC

1956 -Ftsu:ut3 से धारा 5 2-tolSueAtBeAt–.-eutCit–[B2tWVlk_

WaVCkG2t4mSjtWVD8sAtWuZet8eueuGet-j tWC;t–…2z2t-:2jtl:82z

olAGuTYt9u:utiWut-m6tRAtoWRGjKAetWuZetor:t8eueuGet-j tWC;

l urGAtl:tplGsstS43t-:ueutBeut4I’t/WtW8aRhtCitCuSSAetpy2C

8eueuGe t 9u:u t –12lu.a2 t .r1s- t “W9u82 t" महन्त दुजदास बनाम

उदासीन पंचायती बड़ा अखाड़ा (ए०आई०आर० 2008 (सप्ली०) सुप्रीम

-mchtl^zt1867) -utW8aRhtJrPe-t4mtHu2ut4It“HWCitWCuSt.r)e

r…2zt-j tWVD8stCitluq:2t.Sfhet-j t–…2: t15 में माननीय उच्चतम

8eueuGet9u:ut.SVSt.r1s-tC2torsuq:2t.-eutBeut4I-

15- ...............................”

o2gtCuSSAetpy2Ct8eueuGet9u:utaAtB6tpLt8eu1e-tver…Tut-j

oSznCtCit–[B2tWVlk_t-mto1s.SeCt1956 से आच्छाकिदत नही माना

HutW-2u’t/Wt–-u:tolAGuTYt-ute4t-TSt.-tpS-j to1s-u:

जमीदारी टूcSjt-j tXG…rZltlq:lNrt4mtQz-j t4I, अथ'हीन हो जाता है और

olAGuTYt9u:ut/Wt8eueuGet-j tWC;t–…2u.r2t.-ejtBejtWu:ruS

21

.r1s-t–[t…rentCit4AtoTh4ASt4mtHu2jt4I’tQEw.-toWRGjKmtWjte4t“WMt4I

.-t–[B2tWVlk_tl:tp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:Ato1s.SeC t1939 -j

–u.rsuStlE:At2:4tGuBEt4m2jt4Ito2gtolAGuTYt-j to1s-u:tojfAt8 -j

CSZWAt-uP2-u:tWjto1s-tS4AtCuSjtHutW-2jt4U’tp_:t–aj0t-uP2-u:A

o1s.SeCt-j tWzWnB2t–u.rsuSmt-j to82Bh2tosAS…Tt8eueuGet9u:ut.aej

Bejt.SfhedtCit.-WAt–-u:t-Ft2feu(C-toTrut.r1s-t z.ctlq:G1;2

नही होती है. 7:tr2hCuSt.92AetolAGtCit.-WAto8etWu:ruSt.r1s-

किबन्दुt-ut.S.42t4mSut–2A2tS4At4m2ut4Ito2gtr2hCuSt.92AetolAG

DG4ASt4mSjt-j t-u:ft.S:…2t4mSjtem'et–2A2t4m2At4I’|..”

49. It would be appropriate to refer to the judgement passed by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahant Dooj Das versus Udasin

Panchayati Bara Akhara, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 181 wherein the

Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that for application of the

provisions of Section 331 of the 1950 Act which has been incorporated in

the 1956 Act, it was incumbent upon the defendants to lead evidence to

prove that the suit lands had been demarcated under Section 5 of the Act of

1956. In the absence of proof, it cannot be said that the suit area is a

demarcated area and thus vested in the State by issuance of the

notification under Section 8 of the Act of 1956. For a ready reference the

relevant paragraphs are reproduced below:

“…………..23. By virtue of Section 8 after the agricultural

area has been demarcated under Section 5, the State Government

would issue a notification in the Official Gazette declaring that

from specified date all demarcated areas situated in the urban

area shall vest with the State Government and from the date so

specified all such agricultural areas shall be transferred to and

vest, except otherwise provided in the State free from all

encumbrances. The purport of Section 8 is very clear that the

agricultural land falling in the urban area has to be demarcated

under Section 5 and thereafter the notification shall be issued by

the State Government in regard to the demarcated area in the

urban area to have been vested in the State.

29. In the present case, there is no evidence led by the

defendants that the suit land had been declared as a demarcated

area and the suit area being declared to be such has vested with

the State Government under Section 8 of the 1956 Act. The

notification issued under Section 8 says that in exercise of

powers under Section 8 of the 1956 Act, the Governor of U.P.

declared that from 1-7-1963 all agricultural areas in the

following urban areas (which admittedly fall within Haridwar

Union, District Saharanpur) of the then State of U.P. which have

22

been demarcated under Section 5 of the Act shall stand vested

with the State of U.P., and as from that day onwards all such

agricultural areas shall stand transferred to, and vested, except as

provided in the 1956 Act, in the State free from all

encumbrances. It is clear from this notification under Section 8

that the land which has been demarcated under Section 5 in

Haridwar Union shall be vested in the State free from all

encumbrances. Unless and until it is shown that the land in suit

has been declared as a demarcated area or falls within the

demarcated area, exercising the powers under Section 5, it

cannot be said that it has been vested in the State by virtue of the

Notification issued under Section 8 on 20-6-1963. By 20-6-1963

notification, it is only the demarcated area under Section 5

which has been vested in the State. That does not necessarily

mean that the suit lands have been vested in the State. In the

absence of proof, it cannot be said that the suit area is a

demarcated area and thus vested in the State by issuance of the

notification under Section 8 of the Act.

36. For application of the provisions of Section 331 of the

1950 Act which has been incorporated in the 1956 Act, it was

necessary for the defendants to prove that the suit lands had been

demarcated by the State Government by taking necessary steps

as contemplated under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 1956 Act.

Sections 3, 4 and 5, as already held by us, provide a complete

code for demarcation of the agricultural area after giving

appropriate hearing to the party affected by following the

procedure laid down therein. It also provides for an appeal to the

Board of Revenue. It is only after the area is declared as

demarcated area, that Section 8 will be attracted and the

notification to that effect would be issued in regard to and in

respect of such declared demarcated area to be vested in the

State Government. Unless the land is vested in the State

Government, the provisions of Section 331 of the 1956

(sic 1950) Act would have no application to oust the jurisdiction

of the civil court.

50. Taking into consideration, the facts and law as narrated herein above

it is apparent that the Trial Court, the First Appellate Court as well as the

Board of Revenue in deciding the Second Appeal have diligently

considered the issues involved in the case, and have returned concurrent

findings particularly with regard to the issue of abolition of zamindari in

the area in question as also with regard to the issue of demarcation of the

land in dispute as per Section 5 of the U.P. Act of 1956 as agricultural

23

area for the purpose of enforcement of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari

Abolition and Land reforms Act, 1956.

51. In view of the deliberations and observation made herein above this

Court finds, no manifest error of law or perversity in concurrent findings

recorded by the Courts below on the issues involved in the case. The

impugned orders passed by the learned Courts below, do not suffer from

any such procedural irregularity or illegality that warrants interference by

this Court in exercise of its’ Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India. The Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed. It is

accordingly dismissed. However, the parties shall bear their own costs.

Order date :- 27.02.2024

Abhishek Gupta/Arif

24