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PETITIONER:

Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur

RESPONDENT:

M/s. Swaraj Developers & Ors.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/04/2003

BENCH:

SHIVARAJ V. PATIL & ARIJIT PASAYAT.

JUDGMENT:

J U D G M E N T

(Arising Out of S.L.P. (C) No. 19030 of 2002)

WITH

Civil Appeal No. 3489/2003@ S.L.P.(C)No.19852/2002,

Civil Appeal Nos.3494-98/2003@ S.L.P.(C)Nos.22848-22852/2002, and

Civil Appeal No. 3499/2003@ S.L.P.(C) No.22009/2002]

ARIJIT PASAYAT,J.

Leave granted.

A short but important question of law involving effect

of amendment to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,

1908 (in short 'the Code') is involved in these appeals.

Since the answer to the question does not involve any

factual adjudication, a brief reference thereto would

suffice.

By Section 12(i) of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Amendment) Act, 1999 (in short 'the Amendment Act')

operative from 1.7.2002, amendments were made to Section 115

of the Code. In all these appeals, the concerned High Courts

held that because of amended Section 115, the revision filed

before them was not maintainable, as had an order been

passed in favour of the party applying for revision, same

would not have finally disposed of the suit or other

proceeding.

It has been contended by learned counsel for the

appellants that the High Court went wrong in disposing of

the revision applications as not maintainable, on several

grounds. They are (i) the amended provisions do not apply to

petitions which were admitted before the amendment, (ii)

appeals and revisions stand on a parallel footing and are

vested rights in the appellant/applicant, as the case may

be, and as such the amended provisions would not have any

application, and (iii) the applications for injunction and

the like which form subject matter of the revisions relate

to the expression 'other proceeding' and even if the amended

provisions apply disposal of the revision would have meant

final dismissal of such 'other proceeding'.

With reference to Section 32(2)(i) of the Amendment

Act, it is submitted that the same does not convey any

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meaning. The legislature always saved pending proceedings in

terms of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (in

short 'General Clauses Act') and, therefore, proceedings

which were pending before the High Court on the date of

amendment are clearly outside the effect of amendment. Even

if it is conceded for the sake of arguments that there is no

specific provision in that regard, it is clearly a case of

casus omissus.

In response, learned counsel for the respondents

submitted that plain meaning of provisions of a statute

have to be given full effect and even a bare reading of the

provisions makes it clear that the High Court's order is on

terra firma. Whenever the legislature intended to keep the

pending proceedings out of the purview of amended

provisions, it was specifically so provided. Reference is

made to the amendment in 1976 to the Code which in Section

97(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976

(in short 'Old Amendment Act') saved the pending

proceedings, ruling out operation of Section 6 of the

General Clauses Act.

In order to appreciate the rival submissions it will be

necessary to take note of the provisions of Section 115 as

they stood before amendment and after amendment.

"Section 115 (before Amendment):

(1) The High Court may call for the

record of any case which has been decided by

any Court subordinate to such High Court and

in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such

subordinate court appears

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not

vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a

jurisdiction so vested, or

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its

jurisdiction illegally or with material

irregularity,

the High Court may make such order in the

case as it thinks fit:

Provided that the High Court shall not, under

this section, vary or reverse any order made,

or any order deciding an issue, in the course

of a suit or order proceeding, except where

(a) the order, if it had been made in favour

of the party applying for revision, would

have finally disposed of the suit or other

proceeding, or

(b) the order, if allowed to stand, would

occasion a failure of justice or cause

irreparable injury to the party against whom

it was made.

(2) The High Court shall not, under this

section, vary or reverse any decree or order

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against which an appeal lies either to the

High Court or to any Court subordinate

thereto.

Explanation: In this section, the expression

"Any case which has been decided: includes

any order made, or any order deciding an

issue, in the course of a suit or other

proceeding."

Section 115 (after Amendment):

(1) The High Court may call for the

record of any case which has been decided by

any Court subordinate to such High Court and

in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such

subordinate court appears

(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not

vested in it by law, or

(b) to have failed to exercise a

jurisdiction so vested.

(c) to have acted in the exercise of its

jurisdiction illegally or with material

irregularity,

the High Court may make such order in the

case as it thinks fit:

Provided that the High Court shall not,

under this section, vary or reverse any order

made, or any order deciding an issue, in the

course of a suit or order proceeding, except

where the order, if it had been made in

favour of the party applying for revision,

would have finally disposed of the suit or

other proceedings.

(2) The High Court shall not, under this

section, vary or reverse any decree or order

against which an appeal lies either to the

High Court or to any Court subordinate

thereto.

(3) A revision shall not operate as a stay

of suit or other proceeding before the Court

except where such suit or other proceeding is

stayed by the High Court.

Explanation: In this section, the expression

"any case which has been decided" includes

any order made, or any order deciding the

issue, in the course of a suit or other

proceeding."

A comparison of two provisions shows that while proviso

(a) of the un-amended provision has been retained in its

totality, in the amended provisions clause (b) of the

proviso has been omitted.

It is to be noted that prior to the amendments to the

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Code by the Old Amendment Act, the power of revision was

wider. By the amendment, certain positive restrictions were

put on the High Court's power to deal with revisions under

Section 115. Prior to the said amendment, it was not

strictly necessary that the impugned order would have the

result of finally deciding the lis or the proceedings in the

lower courts. In fact, the power could be exercised in any

case where jurisdictional error was committed by the

original court or where substantial injustice had resulted.

By the Old Amendment Act, the condition of finally deciding

of lis and the proceedings in the subordinate courts was

introduced. The proviso which was introduced contains

qualifications which are pre-requisites before exercise of

power under Section 115. They were clauses (a) and (b) of

the proviso. Logically, the High Court has suo motu power to

revise an order where total failure of justice would have

occasioned or where irreparable loss would have caused to

the parties against whom it was made. These powers were

retained by clause (b). Though, after 1976, the exercise of

power was somewhat circumscribed, it was not totally

curtailed. In other words, the High Court could even after

the 1976 amendment interfere in cases where there was

failure of justice or irreparable loss caused, the nature of

the proceedings was substantially changed and the suo motu

power of the High Court was retained. It was in the nature

of power of superintendence of the High Court over the

subordinate courts. Changes were related to indicating

limitations in exercise of power.

Even after the amendments in 1976, in 1999 and prior to

the amendment in 1976, the revision power was exercisable

in a case where the order or the decree, as the case may be,

was not appealable.

Sub-section (2) which was introduced by the Old

Amendment Act and retained even after present amendment,

provides that the High Court shall not interfere where the

order or the decree is appealable in courts subordinate to

the High Court.

It is interesting to note that the Law Commission of

India had recommended deletion of Section 115. In the Law

Commission's opinion, provisions of Section 115 are

analogous to provisions of Article 227 of the Constitution

of India, 1950 (in short 'the Constitution') and the

litigants would not be prejudiced in any way if the entire

Section is deleted. The Joint Committee of the Parliament

discussed these recommendations and only thought it proper

to make certain modifications in the Section. That led to

amendment of Section 115 by Old Amendment Act. The

deliberations of the Committee are reflected in the

following words:

"The Committee, however, feel; that, in

addition to the restrictions contained in

section 115, an overall restriction on the

scope of applications for revision against

interlocutory orders should be imposed.

Having regard to the recommendations made by

the Law Commission in its Fourteenth and

Twenty-Seventh Reports, the Committee

recommended that Section 115 of the Code

should be retained subject to the

modification that no revision application

shall lie against an interlocutory order

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unless either of the following conditions is

satisfied, namely:-

i. that if the orders were made in favour of

the applicant, it would finally dispose of

the suit or other proceeding; or

ii. that the order, if allowed to stand, is

likely to occasion a failure of justice or

cause in irreparable injury."

First aspect that has to be considered is the

respective scope of appeal and revision. It is fairly a well

settled position in law that the right of appeal is a

substantive right. But there is no such substantive right in

making an application under Section 115. Though great

emphasis was laid on certain observations in Shankar

Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat (AIR 1970

SC 1) to contend that appeal and revision stand on the same

pedestal, it is difficult to accept the proposition. The

observations in the said case are being read out of context.

What was held in that case related to the exercise of power

of a higher court, and in that context the nature of

consideration in appeal and revision was referred to. It was

never held in that case that appeal is equated to a

revision.

Section 115 is essentially a source of power for the

High Court to supervise the subordinate courts. It does not

in any way confer a right on a litigant aggrieved by any

order of the subordinate court to approach the High Court

for relief. The scope for making a revision under Section

115 is not linked with a substantive right.

Language of Sections 96 and 100 of the Code which deal

with appeals can be compared with Section 115 of the Code.

While in the former two provisions specifically provide for

right of appeal, the same is not the position vis--vis

section 115. It does not speak of an application being made

by a person aggrieved by an order of subordinate court. As

noted above, it is a source of power of the High Court to

have effective control on the functioning of the subordinate

courts by exercising supervisory power.

An appeal is essentially continuation of the original

proceedings and the provisions applied at the time of

institution of the suit are to be operative even in respect

of the appeals. That is because there is a vested right in

the litigant to avail the remedy of an appeal. As was

observed in K. Eapen Chako v. The Provident Investment

Company (P) Ltd. (AIR 1976 SC 2610) only in cases where

vested rights are involved, a legislation has to be

interpreted to mean as one affecting such right to be

prospectively operative. The right of appeal is only by

statute. It is necessary part of the procedure in an

action, but "the right of entering a superior court and

invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of

the courts below. It seems to this paramount right, part of

the progress of the inferior tribunal." (Per Westbury See:

AG vs. SILLEM 33 J.Ex 209). The appeal, strictly so called,

is one in which the question is, whether the order of the

Court from which the appeal is brought was right on the

materials which that Court had before it" (Per Lord Devuil

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Ponnamal vs. Arumogam 1905 AC 390). The right of appeal,

where it exists, as a matter of substance and not of

procedure (Colonial Sugar Refining Company vs. Irtin 1905 AC

368).

Right of appeal is statutory. Right of appeal inherits

in no one. When conferred by statute it becomes a vested

right. In this regard there is essential distinction between

right of appeal and right of suit. Where there is inherent

right in every person to file a suit and for its

maintainability it requires no authority of law, appeal

requires so. As was observed in The State of Kerala vs.

K.M. Charia Abdulla and Co. (AIR 1965 SC 1585), the

distinction between right of appeal and revision is based on

differences implicit in the two expressions. An appeal is

continuation of the proceedings; in effect the entire

proceedings are before the appellate authority and it has

power to review the evidence subject to statutory

limitations prescribed. But in the case of revision,

whatever powers the revisional authority may or may not

have, it has no power to review the evidence, unless the

statute expressly confers on it that power. It was noted by

the four-Judges Bench in Hari Shankar and others vs. Rao

Girdhari Lal Chowdhury (AIR 1963 SC 698) that the

distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one.

A right of appeal carries with it a right of re-hearing on

law as well as fact, unless the statute conferring the right

of appeal limits the re-hearing in some way, as has been

done in second appeals arising under the Code. The power of

hearing revision is generally given to a superior Court so

that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been

decided according to law. Reference was made to Section

115 of the Code to hold that the High Court's powers under

the said provision are limited to certain particular

categories of cases. The right there is confined to

jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone.

As regards the field of operation of amended provision,

it is to be noted that the language of amended provision is

clear.

It is well settled principle in law that the Court

cannot read anything into a statutory provision which is

plain and unambiguous. A statute is an edict of the

Legislature. The language employed in a statute is the

determinative factor of legislative intent.

Words and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental

references to referents. The object of interpreting a

statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature

enacting it. (See Institute of Chartered Accountants of

India v. M/s Price Waterhouse and Anr. (AIR 1998 SC 74))

The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered

from the language used, which means that attention should be

paid to what has been said as also to what has not been

said. As a consequence, a construction which requires for

its support, addition or substitution of words or which

results in rejection of words as meaningless has to be

avoided. As observed in Crawford v. Spooner (1846 (6) Moore

PC 1), Courts, cannot aid the Legislatures' defective

phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend, and by

construction make up deficiencies which are left there. (See

The State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel

and Anr. (JT 1998 (2) SC 253)). It is contrary to all rules

of construction to read words into an Act unless it is

absolutely necessary to do so. (See Stock v. Frank Jones

(Tiptan) Ltd. (1978 1 All ER 948 (HL). Rules of

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interpretation do not permit Courts to do so, unless the

provision as it stands is meaningless or of doubtful

meaning. Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act

of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found

within the four corners of the Act itself. (Per Lord

Loreburn L.C. in Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910)

AC 445 (HL), quoted in Jamma Masjid, Mercara v.

Kodimaniandra Deviah and Ors.(AIR 1962 SC 847).

The question is not what may be supposed and has been

intended but what has been said. "Statutes should be

construed not as theorems of Euclid". Judge Learned Hand

said, "but words must be construed with some imagination of

the purposes which lie behind them". (See Lenigh Valley

Coal Co. v. Yensavage 218 FR 547). The view was re-iterated

in Union of India and Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama of Vedem

Vasco De Gama (AIR 1990 SC 981).

In Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport

Commissioner and Ors. etc. (AIR 1977 SC 842), it was

observed that Courts must avoid the danger of apriori

determination of the meaning of a provision based on their

own pre-conceived notions of ideological structure or scheme

into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat

fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function

under the disguise of interpretation.

While interpreting a provision the Court only

interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision

of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of

law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal

it, if deemed necessary. (See Commissioner of Sales Tax,

M.P. v. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain (2000 (5) SCC 515).

The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial

interpretative process.

Two principles of construction one relating to casus

omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a

whole appear to be well settled. Under the first principle

a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the Court except in

the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found

in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same

time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for

that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be

construed together and every clause of a section should be

construed with reference to the context and other clauses

thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular

provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute.

This would be more so if literal construction of a

particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous

results which could not have been intended by the

Legislature. "An intention to produce an unreasonable

result", said Danackwerts, L.J. in Artemiou v. Procopiou

(1966 1 QB 878), "is not to be imputed to a statute if

there is some other construction available". Where to apply

words literally would "defeat the obvious intention of the

legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result" we

must "do some violence to the words" and so achieve that

obvious intention and produce a rational construction. (Per

Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC (1966 AC 557) where at p. 577 he

also observed: "this is not a new problem, though our

standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges".

It is then true that, "when the words of a law extend

not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those

which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the

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words further than they reach, by saying it is casus

omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius

accidunt." "But," on the other hand,"it is no reason,

when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience

seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well

as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but

seldom" (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moore, P.C. 345). A casus

omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in

some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus

omissus does really occur, either through the inadvertence

of the legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis

existit proetereunt legislatores, the rule is that the

particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed

of according to the law as it existed before such statute -

Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris

relinquitur; "a casus omissus," observed Buller, J. in

Jones v. Smart (1 T.R. 52), "can in no case be supplied by

a court of law, for that would be to make laws."

The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in

fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The

grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered

to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some

repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument,

in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the

words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and

inconsistency, but no further" (See Grey v. Pearson 6 H.L.

Cas. 61). The latter part of this "golden rule" must,

however, be applied with much caution. "if," remarked

Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and

unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them

in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of

the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may

be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or

obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we

depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used,

merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or

manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal

meaning" (See Abley v. Dale 11, C.B. 378).

At this juncture, it would be necessary to take note of

a maxim "Ad ea quae frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur"

(The laws are adapted to those cases which more frequently

occur).

Laws ought to be, and usually are, framed with a view

to such cases as are of frequent rather than such as are of

rare or accidental occurrence; or, in the language of the

civil law, jus constitui oportet in his quoe ut plurimum

accidunt, non quoe ex inopinato; for, neque leges neque

senatusconsulta ita scribi possunt ut omnes casus qui

quandoque inciderint comprehendantur, sed sufficit ea quoe

plerumque accident contineri; laws cannot be so worded as to

include every case which may arise, but it is sufficient if

they apply to those things which most frequently happen. All

legislation proceeds upon the principle of providing for the

ordinary course of things, and to this principle frequent

reference is to be found, in the reports, in answer to

arguments, often speciously advanced, that the words of an

Act cannot have a particular meaning, because in a certain

contingency that meaning might work a result of which nobody

would approve. In Miller v. Salomons (7 Exch. 475) it was

argued that Parliament could not have intended that a Jew,

before sitting in the House of Commons, must use the words

"on the true faith of a Christian," prescribed in the oath

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of abjuration of 6 Geo. 3, c.53, because any person,

refusing to take the same oath when tendered by two

justices, would, under the 1 Geo. 1, st.2, c.13, be deemed

to be a popish recusant, and would be liable to penalties as

such; and to enforce these provisions against a Jew, it was

said, would be the merest tyranny. But Baron Parke thus

replied to this argument: -"If in the vast majority of

possible cases in all of ordinary occurrence the law is

in no degree inconsistent or unreasonable construed

according to its plain words, it seems to me to be an

untenable proposition, and unsupported by authority, to say

that the construction may be varied in every case, because

there is one possible but highly improbably one in which the

law would operate with great severity, and against our own

notions of justice. The utmost that can be reasonably

contended is, that it should be varied in that particular

case, so as to obviate that injustice no further."

Appeal is the right of entering a superior Court and

invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of

the court below. (per Westbury C., A.G. v. Sillem, 10 HLC

704 = 33 LJ ex.209).

"Appeal", is defined in the Oxford Dictionary, volume

I, page 398, as the transference of a case from an inferior

to a higher Court or tribunal in the hope of reversing or

modifying the decision of the former. In the Law Dictionary

by Sweet, the term "appeal" is defined as a proceeding

taken to rectify an erroneous decision of a Court by

submitting the question to a higher Court or Court of

appeal, and it is added that the term, therefore, includes,

in addition to the proceedings specifically so called, the

cases stated for the opinion of the Queen's Bench Division

and the Court of Crown Cases reserved, and proceedings in

error. In the Law Dictionary by Bouvier an appeal is defined

as the removal of a case from a Court of inferior to one of

superior jurisdiction for the purpose of obtaining a review

and re-trial, and it is explained that in its technical

sense it differs from a writ of error in this, that it

subjects both the law and the facts to a review and re-

trial, while the latter is a Common Law process which

involves matter of law only for re-examination; it is added,

however, that the term "appeal" is used in a comprehensive

sense so as to include both what is described technically

as an appeal and also the common law writ of error. As Mr.

Justice Subramania Ayyar observes in Chappan v. Moidin, 22

Mad 68 at p.80 the two things which are required to

constitute appellate jurisdiction are the existence of the

relation of superior and inferior Court and the power, on

the part of the former, to review decisions of the latter.

Sub-section (2) of Section 115 has remained unaltered

even after the amendment by the Amendment Act. A new sub-

section (3) has been added in Section 115 by the Amendment

Act which states that revision shall not operate as a stay

of suit or other proceeding before the Court except where

such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.

In Section 2, the expressions 'decree' and 'order' have

been defined in clauses (2) and (14) respectively. It is to

be noted that it matters little that the judgment is styled

as an "order". If, in fact, it fulfils the conditions of

the definition under Section 2(2), it is a decree and

becomes appealable. Orders that are not appealable are,

generally speaking, those which are procussual i.e.

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interlocutory or incidental orders regulating proceedings

but not deciding any of the matters of controversy in the

suit. Order 43 deals with the "appeals from orders".

These appeals lie under Section 104 of the Code. The said

Section deals with appeals from orders and specifies the

orders from which appeals can lie. Sub-section (2) of

Section 104 says that no appeal shall lie from any order

passed in appeal under the said Section. Section 104 and

Order 43 Rule I contain a full list of appealable orders.

An order which amounts to a decree within Section 2(2) does

not fall within Section 104 and the only applicable section

is Section 96. Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 104 were

omitted by Arbitration Act 1940. Section 105 relates to

other orders. It, inter alia, relates to any order i.e. so

appealable as well as non-appelable orders. It is in the

nature of a prohibition stipulating that save as otherwise

expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made

by a Court in exercise of original or appellate

jurisdiction; but where a decree is appealed from, any

error, defect or irregularity in any order, affecting the

decision of the case, may be set forth as a ground of

objection in the memorandum of appeal. Sub-section (2)

deals with case of remand. This section, in fact,

contemplates two things i.e. (1) regular appeal from decree;

and (2) the provision relating to grant of objection

relating to interim order. Order 43 Rule 1 is an integral

part of Section 104.

A plain reading of Section 115 as it stands makes it

clear that the stress is on the question whether the order

in favour of the party applying for revision would have

given finality to suit or other proceeding. If the answer

is 'yes' then the revision is maintainable. But on the

contrary, if the answer is 'no' then the revision is not

maintainable. Therefore, if the impugned order is of

interim in nature or does not finally decide the lis, the

revision will not be maintainable. The legislative intent

is crystal clear. Those orders, which are interim in

nature, cannot be the subject matter of revision under

Section 115. There is marked distinction in language of

Section 97(3) of the Old Amendment Act and Section 32(2)(i)

of the Amendment Act. While in the former, there was clear

legislative intent to save applications admitted or pending

before the amendment came into force. Such an intent is

significantly absent in Section 32(2)(i). The amendment

relates to procedures. No person has a vested right in a

course of procedure. He has only the right of proceeding in

the manner prescribed. If by a statutory change the mode of

procedure is altered the parties are to proceed according to

the altered mode, without exception, unless there is a

different stipulation.

Section 6 of the General Clauses Act has no application

because there is no substantive vested right available to a

party seeking revision under Section 115 of the Code. In

Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. and another vs. Union of India

and others (AIR 2000 SC 811), it was observed that if a

provision of statute is unconditionally omitted without a

saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions

must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief

has not been granted before the omission goes into effect,

there is no scope for granting it afterwards. There is

modification of this position by application of Section 6 of

the General Clauses Act or by making special provisions.

Operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the

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past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case

where a particular provision in the statute is omitted and

in its place another provision dealing with the same

contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour

of pending proceedings, then it can be reasonably inferred

that the intention of the legislature is that the pending

proceedings shall continue but a fresh proceeding for the

same purpose may be initiated under the new provision.

In view of what has been stated above the inevitable

conclusion is that the High Courts were right in the

conclusion about non-maintainability of revision

applications.

It was submitted by learned counsel for the appellants

that even if the revision applications are held to be not

maintainable, there should not be a bar on challenge being

made under Section 227 of the Constitution. It was

submitted that an opportunity may be granted to the

appellants to avail the remedy.

If any remedy is available to a party under any statute

no liberty is necessary to be granted for availing the same.

If the appellants avail such remedy, the same shall be dealt

with in accordance with law.

The appeals are dismissed. No costs.

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