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Serial No. 01

Supplementary List

HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA

AT SHILLONG

Date of Hearing: 02.12.2025

Crl.A.No.26 of 2023 Date of Decision: 28.01.2026

Shri. Sking Rymbai,

S/o Smti. Mil Rymbai,

R/o Village: Pasyih Dongmihsngi

P.S. Jowai

District: West Jaintia Hills Meghalaya.

Presently lodged in District Prison & Correctional Home,

West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai.

….. Appellant

-VERSUS-

State of Meghalaya

through Public Prosecutor

….. Respondent

Coram:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge

Appearance:

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. M. Sharma, Legal Aid Counsel with

Ms. T. Buam, Adv

For the Respondent(s) : Mr. S.A. Sheikh, GA with

Ms. S. Shyam, GA

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

1. This appeal is directed against the impugned Judgment of conviction

dated 16.08.2022 and Order of Sentence of even date passed by the learned

Sessions Judge, West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai, in Sessions Case No.63 of

2014 convicting the appellant u/s 376/506 (Part II) IPC and sentencing him 2026:MLHC:7

Page 2 of 16

to undergo 7 years imprisonment with fine of Rs.15,000/- and in default of

payment, to undergo further 2 months simple imprisonment.

2. The fact of the case, as can be derived from the record, is that on

12.08.2012, PW-1 lodged a written FIR to the In-Charge, Phramer Traffic

Cell to the effect that on 09.07.2012 at about 8:00 PM, the appellant came to

her resident at Pasyih Dongmihsngi while she was not at home and raped her

daughter, the survivor (17 years of age), while she was asleep. After

committing the act, the appellant warned and threatened to kill the survivor

if she disclosed the matter to anyone. The said FIR was then forwarded to

Jowai Police Station and registered as Jowai P.S. C/No.108 (8) 12 u/s 376

IPC and endorsed to a Women Police Sub-Inspector (WPSI) for

investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, a prima facie case was

found established against the appellant and accordingly, a charge-sheet was

submitted vide C/S No.174/13 dated 20.12.2013 u/s 376/506 IPC. The

matter was thereafter taken up as Sessions Case No.63/2014 and the

appellant was made to face the trial.

3. On 22.07.2015, the charge was framed by the Trial Court against the

appellant u/s 376/506 IPC to which the appellant pleaded not guilty and

claimed to be tried. During the course of the trial, the prosecution examined

7(seven) witnesses and exhibited 4(four) documents in support of its case.

After the completion of the prosecution evidence, the statement of the

appellant was recorded u/s 313 CrPC on 08.02.2022 in Pnar language

through an interpreter in presence of the defence counsel. No defence

witness was adduced on behalf of the appellant. The learned Trial Court

after hearing the parties, convicted the appellant by the impugned Judgment

dated 16.08.2022 u/s 376/506 IPC and by the Order of Sentence of even

date, sentenced the appellant to undergo imprisonment for 7 years with fine

of Rs.15,000/- for offence u/s 376 IPC and in default of payment of fine, the

appellant was ordered to undergo further 2 months simple imprisonment. In

addition, the appellant was also sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years u/s 2026:MLHC:7

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506 (Para II) IPC. Both the sentences were to run concurrently.

4. Assailing the conviction and sentence, Mr. M. Sharma, learned LAC

appearing for the appellant submits that there was a delay of 33 days in filing

the FIR which remained unexplained during the trial making the entire

prosecution case doubtful. He submits that the evidence of PW-1(informant)

shows that she came to know about the incident after nine days of the

occurrence, but does not throw any light as to the entire period of delay in

lodging the FIR. He submits that there is also glaring discrepancy and

contradiction in the statement of the survivor recorded u/s 164 CrPC and her

deposition before the Trial Court. He submits that the survivor’s statement

u/s 164 CrPC reveals that her siblings were sleeping in another room and did

not hear the appellant’s entry into the house whereas, in her cross

examination before the Court, she stated that her brother opened the door to

allow the appellant to enter the house. He, therefore, contends that it is clear

that there was no forced entry by the appellant in the house of the survivor

and the incident took place as the survivor consented to it. He submits that

the age of the survivor, which was vital for proving whether she was a minor

at the time of the incident, was never established at the trial in order to

determine the possibility of presence of consent of the survivor in the matter

and hence, the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained in law. As to

the question of determination of age of the survivor, the learned LAC has

placed reliance on the decision of this High Court in Amit Kumar Gupta v.

State of Meghalaya & ors, 2021 SCC Online Megh 246 (para 50) and Crl.A.

No.6 of 2025, Shri. Ronal Murmu v. State of Meghalaya through Public

Prosecutor (para 15).

5. The learned LAC further submits that the prosecution case is not

supported by any FSL report. He submits that PW-3, the medical expert who

conducted medical examination of the survivor on 12.08.2012, in his

deposition stated that there was tear of hymen of approximately one month

old and the survivor in her deposition before the Court stated that she had a 2026:MLHC:7

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relationship with someone else during the time of the incident and in such a

situation, there was a possibility of the survivor having sexual intercourse

with her lover. However, the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate this

aspect of the matter and came to a wrong conclusion. In addition, the learned

LAC submits that the brother of the survivor who had opened the door for

the appellant on the alleged day of the incident has not been examined by the

prosecution despite the fact that he was a crucial witness in the case. He,

therefore, submits that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond

reasonable doubt and the learned Trial Court erroneously convicted the

appellant without there being any sufficient evidence and prays that the

conviction and sentence of the appellant be set aside and quashed.

6. Mr. S.A. Sheikh, learned GA appearing for the State-respondent, on

the other hand, supports the conviction and sentence of the appellant and

submits that although explanation for delay in lodging the FIR is not

mandatorily required in a rape case, yet the reason for delay has been clearly

stated in the FIR. He submits that the evidence of the survivor is solid and

more of a sterling witness and her evidence could not be shaken by the

defence. He submits that minor or insignificant discrepancies in the

prosecution evidence as to who opened the door for the appellant on the day

of the incident cannot be a ground for disbelieving the reliability of the

prosecution case as long as the clarity with regard to the evidence of

commission of offence by the appellant is not disturbed. He submits that the

age of the victim was never a determinative factor as it was not a case of

consensual sexual intercourse and the defence also never raised any such

plea at the time of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses. He

submits that mere absence of injury mark on the person of the survivor

cannot be a ground for drawing inference that the survivor was a consenting

party and the evidence of the survivor would prevail over the medical

evidence. He submits that the stand taken by the appellant is totally

contradictory inasmuch as the appellant pleaded that he was not involved in 2026:MLHC:7

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the commission of the offence and at the same time contended that the act

was a consensual act. The learned GA further submits that non-examination

of the brother of the survivor who allegedly opened the door for the

appellant to enter the house of the survivor cannot lend any discredit to the

testimony of the survivor as he was not an eye witness to the commission of

offence by the appellant. He submits that the appellant failed to bring any

evidence to prove that the survivor was a consenting party and hence, the

judgment of the Trial Court cannot be faulted. He, thus, submits that the

prosecution was able to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and the

learned Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant. He submits that there

is no error in the Judgment of conviction and Order of Sentence by the Trial

Court and the present appeal, being devoid of merit, is liable to be dismissed.

In support of his argument, the learned GA places reliance on the decisions

of the Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manoj Kumar Pandey (2009)

1 SCC 72, Phool Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022) 2 SCC 74, State

of H.P v. Shree Kant Shekari (2004) 8 SCC 153 and State of Punjab v.

Ramdev Singh (2004) 1 SCC 421.

7. Heard and considered the arguments made by the learned counsels

appearing for the parties and also perused the materials available on record.

8. PW-1, the mother of the survivor and informant, in her deposition

stated that she is a mother of nine children and the survivor is her eldest

daughter. On the day of the incident, she was not at home as she was

attending the daughter of her sister who was admitted in Ialong Civil

Hospital. She did not remember the date, but came to know about the

incident after 9 days on her return from hospital when the survivor informed

her that the appellant gagged her mouth with a cloth and committed rape on

her and also threatened that if she reported the incident to any person, he

would kill her. Thereafter, she along with the survivor went to Phramer

Traffic Cell and lodged the FIR. She exhibited the FIR as Exhibit-1. After

filing the FIR, she along with the survivor was taken to Jowai Civil Hospital 2026:MLHC:7

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for medical examination of the survivor.

In her cross-examination, PW-1 stated that the appellant was her

relative belonging to the same clan. She affirmed that she remained in

hospital for 9 days attending the daughter of her sister and did not go home.

She stated that the day on which she reached home, the survivor informed

her about the incident and she remembered that the incident took place on

the 7

th

month of the calendar year. All her children were at home when the

incident took place and no elderly person was present in the house.

9. PW-2, the survivor, in her evidence before the Trial Court stated that

she knew the appellant who is her maternal cousin brother. She did not

remember the exact date of the incident, but it was in the month of July. She

stated that on the day of the incident she was fast asleep since it was night

time and suddenly the appellant gagged her mouth with a cloth and raped

her. After committing the act, he threatened her and told her that he would

kill her if she reported the incident to any other person and left thereafter.

The survivor further stated that she informed the incident to her mother after

her mother came back from the hospital and thereafter, they went together to

report the matter to Phramer Traffic Cell. She was then taken to Jowai Civil

Hospital for medical examination. The survivor also stated that prior to the

incident, she used to live with the family of the appellant as a domestic

helper for 2 years and during that period, the appellant used to regularly beat

her physically and mercilessly and he also attempted to sexually assault her

on several occasion. She stated that she had given her statement before the

Magistrate in the case and exhibited the same as Exhibit-2.

In her cross-examination, the survivor denied that she or her family

members had any grudge or enmity with the appellant. She stated that on the

day of the incident her younger brother opened the door and allowed the

appellant to enter inside the house. She also affirmed that during her stay

with the family of the appellant, he used to beat her for no reason and the

family members of the appellant also knew about the assault on her. She 2026:MLHC:7

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stated that she did not know who wrote the FIR, but knew the content of the

FIR and the FIR was lodged 2 weeks after the incident. She stated that she

was in a relationship with some other person prior to the incident and her

lover abandoned her after learning of the incident.

10. PW-3, the Medical Officer who conducted medical examination of the

survivor on 12.08.2012, stated that there was no external injury on the

survivor. After taking consent of the survivor and her mother, he conducted

examination of the private part of the survivor in presence of one female

attendant. As per his finding, there was no sign of recent sexual intercourse,

however, there was an old tear of the hymen at 6 (six) o’clock position.

There was no sign of forceful intercourse. He exhibited the medical

examination report of the survivor as Exhibit-3.

In his cross-examination, he stated that the tear of the hymen of the

survivor was approximately one month old. There was no sexual intercourse

or forceful intercourse with the survivor within one week or two weeks of

the incident.

11. PW-4, who is a Police Officer, in his deposition before the Court

stated that in the year 2012, he was posted as the Officer-in-Charge of Jowai

P.S. and had received the FIR on 12.08.2012 vide GDE No.278 dated

12.08.2012 on being forwarded by the In-Charge, Phramer Traffic Cell. The

FIR was registered vide Jowai P.S. Case No.108 (8) 2012 u/s 376 IPC and

the case was entrusted to PW-7 for investigation. He exhibited his signature

on the FIR as Exhibit-1(2).

The defence declined to cross-examine the witness.

12. PW-5 is also a Police Officer who was posted as the In-Charge at

Phramer Traffic Cell in the year 2012. In his evidence, he stated that on

12.08.2012, PW-1 appeared at the Traffic Cell and lodged the FIR (Exhibit-

1) to the effect that the survivor was raped by the appellant on 09.07.2012.

GD entry No.234 of 2012 dated 12.08.2012 was made at the traffic cell and

the FIR was forwarded to the Jowai P.S on the same day. After the GD 2026:MLHC:7

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entry, he along with PW-1 and the survivor accompanied by a lady constable

went to the Civil Hospital, Jowai for medical examination of the survivor.

He seized the blood sample and vaginal swab collected by the doctor and

also examined the staff nurse, the doctor, PW-1 and the woman police

constable. He also apprehended the appellant on the next date and handed

him over to PW-7 on the same date along with all the related documents and

the seized articles. He exhibited the seizure list prepared by him as Exhibit-

4.

In his cross-examination, he stated that he did not visit the place of

occurrence.

13. PW-6 is the Magistrate who recorded the statement of the survivor as

well as the appellant u/s 164 CrPC. In her deposition, the witness stated that

she recorded the statement of the survivor on 01.10.2012 in her chamber.

She narrated what the survivor stated in her statement recorded u/s 164 CrPC

(Exhibit-2). She recorded the statement of the appellant on 26.10.2012 and

the appellant stated that he is the cousin of the survivor and in the month of

March 2012, he was invited to stay in her house by the mother of the

survivor and one night while he was sleeping, the survivor came to him and

slept with him with her own consent, he did not rape her and he had been

wrongly accused. The witness exhibited the statement of the appellant as

Exhibit-4.

In her cross-examination, the witness stated that she cannot recall

whether the survivor was alone in her chamber while recording the

statement. She also stated that she could not remember who brought the

appellant to her chamber for recording his statement. She had given enough

reflection time to the appellant before recording his statement.

14. PW-7 in her deposition stated that she was posted at Jowai P.S in the

year 2012 and 2013. The case was endorsed to her by the O/C Jowai P.S

after the preliminary investigation was done by PW-5. On examination of

CD and the documents, she found that all the formalities of investigation 2026:MLHC:7

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were done by PW-5 and after going through the case she found that a prima

facie case was well established against the appellant u/s 376 IPC based on

the medical report of the survivor and the statement of the survivor before

the police and the admission of the appellant during interrogation. She filed

the charge-sheet against the appellant vide C/S No.174/13 dated 20.12.2013

u/s 376/506 IPC. In her re-examination, she stated that according to the

statement of the survivor, rape has been committed on her by the appellant.

In her cross-examination, she stated that the case was endorsed to her

on 12.08.2012 and she recorded the statement of the survivor on 25.09.2012.

She stated that she had based the charge-sheet against the appellant as the

medical report showed that there was an old tear in the hymen though there

was no sign of recent sexual intercourse. She deposed that the survivor had

stated that she was a maid in the house of the appellant. She deposed that the

survivor also stated that the appellant had committed forceful sexual

intercourse on her and that sometimes the medical examination does not

reveal if there is a forceful act. She agreed that the statement of the survivor

regarding forceful sexual intercourse did not corroborate the medical report.

In her re-cross by the defence, she stated that the statement of the survivor

that she was raped has been mentioned in the statement recorded u/s 161 and

164 CrPC.

15. Analysis of the prosecution evidence would show that the FIR

(Exhibit-1) dated 12.08.2012 was filed by PW-1 making specific allegation

of commission of rape on the survivor by the appellant. The evidence of

PW-1 before the Trial Court also supported the allegation made in the FIR.

The fact that PW-1 was absent for a period of 9 days from her residence and

that the appellant had committed the crime during the period of her absence

has not been sought to be rebutted by the appellant while cross-examining

PW-1. There is nothing on record to show that PW-1 made false accusation

against the appellant in order to seek vengeance against the appellant. The

appellant did not cross-examine PW-1 to project any case of presence of 2026:MLHC:7

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enmity or grudge against him in making the allegation in the FIR.

16. From the evidence of PW-2, the survivor, it is clear that on the day of

occurrence she was present in her house along with her four siblings, who

were sleeping in a separate room. The appellant entered her house without

the knowledge of the survivor and committed rape on her by gagging cloth

inside her mouth so that she was unable to raise any hue and cry. It is also

clear that after committing the crime, the appellant had threatened to kill her

in the event she made disclosure of the incident to any other person. The fact

of presence of the appellant in the residence of the survivor and the

commission of crime by him and subsequent issuance of threat to the

survivor was not sought to be rebutted by the appellant while cross-

examining the survivor. In fact, a bare reading of the cross-examination of

the survivor would reveal that no attempt was made at all by the appellant to

dislodge the disclosure made by the survivor with regard to the accusation of

commission of rape. There is also nothing on record to project that the cross-

examination of the survivor by the defence was made with an intention to

extract information with regard to presence of consent of the survivor in the

incident. Thus, there is no material to presume that the survivor was a

consenting party to the incident.

17. A perusal of the statement of the survivor given u/s 164 CrPC

exhibited as Exhibit-2 by the prosecution would show that the survivor’s

evidence before the Trial Court has remained the same insofar as the core

allegation of the prosecution case is concerned. There was no attempt by the

defence to contradict the statement of the survivor in her cross-examination

before the Trial Court. The evidence of the survivor before the Trial Court,

as such, stood corroborated by the Exhibit-2.

18. The medical evidence adduced by PW-3 does not lend much help to

the case of the prosecution. However, the evidence of the medical witness

does not in any way contradict the evidence of the survivor. There is nothing

in the evidence of PW-3 to discredit the testimony of the survivor. The 2026:MLHC:7

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evidence of PW-4 which is not much relevant insofar as the factual aspect of

the incident is concerned. The evidence of PW-4 only confirms that the FIR

was received by him and was endorsed to PW-7 for investigation of the

matter. The evidence of PW-5 confirms that the survivor was sent for

medical examination to the Civil Hospital, Jowai, subsequent to the filing of

the FIR before the Phramer Traffic Cell and all the related documents along

with the seized articles in connection with the investigation of the case was

handed over to PW-7.

19. PW-6 proved the Exhibit-2 and affirmed that the survivor had

narrated the entire incident in the statement recorded u/s 164 CrPC by her.

The witness also exhibited the statement of the appellant recorded by her as

Exhibit-4 wherein the appellant had made a statement referring to some

other incident, but made no disclosure with regard to the incident alleged in

the FIR. However, in his statement the appellant did not deny that he was

present in the house of the survivor on the day of the incident.

20. The evidence of PW-7 reveals that she had recorded the statement of

the survivor on 25.09.2012 and after going through the case and the related

documents, a prima facie case was found well established against the

appellant and the charge-sheet was submitted after the supervising officer

had directed to do so.

21. The contention of the appellant that the non-examination of the

brother of the survivor who allegedly opened the door for the appellant as a

prosecution witness casts a serious doubt about the truthfulness of the

prosecution case and has no leg to stand inasmuch as there is nothing on

record to show that the door was opened on the instruction of the survivor.

At no point of time, the appellant denied or tried to rebut the claim of the

prosecution that he was present at the spot of occurrence. As the testimony

of the survivor with regard to the commission of the crime by the appellant

stood unshaken at the trial, the question as to how the appellant entered the

place of occurrence becomes insignificant. 2026:MLHC:7

Page 12 of 16

22. Insofar as the contention of the appellant with regard to the non-

determination of the age of the survivor is concerned, it is clear that no case

of presence of consent of the survivor in the commission of offence by the

appellant has been made out. Neither the prosecution based its case by

contending that the survivor was a minor nor the Trial Court has convicted

the appellant on the ground that the survivor being a minor could not have

offered valid consent. The question of age of the survivor, as such, is of no

relevance in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The decisions

rendered in the cases of Amit Kumar Gupta (supra) and Shri. Ronal Murmu

(supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, have no

applicability in the present case.

23. The Apex Court in the case of Manoj Kumar Pandey (supra) held that

merely because the survivor was more than 16 years of age cannot be ground

to hold that she was a consenting party when no evidence was led to show

such consent. It was further held that normal rule regarding the duty of the

prosecution to explain the delay in lodging FIR and the lack of prejudice

and/or prejudice caused because of such delayed lodging of FIR does not per

se apply to cases of rape.

24. In the present case, the materials on record reveals that the survivor

(PW-2) and her mother (PW-1) are both laborers by occupation. The

survivor is therefore, not a very intelligent girl. Her mother appears to be

practically illiterate as she put her thumb impression on the record of her

evidence. Hence, there cannot be a microscopic approach in scrutiny of their

evidence by the Court. The Apex Court in Shree Kant Shekari (supra) held

that when the victim of offence is not an intelligent girl and her mother, a

rustic woman, was practically illiterate, examining evidence of such

witnesses with microscopic approach would be an insult to justice-oriented

judicial system. Therefore, the plea raised on behalf of the appellant that

there is a confusion with regard to the date of knowledge of the incident of

PW-1 and that there was a delay in lodging the FIR is of no help to the 2026:MLHC:7

Page 13 of 16

defence of the appellant.

25. With regard to the contention of the appellant that no visible injury

was found when the survivor was medically examined by PW-3 and as such,

the allegation of rape stands unsubstantiated, it appears that the survivor was

medically examined on 12.08.2012 i.e. after more than a month of the

incident. The Apex Court in Ramdev Singh (supra) held that when the doctor

examined the victim after about three weeks, absence of visible injury at the

time of medical examination was of no consequence as the effect of the act

on the physical form practically gets obliterated. Thus, the stand taken by the

appellant is not supported by law and cannot be a ground for disbelieving the

version of the survivor.

26. In the instant case, it appears that the survivor has fully supported the

prosecution case and was consistent right from the very beginning of the

case. Nothing has been pointed out by the defence as to why the testimony

of the survivor should not be believed. The substance of accusation rape and

intimidation of the survivor by the appellant could not be shaken by the

defence during the examination of the survivor. In cases like rape and sexual

assault of woman and children, minor contradiction or insignificant

discrepancies in the statement of the survivor cannot be a ground for

disbelieving the otherwise reliable prosecution case. Conviction of the

appellant can be upheld even on the sole testimony of the survivor without

looking for any further corroboration if the testimony is found to be

trustworthy and unblemished. The Apex Court in Ganeshan Vs. State

represented by its Inspector of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 573 held: -

“10.1. Whether, in the case involving sexual harassment, molestation,

etc., can there be conviction on the sole evidence of the prosecutrix, in

Vijay v. State of M.P., it is observed in paras 9 to 14 as under :(SCC

pp.195-98)

“9……………

10………….

11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, this Court held that in cases

involving sexual harassment, molestation, etc. the court is duty-bound

to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. Minor contradictions 2026:MLHC:7

Page 14 of 16

or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of a prosecutrix should

not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution

case. Evidence of the victim of sexual assault is enough for conviction

and it does not require any corroboration unless there are compelling

reasons for seeking corroboration. The court may look for some

assurances of her statement to satisfy judicial conscience. The

statement of the prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured

witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court further held that the

delay in filing FIR for sexual offence may not be even properly

explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any

benefit thereof. The Court observed as under…….

8……….

21…. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case

and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant

discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a

fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. If

evidence of the prosecutrix inspires confidence, it must be relied upon

without seeking corroboration of her statement in material

particulars. If for some reason the court finds it difficult to place

implicit reliance on her testimony, it may look for evidence which may

lend assurance to her testimony, short of corroboration required in

the case of an accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix must be

appreciated in the background of the entire case and the trial court

must be alive to its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing with

cases involving sexual molestation.’

12…….

13. In State of H.P v. Raghubir Singh this Court held that there is no

legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to corroborate the

evidence of the prosecutrix before recording an order of conviction.

Evidence has to be weighed and not counted. Conviction can be

recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if her evidence

inspires confidence and there is absence of circumstances which

militate against her veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by

this Court in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance on an

earlier judgment in Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan.

14.….”

27. The position which emerges from above is that in cases involving

sexual offence, minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the

statement of a victim should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise

reliable prosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual offence is

enough for conviction and it does not require any corroboration unless there 2026:MLHC:7

Page 15 of 16

are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The Court should

examine the broader probability of a case and not get swayed away by minor

contradiction or insignificant discrepancies to throw out and otherwise

reliable prosecution case. Thus, the contention of the appellant that the

brother of the survivor was not examined by the prosecution as a witness, is

also of no help to the appellant. The totality of the circumstances appearing

in the case does not disclose that the survivor had a strong motive to falsely

involve the appellant and, therefore, there should not be any hesitation on the

part of the Court in accepting her evidence adduced during the course of

trial.

28. It is also clear from the case of Ganeshan (supra) that the delay in

filing FIR for sexual offence cannot be equated with the case involving other

offences. The delay in case of sexual offence may not be even properly

explained, but if found natural, the accused cannot be given any benefit

thereof. Furthermore, in the case of Shri. Mihkahtngen Sarubai Vs. State of

Meghalaya & Anr, Crl.A.No.31 of 2023, a Division Bench of this court

while deliberating on the issue of delay in lodging FIR in respect of sexual

offence held that: -

“13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of

Himachal Pradesh Vs. Prem Sing, reported in AIR 2009 SC

1010, had considered the issue of delay in respect of offences

involving sexual assault at length and observed as under: -

“So far as the delay in lodging the FIR in question

is concerned, the delay in a case of sexual assault, cannot be

equated with the case involving other offences. There are

several factors which weigh in the mind of the prosecutrix and

her family members before coming to the police station to lodge

a complaint. In a tradition bound society prevalent in India,

more particularly, rural areas, it would be quite unsafe to

throw out the prosecution case merely on the ground that there

is some delay in lodging the FIR…”.

29. In view of the discussions made above, the appellant has failed to

make out a case for interference with the Judgment of conviction dated

16.08.2022 and Order of Sentence of even date passed by the learned 2026:MLHC:7

Page 16 of 16

Sessions Judge, West Jaintia Hills District, Jowai, in Sessions Case No.63 of

2014. There is no merit in this appeal and the same stands dismissed.

30. Let an authenticated copy of this Judgment be furnished to the

appellant, free of cost.

31. The Trial Court Record be returned forthwith.

Judge

Meghalaya

28.01.2026

“Shrity,PS” 2026:MLHC:7