1

$-

* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

BEFORE

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV

+ W.P (C) 3622/2021, C.M. APPL 10990/2021

1. SMT. DEVIKA (WIDOW AGED ABOUT 32 YRS)

W/O LATE SH. DINESH KUMAR

2. MS. URVASHI (MINOR AGED ABOUT 9 YRS)

THROUGH HER MOTHER SMT. DEVIKA

3. MS. DESHA (MINOR DAUGHTER 6 YRS)

THROUGH HER MOTHER SMT. DEVIKA

4. MR. NAKUL KUMAR (MINOR SON 2 YEARS)

THROUGH HER MOTHER SMT. DEVIKA

5. SMT. CHARAN DEVI (MOTHER AGED ABOUT 54 YRS)

W/O SH. KRISHAN PAL

ALL R/O 504, AGAR NAGAR

PREM NAGAR, SULEMAN NAGAR

NANGLOI, DELHI-11086

.....PETITIONERS

(Through: Mr. Nitin Jain and Mr. Madhav Aggarwal, Advs.)

Versus

1. DELHI JAL BOARD

THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN

ROOM NO. 306, 3

RD

FLOOR,

VARUNALYA, PHASE-II

JHANDEWALAN, KAROL BAGH,

NEW DELHI-110005

2

2. GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI

THROUGH-CHIEF SECRETARY

DELHI 110054 ....RESPONDENTS

(Through: Mr. Tushar Sannu, Ms. Pulak Gupta and Ms. Payal

Rajput,Advs.)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

% Reserved on: 14.05.2026

Pronounced on: 29.05.2026

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INDEX

FACTUAL MATRIX .................................................................................... 3

ANALYSIS. ................................................................................................... 6

A. WHETHER THE PETITIONER IS DISENTITLED TO RELIEF ON ACCOUNT OF

DELAY IN APPROACHING THE COURT? .......................................................... 6

B. SCOPE OF THE COURT’S POWER TO GRANT COM PENSATION UNDER

ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. ............................................ 7

C. WHETHER NEGLIGENCE IS ATTRIBUTABLE TO DJB? ............................ 11

D. WHETHER THE THIRD-PARTY CONTRACTOR IS A NECESSARY PARTY IN

THE PRESENT CASE? ................................................................................... 16

COMPENSATION. .................................................................................... 17

A. STANDARD COMPENSATION ............................................................... 18

B. PECUNIARY COMPENSATION .............................................................. 19

PARTING OBSERVATIONS .................................................................... 22

J U D G M E N T

By way of the present petition, the petitioners, who are the legal heirs

of one Mr. Dinesh Kumar [deceased], are seeking compensation to the

3

extent of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees Fifty Lakh only) for the death of the

deceased on account of alleged negligence attributable to the respondents.

FACTUAL MATRIX

2. Petitioner no. 1 is the wife of the deceased, whereas, petitioners no. 2

to 4 are their children. Petitioner no. 5 is the deceased’s mother.

3. The case set up by the petitioners is that, on the intervening night of

17/18 April 2019, the deceased was returning home from his place of

employment on his motorcycle when he met with a fatal accident on Main

Hiran Kudna Road, Dhichaun Kalan, Delhi. According to the petitioners,

respondent No. 1, namely Delhi Jal Board [DJB], had undertaken pipeline

repair work in the area and, for the said purpose, had dug a deep

excavation/ditch immediately in front of its office premises.

4. It is further the case of the petitioners that, prior to his demise, the

deceased informed petitioner no. 1 that while he was riding back from work

during the late hours of the night, he was momentarily blinded by the

headlights of a truck approaching from the opposite direction, as a result

whereof he was unable to notice the open ditch and consequently fell into

the same along with his motorcycle. According to them, the circumstances

leading to the accident clearly disclose gross negligence on the part of DJB

in failing to secure the excavation site or provide any warning mechanisms

for public safety.

5. The material placed on record further indicates that a PCR call was

received at approximately 06:07 AM on 18.04.2019 reporting that an

individual had been lying in the nala/ditch since the previous night. Pursuant

thereto, FIR No. 0180/2019 [FIR] came to be registered at Police Station

Baba Haridas Nagar under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code,

4

1860. The FIR records that the injured victim was found lying inside the

ditch along with his motorcycle and was removed from the site in an

unconscious condition. It is also specifically recorded therein that the injured

was unfit to make any statement at the relevant time.

6. The record reveals that immediately after the incident, the deceased

was taken to Rao Tula Ram Memorial Hospital for medical treatment and

was, thereafter, shifted to Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital for further

management. However, despite medical intervention and continued

treatment, the deceased succumbed to the injuries sustained in the accident

and left for his heavenly abode on 27.04.2019.

7. According to the petitioners, the deceased was the sole breadwinner

of their family and owing to his death, the petitioners currently have no

source of income. The deceased is stated to be thirty-seven years old at the

time of the accident and had been working as ‘Field Boy;’ with ‘M/s Airef

Engineers Pvt. Ltd.’, and was drawing a salary of Rs. 16,770/- (Rupees

Sixteen Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy Rupees only) per month, at

the time of his demise.

8. DJB, in its counter affidavit, has sought to distance itself from any

liability, and takes the stand that the aforesaid ditch had been dug by a third-

party contractor who had been awarded a contract for improving the water

supply network. According to DJB, any negligence therefore, which may

have led to the death of the incident, could only be attributed to the said

contractor and not the respondents. It is also stated that the contract with the

third-party contractor provided that the contractor would indemnify the

respondents against all claims arising out of the project. Therefore, the

5

petitioner ought to claim compensation from the third-party contractor, and

ought to have necessarily impleaded it as a respondent.

9. Further, according to it, barricades had, in fact, been placed around

the ditch by the contractor, and as per the petitioners’ own case, the accident

was caused due to the deceased’s being blinded by the headlights of an

oncoming truck. Therefore, as per DJB, negligence on the part of the

deceased could not be ruled out insofar as he failed to stop his vehicle upon

facing the oncoming headlights.

10. As per DJB, the petitioners have approached this Court belatedly,

around three years after the demise of deceased, and therefore, the petition

ought to be dismissed on the ground of delay.

11. Per contra, Mr. Nitin Jain, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits

that the stand taken by DJB is a hollow defence taken with the sole purpose

of shifting it liability to a private party. The duty to ensure public safety

remains with the respondents, and any contract that they may enter into with

third-party contractors would not absolve them of this responsibility.

According to him, the respondent may subsequently recover the

compensation amount from the contractor in separate proceedings.

12. He submits that the undisputed circumstances surrounding the

accident would attract the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and establish that the

death of the deceased was on account of negligence by the respondents.

According to him, the respondents ought to be held liable, even if

negligence is attributable to the third-party contractor, applying the

principles of strict and absolute liability.

13. This Court, on 18.05.2025, without going into the merits of the

dispute, and since the petitioners were facing financial hardships, directed

6

the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only)

as interim compensation. The said interim compensation has been paid to

the petitioners.

14. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the

record.

ANALYSIS.

A. Whether the petitioner is disentitled to relief on account of delay in

approaching the Court?

15. At the outset, the preliminary objection pertaining to the aspect of

delay is dealt with. It is seen that the deceased passed away in the year 2019,

and the petitioners have approached this Court after a period of around two

years in the year 2021.

16. It is pertinent to note that, in the interregnum, there was an outbreak

of the COVID-19 pandemic across the globe, disrupting people’s lives to a

great extent. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of the pandemic, in Re:

Cognizance for extension of limitation, observed that the litigants are facing

difficulties in approaching the Court, considering the situation at the time,

and had passed various orders relaxing the limitation period in all legal

proceedings between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021.

1

17. The petitioners depended on the deceased for income. In this context,

to expect them to necessarily approach the Court immediately after his

demise, amidst the pandemic, would not require this Court to turn a blind

eye to stark realities faced by the petitioners. The discretionary powers

vested in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are to be

1

Order dated 08.03.2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020

7

exercised in furtherance of the interests of justice and equity, rather than

defeating legitimate claims on purely technical grounds.

18. It is trite law that although the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963

do not strictly apply in writ proceedings, the underlying principles are

considered while weighing equities In circumstances such as in the present

case, where the petitioners were grappling with bereavement, financial

hardship, and the extraordinary difficulties posed by the pandemic period,

some degree of delay, if any, deserves to be viewed with compassion and a

justice-oriented approach. In view thereof, the Court finds that the petition

has not been filed with unreasonable and unexplained delay, warranting

dismissal at the threshold.

B. Scope of the Court’s power to grant compensation under Article

226 of the Constitution of India.

19. Before proceeding to examine the facts of the present case, it is

apposite to briefly survey the settled legal framework governing the grant of

compensation in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India, particularly in cases where the death of a citizen is alleged to have

occurred on account of the negligence of State instrumentalities. The genesis

of such claims finds its source in the fundamental right to life guaranteed

under Article 21 of the Constitution of India

20. This Court, in Shagufta Ali v. Government of NCT of Delhi and

Ors.,

2

undertook a delineation of the applicable legal principles while

adjudicating a claim for compensation arising out of death due to negligence

by the State. Drawing upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nilabati

2

2024 SCC OnLine Del 6250

8

Behera v. State of Orissa,

3

and D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal,

4

this

Court held that a public law remedy can be resorted to, and monetary

compensation may be awarded, in cases involving a proven violation of

Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court reaffirmed that a claim for

compensation under public law, founded upon the unconstitutional

deprivation of the right to life, is a remedy distinct from, and in addition to,

any private law action in tort. The defence of sovereign immunity, being

wholly alien to the constitutional guarantee of fundamental rights, cannot be

invoked by the State in such proceedings.

21. In Shagufta Ali, this Court formulated the governing principles for

the adjudication of such claims. It was held that ordinarily, a High Court

exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should

refrain from awarding compensation, a remedy primarily within the civil law

domain, when the case involves genuinely disputed questions of fact.

However, where the State's tortious liability is not disputed, or where the

facts speak so plainly and unequivocally that no reasonable inference other

than negligence can be drawn, the maxim res ipsa loquitur may be applied

to overcome the formal evidentiary burden. In such cases, the absence of

concrete proof does not preclude the claimant from recovering

compensation, provided that the known facts permit the Court to draw an

unequivocal inference that the harm was caused by the negligence of the

State or its servants. The relevant portions of the said decision are extracted

below, for reference:

“43. Upon consideration of the aforementioned judicial precedents, it

is evident that the High Court, ordinarily while exercising its

3

(1993) 2 SCC 746

4

(1997) 1 SCC 416

9

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should

refrain from awarding compensation, a remedy primarily available

within the civil law domain, when the case involves disputed questions

of fact. However, if the State‟s liability for a tortuous act, committed

by itself or its servants, is undisputed, the maxim re ipsa loquitur may

be applied to overcome any factual controversy. The absence of

concrete proof does not preclude the claimant from recovering

compensation, provided a reasonable inference can be drawn from the

known facts that the harm was caused by the negligence of the State or

its servants. In such circumstances, the facts must enable the Court to

draw an unequivocal inference and must speak for themselves.

xxxx

46. In light of the aforesaid, this Court has no hesitation in concluding

that where the negligence and breach of duty by the State are

manifestly evident, the maxim res ipsa loquitur shall apply. When the

State is under a statutory duty of care and fails to fulfil such duty, the

presumption of liability without proof will also arise. In such cases, it

is practically not possible for the aggrieved persons to gather positive

evidence of negligence and therefore, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur

comes to the rescue and helps in overcoming the formal evidentiary

burden. However, the same is subject to the proof of foundational facts

and manifest negligence.”

22. The Court in Shagufta Ali drew upon the exposition of the maxim res

ipsa loquitur by the Supreme Court in Shyam Sunder v. State of

Rajasthan,

5

wherein it was held that the maxim is resorted to when an

accident is shown to have occurred and the cause thereof is primarily within

the knowledge of the defendant. The mere fact that the cause of the accident

is unknown does not prevent the claimant from recovering compensation,

provided that a proper inference can be drawn from the known

circumstances that the harm was caused by the negligence of the defendant.

The fact of the accident may, in itself, constitute evidence of negligence, and

it is at that point that the maxim res ipsa loquitur squarely applies. The

Court in Shagufta Ali further held that when the State is under a statutory

5

(1974) 1 SCC 690

10

duty of care and fails to fulfil that duty, the presumption of liability without

positive proof also arises, since in such situations, it is practically not

possible for the aggrieved persons to gather direct evidence of negligence,

and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, therefore, comes to their rescue by

overcoming the formal evidentiary burden. However, this relief remains

subject to the proof of foundational facts and manifest negligence.

23. The principles so enunciated in Shagufta Ali have since been

consistently followed by this Court. In Munna v. MCD,

6

this Court

reiterated that where the negligence and breach of duty by the State are writ

large, and the duty of care is found to be specifically and squarely that of the

public authorities in question, the maxim res ipsa loquitur shall apply.

24. In Pravesh Kumar and Anr. v. Delhi Jal Board,

7

this Court, while

adjudicating a claim for compensation arising out of the tragic death of a

nine-year-old child who fell into a water-filled pit on land owned by the

DJB, applied the principles enunciated in Shagufta Ali with equal force. In

Pravesh Kumar, this Court held that in cases where the factum surrounding

the incident leading to the death of the deceased is undisputed, but the issue

of negligence and liability may be contested, the petitioner would still be

entitled to seek compensation by resorting to the public law remedy. The

facts established by the pleadings provide the basis for a pecuniary claim

regardless of any inter se disputes as to liability for the alleged negligence,

and in such cases, the facts as established by the record speak for themselves

and attract the maxim res ipsa loquitur. The said decision has been affirmed

by the Division Bench of this Court in Delhi Jal Board v. Sh. Parvsh

6

2024: DHC: 7060

7

2024 SCC OnLine Del 8158

11

Kumar and Ors.

8

Further, this decision has also not been interfered by the

Supreme Court in the Special Leave Petition titled Delhi Jal Board v.

Parvesh Kumar and Ors.

9

25. Thus, the position that emerges from the aforenoted discussion,

therefore, is unambiguous. Wherever the foundational facts surrounding the

incident are not disputed, and wherever those facts, read together, admit of

only one reasonable inference, namely, that the State or its instrumentality

failed to discharge its duty of care resulting in the deprivation of the life of a

citizen, the writ Court is not only empowered to grant compensation in the

exercise of its power as a Constitutional Court. It is equally settled that any

inter se dispute between the respondents or any other entity as to which of

them bears primary liability shall not operate as a bar to the grant of relief to

the petitioner. The Court may fasten liability upon one respondent, leaving it

open to that respondent to recover from others in appropriate separate

proceedings.

26. The scales of equity would tilt against relegation of the petitioners to

proceedings before the Civil Court, if the foundational facts to establish that

the deceased passed away due to negligence attributable to DJB are

undisputed. The petitioners, comprising of an old lady, a widow, and three

minor children do not have any source of income since the demise of the

sole breadwinner in their family.

C. Whether negligence is attributable to DJB?

27. Approaching the facts of the present case on the anvil of the aforesaid

legal principle, it is seen that the following facts are not disputed and are

8

Order dated 23.04.2025 in L.P.A. 266/2025

9

Order dated 11.08.2025 in S.L.P. (C) 31574/2025

12

matters of record. DJB had undertaken pipeline repair work in the area of

Main Hiran Kudna Road, Dhichaun Kalan, Delhi, and for that purpose had

caused a deep excavation to be dug in front of its own office premises, on a

public road regularly used by vehicular traffic. The deceased, while

returning home from work on his motorcycle during the late hours of the

night of 17/18 April 2019, fell into the said excavation. The deceased lay

unattended in the ditch throughout the night, until a PCR call was received

at approximately 06:07 AM on 18.04.2019. The deceased was then extracted

from the site and shifted to the hospital, but succumbed to his injuries on

27.04.2019. The FIR registered by the police station concerned corroborates

these facts and records that when officers visited the site, the deceased's

motorcycle lay inside the ditch. The relevant extract of the FIR is extracted

as under:-

“District Dwarka (Delhi) PS Baba Hari Das Nagar GD No. 004A Dt.

18/04/19 Time 6:07:28 entry Made For Rank/Name PIS No. of Police

Officer: Assistant Sub- Inspector/Jai Bhagwan/28820199 GD type (s):

PCR Call GD Subject Information received PCR Call GD Brief: Ref.

CPCR DD No. 18 April 191190072, Incident, Address: DICHAON

KALAN NAJAFGARH NR BY PANI KA UZIYAR, Incident Description:

YHA PAR EK PERSON RAT SE NALE MEPDA H, Mobile No.

9210124264, From Sonia Devi, 10013/PCR, upon received the

information via PCR Call the matter was marked to ASI Krishan Saab

who would investigate the matter accordingly. Baklam ASI/DO

Signature Assistant Sub-Inspector/Jai Bhagwan/28820199. Sir Duty

Officer Saab P.S. Baba Haridas Nagar, it is humbly requested that it

was informed to the ASI on 18.04.19 vide DD No. 4A ASI with duty

officer Ct. Hansraj No. 618/DW reached the site at Main Hiran Kudna

Road, Dichau Village Delhi where in front of Delhi Jal Board Plant,

there was a hole dug at the main road by Delhi Jal Board for repairing

the pipe and the hollow was covered by six plastic Barriaicade of red

colour. At that moment there was a black colour Platina bike bearing

No. HR 26 CV 2326. As there was no eye- witness present at the

moment after getting the DD NO. 6A, the respected ASI, Ct. Hansraj

No. 618/DW had to leave the place of accident to reach RTRM

Hospital. There after getting the MLC No. 1639/19 Dinesh Kumar RO

13

B-504 Agar Nagar Prem Nagar. On MLC DR to AHO RTA of road side

with the wounds still pending and patient was declared unfit for

statement and even in the hospital there was no eye-witness present.

The patient was referred to DDU Hospital for further treatment and

after that ASI returned to the place of accident to take custody of

M/cycle no. HR 26 CV 2326. Dinesh Kumar S/O Kishan Lal was

undergoing treatment in the DDU hospital and the patient is not yet

declared fit for statement. U/S 279/337 IPC was registered. The

register FIR is ready to be investigated. The FIR is now given to

registered ASI officer for further investigation. Dated 18/4/19 time

00.00 to 06.00 hrs: Main Hiran Kudna Road, Dichau Village Delhi:

20/4/19 at 11:45 AM SD English ASI Krishan Kumar after

investigation the case has been registered U/S 279/337 IPC. CCTNS

OPP through computer with computerized copy through SHO to ASI

Krishan Kumar who will look into this matter. The FIR alongwith copy

thereof sent to the senior official for their kind information.”

28. DJB does not dispute the factum of the accident or the death of the

deceased. It, however, seeks to deflect its liability on the ground that the

excavation work was carried out not by DJB itself but by a third-party

contractor engaged by it, and that under the terms of the contract, the

contractor was obligated to indemnify DJB against all claims arising out of

the work. It is further contended that barricades had been placed around the

ditch, and that the accident may have been caused in part by the deceased's

own conduct in failing to stop his motorcycle when faced with the

headlights of an oncoming truck.

29. So far as the question of vicarious liability is concerned, this Court in

Chitra Chary and Ors. v. DDA and Ors.,

10

has held that any activity

undertaken under the authority of the State must be reckoned as the act of

the State itself, and the State must be held vicariously liable for it. This is in

line with the decision of the Supreme Court in Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa

10

(2004: DHC: 22496)

14

and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors.,

11

wherein, it was observed that

the State should be as much liable for tort in respect of a tortious act

committed by its servant within the scope of his employment and

functioning as such, as any other employer.

30. In Lakhan Singh and Anr. v. Delhi Development Authority and

Ors.,

12

this Court, in an analogous situation where the DDA sought to deflect

liability onto a private contractor for leaving an open manhole, emphatically

rejected such a defence, holding that a statutory body's duty of care cannot

be so easily transferred to a contractual arrangement with a private party.

31. The contention of contributory negligence on the part of the deceased

is without merit. The deceased was a commuter on a public road, navigating

conditions of the night, when momentarily blinded by approaching

headlights and unable to perceive an open excavation. The obligation to

ensure that a hazardous excavation on a public road was adequately

safeguarded, not merely by the placement of temporary barricades but by

continuous supervision, adequate illumination, and prompt emergency

response, rested squarely upon DJB.

32. Moreover, the fact that the deceased lay unattended in the ditch from

the night until well past dawn the following morning, despite the ditch being

situated directly in front of an office of DJB, by itself constitutes compelling

evidence of a systemic and egregious failure of the duty of care owed to the

public by a statutory authority like DJB. As per the data furnished by the

Ministry of Road Transport and Highways in its report titled ‘Road

Accidents in India’ 2023, 8,246 people were injured in the year 2023,

11

(1996) 2 SCC 634

12

(2024: DHC: 1088)

15

whereas further 3,904 persons were killed in the same year, as a result of

road accidents due to ongoing road works/construction activity.

13

These

figures underscore the grave danger posed by unattended excavation sites,

unbarricaded ditches, and incomplete repair works on public roads. Such

incidents are not unforeseeable occurrences, but rather a consequence of

administrative negligence and failure to implement basic safety measures

mandated for public infrastructure works. The absence of adequate

barricading, warning signs, illumination, supervision, and emergency

response mechanisms reflects a disregard for public safety and human life.

33. This is exactly what has happened in the present case. DJB ought to

have been well aware that such accidents can occur if a pit is dug on a road

that is used by the public. Therefore, in such cases, the duty of the State and

statutory bodies does not exhaust itself with the mere installation of

barricades, it extends equally to vigilant supervision over hazardous sites

and ensuring timely emergency response.

34. Consequently, the facts and material on record speak for themselves

and indicate a lack of duty of care and negligence on the part of DJB. The

maxim of res ipsa loquitur is squarely attracted.

35. Once the facts established by the record raise a presumption of

negligence, the burden of demonstrating that adequate care and precautions

were taken shifts upon DJB. As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the

burden has not been discharged. Accordingly, this Court finds that the death

of the deceased was occasioned by negligence attributable to DJB and the

petitioners are therefore entitled to compensation under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India.

13

Table 3.5, ‘Road Accidents in India’ 2023, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Pg 44.

16

D. Whether the third-party contractor is a necessary party in the

present case?

36. In proceedings instituted by a third-party against the indemnity

holder, the indemnifier is not a necessary party. The indemnity holder may

recover any dues it would be entitled to, in separate proceedings. Reference

may be made to the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in Pravenn

Kumar Bhatia v. Dr. (Mrs.) M. Ghosh and Ors.,

14

wherein, in a suit for

damages on account of medical negligence, an application for impleadment

under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was filed by the

insurance company on the ground that since it had indemnified the

defendant-doctors, the decision in the suit would affect its rights and

therefore, it was a necessary party therein. However, the Court rejected the

said argument as follows:

“2. Facts, in brief, leading to the filing of the present application so that

Praveen Kumar Bhatia has filed the present suit against defendants 1

and 2 who are the doctors and Defendant No. 3 in the Nursing Home

owned by Defendant No. 2 on the ground that due to their gross

negligence in treating the plaintiff's wife, they have caused death of

plaintiff's wife and thus plaintiff claims Rs. 20 lacs as damages from the

defendants. The plea taken by the applicant insurance company in the

application is that that defendant No. 1 being a qualified medical

practitioner had obtained an insurance cover policy for the relevant

period covering the risk as “Doctors Indemnity Insurance :IMA

Medical Protection Scheme” to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000, so it is

mentioned in the application that applicant's interests are likely to be

effected by any decision to be given in the suit and thus applicant should

be allowed to be joined as defendant for defending the suit…..

5. Counsel for the applicant has vehemently argued that any decision

given in the suit against the defendants is likely to effect the rights of the

applicant inasmuch as applicant shall be liable to reimburse the

Defendant No. 1 in case any damages are imposed on Defendant No. 1

on account of any finding given showing the negligence of the defendant

14

1989 SCC OnLine Del 8

17

in treating the plaintiff's wife. I am afraid that the applicant cannot be

joined as a party in the suit because the presence of the applicant is

neither necessary nor proper for effectively deciding the issues in the

suit….. It was held there is no jurisdiction toadd a party in any other

case merely because that would save a third person the expense and

botheration of a separate suit for seeking adjudication of a collateral

matter which was not directly and substantively in issue in the suit. It

was further observed that plaintiffis the dominus litis and he is master

of the suit and he cannot be compelled to fight against a person whom

he does not wish to fight and against whom he does not claim any relief.

It was held that only in exceptional cases where the Court finds that the

addition of a new defendant is absolutely necessary to enable it to

adjudicate effectively and completely the matter in controversy between

the parties, will it add a person as a defendant without the consent of

the plaintiff..

37. In the facts of the case at hand, the contractor here was engaged by,

and was working under the authority of DJB. DJB cannot escape the

consequences of negligence in the execution of work undertaken within its

own authority, merely by pointing to a contract of indemnity with its

contractor. The petitioners are not privy to that contract, and their right to

claim compensation from DJB cannot be made contingent upon its terms.

Needless to state, DJB is at liberty to recover any amounts paid by it from

the contractor in separate proceedings, if it is so entitled under any contract.

COMPENSATION.

38. This Court, in the case of Kamla Devi v. GNCTD and Ors.,

15

laid

down the principle for calculation of monetary compensation in cases of

Constitutional torts, wherein, it has held as follows:

“5. The compensation to be awarded by the Courts, based on

international norms and previous decisions of the Supreme Court,

comprises of two parts:— (a) „standard compensation‟ or the so called

„conventional amount‟ (or sum) for non-pecuniary losses such as loss of

15

2004 SCC OnLine Del 721

18

consortium, loss of parent, pain and suffering and loss of amenities; and

(b) Compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency.

6. The „standard compensation‟ or the „conventional amount has to be

revised from time to time to counter inflation and the consequent

erosion of the value of the rupee. Keeping this in mind, in case of death,

the standard compensation in 1996 is worked out at Rs. 97,700/-. This

needs to be updated for subsequent years on the basis of the Consumer

Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW)

brought out by the Labour Bureau, Government of India.

7. Compensation for pecuniary loss of dependency is to be computed on

the basis of loss of earnings for which the multiplier method is to be

employed. The table given in Schedule II of the MVAct, 1988 cannot be

relied upon, however, the appropriate multiplier can be taken

therefrom. The multiplicand is the yearly income of the deceased less

the amount he would have spent upon himself. This is calculated by

dividing the family into units - 2 for each adult member and 1 for each

minor. The yearly income is then to be divided by the total number of

units to get the value of each unit. The annual dependency loss is then

calculated by multiplying the value of each unit by the number of units

excluding the two units for the deceased adult member. This becomes

the multiplicand and is multiplied by the appropriate multiplier to

arrive at the figure for compensation of pecuniary loss of dependency.

8. The total amount paid under 6 and 7 above is to be awarded by the

Court along with simple interest thereon calculated on the basis of the

inflation rate based on the Consumer Prices as disclosed by the

Government of India for the period commencing from the date of death

of the deceased till the date of payment by the State”

39. The said formula has since been adopted in subsequent decisions,

including Shagufta Ali, Munna, Pravesh Kumar, and Lakhan Singh. In

terms of the said formula, compensation in the instant case is to comprise of

two parts, a standard compensation and compensation for pecuniary loss of

dependency.

A. Standard Compensation

40. In Kamla Devi, the Court awarded standard compensation as laid

down by the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar,

16

after

revising the same taking into consideration the inflation factor on the basis of

16

(2001) 8 SCC 197

19

the Consumer Price Index for Industrial Workers [CPI (IW)] released by the

Labour Bureau of the Government of India.

41. Similarly, in the present case as well, the standard compensation is

being calculated after revising the standard amount of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees

Fifty Thousand only) awarded in Lata Wadhwa as per the method adopted in

Kamla Devi.

42. Mr Dinesh Kumar passed away in the year 2019. At that time, the

prevalent All-India CPI (IW) was 317 and the base year was 2001. In Lata

Wadhwa, the deceased had passed away in the year 1989 and the CPI

(IW) for that year was 171. At that time, the base year for CPI (IW) was

1982. The linking factor for the two base years is 4.63. Therefore, the CPI

(IW) for the year 2019 taking the base year to be 1982 would be 1467.71

(317 multiplied by 4.63).

43. The formula for adjusting the inflation factor in the compensation

amount awarded for the year 1989 would be compensation as in 1989

multiplied by CPI (IW) for 2019 and divided by CPI (IW) for 1989.

Accordingly, the standard compensation in the instant case would be Rs.

4,29,154.97/- (Rupees Four Lakh Twenty Nine Thousand One Hundred and

Fifty-Four and Ninety-Seven Paise only). This amount can be rounded off to

Rs. 4,29,155/- (Rupees Four Lakh Twenty Nine Thousand One Hundred and

Fifty-Five only).

B. Pecuniary Compensation

44. As per the formula adopted in Kamla Devi, pecuniary compensation is

to be computed taking into account the last drawn salary of the deceased and

deducting the expenses that the deceased would have incurred upon himself,

20

had he been alive. After determining the annual loss of income for the

dependants, the same ought to be multiplied by a suitable multiplier value,

which, the Court in Kamla Devi, adopted from the Second Schedule in the

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [MV Act]. Although the said Schedule has been

omitted from the MV Act vide the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019,

in view of the fact that the omission came into force on 01.04.2022,

17

and in

the absence of a suitable guide for computation of the pecuniary

compensation, the multiplier value specified therein is borrowed.

45. Late Mr. Dinesh Kumar was thirty-seven years old at the time of his

demise, and was earning a salary of Rs. 16,770/- (Rupees Sixteen Thousand

Seven Hundred and Seventy only) per month. His family comprised of six

members, including himself, i.e., three adults and three minors.

46. In order to calculate the personal expenditure that the deceased would

have incurred had he been alive, the family is divided into units; each adult

is assigned two units, and each minor is assigned a unit each. In total, the

family would have nine units, and each unit would have a value of 1863.33

(16,770 divided by 9). The deceased would have incurred a monthly personal

expenditure equivalent to the value of his two units, i.e., 3726.66. Therefore,

his monthly income after deducting his personal expenditure would be Rs.

13,043.34/- (Rupees Thirteen Thousand Forty-Three and Thirty-Four Paise

only). The annual loss of income for the petitioners would, therefore, be Rs.

1,56,520.08/- (Rupees One Lakh Fifty Six Thousand Five Hundred and

Twenty and Eight Paise only).

17

Notification dated 25.02.2022 issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of

India.

21

47. Under the Second Schedule of the MV Act as it existed prior to the

amendment, the applicable multiplier in case, the deceased person was aged

thirty-seven years at the time of his demise, would be 16. Therefore,

multiplying the annual loss of income for the petitioners by 16, we get the

amount of pecuniary compensation, i.e., Rs. 25,04,321.28/- (Rupees Twenty

Five Lakh Four Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-One and Twenty-

Eight Paise only). The said figure can be rounded off to Rs. 25,04,321/-

(Rupees Twenty Five Lakh Four Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-One

only).

48. Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to standard compensation of Rs.

4,29,155/- (Rupees Four Lakh Twenty Nine Thousand One Hundred and

Fifty-Five only) and pecuniary compensation of Rs. 25,04,321/- (Rupees

Twenty Five Lakh Four Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty-One only).

49. In view thereof, the petitioners are entitled to a rounded off lump sum

amount of Rs. 30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakh only). However, considering

that they have received an amount of Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand

only) from DJB, the respondents are directed to pay a lump sum amount of

Rs. 29,50,000/- (Rupees Twenty-Nine Lakh Fifty Thousand only), along

with simple interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of the

accident till the date of realisation, as compensation to the petitioners for the

death of late Mr. Dinesh Kumar, within three months from the passing of this

judgment. Any failure to comply with the same shall result in the petitioners’

being entitled to simple interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, till the

payment is made.

22

PARTING OBSERVATIONS

50. Although policy making is a function of the Executive and it is not for

the Court to impinge on the same, the Court cannot remain oblivious blind to

the difficulties faced by people such as the petitioners. The loss of the sole

breadwinner of a family, particularly where the dependents do not possess

sufficient financial means or social support to sustain themselves, places

such families in an extremely vulnerable and precarious condition, where

even their day-to-day survival becomes uncertain. In such circumstances, the

dependants are often left to navigate prolonged financial distress, educational

disruption, emotional trauma, and social insecurity, all while simultaneously

pursuing legal remedies for compensation. They ought not to be compelled

to undertake prolonged and expensive litigation merely to secure basic

financial relief arising out of incidents attributable to the negligence of

public authorities.

51. The present petitioners have been awaiting financial compensation

since the year 2021 and have been enduring hardship ever since the incident

occurred in 2019. They have thus spent nearly five years in a state of

uncertainty and deprivation. Such delays substantially dilute the very

purpose of compensatory relief, which is intended to provide timely succour

and rehabilitative support to affected families.

52. A structured and effective policy framework for expeditious grant of

compensation in cases such as these, would go a long way in ensuring that

victims and their families receive immediate assistance without being

compelled to pursue litigation for appropriate relief. Such a mechanism

would not only alleviate hardship faced by affected families but would also

enhance accountability among public authorities entrusted with maintaining

23

public infrastructure and safety standards. The concerned authorities are,

therefore, urged to examine the feasibility of formulating an appropriate

policy in this regard, so as to ensure timely, humane, and efficient disbursal

of compensation in deserving cases.

53. With these observations, the petition, along with pending applications,

stands disposed of.

(PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV)

JUDGE

MAY 29, 2026

aks/amg