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PETITIONER:

SMT. PANIBEN

Vs.

RESPONDENT:

STATE OF GUJARAT

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/03/1992

BENCH:

MOHAN, S. (J)

BENCH:

MOHAN, S. (J)

RAY, G.N. (J)

CITATION:

1992 AIR 1817 1992 SCR (2) 197

1992 SCC (2) 474 JT 1992 (4) 397

1992 SCALE (1)655

ACT:

Indian Penal Code 1860:

Section 302-Bride burning-Conviction and sentence-Duty

of Court.

Section 32-Dying declaration-When can form sole basis

of conviction-Plurality of dying declaration-Have to be

accepted when trustworthy and reliable.

Penology

Sentencing-Bride burning-Language of deterence to

speak.

HEADNOTE:

The appellant in the appeal was convicted under Section

302 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to life

imprisonment by the High Court reversing the acquittal of

the Trial Court.

The Prosecution alleged that deceased was married to

the son of the accused in the year 1972, and that there were

frequent quarrels between the appellant-mother-in-law and

the deceased-daughter-in-law. On one occasion, on account

of a quarrel the daughter-in -law went away to her parents'

house and on the assurance of her father-in-law that nothing

would go wrong, the deceased was sent to the house of the

accused. The accused, the deceased and her husband were all

living in the same house. Even after the return, there used

to be quarrels between the accused and the deceased. The

accused developed a profound dislike for the deceased.

On the night of 7th May,1977,at about midnight, the

deceased was sleeping all alone in the `osri' of the House.

The accused went there,poured kerosene on her person,and as

the deceased got up, the accused lit the fire and left the

`osri'. The deceased shouted for help and hearing her

shouts, her husband and other collected there and the fire

was extinguished. She was removed to the hospital in the

cart. In the cart, she told some witnesses that her mother-

in-law had burnt her. later on. she was

198

taken to the Government hospital in a taxi in a burnt

condition. The police constable on duty informed the Taluka

police station and the Head Constable made an entry in the

police station diary, and another Head Constable went to the

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hospital and recorded the statement of the deceased in the

early hours. In that statement, she stated that her mother-

in-law had burnt her. The Head Constable wrote a `yadi' for

a dying declaration to the Executive Magistrate who reached

the hospital at about 7.00 A.M. on 18.5.1977, and recorded

the dying declaration Ex.29. In this declaration also, the

deceased stated that she was burnt by the accused. The

Police sub-Inspector who took up the investigations, went to

the scene of occurrence, made the panchnama of the scene of

occurrence and recorded the statement of witnesses. He

also recorded a statement of the deceased on 19.5.1977. In

that also, the deceased stated that she was burnt by her

mother-in-law. The sub-Inspector arrested the accused on

18.5.1977. The deceased succumbed to the injuries on

20.5.1977. On completing the necessary investigations, the

accused was charge-sheeted and committed before the Session

Judge.

The Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the

deceased might have committed suicide, that it was also

probable that someone else might have burnt her alive,

because she had a grievance against her mother-in-law she

implicated her in dying declaration. The dying

declarations, hence could not be accepted having regard to

this inherent infirmity. On these findings it was held that

the prosecution had failed to prove that the deceased was

burnt alive by the accused, and the accused was acquitted.

The State appealed to the High Court, and a Division

Bench considered the circumstances under which the dying

declarations were recorded. It found that the dying

declaration Ex.24 clearly showed as to how the occurrence

had taken place. The second dying declaration Ex.29 was

recorded in a question and answer form that there was no

scope for tutoring the deceased for giving any statement

which would involve the accused, and that at that time, the

deceased was all right and she was in a position to give the

dying declaration. The third dying declaration was made to

the deceased's father who was a truthful witness and clearly

establishes that there was no scope of parents tutoring the

deceased in any way. The findings of the Trial Court it was

held could not be accepted with reference to the various

aspects like enmity between the mother-in-law and the

deceased, the failure of the deceased to narrate the

incident to her

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husband, and was not prepared to believe that the deceased

attempted to commit suicide and only for revenge involved

the accused falsely. In the result, the order of acquittal

was set aside, the accused was held guilty of the offence of

murder and was convicted under Section 302 I.P.C and

sentenced to imprisonment for life. It was, however,

recommended that the Government consider the case favourably

on the aspect of remission of sentence under Section 432 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure.

In the appeal to this Court, it was contended on

behalf of the appellant that the High Court was not

justified in convicting the accused purely on the dying

declarations which bristle with many contradictions and

improve from stage to stage, and that having regard to the

fact that the relationship between the mother-in-law and the

daughter-in-law,was far from cordial the deceased had every

motive to implicate the mother-in-law. It was also

contended that the appellant was 58 years of age and that

having spent more than a decade in jail,the appeal calls for

interference on the ground of sentence.

Dismissing the appeal, and upholding the conviction and

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sentence, this Court

HELD 1. The situation in which a man is on death bed is

so solemn and serene when he is dying the grave position in

which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept the

veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the

requirements of oath and cross-examination and dispensed

with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it

will result in mis-carriage of justice because the victim

being generally the only eye witness in a serious crime, the

exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a

scrap of evidence. [205E]

2. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great

weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no

power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for

eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This

is the reason the Court also insists that the dying

declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full

confidence of the Court in the correctness. [205F]

3. The Court has to be on guard that the statement of

the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or a

product of imagination. The Court must be further satisfied

that the deceased was in a fit state of mind

200

after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the

assailants. [205G]

4.Once the Court is satisfied that the declaration was

true and voluntary. undoubtedly, it can base its conviction

without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down

as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot

form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated.

The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of

prudence. [205H]

5. If the plurality of dying declarations could be held

to be truthworthy and reliable, they have to be accepted.

[207E]

In the instant case there four dying declarations. The

fist dying declaration is Ex. 24 recorded by a Head

Constable who wrote down the statement as deposed by the

deceased. At that time, the deceased was conscious. The

second dying declaration is Ex. 29 and was recorded by the

Taluka Magistrate in question and answer form. There was no

possibility of the deceased being tutored, prompted as to

utter falsehood, so as to implicate the accused, It is also

clear when she made the statement, she was in a fit mental

condition. The third oral dying declaration was made by the

deceased to her father who has impressed the High Court as

a truthful witness. The fourth dying declaration Ex.34

recorded by the police sub-inspector has been rightly

rejected by the High Court. The High Court was fully

justified in accepting the dying declarations because they

answer every test which is required to be accepted for such

acceptance.

[207E, H;208 D, E,G]

In the instant case, the theory of suicide has been

rightly rejected by the Court. A tender lass after only five

years of married life with and affectionate husband and a

young daughter to foster could not have resorted to that

rash act merely because there were quarrels between her and

her mother-in-law. In every house it is proverbial that such

quarrels do take place. It is impossible to contend that

the deceased was so much frustrated in life so as to commit

suicide. [208H-209D]

6. It would be a traversity of justice if sympathy is

shown when such a cruel act is committed. it is rather

strange that the mother-in-law who herself is a woman should

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resort to killing another woman. It is hard to fathom as to

why even the "mother" in her did not make her feel. It is

tragic ,deep rancour should envelop her reason and drown

her finer feelings. The

201

language of deterrance must speak in that it may be a

conscious reminder to the society. Undue sympathy would be

harmful to the cause of justice. It may even undermine the

confidence in the efficacy of law. [209C-D]

7. Merely because the accused has spent more than a

decade in jail is no justification to show any leniency.

[209E]

Mannu Raja v. State of M.P., [1976] 2 SCRR 764; State

of M.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 SC 416; Ramavati Devi

v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164; Ram Chandra Reddy v.

Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976 S.C. 1994; Rasheed Beg v. State

of Madhya Pradesh, [1974] 4 S.C.C. 264; Kake Singh v. Sate

of M.P., AIR 1982 SC 1021; Ram Manorath v. State of

H.P.,1981 SCC (Crl.) 531; State of Maharashtra v.

Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617; Surajdeo Oza

v. State of Bihar,AIR 1979 SC 1505; Nanahau Ram and another

v. State,AIR 1988 SC 912; State of H.P. v. Madan Mohan, AIR

1989 S.C. 1519; Mohan lal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR

1982,S.C. 839, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal appeal No.

487 of 1980.

From The Judgment and Order dated 17/18-4-80 of the

Gujarat High Court in Crl. A. No. 885 of 1978.

Vimal Dave for the Petitioner.

R.N. Sachthey and Anip Sachthey for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MOHAN, J. Everytime a case relating to dowry death

comes up, it causes ripples in the pool of the conscience of

this Court. Nothing could be more barbarous, nothing could

be more heinous than this sort of crime. The root cause for

killing young bride or daughter-in -law is avarice and

greed. All tender feelings which alone make the humanity

noble disappear from the heart. Kindness which is the

hallmark of human culture is buried. Sympathy to the fairer

sex, the minimum sympathy is not even shown. The seedling

which is uprooted from its original soil and is to be

planted in another soil to grow and bear fruits is crushed.

With this prefatory note, we pass on to the matrix of facts.

The criminal appeal is directed against the conviction

of the appellant

202

under Section 302 of Indian Penal code and sentencing her to

life imprisonment reversing the acquittal by the Tribal

Court. The case of the Prosecution shortly is as under:

Bai Kanta was married to Valji Savji sometime in the

year 1972. Accused is the mother-in-law of Bai Kanta. There

were frequent quarrels between the mother-in-law and the

daughter-in-law. Once Bai Kanta on account of quarrel went

away to her parent's house. Accused went to the house of

Bai Kanta to bring her back. The father-in-law of Bai Kanta

gave an assurance that nothing would go wrong. On this

assurance, Bai Kanta was sent to the house of Accused. The

accused, Bai Kanta and her husband were all living in the

same house. Even after the return, there used to be

quarrels between the accused and Bai Kanta. The accused

developed profound dislike for Bai Kanta. On the night of

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7th May, 1977 at about 12 mid night, Bai Kanta was sleeping

all alone in the 'osri' of the house. The accused went

there, poured kerosene on her person. Bai Kanta got up as

she felt the kerosene was being poured and meanwhile the

accused lit fire and left the 'osri'. Bai Kanta shouted for

help. Hearing the shouts, the husband and other collected

there and the fire was extinguished. She was removed to the

hospital in the cart. In the cart, she had told witnesses

Ratnabhai, Savji Dahya, Shantaben, Valji Ben and others that

her mother-in-law had burnt her. Up to the Gadhka village,

she was taken in the cart. Later on, she was brought to

Rajkot Government hospital in a taxi in burnt condition.

The police constable on duty at the hospital informed Taluka

police station about Bai Kanta having been brought to the

hospital in burnt condition. So, Head Constable Kanji

Ukabhai who was in-charge of the police station made an

entry in the police station diary. He directed Head

Constable Abhal Mamaiya to go the hospital and enquire into

this matter. Accordingly Head Constable Abhal Mamaiya went

to the hospital and recorded the statement of Bai Kanta in

the early hours. It was stated by her that the mother-in-

law burnt her. Abhal Mamaiya wrote a yadi for dying

declaration to the Executive Magistrate which was received

by him at 6 a.m. Abhal Mamaiya, thereafter filed a complaint

on the strength of the statement of the deceased and the

investigation started. The Executive Magistrate reached the

hospital at about 7.10 a.m. on 18.5.1977. He recorded the

dying declaration Ex. 29. In that declaration also, Bai

Kanta stated she was burnt by the accused. Police Sub-

Inspector Tavde of Rajkot Taluka police station took up the

investigation; went to the seen of occurrence; made the

panchnama of the scene of occurrence; recorded the

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statement of witnesses. He arrested the accused in the

evening. He also recorded the statement of Bai Kanta on

19.5.1977. In that also, Bai Kanta stated, she was burnt by

her mother-in-law, the accused. The Sub-Inspector Tavde

arrested the accused at about 6.45 p.m. on 18.5.1977. Bai

Kanta succumbed to the injuries on 20.5.1977 at 0045 hours.

Thereafter, post-mortem was carried out.

On completing the necessary investigation, the accused

was chargesheeted and after committal, she was tried by the

learned Sessions Judge of Rajkot in Sessions Case No. 34 of

1977.

On consideration of the evidence, the learned Sessions

Judge came to the conclusion that the deceased might have

committed suicide. Besides, it was also probable that

someone else might have burnt her alive. Because she had a

grievance against her mother-in-law, in the dying

declaration she implicated her. Hence, the dying

declaration could not be accepted having regard to the

inherent infirmity. Accordingly, it was held that the

prosecution has failed to prove that the deceased was burnt

alive by the accused. Thus it ended in acquittal.

The State took up the matter in Criminal Appeal No. 885

of 1978 to the High Court of Gujarat. The Division Bench

considered the circumstances under which the dying

declaration were recorded. It found that the dying

declaration Ex.24 clearly shows as to how the occurrence had

taken place.

The second dying declaration Ex.29 which was recorded

in question and answer form. There was no scope of tutoring

the deceased for giving any statement which would involve

the accused. At that time the deceased was allright and she

was in a position to give the dying declaration.

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The third dying declaration made by the deceased's

father Jadav who was a truthful witness, clearly establishes

there was no scope of parents tutoring the deceased in any

way.

It was further held that the findings of the Trial

Court could not be accepted with reference to the various

aspects like enmity between the mother-in-law and the

deceased, the appreciation of the statement of deceased, the

failure of the deceased to narrate the incidence to her

husband.

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The High Court considered the legal position whether

the accused could be convicted on the basis of dying

declaration in the light of relevant case law. It

ultimately held that the deceased was young girl aged about

18 years who had a married life of only 5 years to her share

with all hopes of living a happy married life in future with

her husband who was affectionate towards her. She had also

a young daughter aged about 2 1/2 years. Except the

relationship with her mother-in-law, she was quite happy.

There was no possibility of her coming to a conclusion that

she must end her life. There was no indication that the

deceased was so harassed as to have lost her self-control so

as to commit suicide. Thus, the High Court was not prepared

to believe that the deceased attempted to commit suicide and

only for the revenge, she involved the accused falsely. In

the result, the order of acquittal was set-aside. The

accused was held guilty of the offence of murder. She was

convicted under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and

sentenced to imprisonment for life. However, it was

recommended to the Government to consider her case

favourably on the aspect of remission of her sentence under

Section 432 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Special leave petition was directed to be treated as

petition of appeal by an order dated 6.8.1980 passed by this

Court. Under these circumstances, the criminal appeal comes

before us.

The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently urged

that the High Court was not justified in convicting the

accused basing purely the dying declaration which bristles

with so many contradictions and improvements from stage to

stage. Having regard to the fact that relationship between

the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law far from cordial,

the deceased had every motive to implicate the mother-in-

law. Normally speaking deceased would not have failed to

narrate this incidence to her husband who was affectionate

to her. Besides, there were also several other infirmities

pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge who had acquitted

the accused. That acquittal should not have been interfered

with.

In any event, the accused at the time of the judgment

of the High Court itself was 58 years of age. She having

spent more than a decade in jail, the appeal calls for

interference on sentence.

The learned counsel appearing for the respondent State

submits: the High Court has considered fully each and every

aspect after administering to it the caution that an order

of acquittal cannot be interfered with lightly.

205

It analysed the three dying declarations. There again, it

had forefront the law that it could not be safe to hold an

accused guilty solely on the basis of dying declaration.

After doing so, it found that the implication of the mother-

in-law who was real offender was not on account of enimity.

It considered the other aspect as to why the husband was not

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informed and the so called infirmities pointed out by the

Sessions Court. In the light of the decision of this Court,

it was found that the dying declaration ought to be accepted

and rightly convicted the accused.

Having regard to the drastic nature of the crime, even

on sentence, no sympathy can be shown.

This is a case where the basis of conviction of the

accused is the three dying declarations. The principle on

which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is

indicated in legal maxim.

"nemo moriturus proesumitur mentiri-a man will not

meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth".

The situation in which a man is on death bed is so

solemn and serene when he is dying the grave position in

which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept the

veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the

requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed

with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it

will result in mis-carriage of justice because the victim

being generally the only eye witness in a serious crime, the

exclusion of the statement would leave the Court without a

scrap of evidence.

Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight,

it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of

cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting

the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the

reason the Court also insists that the dying declaration

should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of

the Court in its correctness. The Court has to be on guard

that the statement of deceased was not as a result of either

tutoring, prompting or a product of imagination. The Court

must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit

state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and

identify the assailants. Once the Court is satisfied that

the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can

base its conviction without any further corroboration. It

cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the

dying declaration

206

cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is

coroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a

rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several

judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which

could be summed up as under:

(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence

that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without

corroboration. Mannu Raja v. State of M.P., [1976]

2 SCR 764.

(ii) If the Court is satisfied that the dying

declaration is true and voluntary it can base

conviction on it, without corroboration. State of

M. P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav, AIR 1985 Sc 416; Ramavati

Devi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 164.

(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying

declaration carefully and must ensure that the

declaration is not the result of tutoring,

prompting or imagination. The deceased had

opportunity to observe and identify the assailants

and was in a fit state to make the declaration.

Ram Chandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor, AIR 1976

S.C. 1994.

(iv) Where dying declaration is suspicious it

should not be acted upon without corroborative

evidence. Rasheed Beg v. Sate of Madhya Pradesh,

[1974] 4 S.C.C. 264.

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(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could

never make any dying declaration the evidence with

regard to it is to be rejected. (Kake Singh v.

State of M. P.., AIR 1982 S.C. 1021)

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from

infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction.

(Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. 1981 SCC (Crl.)

531).

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not

contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not

to be rejected. (State of Maharashtra v.

Krishnamurthi Laxmipati Naidu, AIR 1981 SC 617).

(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief

statement, it is not be discarded. On the

contrary, the shortness of the statement itself

guarantees truth. Surajdeo Oza v. State of Bihar,

AIR 1979

207

SC 1505)

(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether

deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the

dying declaration look up to the medical opinion.

But where the eye witness has said that the

deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make

this dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot

prevail. (Nanahau Ram and another v. State, AIR Sc

912)

(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the

version as given in the dying declaration, the said

declaration cannot be acted upon. (State U.P. v.

Madan Mohan, AIr 1989 S.C. 1519)

In the light of the above principles, we will consider

the three dying declarations in the instant case and we will

ascertain the truth with reference to all dying declaration

made by the deceased Bai Kanta. This Court in Mohan Lal v.

State of Maharashtra, AIR 1982, S.C. 839 referred to held:

"Where there are more than the statement in the nature

of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be

preferred".

Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could

be held to be truth worthy and reliable, they have to be

accepted.

The first dying declaration is Ex 24. It was recorded

by Head Constable Abhal Mamaiya. At that time, the deceased

was conscious. He wrote down her statement as deposed by

her. That clearly shows that when the deceased was sleeping

in the Osri at night, her mother-in-law, her father-in-law

and others were sleeping in the pali, at about 12 mid-night,

the accused poured kerosene and ignited her. Because the

deceased shouted, people from round about gathered and fire

was extinguished. Therefore, her father-in-law, maternal

aunt-in-law and sister-in-law and 2 to 3 other persons took

her in a cart. It is admitted by Head Constable Abhal

Mamaiya in cross-examination that while recording the

statement, he did not call the Medical Officer.

The second dying declaration is Ex. 29. This is

recorded by Taluka Magistrate Bhachandra Prabhashanker

Trivedi. He reached the hospital at 6.35 a.m. He reached

the hospital at 6.35 a.m. He ascertained from the Doctor

whether Bai Kanta was conscious. The Doctor examined her

and found her to be conscious. Thereafter, only

208

the Medical Officer was allowed to remain the room and the

other persons were sent out. He recorded the dying

declaration in question and answer form. The Executive

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Magistrate wrote down the answers given by the deceased.

This was completed by 7.10 a.m. This declaration makes it

clear that the deceased was sleeping alone in the 'osri',

someone came near her, poured kerosene whereupon she woke

up. At that time, she found out the person who poured

kerosene on her, was her mother-in-law, the accused.

According to this statement, the accused poured kerosene

because there was dispute in the house for 8 to 10 days

prior to the date of the occurrence, during which time

frequent quarrels took, place and the mother-in-law rebuked

her since Bai Kanta did not do work.

It is important to note to the specific question as to

whether she was sleeping alone or someone else was also with

her, she replied that her husband had gone to the wadi and

she was sleeping alone.

It is equally important to note that the parents of the

deceased reached the hospital only round about 7.30 a.m.

Hence there is no possibility of she being tutored, prompted

as to utter falsehood, so as to implicate the accused. It

is also clear that at that time when she made the statement,

she was in a fit mental condition to make the statement.

The third oral dying declaration was made by the

deceased to her father Jadav. The deceased told him that

her mother-in-law had burnt her. Jadav impressed the High

Court as a truthful witness because he did not want to fall

in line with the narration of the police in which minor

details were attributed to him. We also on going through

the evidence of Jadav are fully impressed with the same.

As rightly held by the High Court the fourth dying

declaration Ex. 34 stated to have been recorded by the

police Sub-Inspector Tavde has to be discarded. Thus, we

are clearly of the opinion the High Court was fully

justified in accepting the dying declaration because they

answer every test which is required to be applied for such

acceptance.

We concur with the High Court in reversing the findings

of the Learned Sessions Judge as to why the deceased could

not try to run and catch the miscreant and allow her cloth

to burn. Equally, we agree with the High Court with regard

to the other infirmities including not informing the

husband. The theory of suicide has been rightly rejected by

the High

209

Court. As was pointed out a tender less after only five

years of married life with an affectionate husband and a

young daughter to foster could not have resorted to that

rash act merely because there were quarrels between her and

her mother-in-law. In every house it is proverbial that such

quarrels do take place. It is impossible to contend that

the deceased was so much frustrated in life so as to commit

suicide.

In the result, we have no hesitation in upholding the

conviction.

Turning to the sentence; sympathy is what is pleaded at

our hands. We are clearly of the opinion that it would be a

traversity of justice if sympathy is shown when such cruel

act is committed. It is rather strange that the mother-in-

law who herself is a woman should resort to killing another

woman. It is hard to fathom as to why even the "mother" in

her did not make her feel. It is tragic deep rancour should

envelope her reason and drawn her finer feelings. The

language deterrance must speak in that it may be conscious

reminder to the society. Undue sympathy would be harmful t

the cause of justice. It may even undermine the confidence

in the efficacy of law.

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Merely because the accused has spent more than a decade

in jail, we see no justification to show any leniency. Of

course, we are aware the High Court itself had recommended

for remission under Sec. 432 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, in view of the accused being 58 years of age at

that time. Whether of the counsel in favour or opposition

have informed us as to what had happened whether remission

was granted or not. However, we leave it at that.

In the result, we dismiss the appeal.

N.V.K. Appeal dismissed.

210